Jaina Ethics

Author(s): Dayanand Bhargav
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 96

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Conception of Morality When he was distributing his wealth amongst his wives, one of them, Maitreyi, pondering over the temporary nature of worldly possessions, refused her share of it with these words : "What are these to me, if I am not thereby to gain life eternal'l.
This anti-hedonistic tendency is brought out more clearly in the story of rama and Naciketas in the Kathopanișad. Yama tempted the youthful imagination of Naciketas and placed all human and divine pleasures at his disposal. There
: a colourful description of the damsels and long life that were promised to him. Chariots ringing with divine music were offered. But none of these could budge him from his keen desire of knowledge of the self because he knew that all worldly pleasures would wither away by to-morrow.3
Thus when it was established that Naciketas was really a deserving candidate for spiritual knowledge, Yama began his discourse with a clear distinction between the good (śrejas) and the pleasurable (preyas). He made it clear that both of these were diametrically opposed to each other and lead a person to diverse ends. The path of good has the prerequisite of freedom from the allurement of environment.
Modern scholars have also emphasised the supra-moral nature of the ethical teachings of the Upanisads. Dr. Radhakrishnan, while discussing the ethics of the Upanişads, remarked, “Duty is a means to the end of the highest perfection. Nothing can be satisfying short of this highest condition. Morality is valuable only as leading to it."5 Deussen has also very clearly pointed out this. He observes that when “the knowledge of the Atman has been gained, every action and, therefore, every moral action also has been deprived of meaning". 8 Buddhist View
According to Buddhism it is meditation, which is beyond
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1. Bịhadāranyakopanisad, 2.4.2. 2. Kathopanişad, 1.1.25.
Ibid., 1.1.26.
Ibid., 1.2.1. 5. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 208.
Deussan, Paul, The Philosophy of the Upanişads, Edinburgh, 1919, p. 362.
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