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JAINA ONTOLOGY
creation; and this aspect of the question is of considerable importance. For as time passed Akalanka became more and more keenly aware that the Jainas were yet without a real doctrine of pramānas. He, of course, knew that the tradition spoke of a fivefold division of jñānas; nay, in Rajavartika he had himself offered a lucid exposition of this traditional understanding of the subject. But he felt that the traditional list of 5 jñānas was no match for the lists of pramānas that were being offered by the different non-Jaina schools of Indian philosophy, e.g. by the Buddhist Nyāya, Vaiseșika and Mīmāmsā schools. So he devised a new such list for his camp and its items were as follows: pratyakşa, smrti, pratyabhijña, tarka, auumāna, agama. The chief merit of this list was that it included two items, viz. pratyakșa and anumāna which were there in almost every other nonJaina list and which were not clearly provided for in the traditional list of five jñānas. Of course, Akalanka also sought to demonstrate that the six items of his list were reducible to the five items of the traditional list. In this connection the task in essence was to show how indriya pratyakşa, smrti, pratyabhijña, tarka and anumāna were cases of matijñāna; (āgama could well be treated as a synonym for śrula while avadhi, manah paryāya and kevala treated as cases of atindriya pratyakşa). This required a thorough evaluation of the traditional concept of mati but Akalanka did nothing of the sort and mainly relied on Umāsvāti's declaration to the effect that mati, smrit, sañña, cinta and abhinibodha are anarthāntara, a declaration which itself stood in need of a critical examination. On the other hand, Akalanka thoroughly examined - and did so again and again the meaning be had decided to bestow on the six members of his list of pramānas. The result was that the Jainas came to have a well considered list of pramāņas which was a good enough match for the various non-Jaina lists then current. Besides, Akalanka almost always sought to append to his treatment of pramānas a treatment of nayas and nikṣepas but there was not much original in this latter treatment. Even then this part of Akalarka's writings has to be studied seriously and compared with the corresponding part of Jinabhadra's Višeşāvasyakabhāsya; for in both cases there was a serious attempt to give logical shape to two traditional doctrines which were not so logical to begin with. In any case, it was almost always with a view to dealing with pramāna, naya and niksepa that Akalanka undertook to compose independent texts; (Siddhiviniscaya has a somewhat broader canvas). But the discussion in these texts is not epistemological in the narrow sense of the term. For one thing, a treatment of pramāna almost involves a treatment of pramāņa-vişaya and the latter is a purely ontological enquiry; but even otherwise there are numerous occasions when a treatment of pramāna, naya or nikse pa involves a treatment of ontological problems; (as just hinted Siddhiviniscaya treats a few ontological problems quite independently as well).
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