________________
THE AGE OF LOGIC
163
juxtaposition of the opposites concerned.58 As a matter of fact, a close observer could not fail to see that there was some sort of basic similarity between the Jaina's traditional preoccupation with the problem of 'standpoint and the Navyanaiyāyika's current preoccupation with the problem of 'auncchedakata'; both were meant to ensure that no ambiguities remain attached to what one says. Of course, in both cases one might feel that the thinkers concerned are being rather unduly cautious but that they are evincing an identical attitude is unmistakable. In any case, Yašovijaya was as through a student of Navya-nyāya as that of the traditional Jaina positions and this one fact is sufficient to make his treatment of Anekāntavāda unique performance. Moreover, this treatment based as it is on texts as old as Anuyogadvāra is important also from the stand point of historical evolution. Nor that there are no cases when one feels that even Yašovijaya has failed to get at the meaning of an old text-passage; but such cases are not very many and even here it is almost always difficult to suggest a more plausible alternative to what Yašovijaya says59. Again, it is not the case that Yašovijaya himself sees things in a correct historical perspective but that is a different question. Take for example, his treatment of that intriguing Āvašyakaniryukti statement according to which the doctrine of nayas was well applicable in olden days when scriptural texts were not classified subjectwise but it is not so applicable now at the most the first three nayas are applicable now) after Aryarakṣita has executed such a classification, Yašovijaya dilates upon this point in the course of emphasising the subtlety of the naya doctrine and his thesis is that in olden days the students of scriptural texts were intelligent enough to follow the standpoint of all the seven nayas but that they are now too dull to do that at the most they can now follow the standpoint of the first three nayas which are not as subtle as the remaining four).60 To historically minded student of Jaina philosophy Yašovijaya's thesis will make just no sense. But then i perhaps be too much to expect in an old Indian author — even in an author as recent as Yašovijaya – a due sense of historical perspective. Nevertheless, Yasovijaya will be our best guide in grasping the logic of a Jaina philosophical position. However, here again there is a snag. For Yašo. vijaya's discussions are most often replete with the technical terminology of Navya-nyāya, a terminology not easy to master. But fortunately, Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā (minus the portion dealing with Vaišeșika), Nayopadeša (plus some part of its auto-commentary called Nayāmộtatarangini) are all relatively free from Navyanyāya terminology; (it is the Anekantavyavastha part dealing with Vaiseșika and a large part of Nayāmstatarangini which are incomprehensible without an adequate grounding in Navyanyāya terminology). Anekāntavyavasthä contains not only a discussion of naya, nikse pa and saptabhangi but also a connected critique of the Vaisesika, Advaita -Vedanta, Sankhya and Buddhist standpoints respectively exemplify
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
