Alamban Pariksha

Author(s): Dinnaga, Dharmapala, N Aiyaswami Shastri
Publisher: Adyar Library
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/002350/1

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The Adyar Library Series-No. 32 ALAMBANAPARIKSA CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT MUSTAKALA P. BOX S..BENARES

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ALAM BANAPARIKSA AND VRTTI BY DINNAGA WITH THE COMMENTARY OF DHARMAPALA Restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese Versions and edited with English Translations and Notes and with copious extracts from Vinitadeva's Commentary BY N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI S. V. S. COLLEGE, TIRUPATI (Honorary special Editor of Tibetan and Chinese Texts, " Brahmavidya", Adyar, and formerly Professor of Buddhist Studies, Santiniketan) THE ADYAR LIBRARY 1942

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Price Rs. 3-8-0 Printed by C. SUBBARAYUDU, AT THE VASANTA PRESS, ADYAR, MADRAS,

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Dedicated To THEM Who laboured for the cause of cultural and spiritual advancement of all living beings

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CONTENTS xi PAGE Prefatory Note . ix Preface Restored Sanskrit Text with Author's own Vrtti Literal Sanskrit Translations of Paramartha's and Hiuen Tsang's Chinese Versions in parallel columns Dharmapala's Commentary--Sanskrit Text. English Tra nslation of the Text with Extracts from Vinita deva's Commentary . . . English Translation of Dharmapala's Commentary Romanised Tibetan Version of the Text Additional Notes Appendix : A. Vasubandhu on Externalism . . 105 B. Sthiramati on Externalism 110 C. A Treatise on Yogacaras' Classification of Dharmas. 111 D. Sautrantikas' Classifications * 116 Indexes . . . . . . . 119

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PREFATORY NOTE In the scheme of publications planned for the Adyar Library, Buddhistic literature forms one important branch of study. Special attention has been paid in recent years to the study of Tibetan and Chinese versions of certain Buddhistic Texts in Sanskrit which had been lost and could only be reconstructed on the basis of their Tibetan and Chinese versions. The Bhavasankranti-sutra and Nagarjuna's Bhavasankranti s'astra published by the Adyar Library in 1938, under the editorship of Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri, were our first attempts in the direction of such restoration. Encouraged by the reception which the Bhavasankranti-sutra received at the hands of the scholars, we are now issuing the second of the series, the Alambanapariksa and Vitti of Acarya Dinnaga under the same editorship. A fortunate circumstance has preserved this important Buddhistic work in their Chinese and Tibetan versions while the Sanskrit original has been lost. The Journal Asiatique (Vol. CCXIV, No. 1) contains a French translation of this work with copious extracts from the commentary of Vinitadeva under the joint efforts of Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi of Japan and Henry Meyer of Paris. For increasing its usefulness, it was felt necessary to have the treatise reconstructed into Sanskrit along with an English translation. Pandit Aiyaswami Sastri who is eminently fitted for the task, kindly undertook to prepare and edit the work and has now carried it through to a successful completion. In the

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present edition, he has incorporated all the salient features of the French translation including the extracts from the commentary of Vinitadeva and has also gone much farther. The Commentary of Dharmapala in the Chinese version of I-tsing has been rendered into both Sanskrit and English and incorporated in this edition. It is noteworthy that this Dharmapala is earlier in point of time to Vinitadeva. He is further stated to be different from his South Indian namesake who lived near Negapatam. Valuable information on Dinnaga is also presented in the Editor's preface. It is hoped that the 'Additional Notes' and four Appendixes will be helpful to students of research on the subject. The need for a reorientation of Indological studies from the point of view of cultural contact with the Far East and China, has not yet been adequately provided for in our country. Only a few institutions and Universities have made provision for the study of Tibetan and Chinese Literature and fewer still for original research. It is earnestly hoped that our Universities and other cultural centres will realize the imperative need for providing for this branch of study as early as possible. A chair in each University to promote the study of the cultural contributions of the literature of the Far Eastern countries may well be expected to open up new and fascinating fields of research. It is with great pleasure that I record here our obligations to Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri for placing his most valuable and scholarly services at the disposal of the Library, freely and generously. Adyar G. SRINIVASA MURTI, 7th April, 1942. Honorary Director.

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PREFACE The Alambanaparikna is one of the smaller treatises on the selected subjects composed by Acarya Dinnaga, the father of medieval Indian logic. The treatise, as its title denotes, starts an enquiry about the true nature of the alambana, object of consciousness. The author, after a thorough examination of the standpoints of the Realists such as Vaibhasikas, Vais'esikas and others who hold the external things to be real, and proving their views untenable, establishes that the alambana, as it appears to us, is unreal and that consciousness alone is real-a dogma which has been held by his predecessors, Asanga and Vasubandhu, two eminent teachers of the Yogacara school of Buddhism. The main contribution of Dinnaga to that school in his present treatise lies in putting the dogma on a logical basis. This position of the author provoked a vehement protest from the dialecticians of the opposite camp, more specially Kumarilabhatta and Sankaracarya, two great thinkers and up-holders of the Brahmanical tradition and culture. According to Yogacaras, only the pure consciousness appears into subject and object; and there exists, for them, nothing external apart from consciousness. What causes consciousness to arise is only its part known as grahyabhaga, knowable aspect, and

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xii the same is regarded as the object-cause (alambanapratyaya). The opponent asks: "How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness itself ? " Dinnaga answers this question in two ways. The first answer is : * It is, though simultaneous, a condition, because it is associated invariably with consciousness : pratyayo 'vyabhicAritvAt saha. The second answer is : It becomes also a condition in succession by transmitting the force (s'akti) : 37477 cutia 7791C 11 (Alam. parikna, 7 a-b). Both these answers, according to Kumarila, are unsatisfactory and do not stand the strict scrutiny of the logicians. So he takes up the question for an impartial investigation and proves invalidity of those arguments of Dinnaga in these verses : anyonyanirapekSatvAdyugapaccApi janmani / ATTA DELA Ifera F21812359 $ala Il etc. 77 7andugri Fremaa wata I etc. (S'lokavartika, S'unyavada, 150-158 and 158-167). Similarly S'ankaracarya 1 also has, in his Bhasya on the Brahmasutras, summarized and demolished the whole structure of Dinnaga's arguments found in the present work; and in doing so he quotes this line : afragmas a aftagghia I (Alam. par. 6 a-b) in the course of setting forth his own siddhanta. Similar criticisms See my paper on "Sankaracarya on Buddhist Idealism" published in the Journal of Sri. Ven. Orien. Inst., Tirupati. Vol. I, part 3, pp. 71-85, where I have studied the Bhasya in the light of original Buddhist sources.

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xiii are also met with in the works of Udyotakara, (Nyayavartika), Vacaspatimis'ra (N. tatparyatika) and Salikanatha (Prakaranapancika) and others. I, therefore, need not say how thought-provoking and epoch-making the treatise was in those days. Their arguments and counterarguments will be more understandable, if one could get acquainted with the present work. Further, the work, as it is stated, forms one of the author's original contributions to the logic-minded Yogacara school of Buddhism. All these circumstances necessitate us to undertake the publication of the present treatise. It is most unfortunate that such an important work should have been lost to us in its original Sanskrit, though available in translations of foreign languages, Chinese and Tibetan. The work has two commentaries, one by Dharmapala of Nalanda, preserved in Chinese version of I-tsing, and the other by Vinitadeva available in Tibetan version. Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi in collaboration with H. Meyer has translated into French and published in the Journal Asiatique T. CCXIV, (Jan.March, 1929) this work with copious extracts from the commentary of Vinitadeva, and also edited the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the text. But he did not study systematically the commentary of Dharmapala. I have restored into Sanskrit this important treatise, text with author's own vitti from the Tibetan version (Tang. hgyur. vol. Ge, XCV), with the commentary of Dharmapala from the Chinese version of I-tsing, A.D. 671-695 (Nanjio, No. 1174, Taisho ed. vol. 31, No. 1625) and also translated them all into English. Dharmapala's

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xiv commentary is incomplete and abruptly breaks off in the seventh verse. I have added to my English translation of the text almost all important portions of Vinitadeva's comment translated into English from its French translation of S. Yamaguchi and H. Mayer. There are two translations in Chinese of the text, one by Paramartha (Nanjio, No. 1172, Taisho ed. vol. 31, No. 1619; Shanghai ed. "lai" part 10, pp. 13-14) and the other by Hiuen Tsang (Nanjio, No. 1173, Taisho ed. vol. 31. No. 1924, and Shanghai ed. "lai" part 10, pp. 12-13). Literal Sanskrit renderings of these two versions are made and printed in parallel columns so that the readers may themselves note their differences. For preparation of the edition of this work of Dinnaga, I have made use of the above specified and other reference books of the Adyar Library which is one of the richest and well-equipped Libraries of India, and more specially so in regard to rare collections of Buddhist literature including Tibetan and Chinese. I have only consulted for Dharmapala's. comment the Nanking edition of the Chinese version of I-tsing in my possession. Romanised Tibetan text of the treatise has also been added at the end with a view to facilitating the beginner in these studies. As. no printing facilities are available in the Press, I refrain from publishing any Chinese portion or wordindex in Chinese of the work. 'A copy of this edition was presented to me by my friend and student Mr. Shilu of China during my stay at Santiniketan in 1938-1939.

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XV Before closing this short preface, it will not be out of place to say a few words about the author and his commentators. The following accounts of Dinnaga are narrated by the Chinese traveller, Hiuen Tsang : "Above twenty li further south west of the monastery of Achala near the capital of Pundhra was an isolated hill on the ridge of which was a stone tope where Chenna ( = Dinnaga) Pusa composed a Yin-minglun or a treatise on logic. The pilgrim then relates about the circumstances connected the production of this Sastra in exposition of Buddha's teaching on Yinming. Chenna, the pilgrim relates, after the Buddha departed from this life, came under his influence, and and entered the Order. The aspirations of his spiritual knowledge were vast and his intellectual strength was deep and sure. Pitying the helplessness of the state of his age he thought to give expansion to Buddhism. As the Sastra on the Science of Inference was deep and terse, and students wrought at it in vain, unable to acquire a knowledge of his teachings, he went apart to live in calm seclusion to examine the qualities of the writings on it and investigate their characteristics of style and meaning. Hereupon a mountain-God took the Pusa up in the air and proclaimed that the sense of Yin-ming-lun originally uttered by the Buddha, had been lost and that it would, that day, be set forth at large again by Chenna. This latter sent abroad a great light which illuminated the darkness. The sight of this light led to the King's request, that Chenna should at once

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xvi proceed to the attainment of Arhatship. When the Pusa reluctantly agreed to do so, Manjus'ri appeared and recalled him to his high design and aspirations for the salvation of others and summoned him to develop for the benefit of prosperity, the Yogacarabhumisastra, originally delivered by Maitreya. On this Chenna renounced the idea of an arhat's career, and devoted himself to a thorough study and development of the treatise on the Science of Inference. When he had finished his work on this subject, he proceeded to the propagation of the rich teaching of Yoga system, and had disciples who were of note among their contemporaries ". (v. On Yuan Chwang's travels in India by Thomas Watters, Vol. II, pp. 209-10). We learn from the above extract that Dinnaga composed his Yin-ming-lun, probably the Pramana- , samuccaya in the monastery of Achala in the Maharattha country, identified with Ajanta caves (Ibid., p. 240) and stayed much in that monastery, and also there have been some legends connected with further development of his logic. But some more particulars of the early part of his life may be gathered from the Tibetan historians, Buston and Taranatha. The former relates the following: "Dinnaga was of Brahmanic caste and ordained by a teacher of the Vatsiputriya sect. Having received a perfect education in the school of worldly sciences, he received from his preceptor, the instructions about the concentrated meditation for the removal (of Obscurations). Then he was told to meditate over the principle of the Ego which was said to be inexpressible as being neither

