Jaina Ontology

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
(i) Pañcāstikāya-cum-kāla .. Philosophically the most important Jaina concept is that of pañcāstikāyacum-kala and it deserves a thorough consideration. In their search for the basic types of reals Jaina scholars must have started with jiva (soul) and pudgala (matter) but the search came to an end only when three additional concepts-viz.dharma (the medium of motion), adharma (the medium of stoppage), ākasa (the medium of location-were posited. Thus came into existence the elaborated doctrine of five astikāyas. A number of Bhagavati dialogues go to testify that the early Jainas were much exercised over the fact that they had to speak of things like dharma, adharma and akaśa which were visible to dobody or as they naively put it, 'on which nobody could sit, stand, rest or lie down'. 33 They felt reassured only when it was pointed out to them that there are things like sound, smell and air which are visible to nobody and yet exist. We have already referred to the thesis that there are ten things which in their entirety are known and seen only by an omniscient person. The first eight of these are ontological categories and are (1) dharmastikāya (2) adharmāslikāya (3) akāśastikāya (4) soul apart from body (5) physical atom (6) sound (7) smell (8) air. The meaning of the catalogue was clear, viz, that basically speaking the doctrine of five astikāyas was to be accepted on faith in the omniscience of a Jaina teacher like Mahavira who had propounded it. But the details of the doctrine could well be defended on rational grounds and this is what was actually done at length. However, as regards dharma and adharma little was attempted beyond saying that they were respectively the medium of motion and that of stoppage. Only in one rare passage of Bhagavati was a catalogue drawn of the activities of the form of motion and of those of the form of stoppage-of-motion, the former included 'coming, going, speaking, blinking, mental activity, Vocal activity, bodily activity', the latter 'standing, sitting, lying down, mental concentration'39. But even here it is puzzling why the catalogue remained confined to voluntary activities undertaken by a living being-for certainly the belief is that even purely physical activities are due to dharma and adharma. On the other hand, the concept of akasa was in a way fundamental. For whenever there was the need for saying that a thing exists in spaceand there is nothing that does not exist in space--the meaning was that it exists in akasa; this is the meaning of the statement that akāśa is the receptacle of all things-- living and otherwise (āgāsatthikāe nam jivadavvāņa ya ajavadavvāņa ya bhāyaṇabhūe)* *. Lastly, the concepts of pudgala and jiva were again fundamental and obviously so, but they deserve independent treatment- each on its own account.
In this connection there also arises the question of the ontological status of time. In Bhagavatī time (its favourite word for it being addhāsamaya) is frequently mentioned along with the five astikāyas. Thus its list of ajīvas or