Jaina Ontology

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 87

JAINA ONTOLOGY
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considered as a case of avagraha etc, had through manas). 6 In this account avagraha really means arthavagraha, for in the case of four sense-organs, viz, touch, gustatory, olfactory and auditory arthavagraha is preceded by vyanjanavagraha; Nandi describes how yañjanavagraha takes place in the case of auditory sense-organ 97. All this gives a clear idea of the direction in which the mind of the Jaina theoreticians was moving when they were speaking of mati and its classification into avagraha, tha, avaya, dharaṇā; (obviously, here was being described a process which was described by others under the title pratyakşa- though naturally the Jaina description of the process had its own special features). At the same time Nandi speaks of four additional types of mati, viz. aut fattiki, vainayikt, kārmika, pāriņāmiki.98 The later Jainas make no particular use of this classification though in Bhagavati it not only appears but appears in the company of aragraha, ha, avaya and dharaṇa themselves. The Nandi definitions of autpattiki etc. not so much illuminating but in each case the text refers to certain stories supposed to be exemplifying the type of-mati in question; the commentaries actually recount these stories and from them it becomes clear that what is being described in this connection are the types of cognitive dealings had by people in the course of their every day life. The Nandi account of sruta is also useful in its own way. Śruta is here classified into 14 types the form of 7 pairs-with-mutually-opposite-items. The first two pairs, viz. akṣara-anakṣara, samjni-asamjn are to be explained as cases of ordinary cognition-involving-the-use-of-words, the last five pairs as cases of cognitionof-scriptures. The first two pairs deserve serious study because they give us an idea of the precise Jaina concept of śruta; (certainly, to do something like treating śruta as a case of cognition based on scriptures was an ordihave to nary practice not confined to the Jainas alone). Thus the Jainas conceive śruta in such a manner that its possession becomes possible not only in the case of men and big animals but also in that of small insects, nay, even in the case of static-bodied beings. It is instructive to note that when Nandi wants to say that even in the case of the lowest type of living beings some amount of cognitive awareness is always present (otherwise they would be no living bodies but dead bodies) it uses the word 'verbal cognitive awareness' (akṣara) rather than 'cognitive awareness' pure and simple;100 (of course verbal cognitive awareness i. e. śruta is necessarily accompanied by sensory cognitive awareness i. e. mati, but the Nandi usage is revealing). In any case śruta stands for that type of cognition which involves a reception-explicit or otherwise of some word standing for the object being cognised, and the Jaina theoreticians feel that an implicit reception of words is possible even on the part of the lowest type of living beings. Really speaking, concept 'implicit reception of words' is fraught with difficulties. Or rather the question is as to what exactly is meant when śruta is declared to involve a reception of some word standing for the object-under-cognition',
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