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xvii identcial with the groups of elements, nor differing from them. Having accordingly practised meditation, he could nowhere find such an Ego. He practised severe penance sitting betwixt fires at four directions. While he was doing so, the preceptor asked him what he was doing. He replied he was searching for the Ego. The preceptor said: "Thou art overthrowing our own philosophical system. Therefore, be gone." He departed and finally came to the teacher, Vasubandhu. With the latter he studied the texts of 3 Vehicles and became specially versed in the Vijnanavada and in logic. He composed the commentary on the Abhidharmakos'a, the commentary on the Gunaparyantastotra, the Alambanapariksa and other fragmentary works, 100 in number. But as these treatises were mere fragments (without any system), he resolved to compose the Pramanasamuccaya. And it is stated that he composed it being induced by Manjus'ri for the benefit of the world. One of his pupils was Is/varasena who was versed in 5 branches of the science and composed a sub-commentary on the Pramanasamuc.caya." (v. Ober Miller's translation, History of Buddhism, part II, pp. 149-50). The following accounts of his life are given by Thomas Watters from the Tibetan Channels, viz., from Taranatha : "He was born in Simha-vaktra, a suburb of Kanci in the south, and he was of a Brahmin family and well trained in the orthodox learning. He afterwards joined the Vatsiputra sect of the Hinayana Buddhists, but

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xviii having incurred displeasure of his teacher, he was expelled, and he then joined the school of Vasubandhu. Then he lived for some time in a cave on Bhora Saila in Odivisa, sojourned in Nalanda, where he disputed successfully with several defenders of various schools and afterwards returned to Odivis'a. Here he resolved to devote himself to the compilation of a treatise on logic, and the resolve was followed by an earthquake, a great light and a noise in the air. When he began to despair of success in his understanding, Manjus'ri appeared to him, and roused him to renewed application by advice and encouragement. The king of the country also became of his friend and patron." (v. On Yuan Chwang's travels in India, Vol. II, p. 212). From the above narratives we may conjucturally construe his life as below : He was born in a Brahmin family in a suburb of Kanci, then capital of Pallava kings in South India. Being educated in the orthodox teachings of Brahmins and Buddhists, he joined first the Vatsiputriya sect of Buddhists. Being unsatisfied with its teachings he started for search of truth and finally came to Vasubandhu in Nalanda and studied with him the logic and Vijnanavada. He composed there several smaller treatises such as commentary on the Abhidharmakos'a, the Alambanapariksa, Nyayamukha and others. After retirement from Nalanda, he settled in a cave on Bhora Saila in Odivisa and also frequently staying in Achala's monastery (=Ajanta caves) where he composed his Pramanasamuccaya, the standard treatise

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xix on the Buddhist logic. His date may roughly be fixed about 400 A.D., as he is stated to have studied with Vasubandhu in Sri Nalanda, whose life-period has been fixed as c. A. D. 280 to 360 by V. A. Smith (History of India, 3rd ed. p. 328) on the authority of N. Peri (Bulletin de L'Ecole France d'Extreme Orient, t. XI, pp. 339-90). Turning to Dharmapala, his commentator, I should, at the outset, like to stress on one point, namely that he is not to be confounded with a person of his namesake viz., Dharmapala of the Theravada school. The latter is said to be a resident of Badaritittha (v. Visuddhimaggatika, colophon) which is simply stated in the Sasanavamsa to have been situated in the country of Dami?a, not far from the island of Ceylon (P.T.T. edn. p. 33). However, the latest Archaeological finds help us to identify it with some place near Negapatam, a small seaport town in South India. The present commentator, Dharmapala is nowhere mentioned to have been connected any way with Badaritittha. He, on the other hand, is stated to have fled away from Kanci towards the north in his youth and remained there until his death. I have discussed at length all the points relating to the persons and dates of these two Dharmapalas in a separate paper entitled "On Dharmapala " published in the Journal of Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, (Vol. II, part 2, p. 347 ff.). The following accounts of the life of the present Dharmapala are narrated by the Chinese traveller :

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XX "The capital (Kanci) was the birth-place of Dharmapala who was the eldest son of a high official of the city. He was a boy of good natural parts which received great development as he grew up. When he came of age a daughter of the King was assigned to him as wife, but on the night before the ceremony of marriage was to be performed, being greatly distressed in mind he prayed earnestly before an image of Buddha. In answer to his prayer, a god bore him away to a mountain monastery some hundreds of li from the capital. When the Brethern of the monastery had his story told, they complied with his request and gave him ordination and the king on ascertaining what had become of him, treated him with increased reverence and distinction." (v. T. Watters, op. cit. p. 226). The direction to which he fled on the eve of distress is not mentioned there; yet we may assume that it was North where he spent major part of his life. It is stated that he drew up the following works : S'abdavidyasamyuktas'astra in 25,000 s'lokas; a commentary on the Satasastravaipulya ; on the Vidyamatrasiddhi ; and on Nyayadvaratarkastastra (= Nyayamukha of Dinnaga). The first of the above four works seems to be the same as the commentary on Bhartshari's treatise called pei-na, mentioned by I-tsing. Takakusu suggests that pei-na is probably ' Beda' or Veda.' But this is improbable, because Bhartihari is unknown to have composed any treatise on Veda, and much more so, that Dharmapala should have commented upon it. So it may, perhaps, be Vyakarana.

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xxi This commentary and the commentary on Nyayamukha are not now available. Nanjio's Catalogue mentions four works in his credit: (1) Alambanapariksavyakhya No. 1174, (2) Vidyamatrasiddhi No. 1197, (3) Satasastravaipulyavyakhya No. 1198, (4) Vidyamatrasiddhis'astra No. 1210. As regards his date, I-tsing A.D. 671-695 speaks of him as contemporary of Bhart;hari who, according to the same Chinese authority died in about A.D. 651-52. It is also believed that he was the elder contemporary of Dharmakirti who flourished in the middle of the 7th century A.D., and that the latter was the pupil of the former. In the present commentary of Dharmapala, there are two quotations, both agreeing in spirit with the verses of Pramanavartika of Dharmakirti (v. pp. 61, 67). It is not certain whether the former quotes from the latter or they both cite them from a common source. This. Dharmapala seems to be the same as the teacher of Silabhadra who received Hiuen Tsang at Nalanda in 635 A.D. (v. Takakusu, Record of the Bud. Religion by I-tsing, XIV). Prof. H. . Ui has, however, fixed 539-70 A.D. as Dharmapala's palmy days on the authority of Kwechi's commentary on the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi which is reported to have stated that Dharmapala died in the 32nd year of his age and was one year younger Instances are not lacking to make us believe that Dharmakirti's Pramanavartika contains quotation from some earlier works ; e.g., the verses cafa fa quat, etc., of the Ratnavali of Nagarjuna (ed. G. Tucci, in Journal of R.A.S. 1934, April) found in the Pram. vartika, L. 221, p. 87.

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xxii than Slilabhadra. This Silabhadra, says H. Ui, was, according to the Siyuki of Hiuen Tsang, 30 years old while studying with Dharmapala, and was 106 years old when Hiuen Tsang met him. The Chinese pilgrim started from China in 629 A.D. and arrived at Rajagtha and saw him in 633 A.D. So Dharmapala was still living in 557 A.D. These are circumstances which prompted H. Ui to arrive at the opinion in regard to the date of Dharmapala above stated (v. Vais'esika Philosophy, p. 10). Though the tradition of Kwechi and others is earlier and more trustworthy, yet it is not supported by I-tsing and the Tibetan authorities, (e.g., Taranatha, pp. 161-2). Therefore we may, as it has been stated above, assign our commentator to the second quarter of the 7th Century A.D. (cf. Tattvasangraha, Intro. xcv). : Scholars will themselves see how lucid, and elucidative his commentary is even in the translation of so linguistically unfamiliar and foreign language as Chinese, and how much more useful purpose would have been served, if the Sanskrit original of it were recovered. It is also equally regrettable that the commentary is incomplete. As for Vinitadeva, the other commentator, we know very little of his life, and we have to content ourselves with what Taranatha briefly remarks: "Zu der zeit liebten die Zauberkundigen : Konig Sahajavilasa (Lhan.skyes.rol.pa), in Sri Nalanda der Acarya Vinitadeva (er verfasste einen commenter zu dem Pramana in Sieben Abtheilungen), der Sautrantika S'ubhamitra and der Acarya Silapalita," . . . (Schiefner's translation,

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xxiii p. 197-8). He was a great logician and commentator of his time, and was one of the gems of Nalanda University. He is said to have flourished in about 700 A.D. His commentary on the present treatise is very learned and helpful to understand fully the position and motive of Dinnaga in writing the present work. Almost all important portions of this commentary have been translated into French by S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer from its Tibetan translation, and again translated into English by me and added as notes to my English translation of the treatise. In concluding the preface I should offer my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Adyar Library, especially the Director, Dr. G. Srinivasamurti, B.A, B.L., M.B. & C.M., Vaidyaratna, and the Editor Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) for kindly publishing this book in the Adyar Library Series. I should like also to thank M. Bhikshu Arya Asanga (formerly A. J. Hamerster) Jt. Director and Curator for the Western section of the Library for the help he has kindly rendered by going through some portions of my English translation of the French passages. However, I must say that I hold myself responsible for those portions as printed in this volume. N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI

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Substitute the following for the verse 7a-b on page 2, line 5 and p. 6, 11. 7 and 11: - pratyayo'vyabhicAritvAt saha zaktyarpaNAt kramAt / (cited by Parthasarathi Mis'ra in his comment on S'lokavartika, pp. 311 and 312.)

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* AlambanaparIkSA AcAryadiGnAgakRtA namaH sarvabuddhabodhisattvebhyaH 1. yadyapIndriyavijJapteryAdyAMza: (aNavaH) kAraNaM bhaveta / atadAbhatayA tasyA nAkSavadviSaya: sa tu (aNavaH) / / 2. yadAbhAsA na tasmAt sA dravyAbhAvAt dvicandravat / evaM bAhyadvayaJcaiva na yuktaM matigocaraH || 3. sAdhanaM saJcitAkAramicchanti kila kecana / avAkaro na vijJapterarthaH kaThinatAdivat // 4. bhaveTazarAvAdestathA sati samA matiH / AkArabhedAdbhedazcet, nAsti tu dravyasatyaNau || * Fanjur (Narthari), Mdo, ce, (XCV) No. 4. This verse is quoted in the Tattvasangrahapanjika (GOS.) * p. 582. The reading aNava: ' given within bracket is according to the Tibetan version. * This line being put literally, may read thus : kecit saJcitAkArAn sAdhanamicchanti / 3 Lit. vijJapti - artha.

