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THE AGE OF LOGIC
that the advocate of this nihnava was defeated when the following 36 items were examined under the four heads jiva, ajiva, no-jiva, no-ajiva :
(1) 9 dravyas (2) 17 gunas (3) 5 karmas
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(4) satta, samanya, samanya-viseşa (3 items) (5) višeşa (6) samavāya
These are certainly Vaiseṣika categories but it is difficult to make out what the nihnava in question has to do with the Vaiseṣika school. It seems that historical references made in connection with the seven (or eight) nihnavas are not literally true. In this connection it will be instructive to recall an obscure historical reference made in connection with the doctrine of
seven nayas. For following Avasyaka-niryukti Jinabhadra says that the doctrine of seven nayas was well applicable in former times when each scriptural passage was to be explained as a passage dealing with ethical, didactic, cosmographic and philosophical matters but that is ceased to be the case (at the most the first three nayas are now applicable) when different scriptural texts began to be explained as texts dealing with ethical, didactic, cosmographic and philosophical matters, a statement which, as it stands, makes little sense. It seems that a pre-occupation with the problem of partial truth led to the formulation of the doctrine of seven nayas as well as the doctrine of seven (or eight) nihnavas while the historical references made in connection with both are somehow of the nature of an after-thought.
Jain Education International
In Gaṇadharavada Jinabhadra has found it possible to discuss certain philosophical questions of most fundamental importance -in each case pre senting the standpoint of a rival and counterposing against it the corresponding Jaina standpoint. Some of these rivals are clearly recognizable as advocates of certain well-known schools of Indian philosophy. For example in the first discussion (as already hinted, there are eleven in all) which seeks to prove the existence of soul and in the third which seeks to disprove that consciousness is a property of physical elements the rival concerned is the materialist. However, in the former discussion there also occurs an incidental refutation of the doctrine of one soul - which must have been the doctrine advocated by certain Upanisadic circles. Again, in the fourth discussion the rival is represented as denying the reality of physical elements and this means that he ought to be a Vijñānavādi Buddhist, But Jinabhadra's charge against him is that if he is ready to deny the reality of so palpable a thing as physical elements then he should also deny the reality of consciousness which is after all something subtle; this way the rival is reduced to the position of a Ŝunyavādi Buddhist and tackled as such. In the second discussion, the rival is opposed to the doctrine of karma in general and its Jaina version in particular; in the first capacity he must be a materialist, in the second capacity he could be a believer in the doctrine of karma
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