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THE AGE OF LOGIC
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with pramāṇa, naya, nikṣepa. Thus Prabhācandra based himself on two texts, one that was less systematic but written by Akalanka himself, the other that was more systematic but written by one who followed Akalanka. And in this connection he could manage to take within the purview of bis discussion a large number of philosophical problems epistemological as well as ontological; (many of the problems occur in both the texts). But cert. ainly the range of Prabhācandra's enquiry was less comprehensive than that
idyānanda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter. As a matter of fact, a study of Prabhācandra is a good preparation for that of Vidyānanda, that it is a good preparation argues Prabhācandra's worth, that it is only a preparation argues his limitation.
Prabbäcandra was the last great Digambara author to have written on philosophical questions, and the second important author of the third stage of the age of Logic was the Svetambara Abhayadeva who wrote a volu. minous commentary on Sanmati. [Even if Abhayadeva came before Prabhacandra there is an advantage in considering him after the latter). But Abhayadeva was interested not so much in making clear the positions maintained in Sanmati as in independently treating such philosophical problems as to him appeared important. The result is that hardly a fifth part of Sanmatitika explains the wording of the original text while the rest is a miscellaneous collection of independent philosophical discussions connected in more or less far-fetched manner with some word or other of the origi
ext. Take for example the very first verse of the text. In the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva discusses -- and at great length - the following problems : 1. Prāmānya-svatastva-paratastva ( the problem whether knowledge is
self-valid or otherwise) 2. Vedāpaurşeyatyavāda (the problem of Veda being an impersonal
composition) 3. Sarvajñavāda (the problem of omniscience) 4. Isvaravāda (the problem of God) 5. Almaparimāņa (the problem of the size of soul) 6. Mokşasvarūpa (the problem of the nature of mokşa)
And yet the fact is that the wording of the verse provides ao natural occasion for all this discussion; in any case, the verse is too unimportant to warrant such an inordinately long comment. Similarly, the second verse provides no natural occasion for the extremely lengthy discussion on the problem of word-meaning relation indulged in by Abhayadeva in the course of commenting on it. Then a verse in Sanmati says that rjusūtra is the basic paryāyāstikanaya while the remaining paryāyāstıkanayas are its branches and sub-branches; in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva elabor. ately presents and criticises the philosophical standpoints upheld by the
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