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AlambanaparIkSA 5. pramANabhedAbhAvAt saH', adravye'sti tataH sa hi / ____ aNUnAM parihAre hi tadAbhajJAnaviplavAt / / 6. yadanta yarUpaM tu bahirvadavabhAsate / ___so'rtho vijJAnarUpatvAttatpratyayatayApi ca // 7. ekAMzaH' pratyayo'vItAt zakyapaNAtkrameNa [vA] / sahakArivazAyaddhi zaktirUpaM tat] indriyam // 8. sA cAviruddhA vijJapterevaM viSayarUpakam / pravartate'nAdikAlaM zaktizcAnyonyahetuke / ityAcAryadiGnAgakRtA AlambanaparIkSAprakaraNakArikA samAptA * The two quarters 4d and 5a form one idea, and they may be put literally thus : saH aNau dravyasati nAsti pramANabhedAbhAvAt . 5 This may literally read thus : aNu parihAre tadAbhajJAnaviplava:. The reading 'fagara' is adopted from the Tibetan version of the Vrtti. * This verse is quoted in the Tattvas. pan. p. 582. Mr. S. Yamaguchi suggests in Tib. 6b the reading 'de' for 'te' relying upon Vinitadeva's commentary (Tib.). It is also supported by the Sanskrit original. The first half of this verse is cited by Sarkara in his Bhasya ad II, 2, 28, with the reading 'tat ' for 'tu'. ?=gcig. cha han. So reads S. Yamaguchi's edition of the Tib. version. But the Xylograph reads gcig. nahan=faitsfa. =avinAbhAvaavyabhicAra=mi (ma) hkhrul. 9 This quarter is cited in the Tattvasari. pan. p. 582 along with the prose passage of the Vrtti thus : atha vA zaktya rpaNAtkrameNApi, etc.

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AlambanaparIkSAvRttiH * AcAryadiGnAgakRtA namaH sarvabuddhabodhisattvebhyaH ye cakSurAdijJAnasyAlambanaM bAhyArtho'stItIcchanti / nanu te kalpayanti paramANUn ; tatkAraNatvAt [ jJAnasya ] | saMghAtaM ' vA tadAbhajJAnasya jAyamAnatvAt / tatra tAvat yadyapIndriyavijJaptergrAhyAMza: ( = aNavaH) kAraNaM bhavet / atadAbhatayA tasyA nAkSavadviSaya: sa tu (aNavaH) // 1 // viSayo hi nAma yasya jJAnena svabhAvo'vadhAryate / viSaya iti / jJAnena svarUpa [ meva] nirdhAryate / tadAkAratayA ' jAyamAnatvAt / yadyapyaNavaH tatkAraNam / tathApi na tAdRzAH akSavat / evaJca nANavastAvadAlambanam / saMghAtastu tadAbhave'pi [ jJAnasya, nAlambanam / yataH ] Tanjur (Narthari), Mdo, ce (XCV) No. 5. The Tibetan version has been edited by Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi with French translation in the Journal Asiatique T. CCXIV, No 1 (1929). 1 hdus. pa. Lit. -kAreNa jananAta . 3 This sentence may also read thus : aNUnAM tatkAraNatve'pi na tathAbhAvaH akSavat .

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AlambanaparIkSA yadAbhAsA na tasmAtsA yo'rthaH svAvabhAsivijJaptimutpAdayati sahyAlambanaM yujyate / yataH sa eva hyutpattipratyaya ucyate / saMghAtastu naivam / dravyAbhAvAd dvicandravat / indriyavaikalyAt dvicandradarzanasya tadAbhatve'pi na tasya viSayo'sti / tadvat saMghAtaH dravyato'sattvena akAraNatvAt nAlambanam / evaM bAhyadvayaJcaiva na yuktaM matigocaraH // 2 // aNuH kalApazceti bAhyo'rthaH nAlambanam , ekAGgavaikalyAt // tatra sAdhanaM saJcitAkAramicchanti kila kecana' / sarvo'rtho bahvAkAraH ataH tatra kenacidAkAreNa pratyakSa iSyate / paramANuSvapyasti saJcitAbhajJAnotpattikAraNabhAvaH / aNvAkAro na vijJapterarthaH kaThinatAdivat // 3 // * Representative of this view in later periods seems to be Bhadanta Subhagupta ; cf. Tattvas. pan. p. 551 : samuditA evotpadyante vinazyanti ceti siddhAntAt naikaikaparamANupratibhAsa iti / yathoktaM bhadantazubhaguptenapratyekaparamANUnAM svAtantryeNAsti saMbhavaH (Read asaMbhava) / ato'pi paramANUnAmekaikApratibhAsanama / =rnam. pa. du. ma. can. yin. pas. So reads S. Yamaguchi's edition. But the Xylograph reads simply 'yin pas '. ___ Cf. the opinion of Sumati, a Digambara, cited in the Tattvas. pan. p. 554 : sAmAnyavizeSAtmatvAt sarvapadArthAnAM tulyAtulyarUpeNa dvirupAH paramANavaH / tatra samAnaM yadrUpaM tadindriyairgRhyate nAsamAnam / tatazcaikAkAraM vijJAnamaNuSvaviruddhamiti pratyakSasiddhA: prmaannvH|

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AlambanaparIkSAvRtti: yathA kaThinatAdi vidyamAnamapi na caakssussbuddhivissyH'| 'evamaNutvamapi // bhaveddhaTazarAvAdestathA sati samA matiH / ghaTazarAvAdiparamANuSu bahupvapi na ko'pi vizeSo'sti / AkArabhedAr3hedazcet , yadi manyase grIvAdyAkAraH vizeSakriyA, yena buddhervizeSaNamupAdhibhavet / iti / ayamupAdhighaTAdAvasti / nAsti tu dravyasatyaNau // 4 // pramANabhedAbhAvAt saH, paramANuSu dravyAntareSvapi pArimANDalye bhedo nAsti / adravye'sti tataH sa hi / AkArabhedaH saMvRtisatsvevAsti na tu paramANuSu / ghaTAdayazca saMvRtisanta eva / / aNUnAM parihAre hi tadAbhajJAnaviplavAt // 5 // dravyasatsu "apanItasambandhiSvapi nIla-] varNAdivat svabuddhirna tyajyate / tathA sati indriyabuddhInAM viSayo bahirnAstItyupapadyate // yadantaheyarUpaM tu bahirvadavabhAsate / so'rthaH ' Lit. aNutvasadRza: =zlum. po. ' More lit. sambandhini apanIte'pi ; or sambandhina apanaye'pi.

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vAhyArthe'vidyamAne antassadeva bahirvadavabhAsanamAlambanapratyayaH / vijJAnarUpatvAttatpratyayatayApi ca // 6 // antarvijJAna marthatayAvabhAsate "tato utpadyate ceti dharmatAdvayaviziSTamityataH antassadevAlambanapratyayaH // yadi tAvadevamavabhAsa eva vedyate / kathaM tadekadezaH sahajAtaH pratyayaH / ekAMza : pratyayosvItAt, 12 sahabhUto'pi avyabhicArAt " anyajAtasya pratyayo bhavati // naiyAyikAstu evamAhuH / krameNa jAyamAnayorhetuhetumatoH bhAvAbhAvatadvattA lakSaNa' miti // athavA AlambanaparIkSA 1 14 10 zaktyarpaNAt krameNa [ vA] / 14 krameNApi so'rthAvabhAsaH " svAnurUpakAryotpattaye zakti vijJAnAdhArAM karotItyavirodhaH '* // yadi tarhi svarUpamevAlambanapratyayaH / kathaM tat [ rUpaM ] cakSuzcopAdaya cakSurvijJAnamutpadyate [iti] | Or. arthaH avabhAsate. " = arthAt . cf. Vrtti ad 2a. 16 12 Lit. anyasmAt jAtasya. 13 Cf. Nyayasutra, IV, 1, 49: prAgutpatterutpattidharmakamasadityaddhA kasmAdutpAdavyayadarzanAt . 14 The passage, athavA... avirodhaH is quoted in the Tattvas. pan. p. 582. The panjika cites this passage omitting the words krameNa vA in the quarter b of the verse 7. 15 Xylograph reads svabhAsAnu --, rani snan ba--. ran. gi. gzugs.

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. AlambanaparIkSA sahakArivazAdyaddhi zaktirUpaM tat ] indriyam' 0 // 7 // indriyaM svakAryAt zaktirUpamevAnumIyate na tu bhautikam / * sA cAviruddhA vijJapteH 1'zaktistu vijJAne vAstu / anirdezye svasya" rUpe vAstu kAryoMtpattau na vizeSaH / evaM viSayarUpakam / pravartete'nAdikAlaM zaktizcAnyonyahetuke | // 8 // cakSurAkhyAM zaktimantaH "rUpaJcopAdAya vijJAnamarthAvabhAsi AlambanAdavibhaktamutpadyate / idaM dvayamapi anAdikAlamanyonyahetukam / kadAcit vijJAnasya zaktiparipAkAt viSayAkAratA bhavati / kadAcicca tadAkArazaktiH / vijJAnaM sA ca ubhayamanyatvenAnanyatvena ca yatheSTamucyatAm / evamantarAlambanaM dharmatAdvayaviziSTatvAt viSayatayA upapadyate // ityAcAryadiGnAgakRtA AlambanaparIkSAvRttiH samAptA 162 Cf. Madhyamakavatara, Sanskrit text VI, 62 and bhasya thereon. " =nus. pa. ni. Xylograph omits it. 16 Or. svarUpe=ran. gi. lio. bo. la. =nan. gi. gzugs. 20 ==de. hi. rnam. pahi. nus. po. 1 Better reading will be antarvijJAnaM. Cf. vrtti ad 6c-d.

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PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE VERSION anAkAracittaviSayazAstram 1. yadyapyucyate aNuH indriya [vijJapteH] kAraNam asarUpatvAt akSavanna viSayaH / 2. vijJaptiH saMghAtAbhA bhavati na tasmAjjAyate / saMghAto'sadrUpaH dvicandravat / anena dvau bAhyArthI na viSayau / 3. kecidvadanti / aNavaH saMbhUya padArthasAdhanAni viSayAH sidhyanti, vijJAnasya tadAbhatvAt / aNusvarUpaM dravyasadapi na viSayaH 'rajovat vijJAnAsarUpatvAt / 4. aNurviSayazcet , tadA vijJaptirabhinnA syAt ] / yadyAkArabhedaM vadasi tadA vijJaptirviSamA syAt / AkArabhedaH prajJaptisthaH / ata AkAro na tathyaH / 5. aNupramANaM sarvatrAbhinnam / yadyaNUn pariharasi, viSayavijJapti noMdiyAt / tasmAt viSayAH prajJaptinAmAni / Chen=dust. dirt, This character is also used for fage. But in the corresponding passage of the vstti of Paramartha's and Hsuan Chuan's versions, the character chien' is used which exactly corresponds to kaThinatA of the Tibetan. So 'chen' is, I think, a mistake for 'chien'-kaThinatA.

