Jaina Ethics

Author(s): Dayanand Bhargav
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 66

Metaphysical Background The Vedānta system
Vedānta believes that the cause, or Brahman, is real (sat) whereas the effect or the world is unreal. This is known as vivart avāda, 1
In the Brahmas ütra , it has been clearly brought out that prakrti itself cannot act. How can insentient prakrti change into this universe without the supervision of a sentient God ? Thus Sāmkhya view has been contradicted. Neither Vaiseșika view is upheid as right. How can insentient atoms combine into a systematic universe ? Even adrsta which is supposed to govern the atoms, is insentient. The praksti, therefore, accord ing to Vedānta is an effect of Brahman and has no independent existence.
The Jaina view
Dr. Radhakrishnan presents the Jaina view with regard to materialism and monism in these words :
"To regard the intelligent subject as the product of five elements is as fruitless from the ethical point of view as to make out that the variety of world is a manifold presentation of the one intelligent principle.''3
The correctness of this view is upheld by the fact that materialism shows no regard for ethical principles, whereas Vedānta thinks monism correct only from philosophical point of view; for all practical purposes, where ethical principles are involved, it accepts the reality of material world as much as any other system.
According to Jainism, therefore, matter is as real as spirit. In this, Jainism agrees with realistic systems. It agrees with Samkhya that self ( puruşa) and matter (prakrti) are two different entities. But it does not agree with Sāṁkhya regarding the inactivity of purusa and oneness of praksti. Matter consists, according to Jainism, of atoms. But the Jaina conception of atoms is different from Nyāyavaiseșika view. The atoms, according to Jainism, are far more subtler than conceived by Nyāyavaiseșika.
1. Upadhyāya, Baladeva, Bhārtīyadarśana, Benaras, 1948, P, 442, 2. Sankara on Vedāntasūtra, 2.2.12-18. 3. Radhakrishnan, $. Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 312,