________________
162
JAINA ONTOLOGY
not come down to him through Syadvadaratnakara Yasovijaya was often critical of them. For instance, he frequently criticises Kundakunda's distinction between yavaharanaya and niscayanaya as applied to the account of soul.56 Thus Kundakunda argues that from the standpoint of niscayanaya only that soul is to be called jiva which possesses just the most essential property of soul, viz. congnitive capacity; this means that according to him only a released soul is to be called jiva from the standpoint of niscayanaya. On the other hand Yasovijaya argues that from the standpoint of niscayanaya only that soul is to be called jiva which is leading an embodied life; this means that according to him only an embodied soul is to be called jiva from the standpoint of niscayanaya. Both positions have logic in their support but the noteworthy thing is that Yasovijaya criticises Kundakunda because the latter was supported by no Svetambara author. Be that as it may, Yasovijaya's treatment of naya, nikṣepa and saptabhangi is a most welcome aid to the study of the old Svetambara authors' treatment of the same. However, Yasovijaya was not only a faithful reporter of the past, he was also a creative interpreter of this past in the light of the current situation. And the current situation being powerfully moulded by the thought-currents emanating from the Navya-Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta circles. This means that among the Jainas only an author as well equipped as Yasovijaya was in a position to cope with the tasks of the hour. Yasovijaya could at once see where the Jaina notions coincided rather tended to do so - with certain Navya-Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta notions and he would never be slow to point it out in a language that was always pointed and precise. For example, it was an old Jaina position that a thing exists from the standpoint of its own properties while it does not exist from the standpoint of the alien properties. This was an odd sounding position but it constituted the heart of the Anekantavada doctrine and so the generations of Jaina scholars defended it as best they could. But in Navya-Nyaya circles a position similar to the present one began to be maintained. Thus they would speak of a thing's absence "limited" by a property not belonging to it,' e.g. 'a jar's absence "limited" by cloth-ness (patatvavadhikaghaṭābhāva)'; and it was given out that such an absence of a thing exists even at a place where the thing itself exists. Yasovijaya aptly pointed out that this amounted to endorsing the Jaina position that a thing as viewed from the standpoint of the alien properties does not exist (i. e. is absent) even at a place where it is seen to exist, it being the case that at this place it exists only as viewed from the standpoint of its own properties.57 And there were other such cases, though not of such basic importance. For instance the Navyanaiyayikas would argue that variegated colour is a type sui generis and not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the constituent colours; Yasovijaya pointed out that in a similar fashion the unity of opposites spoken of by the Jaina is a type sui generis and not just a mechanical
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