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AlambanaparIkSA 6 - antarviSayarUpaM bahirvadavabhAsamAnaM vijJaptiviSayaH sidhyati / vijJAnasya dRzyAkAratvAt idaM vijJAnamAlambanapratyayaH / 10 7. utpattinaiyatyAt yugapat [ pratyayaH ] sidhyati / krameNa vA zaktirjanayati / dvitIya mindriyaM -- sahajAtazaktivizeSa indriyaM bhavati / 8. vijJAnasyApratighaH' / anyonyahetuke zaktivizeSaviSayAtmake anAdikAlamanyonyapravRtte || 2 There are two kinds of sense organs, sthula and suksma. The latter seems to be meant here. = avirodhI, 3

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PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE Hsuan CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION anAkAracittaviSayazAstrama AlambanapratyayaparIkSAzAstram 1. ye kecit svIkurvanti cakSu- 1. kecit cakSurAdipaJcavijJArAdiSaDvijJAnAni bAhyamartha pratItya nAnAM bAhyarUpamAlambanapratyayaM kurvantaH utpadyanta iti / te kalpayanti paramANuM vA kalpayanti vastuta paramANuM vA viSayam / vijJAnahe- astIti / vijJAnajanakatvAt / satutvAt / paramANusaGghAtaM vA viSa- vAtaM vA gRhNanti / jAyamAnaviyam / saGghAtAbhavijJAnasyodayAt / jJAnasya tadAkArabandhAt / ubhayamapi na yuktam / kasmAt / aNuH paJcavijJAnAnAM kAraNamapi nAlambanam / tadAkAravijJAnAbhAvAt cakSurakSAdivat // Alambanapratyayo yaduta tadAkAraviSaya iti kiMlakSaNaH / 'yat baddhavijJAnajanakapratyayaH / vasturUvijJAnavijJApakam / tallakSaNaH / yathA pazca janakapratyayo bhavati / vijJAnaM tallakSaNaM vijJAnamudeti / tasmAtsa tamapekSya jAyate / rUpAdiparamANuviSaya ucyate / paramANu 3tdvRttiH| yadyapi vasturUpaH AlambanAkAravi. 11

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12 AlambanaparIkSA Hsuan ChuanG'S CHINESE PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION yatparamANudravyam idaM vijJAna- jJAnajanakaH tathApi nAlambanam / kAraNam / paJcendriyavat / tasmAnna cakSurakSAdivat / cakSurAdau tadAkAraviSayaH paramANuH / vijJAnAbhAvAt / evaM paramANuzcakSurAdivijJAnasya nAlambanam / 2. tathA cet paramANusaGghAto 2. saGghAtaH paJcavijJAnAnAviSayaH syAt / yathAsaGghAtaM vijJAno- mAlambanamapi na pratyayaH / dayAt / yadyapi punarevaM tadAkAra- tadravyAbhAvAt mudeti / vijJAnaM na tasmAjjAyate / dvitIyacandravat // tasmAt saGghAto'pi na viSayaH / rUpAdisaGghAtaH yadyapi AlambanI-. kasmAt / viSayazcet , tadAkArAbha- kriyate / cakSurvijJAnAdInAM tadAkAvijJAnajanako viSaya AstheyaH / rakatvAt / tathApi na pratyayaH / kasmAt / ayaM hi viSayo vaktavyo saMkSubhitanetradRSTadvitIyacandravat / tasya vijJAnotpattipratyayatvAt / saGghAtastu dravyato nAstItyakAraNatvAt / evaM naivam / adravyasattvAt dvicandravat / saGghAtazcakSurAdivijJAnAnAM pratyayo saMkSubhitacakSurindriyasya dvicandrAbhavi na bhavati / ato bAhyau dvAvarthoM jJAnamasti / na [tu] candradvayam / Alambanapratyayayau mitha ekAGgavijJAnagocarasya dravyato'bhAvAt / vikalau / ata eva na yuktau / saGghAto'pyevam / paramANUn vihAya dravyaM nAstIti saGghAto na vijnyaangocrH| tasmAdbAhyaviSayaH-dvAvau~,

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AlambanaparIkSAvRtti 13 PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE . VERSION VERSION na vijJAnagocaraH / dvayo vikalAGgatvAt / 3. kecidAcAryA vadanti / aNa- 3. kecit gRhNanti rUpAdInAM vaH saJcitAH padArthasAdhanAni bahvA- pratyekaM bahvAkArAH santi / tatra kArasaMpannAH / tAn gocaraM sadhA- ekAkAraH prtykssvissyH| ataH yAmaH / kasmAt / AkArAntarayuktaH paramANUnAmAkArasamRddhAnAmasti prapratyakSajanakaH / na kevalaH paramANuH tyekaM snyjitaakaarH| ayamAkAro paramANusaGghAtazca / tasmAt paramANau dravyasan pratyekaM tad-] AkArAma paramANusaGghAte ca astyAkAraH mijJAnotpattyArambhaka iti paJcayaH] SaDijJAnAnAM viSayaH kriyte| vijJAnAnAmAlambanapratyayIkriyate / ANvAkAro na viSayaH kaThina- iti / tadapi na yuktam / kasmAt / tAdivat / paramANau santi kAThinya- saJcitakAra: kaThinatAdivat zItoSNaprayatnasparzAH / te ca dravya cakSurAdivijJAnAnAM / santo na cAkSuSavijJAnagocarAH / pratyayo'pi nAlambanam cAkSuSavijJAnasya atAdRzatvAt / aNvAkArAbhyupagamAt // paramANuvartipadArtha [AkAra] zcaivam / yathA kaThinatAdyAkAraH yadyapi vastusan cakSurAdivijJAnAnAM pratyayabhAvaM bhajate / tathApi nAlambanam / cakSurAdivijJAneSu tadAkArAbhAvAt /

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14 AlambanaparIkSA PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE VERSION HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION rUpAdiparamANUnAM saJcitAkAre'pi yuktistathaiva / tasya sarvathA aNvAkAratayA grahAt / 4. cakSurAdivijJAnakAraNaparamANusaJcitAkAravAde punarasti do 4. kasmAt / padArthamadhyavartI paramANu ryadi vijJAnajanakaH / tadA idaM vijJAnaM na bhidyeta / padArtha - SAntaram / madhyavartiparamANubhedAbhAvAt / yadi vadasi AkArabhedAt vijJAnabhedo jAyate / ghaTAdipadArthAzca na samAH / tadAkArakAraNatvAt jAyamAnaM vijJAnaM bhidyate / iti / ayamartho na yujyate / I kasmAt / tAdRzAkArabhedAH ghaTAdi - ghaTazarAvAdimahadalpAdipadArthasAdhana - prajJaptipadArthavartinaH na tu 'paramANudravyavartinaH / ghaTazarIvAdimatiH tadgRhNantI abhinnA syAt / nAkArabhedAda bhedaH AkArabhedasyAdravyatvAt // paramANuSu bahuSu alpeSu vA sAmyAt tatkAraNA matirabhinnA syAt / tatpadArthAkArabhedAdbuddhyAkArabheda iti vadasi cet / na tathA yuktan / grIvAdyAkArabhedaH kevalaM ghaTAdiprajJaptidharme'sti / atastanna grAhyaM paramANavo'pi bhinnAkArA iti / tu paramANuSu /

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AlambanaparIkSAvRtti 15 PARMARTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION __5. aNupramANasya bhedAbhA- 5. aNupramANasAmyAt vAt / padArthasthaparamANupramANaM yatpA- AkArabhedaH prajJaptimAtram / rimANDalyaM tat ] abhinnam / aNuzastasya bhede tasmAt padArthAnAmAkArA na vastu- tadbuddhityAganiyamAt // santaH / [kintu] prajJaptisantaH / na ghaTazarAvAdiniSpAdakaparamANUnAghaTAdipadArthAzca prajJaptyAkArA ityu mAkAraparimANaM bhidyate / pArimANDacyante / lyalakSaNaM hIyeta / ato jJAyate aNUnAM parihAre ghaTAdyAkAravi - vibhinnAkAraH prajJaptistho na dravyam jJAnasyAnutpatteH / dravyeSu saMyuktadharmA iti / vibhinnAkAraH punaH parabhagnAzcet tadApi] dravyAkAravijJAnaM mANuzo bhajyate [cet ] tadbhuna nazyati / abhanakAla iva ghaTe ddhiniyamena tyajyate / na nIlApaJcaviSayavijJaptirjAyate / bhagnArthe paJca deraNuzo bhaJjane tadbuddhistyajyate / viSayavijJapteranaSTatvAt paJcaviSayAdayo asmAt AkArabhedaH sNvRtisnmaatrm|| dravyasantaH / anena aNusaGghAta na nIlAdivat dravyasthaH / tasmAtpaJcapadArtho na vijJaptijanako / tasmA vijJaptInAmAlambanapratyayo na bAhya dvAhyayaviSayo na vijJAnagocaraH / / rUpAdi itIdamupapattyA saMpannam / 6. tathA cet ko dharmo vissyH| 6. nanu tadAlambanapratyayaH sarvaantarviSayarUpaM bahirvadavabhAsate / ayaM thA nAsti / naiva sarvathA nAstIti / vijJAnaviSaya ityucyate / bAhyaviSaye tathA cet kim / vastuto'vidyamAne, antarvijJAne sa

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16 AlambanaparIkSA PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE VERSION Hsuan ChuanG's CHINESE VERSION ttvAnAM mugdhacittavikalpAt SaDiSaya- antaH rUpaM bahirvadavabhAsamAnaM vikalpaH pravartate / ayaM vikalpo vijJAnAlambanapratyayaH / / yathA bahirvartate tathA avabhAsate / tadAkAro vijJAnavartI cataSu pratyayeSu ayaM nAma vijJAnAla- vijJAnajanakazca ityabhyupagamAt // mbanapratyayaH / asya vijJAnarUpa- bAhyaviSayo yadyapyasan / tathApyasti tvAt asmAdvijJAnasya jananAt / antaH rUpaM bahirviSayAkAramavabhAsakasmAt / idaM vijJAnaM, antarviSaya- mAnamAlambanapratyayaH / cakSurAdirUpaM bhavati antarviSayAjjAyate iti vijJAnaM tadAkArabaddhaM pravartate tata dharmadvayasaMpannam / tasmAdantarviSayo utpadyate ca iti dharmadvayayuktamityagocara AkhyAyate / bhyupagamAt / ___7. pRchayate / yathAviSayaM vi- 7. ayamantarviSayAkAraH vijJAjJAnaM saMbhavati itIdameva yuktam / nAdavibhaktaH / vijJAnakAraNapratyayaH antarviSayo'yaM vijJAnaikadeza eka- kathaM bhavati / kAla utpannaH kathamAlambanapratyayo sahavRttinaiyatyAt bhavati / ucyate / Alambana- yugapadapi kAraNapratyayaH / pratyayaH sidhyati / iti / Alambana- paurvAparyeNa vA pratyayaH pratyayo'yaM saMbhavati advidhAbhAvAt / tacchaktayarpaNAt // pratyaya iti / kadAcit ekakAla viSayAkAro vijJAnena sahavRttinaiutpanno'pi anyajAtasya dharmAntarasya yatyAt yugapajjAto'pi vijJAnasAdhanam / utpattivinAzayo' niya- kAraNapratyayaH / naiyAyikA AhuH / tAnubandhitvAt / pRchyate / krameNa yadyayaM tena asahavartI bhavati /

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AlambanaparIkSAvRtti 17 PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION jAtayoH kathamAlambyAlambanarUpam / yugapajjAtayorapi [na] kAryakAraNabhAvo ucyate / hetuH pUrva cet pazcAt labhyate / phalam / . phalaM hi hetvanantarabhAvi' / na tu hetuH phalAnantara'' bhAvI / hetossaphalatve avazyaM sttaa| hetorniSphalatve avazyamasattA / phalaM hetvanantarabhAvi'' sadvA asadvA / idamAkhyAyate hetuphalarUpam / atha vA zaktayarpaNAt krameNa A- atha vA pUrva vijJAnAkAraH lamvyAlamvana [rUpaM] sidhyti| viSa- pazcAdvijJAnapratyayo bhavan mUlayAkAraM vijJAnaM krameNa utpadya utpA- vijJAne svAnurUpakAryotpAdakazaktayadayati / kAryAnurUpazaktayutpAdanena rpaNAdutpAdayati / iti yuktayavirovijJAnadhArAmutpAdayati / dhAt / pRchyate / yadyantarviSayo vijJAnA yadi paJcavijJAnAni kevalamantaH lambanapratyayaM utpattikAraNam / kathaM rUpaM pratItya jAyante / kathaM punarucyate sUtraM vyAkhyAtavyam / sUtramAha' / cakSurAdiH pratyaya iti / cakSurUpaJca pratItya cakSurvijJAnamutpadyate / iti vistaraH / ucyate / kAryasahakArizaktisvarUpamindriyamucyate /

