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JAINA ONTOLOGY
doctrine
spiritual life ). Be that as it may, an iteresting fact of the Naya was brought to light by Kundakunda in his Samayasāra.
The last important author of what we have called the first stage of the age of Logic was the Digambara Samantabhadra whose Āptam māṁsā is a philosophical text of first-rate importance. For it was in Aptamimāṁsā that for the first time a basic use was made of the Saplahhangi doctrine in connection with formulating philosophical problems. The doctrine was somehow in the air ever since the day of Bhagavati and in Sanmati it was actually laid down in full. Even Umāsvati seems to have been acquainted with what Siddhasena says but the surmise is not beyond doubt. For in the course of his Bhāsya on the aphorism concerning arpita-anar pita Umāsvāti speaks of a fourfold division of judgment into dravyāstika, mālīkāpadāstika, utpannāstika and paryāyāstika; the meaning of the division is not much clear but while explaining the fourth item Umāsvāti says that a thing is there from the standpoint of its own properties, it is not there from the standpoint of alien properties, while it is indescribable from the standpoint of both these sets of properties, and he concludes by saying that alternatives are to be formulated on the basis of a consideration of parts. The meaning seems to be that two of the three features in question, viz. is, is-not, indescribable can appear in two different parts of a thing (and this can happen in three ways) while all three can appear in three of its parts and this can happen in just one way ). Thus together with the original three we will get seven alternatives in all, that is, the same as Siddhasena speaks of. But the possibility is not ruled out that Umāsvāti is referring not to these seven alternatives but to those 23 that had made their appearance in Bhagavati. Kundakunda too, in both Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra, summarily refers to the seven alternatives of the Saptabhangi doctrine though in both he actually quotes only the first four of them and in the former alone does he say in so many words that the alternatives are seven in all. Moreover, it is not certain whether Kundakunda conceives saptabhangi after the manner of Siddhasena or he does so after the manner of Samantabhadra. For with Samantabhadra the first two alternatives are the same as those with Siddhasena but the rest emerge differently. Thus according to the former a thing both is and is not when the standpoint of its own properties and that of the alien ones are applied successively while it is indescribable when they are applied simultaneously; as for the last three alternatives they on this view emerge when the standpoint of the fourth alternative is applied along with that of first, second and third respectively, This difference obtaining beween the two versions of Saptabhangi is noteworthy but let it be clearly recognised that it does not touch the essence of the matter. For the essence of the Saptabhangi doctrine lies in maintaining that a thing is characterised by two mutually contradictory properties at
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