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JAINA ONTOLOGY
ignored.) But how to evaluate them is a task. As can be easily seen Jinabhadra has brought within the purview of his discussion the following four problems :
(1) The problem of the general and the particular
(2) The problem of the continuous substance and its ever-emerging properties
(3) The problems of word-meaning
(4) The problem of practical truth and ultimate truth
Of these the first two are philosophically most important, for they were destined to provide the firm foundation on which the doctrine of Anekantavada was to be built. As for the problems of word-meaning it never assumed a very important significance in the context of Jaina philosophicai speculations while the prablem of practical truth and ultimate truth proved to be important in one particular sense. For the Jaina theoreticians were bound to maintain that the various non-Jaina philosophies are so many partial expressions of truth while Jaina philosophy is a complete expression of the same, and in this connection the conceptual couple vyavahara-niscaya in one of its versions was abviously of use. Be that as it may, Jinabhadra's treatment of the problems of sāmānya-viseṣa and dravya-paryaya is most crucial to his treatment of the problem of naya.
As for the doctrine of nikşepas Jinabhadra was thoroughly conversant with the niceties of the rather cumbresome piece of speculation. This is evident from his discussion of mangala occurring at the very beginning of his text; (what is here said about nāma, sthāpanā, dravya and bhāva is later tacitly assumed whenever the occasion arises). But towards the end of this discussion Jinabhadra suggests alternative definitions of nama, sthapana, dravya, bhava, definitions which are philosophically most enlightening. Here are his words. "Or nama is the name of a thing, sthapana its configuration, dravya its cause, while bhava is its self in the form of an effect" (60). Not only that, he then goes on to describe, at some length, four one-sided views which respectively, emphasise the importance of nāma, sthāpanā, dravya and bhava as thus understood. And this is how he begins his critical comments against these views: "The nayas thus quarrel with each other on the basis of a false dogmatism while the Jaina doctrine which comprehends all the nayas is absolutely free from fault." (72). Thus Jinabhadra makes the doctrine of niksepas serve the same purpose as the doctrine of nayas, that is, the purpose of categorising and assessing one-sided philosophical views. He actually says: "Whatever thing is there in the world is possessed of four features (viz. nāma, sthāpanā, dravya, bhāva)" (73); again, "these four features are to be attributed to everything just like the three features origination, etc. (i.e. origination, destruction, permanence)" (74).
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