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18 AlambanaparIkSA PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE VERSION Aha / indriyaM kiMsvarUpam / ucyate / zaktivizeSasvarUpam / tatsvarUpaM kena kAraNenAnumIyate / svakAryAttacchaktivizeSarUpaM vijJAyate / na caturmahAbhUtarUpam / HSUAN CHUANG'S CHINESE VERSION 8. vijJAne zaktirUpANi indriyANi yujyante / zaktirviSayazcAnAdikAlamanyonyahetukau // 8. sA zaktirvijJAnasya aviruddhA | sA zaktirvijJAne vartate vijJAnavibhaktA / anirdezyaM vA tatsvarUpam / yathA mayA sAdhita mindriyaM bhavatA sAdhita mindriyaJca zaktayAtmakaM samam / tayoH ko bheda: 13 zakti viSayAkArAvabhAsazcotpadya anA - dikAlAttathA AgacchataH / indri yAkhyazaktimAzritya arthAkhyamantaviSayarUpaJca pratItya saMkSubhitaM vi jJAnamanirdezyarUpam / ayaM dharma anyonyahetukaH anAdikAlaJca prava rtate / kasmAt / kadAcit zakti - paripAkAt vijJAnaM viSayAkAraM vijJAnArambhAnumAnena jJAyate indri - yamastIti / tat kevalaM zaktiH na / evaM zaktirviSayAkArAva - tu bAhyakRtamiti / ato mUle vijJAne bhAsazca anyonyahetukau / tathA paJcazaktirUpANi cakSurAdIndriyANi AkhyAyante / [ itIdaM] na yuktiviruddham / zaktirvijJAnArambhanyAyAbhedAt vijJAnavartinI anyavartinI vA / anirdezyApi [vA ] / bAhyadharmatve yukta bhAvAta sA vijJAnavartinI nAnyavartinI iti niyamenAbhyupagantavyam / tacchaktIndriyaM pUrvaviSayarUpaJca anAdikAlAdanyonyahetuke /

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AlambanaparIkSAvRtti ___19 Hsuan CHUANG'S CHINESE PARAMARTHA'S CHINESE VERSION VERSION pravartate / kadAcit viSayAkAravijJA- tathAhi / sA zaktiH paripAkaprAptA nAcchaktiH sidhyati / vijJAna- vijJAne paJcAntarviSayarUpANi avamubhayabhinnaM vA ubhayAbhinnaM vA ani- bhAsayati / imAni antarviSayarU rvAcyaM vA / eva mantarviSayo dharmadva- pANi punaH pAkAntareNa vijJAne paJceyaviziSTatvAt vijJAnagocaro bhaavyH|| ndriyazaktIrarpayanti / indriyaviSaya [khya] rUpadvayaM vijJAnAd bhinnamabhinnaM veti" yatheSTamucyatAm / evaM vijJAnAnAmantarviSayAkAra evAlambanapratyaya ityupapattyA nipuNaM sAdhitam // anAkAracittaviSayazAstram AlambanapratyayaparIkSA zAstram + Lit. yadi. 1 Lit. nAni uddizya. 'Lit. yathA tadAkAra.. ' Lit. AlambanabhAvabhAgvijJAna0. * The chinese text has a nega 3 =ou= bowl. tive particle wu, just before a To put more literally this .these two words. It is to be phrase : 0rUpadvayaM. vijJAnena eka manyadvA, omitted to make the sense more athavA naika nAnyadvA0. correct. No case sign in Chinese 'Lit. kriyate. " Lit. anutpatti. 1' OranuruddhatvAt . " Lit. hetvanusAri. 12 Cf. Madhyamakavrtti, ed. L. V. Poussin, p. 6, 1. 3 with note thereon. 13 na ko'pi bhedaH iti zeSaH /

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CORRECTIONS AND ALTERATIONS IN THE COMMENTARY OF DHARMAPALA Page 21 line 7-9 Read tatra AdivacanaM parasaMmataM rUpendriyAzraya paJcavidhavijJAnaM saMgRhNAti / ,, , , 11 , yadyapi manovijJAnamavayavidravyapratyayamaGgI kriyate / , 4 , svasamutpattau for svasaMtatau , 6 , indriyavijJAnAhRtabhAvyaM manovijJAnam . , 12 , cakSurAdivijJAnAnAM rUpamAzrayapatyayaH sat AyatanaM bhavati / 23 , 14 , sa AlambanArthaH yaH pratyayeSu vijJAnasya utpAdakahetuH iti / __, 20 , yat vijJAnaM yadAkArayuktaM . . . __, dharmiNaH svarUpavirodhadoSaH syAt / tathA ____ dharmavacanamaprasiddham / , 8 , tadAkArayogo hetu bhavet / , 2 , svarUpaM svAkAra ucyate / nirdhAryate nizcIyate / yadi yathoktameva kAraNaM . . . tathA cet Aha for yadyapyevam . . . ya eva janakaH sa eva . . . sa eva . . . vyavahriyate / saJcitAtmakAH / ato na dravyasantaH . . . , paramANUMnAM bahutve'pi avizeSAt , indriya . vijJAnAnAntu vizeSAkAratvAt / , 38 , 11 omit " / anena"

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AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA * AcAryadharmapAlakRtA 2 durmedhasAM prajJAM pradIpayituM doSAvaraNaM tiraskartuJca yo' jagAda ' / [taM] praNamya ayamartha: parIkSyate // .] kalpayanti / iti / yasya hAnamupAdeyasya vopAdAnaM parIkSAphalam / ato heyArthasya [ta] dviparItasya ca hetuH pradarzyate / tatra svayUthyA vadanti / yat rUpaM cakSuzcAzritya paJcavidhavijJAnAni [bhavanti ] iti pare kalpayanti / [ tat ] saMgRhNIma iti / pare tAni ' ekonmukhAni vastupratyayAni iti pratipadyante / ato manovijJAnaM na yuktam / ekonmukhatvAbhAvAt rathAdi[vat] saMvRtisatpratyayatvAbhyupagamAt / yadyapi manovijJAnaM gocaraM vastu pratItya sAkAram' / [tathApi] vijJAnAkAravihInamatadviSayamapi gRhNAti / cakSurAdivijJAnasya avinAbhUtaH ' prasiddho viSayaH AkAra : siddha: / tasmAt nAsya 6 cakSurAdivijJAnAnAM [ .. This commentary has been rendered into Sanskrit from the Chinese version of I-Ching. 1 Lit. yadi * * Lit. gadituM zakta: 3 = niyataikabAhyapadArthagocarANi. Lit. sAvayavam * ' Or avinAbhUto viSaya: prasiddhaya (or siddhiM labdhvA ), etc. Lit. pradeza : = fang.

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AlambanaparIkSA 'maryAdA prApyate / kiJca abhyAsajJAnabodhyarUpatattvasya tarkAgocaratvAt dRzyavat pratiSThitatvAcca ihedaM tattvaM] zravaNamananabhAvanAjanyajJAnamAtraviSayaH / tathA manovijJAnAlambanArtho'tyantamabhAvaH sidhyati / asya svasantatAvazaktapratyayatvAt / gatAnAgatapratyayayoH punaravastutvAt asaMskRtayat / tadarthamAdivacanaM paJcavijJAnakAyasaMgrAhakam / ___ tarhi indriyavijJAnagRhItaM sarva mano vijAnAti / iti cet / tadapi katham / naitadindriyavijJAnasamakAlam / anantaraM vaa| rUpAdyAlambanasya niruddhatvAt / na vA vartamAna [Alambana] pratyayaH / indriyavijJAnagRhItatvAt / tanmanovijJAnaM svato bAhyArthagrahaNasvabhAva[zcet / tadA badhirAndhAdInAmabhAvaH syAt / anumAnavirodhi ca indriyAntaram / adhikarUpanirAkaraNasya iSTatvAt / tathA manovijJAne na punarAgrahaH / cakSurAdivijJAnAni 'rUpamAzritya "AkAravanti / anAvaraNamakriyAsvabhAvamAtram / . ato'bhAvaH svayamabhyupagamyate / tathaiva 1 karaNaM manaH / tadAlambanaM 1pratyakSamAvi / grAhyasvabhAvatvena atyantaviSamagatitvAt / tadAlambanatAnirAkaraNaM samyak manyAmahe / tena ca tadAzrayatAnirAkaraNam / samakAlInazaktirUpendriyaM tatkalpayiSyati / athApi Aha / bAhyArtha iti / Or vyavasthA. "Lit. abhyAsakAryajJAna. 9 tsun-huai, to preserve and cherish. 1deg Lit. rUpAzrayapratyayAni. " Lit. pradezavanti. 1" pen=root, mUla, etc. 13 The translation (tadAlambanaM . . * kalpayiSyati) is tentative.

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AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA .23 etadvayatiriktamarthAntaramastIti gRhyate / tat tadviparItaM prakAzayati / prakAzitazca so'rthAntaragrahaNayogyatvAt artha iti ucyate / kathamucyate samagrI pratItyeti / na hi sAmagrI dravyaM yujyate / [yattarhi tathAgatasatyaM dUSyeta iti / tat svataH pUrvottarayuktiviruddham / mama tu kA hAniH / dravyaM sAmagrIcca pratItya iti svIkRtatvAt / doSAntaramapi vivakSitaM syAt / ato'yaM doSo'pi parihIyate / paramANuM vA kalpayanti / iti / yadyapi paramANuH samadayamAtraniruddho dRSTaH / tathApi dravyadvayaM pratyayaH na saGghAtaH / yathA rUpAdIni indriyANAM vartamAnaviSayA api asaMkIrNAH / indriyazakteH pratiniyatatvAt / naSTe'pi dravye sattAsamartha vyaNukamAlambanaM sidhyati / tatkAraNatvAditi / tasya cakSurAdivijJAnasya kAraNatvAt / taddhi avayavArthasannikarSasamuttham / tathAcAhuH / tadAlambanArthoM vijJAnasya jananahetuH sarvapratyayavRttitvAt / tatsaGghAtaM vA / iti / tadvAdino vadanti / paramANubhAvyasamudAyastadAlambanamiti / tadAbhavijJAnasya jAyamAnatvAt / iti / saGghAtasya etadjJAnajananAt nizcIyate sa Alambanamiti / yathAha kazcit / 'yat vijJAnaM tadAkArayuktaM, so'sya viSaya iti / imau " Lit. yadi

