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JAINA ONTOLOGY
so his elaboration of the essentials of Anekantavada deserves serious study by those who harbour genuine misgivings against this typical Jaina philosophical doctrine. Certainly, the doctrine took its rise in the atmosphere surcharged by the Buddist vs. Brahmin controversies as to the nature of change and the ontological status of universals. For these provided two of the most conspicuous fields for the application of Anekantavada, fields of which there was little inkling in the old Agamic texts. Thus it was no regular theme of Agamic discussions as to what it means when we say that a thing undergoes change or when we say that two things share a feature in common. But in course of time the Buddhists tended to argue that a thing becomes altogether different every next moment and they were criticised by the Brahmanical philosophers like Nyaya-Vaiseṣikas and Mimām. sakas; similarly these Brahmanical philosophers tended to argue that an universal is an independent entity standing over and above the particulars subsumed under it and they were criticised by the Buddhists. This precisely was the period when the Jainas began to talk of dravyārthikanaya and paryayarthikanaya the former diametrically opposed to Buddhist momentarism, the latter identical with it; similarly this was the period when the doctrine of seven nayas was so explained that the first three nayas came to mean an advocacy of the mechanical juxtaposition of universals and particulars, an advocacy of the reality of universals at the cost of particulars, an advocacy of the reality of particulars at the cost of universals. Soon afterwards the Buddhist and the various Brahmanical schools were made an independent subject of study and it was shown how this or that from among them represented the standpoint of this or that naya. In the begining the result of the endeavour was rather crude but with the passage of time much refinement was introduced therein, And the process of refinement reaches its pinnacle in Vidyananda who has given us not only a critique of the one-sided views pertaining to the problems like that of change and permanence, that of universals and particulars but also an exposition of the traditional doctrines of naya and nikṣepa, doctrines which played a significant role in the evolution of Anekantavada. Vidyananda's account of nayas and nikṣe pas occurs in his commentary on the relevant aphorisms of Umāsvāti but his critique of the one-sided views in question occurs in both Aştasahasri and Tattvarthaslokavārtika, for in the latter text too Vidyananda has so argued his case that occasions for such a critique are created rather frequently. For instance while dealing with the item sthiti in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to the Anuyogadvāras, nirdeśa, svāmitva etc. Vidyananda undertakes a criticism of Kṣaṇabhangavāda, in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to nikṣepas he repudiates the Buddhist thesis on universals,45 while in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to pramana and naya he takes exception to Buddhist contention that a composite is nothing over
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