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THE AGE OF LOGIC
all-out emphasis on its momentary properties he suggested that the former two nayas belong to the category drayyāstika, the last to the category paryāyāstika. [Siddhasena spoke not a word about the remaining three nayasexcept that they too belong to the category paryāyāstika whose root-naya is rjusūtra). But it is doubtful if the traditional seven nayas were meant to be thus subdivided into the categories dravyāstika and paryāyāstika, Be that as it may, the essence of the naya-doctrine was seen by Siddhasena to lie in the following two positions :
(i) a physical substance is absolutely permanent qua a physical substance, it is more or less permanent qua a lump of clay or a jar, it is absolutely transient qua a seat of its momentary properties;
(ii) two physical substances are absolutely alike in so far as both are physical substances, they are partly alike in so far as one is a lump of clay the other a jar, they are not at all alike in so far as each is a seat of its momentary properties,
Through the first of these positions the Jainas became participant in the Buddhist vs. Brahmanic controversy on the question of kşanikatyanilyalva, through the second in that on the question of sämānya-viseşa. Siddhasena's dicussion of the questions was a good model for the later authors and so he was treated as an authority in the Svetāmbara as well as Digambara camps; (however, these authors seldom followed Siddhasena's practice of completely ignoring naigamanaya and of making no more than a passing mention of the three sabdanayas).
Let us also briefly consider certain minor contributions made by. Siddhasena. Thus he takes note of the doctrine of four nikṣepas — saying that nama-, sthāpanā- and dravya-nikṣepas belong to the category dravyāstika, bhāvanikşe pa to the category of paryāyāstika; but he does nothing by way of elaborating his contention. Similarly, he lays down the seven alternative ways of describing a thing that are the subject-matter of the Saptabhangi doctrine - to be precise, of this doctrine in one of its two versions -- but his amplification of the same is contained in just one verse which, unfor. tunately, is utterly obscure in its meaning. Again, he seeks to argue against the position that guna and paryāya are two different concepts. In Umässvāti's time it was gradually becoming a fashion with the Jaina authors to distinguish between guna and paryāya but no such distinction was made in the old Agamic texts. Appealing to the authority of these texts Siddhasena makes out some sort of case in support of his view but the distinction had come to stay even if the subsequent authors were not always unanimous as to their understanding of the same. Lastly, Siddhasena argued that jñana and darśana are not two different concepts; on his view certain cases of iñana as traditionally understood are to be called jñāna as well as darśana
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