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AlambanaparIkSA dvau vAdinau AhatuH / tadAkArayuktatvaheturnocyate / hetutvAdisAdhanahetvAderiva asya hetodRSTAnto nAstIti cet / paramANusAmAnyalakSaNamAlambanaM tatsAdhayati / na ca vijJAnasya bahirdravyaM pratyayaH / iti yadi sva[pakSaM] svIkaroSi / [tadA] dharmiNAM svalakSaNavirodhaH syAt / tathA na dharmAnuzaMsanaM prasidhyet / yat idaM parasya saMmataM tadeva dRSTAntIkriyate / iti yathoktameva iti cet / sAdhye'pi tatsamAnam / iti / pramANAgramanaskastu Aha / vAdamUlaM hetudvayaM yena hetunA viditam / sAdhAraNasiddhadRSTAntAbhAvAt naivAstyayaM hetuH / ataH kena tathA tadAkArayogaheturbhavet / ___ atha punaH svavAdasya yuktiravyabhicAriNI pradarzayiSyate / paJcamIvibhaktinirdezena parasaMmatiH prakAzitA / yadyapi kAraNam / iti / yathAsaMmatam / "anupalabhyamAnapadArthasya asattvAt paramANurakAraNam / kintu paramANukAyasya tatkAraNatA tathApi kevalamasaMyuktasya AlambanatA ucyte| tadAkAra[vijJAna]bhAvAt / iti / paramANvAkAra ityetadAha / indriyavijJAnasya paramANuna viSayaH akSavat iti / yathA indriyaM vijJAnasaMnikarSAzrayaheturapi na tadviSayaH / anindriyAkAratvAt / tathA paramANurapi / atadAkArA na tadviSayA iti yat / tadarthamAha / .. 1 Lit. virodhadoSaH 16 Kar. 1, a-b. Lit. avidyamAna

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AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA sa viSaya ityAdi / sa svabhAvo yaduta svasamAnAkAra pratyAyananirdhAraNam / kathaM punastatpratIyate / tadAkAratayA" jAyamAnatvAt iti / etanmano vacanam / tadAkArasarUpaM vijJAnamudeti / [yat ] 3degtadAnurUpyaM tattu tadviSayapratyAyanamucyate / vastuto vijJAnaM vinA vijJeyAntarasyAsataH vijJAnotpAdakahetutA kutaH / tathApi astyeva pUrva viSayAkAraH / sa tadAtmani Adarza bimbavadargyate / idameva tadviSayapratyAyakatvena saMmatam / dvayaNukasvarUpaM tu vijJAnAkAraM nAnuvartate / yena paramANurapi viSayaH syAt / kAraNamapi iti / naitAvatA kAraNamAlambanam / akSavat iti / kAraNatve'pi nAlambanam / yadi kAraNatvena AlambanaM svIkriyate / indriyamapi etatsamAnaM "tat sAdhayet / tadAkArayuktatvahetorasiddhidoSaH pUrvamukta eva ityuktaM bhavati / tathA ca mano na kevalaM kAraNatayA prathate / indriyatayA AlambanAkAratayApi / yadyuktarItyA kAraNaM sAdhayasi / tadA tasya kAraNatvAt kathamAlambanatvam / indriyasyApi [kAraNatva] masti Is Lit. pratyeta. 1 Lit. tadAkAravat 10 Lit. tadrUpAnusaraNAt 21 = vijJAnAtmani 2 = Alambanam

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26 AlambanaparIkSA [AlambanatvaM syAt ] ityanaikAntikadoSaH sidhyati / yadyapyevam / tathApi nAyaM doSaH / atadAbhatayA iti / kimarthamidam / svapratijJAprasAdhanArtham / na parapakSadoSakathanamAtreNa svArthaH sidhyati / svavijJAnAkArAjanakatvAt na viSayaH paramANuzcakSurAdivat / iti pratipAdanArthamidaM vacanam / yadi idaM taddhetutAvacanam , zAstrakAraH parapakSaM puraskRtya parasAdhAraNaM mataM vizadayati iti bhavet / tadA parapratiSedhe manaH prakAzya siddhadUSaNaH tadvacanaM pratikSipet / tadaikAntikaH pakSaH svIkriyate / anaikAntikaH parapakSaH asaMmatizaGkI / pUrva paraH anaikAntikadUSaNamutthApayati / kathaM duSTaM svapakSAnumAnaM kalpayasi / prAkRtajanA vadanti / vyabhicAri aniyatamasAdhanamiti / tat saMdehaprApakam / tasmAt anyat pramANaM sthApanIyam / atadAbha itIdaM anirdhAritasvabhAveSu paramANuSu kadAcit syAt / yathAkAraM vijJAnamudetIti yanirdhAraNam / tadabhAvAt spaSTaM jJAyate nirdhAraNasyApyasyAnavakAza iti / anirdhAritasvabhAvavacanaucityAt / tatkAraNaM nAlambana mindriyaparamANuvat iti kevalaM bhavati / anye'pi vijJAnakaraNavizeSAH cakSurvijJAnasAdhanAni prathante na punaH paramANusvarUpapratyAyakAH / atadAkAratvAt / indriyavijJAnavat vijJAnAntarANi vAcyAni / akSavadvacanaM vastutaH pradarzanArtham / dRSTAntAntaramapyarthApattyA Apatati / idaM kAraNatAyA vacanamapi apArthakam / iti / Lit. puraHsAdhayitvA for parasaMmatam

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Alambana parIkSAvyAkhyA 25 " yathA tasya kAraNavRttitve'pi nAlambanatA / evaM sArthakamidam / zabdAdisarvaparamANavaH anyendriya vijJAnajananakAraNAni mA bhUvanniti / kazcidAha / vijJAnasya svarUpama saMGghAtatvopalambhAt nAlambanam / indriyaparamANuvat iti / vijJAne viSayAkArArpaNAdhInA tadAkAratA / itye tadasaMbhavAt yujyata eva tasyAsaMghAtopalambhaH / evaJca na paramANava Alambanam / iti kathitam / tasya sAdhanamanAkAratvAt pramANasaMsiddhAviSayatvAcca iti / tarhi saMghAto viSayo'stu / uktabhAvAnAM sAdhanena yadi pakSa - sthApanaM vAJchasi [tadA ] asiddhatA syAt ityayaM nyAya: 1 26 saMghAtastadAkArayukto'pi iti / 25 AlambanaM bhavet / na kAraNatvam / 26 28 tadAkArAdvijJAnaM na jAyate / iti / saMghAtAkArakaM " saMghAtavijJAnam / na sa [ saMghAtaH ] tadvijJAnaM janayati / kathamayaM tatpratyayaH / AlambanalakSaNAyogAt nAstyAlambanArthaH / pUrvoktasya tu tadAkArayogo'siddhaH / tathA cet kimAlambanalakSaNam / 27 sarvo'rthaH tatsamAnasvarUpaM vijJAnamutpAdayatIti yujyate iti / Lit. tathA or evam Lit. ityevaM nyAyatattvam 27 Lit. akAraNatvAt 28 = yadAbhAsA na tasmAt sA, Kar. 2, a. 29 Lit. ajanakasaMghAta *

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AlambanaparIkSA 80 viSayavijJAnamanusRtya sa eva janakaH sa evAlambanam / kecidAhuH / sarvo'rthazcittacaittAnAM kAraNaM ityavazyaM yujyate / eta evotpadya yathAviSayagrahaM zabdena vyavahIyante / ' anAdikAlamime Alambana viSayA AkhyAyante / yadIdaM dvividhalakSaNaM, tadbhAgayuktamAlambanaM bhavati / jamakatAyAM satyAmAlambanArthaH / Agame uktaM / asmin sati idaM bhavati iti pratItyasamutpannatAyA abhidhAnam / iti / 28 tadvijJAnotpattikAraNamutpattipratyaya iti ayaM tadAlambanArthaH sammataH / svalakSaNamupalabhyate / nAtrAdhikamasti ityatastannocyate / 3 saMghAto notpAdakaH, " dravyAbhAvAt / iti / sa saMghAto na dravyam / tasya saMghAtina ekatvAnyatvAbhyAmanirvacanIyatvAt / na cAdravyabhUtasya " utpattikriyAzaktiH saMbhavati / 33 dvicandravat" / iti / yathA dvitIyazcandraH na dvitIyacandra vijJAnasyotpAdakaH / kiM tarhi tadAkArapratibhAsakAraNam / indriyavaikalyAt / iti / yadA cakSurindriyaM timirAdyupahataprakAzakam / tadA indriyavaikalyAt dvicandradRSTibharvati natu vastutvena / 30 Lit. anekakAla 0 31 More lit. yadyarthaH dvividhalakSaNasaMpannaH tadA tadbhAgayoga AlambanaM nAma bhavati. 32 Kar. 2. b. 33 Lit. utpattiphalakakriyA *

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AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA dvicandra[darzana]sya tadAbhatve'pi na tasya viSayo'sti / iti| dvicandravat / tadvijJAnasya tadAkArayuktatve'pi anutpAdakatvAt na sa viSaya AkhyAyate / "tadvat saMghAtaH dravyato'sattvena tadvijJAnasya na kAra Nam / iti / adravyatvAt dvicandravat / tadaM zasyAkAraNatvasiddheH / nAlambanam / iti / dvicandravat ityAvartyate / dvicandradRSTAntena tadAkArahetoranaikAntikadoSo jJeyaH / vijJAnArthasya nyAyasiddhatvAt virodhadoSazca / cakSuH pratItya vijJAnaM bhavati / na nIlAdisaMghAtaM paramANuM vA / tenAjanitatvAt anyendriyavijJAnavat / ayaM dRSTAntaH sarvasaMmataH / ato'nyo nocyate / . dvicandradRSTAntasya adravyatvAt sa akAraNatAyAM bhavan tAM sAdhayati iti jJeyam / yathoktasya sAkAratve'pi na sa viSayo'sti / tadvacanaM punastatkAraNathai vinaiva bhavati / dvitIyazcandro nAsti kathamAkAradvayaM pratyakSaM dRzyate iti vadasi cet / tathA hi / antarvartizaktivizeSAt tatkrameNa tatsamAnAkAraM vijJAnaM pravartate / yathA supto viSayAn pazyati / tato mithyAkAritrANi tAni adhyavasyati / [evaM] taccandre anyamAropya pshyti| 34 Add here in the Chinese text the character ju "as" *" fang = aMza or bhAga? Lit. dRSTAntamAdAya.

