________________
THE AGE OF LOGIC
145
but change-in-permanence, an essentially sound utterance. Similarly, in hundred and one ways does he argue that causal efficiency is possible neither in a thing that changes without remaining permanent nor in a thing that remains permanent without changing but in a thing that remains permanent while changing, 28 an essentially sound argument.
Then a point of historical interest in connection with Akalanka's vindication of Anekāntavāda. Akalanka has thought fit to devote considerable attention to an elaboration of the traditional doctrines of naya and niksepa. Particularly noteworthy is his treatment of nayas in Pravacanapravesa, Pramānanayapraveśa and Siddhiviniscaya, his treatment of nikse pas in Pravacana pravesa and Siddhiviniscaya? 9. Of course, these treatments are nothing as compared to Akalanka's extensively elaborate treatment of pramānas, but even then they are of utmost value as indicative of the author's link with the past. On the questions of naya Akalanka says so many important things that are comparable to the corresponding utterances of Siddhasena and Jinabhadra - though on certain minor points he differs from the latter (as the latter differ among themselves). Thus Akalanka's usual account of vyavahāranaya is different from that of Jinabhadra and his usual account of naigamanaya is broader than that of the latter. Moreover, Akalanka is more serious than both Siddhasena and Jinabhadra about attributing the different nayas — rather different nayābhāsas (pseudonayas) - to the different non--Jaina philosophical schools. For example, when he puts Nyāya-Vaišeșika and Sankhya schools under naigamābhāsa, Brahmavāda under sangrahābhāsa, Vijñānavāda and Sūnyavada under vyavahārabhasa, Kşanikavāda under rjusūtrabhāsa he throws interesting sidelights on his understanding of the nayas in question as well as the philosophical schools in question.
(iii) Pramāņa On the question of pramānas Akalanka's greatest contribution was his coming out with the idea that following are the six pramānas according to Jainas : pratyakşa, smộti, pratyabhijña, tarka, anumāna, agama. Of these six pratyakşa, anumāna and āgama were alreay admitted to be independent pramāṇas by so many of the non-Jaina schools but Akalanka was the first to accord the status of an independent pramāņa to smrti, pratyabhijña and tarka. The Buddhists bad held that neither smộti nor pratyabhijña is a pramāna while the Nyaya-Vaiseșikas and Mimāmsakas had retorted that smrti is certainly no pramāņa but pratyabhijñā is a case of perception. As for tarka the very idea of it was almost unknown to others and the later Jainas stressed the point while finding fault with the rival doctrines of pramānas. According to Akalanka tarka is the specific instrument of arriving at vyāpti (i. e, the relation of invariable concomitance) and his followers taunted
J. O...19
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
