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THE AGE OF LOGIC
(x) 'ignorance leading to worldly bondage' and 'ignorance leading to mokşa'
Of these (viii)-(x) pertain to the field of ethics, (vi) to that of epistemology, the rest to that of ontology. Confining ourselves to Samantabhadra's treatment of the ontological pairs let us note that he always first considers two onesided views and then offers a synthesis of the two this synthesis constituting the Jaina view of the matter. Of the two one-sided views one bases itself on one member of the given pair of contradictory features, the other on the other. Thus the following six pairs of mutually contradictory views are here constituted in all
I (i) Only positive entities exist and no negative ones
(ii) Only negative entities exist and no positive ones II (i) All things are absolutely one with each other
(ii) All things are absolutely separate from each other III (i) Everything is absolutely permanent
(ii) Everything is absolutely transient
IV (i) A cause is absolutely different from its effect, a substance
V
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from its properties, and so on and so forth
(ii) A cause is absolutely identical with its effect, a substance with its properties and so on and so forth
(i) The properties of a substance are absolutely dependent on their substance
(ii) The properties of a substance are absolutely independent of their substance
VI (i) Whatever exists exists in the form of a mental happening
(ii) Whatever exists exists in the form of an outward happening Against each of these one-sided views Samantabhadra urges more or less penetrating difficulties but he never names the advocate of a view under consideration. However, in some cases the identity of the rival is unmistakable. For example, the advocate of II (ii), III (ii), IV (ii), V (i) must be a Sautrāntika Buddhist, that of VI (i) a Vijñānavādi Buddhist, that of IV (i), V (ii) a Nyaya-Vaiseșika. The advocate of I (ii) is a nihilist, that of II (i) a monist. The advocate of VI (ii) might be a Mimamsaka according to whom all cognition is valid. The view I (i) might be attributed to all those schools which deny the reality of non-existence' and the view III (i) to a school insofar as it posits an absolutely unchanging entity e. g. to Sankhya insofar as it posits purusas. The variety of Sainantabhadra's field of investigation is really remarkable and it gives him ample opportunity to test his own anekantavad conviction against so many more or less influential philosophical doctrines of his times. And even if Samantabhadra's treatment of problems lacked due thoroughness it had the unique advantage of being J. O...18
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