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AlambanaparIkSA kecidAhuH / cakSurvijJAnayoH sahopalambhe kramikAvasthAnadUSaNAt te samakAlaM vyApriyate / dvividhAkAraitatpAThikaM manovijJAnaM bhavati candradvayaM pazyAmIti / anyaH kazcidAha / [ekatvena] sarvasaMmate candre saMkhyAviparyayaH / indriyavaikalyAt / yadi bAhyArthapakSaM necchasi / tadA sthUladRSTirabhimAnamAnaM syAt / [iti / na hi cakSurvijJAnAlambanasamanantaraM manovijJAnaM pravartate / ekakAlameva sahobhayAkAraM pratItya pravartate / kathaM tadAdhyavasIyate candradvayaM pazyAmIti / zabdAdipratyayatadvijJAnayoranantaraM zabdadvayopalambha aikakAlikaH kuto na jJAyate / svasthanetrasya manovijJAnaM kramikamapi duradhyavasAyam / kiM nizritya rUpendriyavijJAnaprameyatadvizeSA bahavo bhAvA sidhyanti / ekaM candraM dvidhA samanupazyAmi iti yadA vijJAnAtiriktaM dravyaM svIkaroti / so'pi kiM kRtvA vadet candradvayabhrAmakaM saMkhyAviparyayam / vijJapte barbAhyadvayam / paramANoH saMghAtasya ca ekAGgavaikalyAt yathoktasAdhanakhaNDanayuktibalAcca / tadviSayakaM na yuktam / ekAGgavaikalyAt / svAkArapratibhAsa utpAdakatA cetyetadvayaMzamAlambanam / paramANorAdhAgabaikalyam / dvitIyapakSe dvitIyAnahAniH / yathAvicAritapUrva doSadvayaM punarai bhedaM grAhayati // 3 Kar. 2. c. 38 Kar. 2. d. 39 Ie. vijJAnArthayoH

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31 AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA saJcitAkAramicchanti kecana'' iti / paramANuSu pratyekaM saJcitAkAro'sti / sa eva sthUlaviSayaH paramANUnAM taratamabhAvamanusRtya sAkAraH pratibhAsate / sa ca vastusan / paramANoH saJcitAkAraH svAkAravijJAnajanakaH dravyatvAt AlambanaM syAt / asya tu ubhayAGgavattvAt / sa ca pUrva siddha eva / kuto vi kalpyate kiM saJcitAkAraH paramANureva kiM vA na tathA iti / sarvo'rtho bahvAkAra iti / ta evANavo'NvAkArAH saJcitAkArAzca svIkRtAH / kathamekaM vastu dvayAkAraM nyAyyam / bahvAkArAH sarvabhAvAH rUpasamudAyarUpAH pRthivyAdicaturmahAbhUtAtmakAH / te svabhAvato viziSTazaktiyuktAH / nIlavarNAdyAkAraH dravyavartI indriyavartI ca vibhinnaH pratItaH / so'pi bahvAkAreSu paramANau asti saJcitAkAraH / asyaivAkArasya cakSurAdivijJAnagocaratvAt pratyakSatvam / yadyevam / aNUnAM vijJAnaM saJcitAkArakamiti kiM nAha / aNuH saJcitAkAraH / kiM nAha vijJAnaM saJcitAkAramiti / kena punarAha ____ paramANuSvasti saJcitAkAra iti / 40 Lit. vadanti 41 Kar. 3, a.b. 4' Lit. abhAvagatyA or abhAvavidhayA pRlayate / 4. Lit. aNau

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32 AlambanaparIkSA idaM vacanameva tatprayogAtmakaM sat pradarzayati vijJAnaM paramANusaJcitAkAramityapi / tathA cet dvayaNukaM tadAkArakam / kasmAt saJcitAkArakam / rUpaparamANusaMghAtA vibhinnA etacchAstrasvIkRtAH / ta eva saJcitatvAt na dravyasantaH iti pUrvavat pradarzitam / kimartha punarvacanam / astyAzayAntaram / vastuni vibhinnarUpe'pi ayamAkAraH saJcayamAtrasaMmizrita iti pratyetavyam / vivicya kathane saMJcitAkAro na ziSyate / kiJca yadyapi sarvabhAvAH paramANusaMghAtAtmakAH / tathApi ekaikasya vastunastAratamyamasti / *"yathAvastu tatpazyAmaH / yathA ca 'nIlarUpaM tatpRthivIdhAtuH / ' evamAdi tattvavacanaM nyAyyam / evamabhyupagame vastUni *"atyantAbhAva (?) vat utpatteH prAg atimAtrAsambhavamanuvarteran / saMbhavasthalaM nizritya kRto'yaM mithyAvyavahAraH / tathA cet kathaM paramANavo nendriyadRSTAH / kathaM vA punastathatAjJAnamAtradarzanAH paramANavaH / aNvAkAro na vijJapterarthaH / iti / nAyamindriyajavijJapteviSaya ityanindriyaH / anindriyArthaH kevalaM tthtaajnyaanbhaavitH| kA punaryuktiH / na hi pratyakSataH paramANvAkAro dRSTaH / kaThinatAdivat / yathA kaThinazItatAdi / tatra nIlAdi vastusadapi na cakSurAdivijJaptiviSayaH / " = dvayaNuka0 45 = prativastu ** Chi, extremely i chih, (R. 155) empty. This means also" red" rakta.

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33 AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA indriyazakteH pratiniyatatvAt / evmnnurpi| na sarvasammatibAdhaH / nanu aNurbhAtu na kaThinatA / svabhAvAntaratvAt / ucyate / bhautikamAtradazAyatanasAdhAraNyena pakSadharmaH svIkRtaH / ata idaM vacanamaduSTam / tathAyamuktaH / "ghaTazarAvAdimatiriti / ____ evaM pazyataste ghaTe zarAve ca niSpannA indriybuddhiH| . samA dRshyet"| - vijJapteH svaviSaye bhedAbhAvAt / indriyabuddheH purovartiviSayamanusRtya AkArodayAcca / kathaM jJAyate vijJaptiviSayo na bhidyate iti / na ghaTazarAvAdInAM bahuSu paramANuSu vizeSo'sti / idaM vacanamAha / yadyapi paramANavaH saJcitAkAreNa viSayA bhavanti / naivAsti tu ghaTAdisvarUpaprakAzakAle bahuSu saMghAteSu avayavavizeSarUpam / teSAM vAstavAkArAt bahiH vizeSasaJcitAkArasyAnupalambhAt / tatpratItya niSpannA indriyavijJaptirabhinnAkArA syAt / anenAMzena aNusvarUpe AlambanatA sidhyati / na punaH teSAmavizeSAkAre pratyavamarzasya pratyayaH / adhyavasAyAntaratvAt / yathA nIlAdi pratItya / AkArabhedAr3heda ucyate cet / / * Kar.4 a-b. " More lit. svaviSaye vijJapyabhedAt . 49 Kar.4 c.

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34 51 AkAraH bhedakalpakaM bimbam / 52 satyaM yujyate / nendriyavijJaptidRSTaviSaye paramANavo bhinnA bhavanti / yadyapi ayaM 52 saMghAtaH sAMvRtaH / tathApi na sa saMghAtaH [ aNuza: ] vibhidyamAnaH indriyavijJaptiviSayo'sti / na punaravizeSaviSaya: " vibhinnavijJAnAkArasya kArako yujyate / kathaM jJAyate paramANuSu AkArabhedo nAstIti / paramANvAkRtibhedAbhAvAt / 54 AlambanaparIkSA ghaTazarAvayo grIvodarapAdAdibhirbhinnAkAratvAt / viSayavazena vizeSabuddhirapi vibhinnAnuvartate / sarve padArthA ssAvayavA ityavazyamavayave AkArabhedaH saMbhavati / paramANUnAM svarUpaM tu niraMzamatisUkSmam / kathamasyAkArabhedo labhyeta / 53 Kar. 5a. 53 50 51 'nAyaM vastu" / 50 Lit. evam. * Kar. 4d. Lit. savizeSaviSayaH asan, Or dravyavizeSeSu. ekarUpasyAsya upacayApacayAbhAvAt / ghaTazarAvAdiSu dravyAntare svaipi paramANusvabhAve bhedo nAsti /

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AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA 35 5 ato jJAyate saMghAte na vastubhAvo'sti / iti / sarvamavayavi AropitAkAraM nendriyvijnyaangocrH| evaM tAvat purastAdAgataM saMghAtA AkArabhedapradarzakatayA iSyamANAH parIkSya dUSitA iti / ato ghaThazarAvAdibuddhayo na bhinnavastvAlambanaviSayakAH / sukhaduHkhavedanavat / tathA ca paramANavo na viSayabhedakAH / AkArazca na tadviSayarUpam / AkArabhedAdavayavabheda ucyate cet / idaM vAkayaM na avizeSavastu viSayo bhavati iti vaktumiSTaM siddhasAdhanam / te hi manyante / paramANuvastuto'bhinnaviSayaH / tathApi AkArabhedAr3hedaH iti / paramANurabhinna iti mamApi saMmatam / ataH siddhasAdhanam / paramANupramANabhedAbhAvAt itIdaM vAkyaM] vastubhedaH arthabhedaka ityasya asiddhiM pradarzayati / atha vA idaM dyotayati / ghaTazarAvAdIndriya vijJAnAnAM paramANvAkaratvAbhAvAt nAstyAlambanaM paramANuH] yathAnyavijJAnasya / mano vA anyendriyavijJAnaM vA anyavijJAnamucyate / nIlapratyaye pItAkArAbhAvAt / iti / paramANUnAM saMghAtarUpe avizeSe'pi indriyavijJAnAnAM vizeSAkAratvAt ayaM tAvat nANvAkRti Kar. 5b. " Then follows another interpretation (Chinese Editor). " Lit. vacanam . 5 Lit: asiddhiprativacanam .

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36 AlambanaparIkSA rUpamiti saMsidhyati / zloke paramANUnAM vizeSavacanaM vA anupUrveNa pRSThA prativaktavyam / yadi saMghAto vyatyastAkAraH svIkriyate / AkAro na dravyamiti nyAyasAdhyam / evaM nyAyavizeSaH sAdhayitavyaH / 6degaNUnAM parihAre ityaadi| degyadA te [aNavaH] parihiyante tadA tabuddhyabhAvAt / senAdivat ghaTAdivacanaM. na dravyam / ato dravyato nAsti / idaM pakSAntarapradarzanam - yAni] [ya] dravyavihInAni na santi / na tAni] tayAvartakAni iti / ayamAkAravizeSaH vyatyastAkArabhUtaH ghaTAdiviSayakatvAditi vastuviruddham / yathA zabdAdau sati na nIlabuddhirasti / yadyapi saMghAto gRhyate anyat dRzyate iti yuktam / tathApi paramANusvarUpe vizeSo'stIti padarzayitumatyantamazakyam // ___yat ] "antteyruupm / iti svapakSe Alambanavastu sAdhyate / yadi, sAmAnyato vibhAge nAstyAlambanam / tadA lokavirodhaH svapakSasya doSaH / sUtre caturvidhAnAM pratyayAnAmuktatvAt / tatra antazzabdaH vijJAnaM vinA AlambanaM nAstIti pradarzanArtham / jJeyapadaM grAhyAMzaH vijJAnapariNAmaH viSayAkAro'rthoM bhavati See Paramartha's version, vrtti ad Kar. 5. 60 = aNUnAM parihAre tadAbhajJAnaviplavAt . Kar. 5c-d. Here I have changed the punctuation in the Chinese text so as to suit the sense. 62 Kar.6a.

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37 AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA iti [pradarzayati / ato vijJAne bAhyavikalpo viSayatvena sthApito gRhyate / lokavirodhaH punaH pUrvavadvartate / laukikAnAM hi saMmataM viSayasya bahirvartanamiti / [ataH] ucyate bahirvaditi / sa vijJAnaM vinA nAsti / tasya grAhyAMzaH bahirvadavabhAsate / viSayaM pazyAmIti vacanamAbhimAnikaM, vastutastaddhetukam / yathA kezAdyavabhAsi cAkSuSavijJAnam / bAhyArthe'vidyamAne'pi / . bAhyArtho vastuto nAsti / apratItatvAt / na hi yuktyA vicAre niyatatatsvarUpaM bahiH pratIyate / yadyapi bAhyalakSaNaM vastusat iti te svIkurvanti / tathApi na tit ] vijJAnAlambanaM bhavati / atadAkAratvAt na paramANvAkAro'vabhAsate / bAhyAkAravadavabhAsamAnamidamAlambanapratyayaH / / tadAkArayuktatvAt / yat [yad-] AkArayuktaM tat tadeva / yathA kAraNatAdiH svAkArayuktaH / punarAlambanasya vizeSasvarUpaM pradarzayati / yathAha / "vijJAnasya tadAkAravattvAdityAdi / 3 Kar.6b. st This sentence will literally read : yadi AkArayuktatvAt tat tadeva / yathA kAraNatAdiH svAkArayuktatvAt . ts = vijJAnarUpatvAt , etc. Kar. 6c-d.

