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THE AGE OF LOGIC
are the ways of speaking, while there are as many rival (non--Jaina) tenets as there are views of the form of nayas'. (3.47). Just before he has remarked : 'A well presented view of the form of naya only lends support to the Agamic doctrines while the same, if ill presented, destroys both (i.e. itself as well as its rival)' (3.46). And this is how he concludes : 'Kapila's philosophy is a statement of the dravyāstika viewpoint while Buddha's that of the pary. āyāstika. As for Kaņāda, his doctrine, even if supported by both viewpoints is false inasmuch as each here gives primacy to itself and is independent of the other'. (3.48-49). These utterances give a nice clue to the atmosphere in which the doctrine of nayas was first formulated and then underwent development. For it seems that the Jaina theoreticians of the period had somehow come to the conclusion that the so many non-Jaina philosophical views are just so many one sided expressions of truth and that their task simply was to point out how this or that philosophical view was actually a one-sided expression of truth. On the face of it, the task was rather unwieldy. For the philosophical views of a school deal with so many aspects of truth and so the first thing to do is to enumerate the aspects under which philosophical views are to be evaluated. For example, there is an aspect of temporality and evaluated under it one one sided view is that things ever remain the same and another that they become different. In the language of Siddhasena the former is dravyāstikanaya while an instance of it is Sānkhya philosophy, the latter is paryāyāstikanaya while an instance of it is Buddhist philosophy. Now leaving aside the consideration that the designation dravyästikanaya might well apply to the Sankhya doctrine of puruşa but not to the allied doctrine of praksti the fact remains that temporality is not the only aspect under which philosophical views are to be evaluated. Now the traditional doctrine of nayas speak not of two nayas, viz dravyāstika and paryāyāstika but of seven nayas, viz, noigama, sangraha, vyavahāra, rjusūtra, sāmprata, samabhirūdha, evaibhūta; and in this connection, Siddhasena. simply ignores naigama while submitting that sangraha is suddhadrayāstikanaya, vyavahāra asuddhadravyāstikanaya, rjusutra the basic paryāyāstika, sām prata etc. the derivative paryāyāstikanayas (1.4-5). This tends to suggest that the traditional doctrine of nayas took into consideration just the aspect of temporality. However, let us notice another trend of Siddhasena's thought. For he distinguishes between vyanjanaparyaya and arthaparyāya, the former meaning something like general and hence 'nameable characteristic', the latter particular hence unnameable characteristic.' Thus according to him a thing in so for as it is called by a name is similar to all the things called by the same name while in so for as it is a unique thing it is unna meable (3.5.). This implies that views can also be evaluated under the aspect of kinship - where one one-sided view will be that a thing is absolutely similar to another thing, another that it is absolutely dissimilar to the latter. Therefore, Siddhasena might also speak of a twofold division of nayas into vyañjana paryāya and
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