Jaina Ontology

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 40

THE AGE OF AGAMAS
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characterizing just one unit, avaktavya characterizing a group of two units). In any case, neither Bhagavati nor Anuyogadvāra lays down the principle that everything whatsoever is describable through the seven propositions of the Saptabhangi doctrine; for even on the showing of Bhagavati (whose treatment of the problem is of a more general nature) it is only an aggregate made up of more than two atoms that is so describable (an aggregate made up of two atoms being describable through six propositions and a loose atom through three).
Evolution of the treatment of Pañcāstikāya :
It can thus be seen that the problems discussed in the first chapter of Tattvärthasutra were either not treated at all or were treated differently in the old Agamic texts like Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā. But that is not the case with the problems discussed in its II, III, IV, V and VIII chapters. As a matter of fact, barring exceptions these chapters can be treated as a good summary of the corresponding discussion of the old Agamic texts. But even here these old texts themselves will have to be consulted if we are to form an idea of the doctrinal evolution concerned. Take for example the course of discussion on Pañcastikāya, In Bhagavati a large number of dialogues touch upon this or that aspect of the nature of soul and a good number of them do the same for matter, but dialogues touching upon the nature of dharma, adharma and ākāśa are few and far between. As a matter of fact, two parallel possages which seek to indicate the doctrine of five astikayas are couched in a strikingly defensive terminology. Thus in one of them Mahāvira's chief disciple Gautama, when asked to justify his belief in the existence of the five astikāyas, naively pleads that only that which exists is called by his camp an existing entity, only that which does not a non-existing entity (savvam atthibhavam atthiti vadāmo savvam natthibhavam natthili vadāmo)29; placed in a similar circumstance a staunch disciple of Mahavira named Madruka says that on the testimony of kevalt must one believe in the existence of all the five astikayas even when they are not visible to eyes-just as one believes in the existence of air, smell, fire-inside-wood, etc. even when they are not visible to eyes 30. It seems that the Jaina theoreticians first of all arrived at the notion of loka having a particular shape and size as also that of an empty aloka surrounding loka. Naturally, loka must have been supposed to be the permanent seat of the permanently existing matter and souls, but soon enough certain consideration led to the posting of three rather sophisticated concepts, viz. dharma, adharma and ākāśa-the first supposed to be the medium of motion, the second that of stoppage, the third that of location (the first two covering loka alone, the third loka as well as aloka). Thus in a dialogue of Bhagavati it is maintained that a god standing at the far end of loka cannot move about his limbs inside aloka; however, the reason given for it is not that there are no dharma and adharma in aloka but that there