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THE AGE OF LOGIC
95
Kundakunda is the first Digambara author who is considerably affected by the initial strivings of the age of Logic. His philosophical masterpieces are three - Pancāstikāya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra -- to be studied in this very order. In Pañcâstikāya he discusses the doctrine of Pancāstikāya, the doctrine of Navatattva, the doctrine of Moksa but the whole discussion starts with a treatment of the problem of drauya, guna, paryāya, and that of ut pāda, vyaya, dhrauvya, a procedure that is symptomatic. However, on the whole the level of discussion in Pañcāstikaya is comparatively elemen tary. A comparatively advanced level of discussion appears in Pravacanasāra which is divided into three sections, viz. Jñānādhikāra, Jñeyādhikara, Caritrādhikara; of these the first two raise philosophical questions of consi. rable importance. Thus in Jñāpādhikāra there occurs an ontological analysis of the cognitive, emotive and affective states of a soul — the emphasis being on the point that what happens to a soul as a results of its association with an alien element, viz. matter is not something really its own. And like Pancā. stikāya, Jñeyādhikāra begins with an important discussion on the problem of dravya, guna, paryāya and that of ut päda, vyaya, dhrauvya; the remaining section is made up of a small part treating pañcāstikaya and a large part treating soul. Here again it is emphasised that what matter does to a soul is not something essential to this soul. Now observations about the essential dissimilarities obtaining between soul and matter which occupy so much part of Pravacanasāra ( and which in a rudimentary form appear in the Moksa part of Pañcāstikāya as well ) are the solid basis on which is erected the superstructure of Samayasāra --- in a way, a unique document in the whole philosophical literature of the Jainas. Employing the terminology of vyavahāranaya and niscayayanaya Kundakunda here argues that an account of a soul in terms of what happens to it as a result of its association with matter is its account from ths standpoint of vyavahāranaya (practical standpoint) while an account of it in terms of what happens to it all by itself is its account from the standpoint of niscayanaya ( definitive standpoint ). True, distinction between vyavahāranaya and niscayanaya is as old as Bhagavati but Kundakunda's so massive a recourse to it was startling. Moreover, there was an important difference of nuance. For according to Bhagavati niscayanaya tells us all that is the case whereas vyavahāranaya tells us only that part of it which is important from the standpoint of everyday life; as against this, Kundakunda was suggesting that vyavahā. ranaya tells us all that is the case whereas niscayanaya tells us only that part of it which is important from the standpoint of higher spiritual life. For certainly, as a Jaina Kundakunda could not maintain that nothing happens to a soul as a resul of its association with matter; he could only emphasize that what thus happens is something that is not bound to happen for ever (and hence something that is not important from the standpoint of higher
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