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THE AGE OF LOGIC
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19. Sanmatitikā (i) The text-portions following Sanmati
(i ii) Anekāntavāda and pramāna in the manner stated above
in connection with Sanmati) (ii) The text-portions independent of Sanmati : (iv) An independent evaluation of
the non-Jaina philosophical
views
20. Syadvadaratnākara (i) The naya part
: (i) Anekāntavāda (ii) The pramāna part : (ii) pramāna 21-25. Nayarahasya, Anekantavyavastha, Nayopadesa, Tarkabhāṣā,
Jñānabindu (i) Nayarahasya, Anekānta
vyavastha, Nayopadesa : (i) Anekantavada (ii) Tarkabhāṣā, Jňānabindu : (ii) pramāņa
This, however, is the barest skeleton of the relevant information but before the necessary details are filled up let us say a few words about certain general considerations that are to be kept in view in the case of the four items in question; we take them up one by one.
(i) The doctrine of Anekantavāda was doubtless the most characteristic and most conspicuous of the Jaina philosophical views upheld during the age of Logic. In some form or other it was maintained and defended by all the authors we are going to discuss; (even Mallavadi whose text was outwardly of the form of a general evaluation of the non-Jaina philo. sophical views said a lot by way of vindicating Anekāntavāda). It is therefore necessary to take note of the precise inanner in which this or that author has made his contribution towards the development of Anekāntavāda. Some of the authors have done so through an independent exposition of the doctrines of naya, nikṣepa and saptabhang7, some through a commentary on some early author's exposition on the same; then there are occasions when an author has indicated Anekāntavāda without basing himself on the doctrines in question. In every case the attempt has been to point out that to be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time is the very nature of a real thing.
(ii) As for the doctrine of pramāņas it might first of all be noted that much that has been said in this connection has no ontological significance and will be neglected by us. It is mainly while discussing the nature of pramāņavişaya that a genuine ontological problem has been considered but here too a good part of the discussion is devoted to showing hoy a real thing is characterised by two contradictory features like permanence and
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