Jaina Ontology

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
is no matter there it being supposed that matter (also soul) can move only when placed in the midst of matters 1. So originally it seemed a satisfactory argument that things from loka do not intrude into aloka simply because the latter is an empty region ; but later on it was thought fit to argue that things from loka do not intrude into aloka because the latter lacks dharma and adharma. As for ākāśa it was a natural enough concept--as is evident from its so wide a prevalence in diverse philosophical circles. On the other band, the Jaina concepts of matter and soul have many peculiarities of their own--as is to be expected in view of the fact that so much atteniton was devoted to their formulation. All this tends to suggest that the doctrine of pancāstikaya took some time to get established and the situation as it evolved historically is reflected in the pages of Bhagavati. In Prajñāpanā, on the other hand, a deliberate attempt was made to offer an account of the multifarious activities of soul in the name of offering an account of the whole of reality and this, as has already been noted, was a rather misconceived plan. However, there is partial justification even for the Prajñāpanā procedure. For a most conspicuous feature of the Jaina concept of soul is that according to it not only are insects, animals, men (along with the denizens of hells and heavens) ensouled bodies but so also are earth, water, fire, air and plants of all sorts. As a result it happens that so many questions which others discuss in connection with their treatment of matter the Jainas do in connection with their treatment of soul. Even then the fact remains that the Jainas do have a theory of pure matter and aspects of it are brought to light in Prajñāpanā itself. That is why it would have been better if this part of the discussion was here accorded a special status of its own,
Relative recency of the treatment of Satsāmānya :
We have surmised that the tradition of discussing the nature of loka and aloka, matter and soul was comparatively old, that of discussing the nature of five astikayas comparatively recent. It seems that the tradition of discussing the nature of reality in general is still more recent. As a matter of fact, this question as such is never raised in the old Āgamic texts and when Tattvārtha does raise it it comes out with an answer of which there is no trace in these old texts. Thus Tattvārtha says that the real is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence and no old Āgamic text subscribes to the position. So in the context of the old Āgamic texts the question of the nature of reality in general has to be understood somewhat differently. Let us recall that the Bhagavati list of 23 topics-of-investigation contained three items in the form of dravya, pradeśa and paryāya, and it is these that we propose to treat as the sub-items of one general item, viz. reality in general. The proposal needs elaboration. As we have seen, the Jaina theoreticians gave thought to the question as to how many types of