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38 AlambanaparIkSA mithyAbhUtaM bAhyavastu viSayatayA nAstIti spaSTam / yathAtarkitaM viSayAkAro'nuvartate / yataH tarkitaM vijJAnamuktaJcat bahirnAsti / .. tadviSayAkAro vijJAnaM vinA svato nAsti / tena antteyruupmityaakhyaa / atra antazzabdo vijJAnaM vinA nAstIti vadati / tadvahiH svata avidyamAnamantaH iSyate / tata utpadyate ca / sa bhAgaH jAyate tata eva] kadAcit / paJcasaptatipadArthasya savizeSatvAt / jJeyaM vinA vijJAnaM nAstItyataH sa eva bhAgaH vijJAnajanitaH / na paJcama [pratyayajanita] ucyate / dharmadvayaviziSTatvAta / . sa AlambanaM, nyAyayuktatvAt / [anena] sAdhanaM pradarzitamiti . spaSTam / idaM sAdhAraNAkAraM "jJeyameva sAdhanaM bhavati / yadi viziSTa[-AkAraM], tadvijJAnasya na bAhyavastu AlambanaM, yathA] svapnAvasthAyAM prakAzamAnam / yathoktadviprakAramekaM sAdhanaM bhavati / vijJAnaM tadAkAravat punarvijJAnajanakaJca / ime dve vRttI pratItya bhAga ekaM pramANaM sidhyati / . antassadeva iti svIkAre'pi / it In the Chinese text (Nankin Ed.) we have to read mo "plan" for shui "who", as in the page 3b, line last. 67 =vijJAnasya. 65 Or farizata, yu-pieh. ty Lit. viSaya or artha. 70 = sAdhanam . More lit. sa AntarAkAra, etc. '

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AlambanaparIkSAvyAkhyA 39 bAhyArthasya mithyAbhUtAkArasya parIkSitatvAdeva nAsti' bhUmilakSaNam / yathAvikalpaM viSayo vedyate / viSayAkArastu antarvartI nyAyyo bhaviSyati / kathaM tadekAMzaH sahajAtaH pratyayaH / grAhyAMzasya vijJAnaM vinA abhAvAt asya ekAMzaH punarvijJAnaM janayati / tadA sidhyati svarUpavirodhadoSaH / punastadekAMzatvAt / grAhakAMzavat / asya hi tadA janakatA na sidhyati / vijJAnaM kevalaM bAhyAkArakliSTaM pravartate / sa evAkArAMzo vijJAnasahajAtaH / na dvayoH samakAlInayoH kAryakAraNabhAvo'sti / yathA zRGgadvayam / kizca na tadabhinna vastu ekakAlaM ''sahavartate [ityucyate] / sahazabdastu tatsaMyogavAcI / nApi vijJAnabhinno viSayo'stItyucyate / asya tu kathaM sahajAtatvamityAkhyA / satyamevam / tathApi AkAravizeSabalAt tat bhinnaM vyAkRtya nirucyate / dRzyAMzAkArAMzayorbhedo'stIti tat vijJAnaM savizeSaM gRhyate / yadyevam / pratyayatvameva grAhyaM syAt / na vikalpitaM vastu sasvabhAvam / tadA asya sidhyet apratyayatvam / idamaviruddham / anyagrAhyavizeSaviSayasyAyaM pratyaya iti sarvasaMmatam / yathA samanantaranirodhaH / sabhAgavijJAne * nirudhyamAne tadeva vijJAnaM caturvidhaiH pratyayaiH pratyayo bhavati // 72 bhumi, ti Mearth' is probably an error for anya, ta, " another " as has been noted by the Chinese Editor. 13 Or sahajAtasya. 4 Lit. sahavartamAnaM sahazabdena tatsaMyuktamucyate. ' * Lit. pratyayasvabhAva. 76 Here ends the Chinese text. The Chinese Editor notes that the commentary on remaining portion of the text is not known.

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE ALAMBANAPARIKSA WITH COPIOUS EXTRACTS FROM VINITADEVA'S COMMENTARY A TREATISE ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECT-[-CAUSE] OF CONSCIOUSNESS ADORATION TO ALL BUDDHAS AND BODHISATTVAS! THOSE who accept that there exists an external thing which serves as the object-cause (alambana) of the consciousness of the eye, etc. imagine either atoms to be [the ultimate object]; because they serve as causes of the consciousness; or aggregates of atoms; because the consciousness arises representing the image of the aggregates. Now [says the author:] 1. Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness (vijnapti) of the sense-organs, they are not its actual objects like the sense-organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms.

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42 ALAMBANAPARIKNA [As regards the nature of] the object, [declares the author,] consciousness grasps only the form of its own ; because it arises in that form '. Though the atoms are causes of consciousness, they do not possess the form reflected in consciousness just like the sense-organs. Therefore they cannot become its actual objects (alambana). Though: aggregates of atoms are alike the image of consciousness, [they cannot become its actual objects ;] because 2a. The consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it. What object produces the consciousness endowed with the image of the object, is properly said to be the actual The following extracts are translations from the French of Vinitadeva's commentary on the Alambanapariksa. They are first translated into French from the Tibetan version of the commentary by Mrs. Susumu Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, and incorporated into their French translations of the Alambanapariksa published in the Journal Asiatique, Jan.-Mar. 1929. [The opponent says:] If consciousness were not capable of being what possesses the form of atoms; it could perceive itself. Why will not (then) the atoms, while producing the perception, become the object (visayir)? The author replies the following. Speaking otherwise, beyond the production of the form of object, consciousness cannot conceive the object (visaya). That is to say, if a consciousness does not manifest itself under one form particularly adapted (pratiniyata) to the atoms, how can it conceive their proper existence ? [And] if it does not conceive (the atoms), how can they (atoms) become the object ? Though (the organ] is the cause (that produces consciousness), it is not capable of being the object itself; because the consciousness which is born of this (organ] does not grasp the proper nature of the organ. In order to refute the opinion of the opponent who maintains that the aggregate is the object (artha), the author says the following: (r) [The opponent asks :) When one understands that (the representation is not produced by this aggregate, why could not

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 43 object? (alambana) of the consciousness; because that alone is spoken of [in the S'astra] as the productive cause of consciousness. But the aggregates of atoms are not so (i.e. do not give rise to consciousness) ; 26. 10 Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon ". The double moon is perceived [by a man] on account of defects of his sense-organs. But [this perception is not produced by the double moon, as] there exists no object like the double moon. Similarly the aggregates of atoms do not exist in substance and cannot act as causes of consciousness. Hence they are not its actual objects. : 2c-d. Thus both the external things are unfit to be real objects of consciousness. this (aggregate] be the perceivable object (alambana)? The author replies the following. When consciousness occurs according to the form of the object and this object produces consciousness, this object (artha) is capable of being the perceivable object (alambana). The following is reply to the question: Why is that which produces (consciousness) only the perceivable object ? The Sastra explains further that this object (artha) which is the cause (hetu) of the production of the mind and mental things (cittacaitta) and which gives the designations (vyavahara) to this object (artha) when the mind and mental things have been produced, is (precisely) the perceivable object (alambana). 10 This is reply to the question: Why is not the aggregate what produces (the representation ? "For example, since a second moon does not exist in substance (dravyatas), it is not capable of being the object (bhava) of the cause of the perception (jnana) which appears as if it is a second moon: in the same way the aggregate is no longer the cause of the perception which appears as if it is (the aggregate] itself.

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44 ALAMBANAPARIKSA The external things, atoms and their aggregates cannot serve as the actual objects of consciousness, as both of them are defective in one or other respect." .3a-b. 13 Some [acaryas] hold that the combined form of atoms (sancitakara) is the cause of consciousness. All" things are possessed of many forms; they are perceived in one or other form of many. Even in atoms, therefore, there exists the aspect which produces the consciousness possessed of the combined form 16. ? That is, (1) when, for the thesis of atoms, though there is causality (hetutva), there is no form (akara), and (2) when, for the thesis of aggregate, though there is form, there is no causality. Having thus refuted these two theses, the author examines a third thesis of some of the advocates of the external things (bahyartha), viz., Vagbhata, etc. 14 What does it matter what exists in atoms, they all exist substantially (drar yatas). Therefore, since they exist substantially, the state of combination (sancitakara) is capable of being itself the cause of knowledge (vijnana). The atoms are thus the object (visaya) in another manner. [The author asks of these opponents :) Is it not that the character of atoms is well-known to be very subtle ? [Now] where is found in these [very subtle atoms) such a state of combination (sancita kara)? How can there be two contradictory characters in a single (thing] ? (The opponents reply :) All the material things are composed of four great elements (caturmahabhuta) and since these latter possess the characters of colour, of odour, etc., there is what possesses several characters. Just as there are several characters in the atoms which are composed of four great elements, so also there are several characters in the state of combination. Thus all things have several characters, but one cannot see all of them at the same time. Because their powers being differently affected, the organs cannot cognise all the objects (artha) at the same time. 10 Having proved that in the atoms there is the combination, one, further proves that in the atoms there is the cause which

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION : 45 3c-d. The 17 atomic form does not become the object of consciousness just like the attributes such as solidity, etc. Just as the attributes, solidity and others, though existent in atoms, are not perceived by the visual consciousness, so also the atomic form ". 4a-b. In that case, the [different] perceptions of a pot, cup, etc. will be identical ''. Though the atoms of a pot are greater in number and that of a cup [less], there exists no distinction whatever amongst the atoms ". produces the perception manifesting itself as if it is a combination. It is, one asserts, the two parts of the perceivable objects (alambanasya dvibhaga) which lack in the two lprevious] propositions. When one says that the existence of cause produces the perception, he asserts the causality. When one says that what manifests itself as if a combination (produces the perception), he supposes the form, and he proves the reality (astitva) of the state of combination. 17 If there is in the atoms the state of combination which is their gross character, how can one call them atoms? [The opponent continues the following). 16 It is so because the powers of the organs are differently affected (pratiniyata). Likewise, though there are atoms) they are no longer (capable of being object of the visual perception). 19 The author, wishing to refute the third proposition, asks: What state of combination do you want to assert in the atoms?, (and he adds :) In all cases, it is well-known that the vase and cup, etc., are combinations (of atoms). In such case, what state exists in the atoms? If you say : "It is the state of vase," the perception of vase will arise in all the combinations of the cup, etc. If you say: "It is the state of the cup," the perception of the cup will arise in all (the combinations of the vase, etc.). Therefore the [different] perceptions (prthagbuddhi) called in certain case" perception of the vase " and in some other case "perception of the cup" will not arise. 20 The opponent says: With regard to the vase, atoms are numerous : with regard to the cup, they are a few; one recognises

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46 ALAMBANAPARIKSA 4c. If [the opponent says that] the perception differs in accordance with differences in the forms of the pot and others ; If you think that the parts of the pot, etc. neck, etc. (and that of the cup] are different, whereby these differentiating elements differentiate their respective cognitions. True, this differentiating element exists in the pot, etc. 4d-5a. But it never exists in the atoms which exist in substance, because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimensions ?. Though" the atoms are different in substance, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic size " (parimandalya). equally atoms either many or a few in other cases; therefore there exists a distinction (vis'esa) of perception made by "many" or "a few". The author replies : The distinction in the perception (buddhivises a) is not capable of being made by "a few," or "many": for though in the vase there are many atoms and (a few] in the cup, however there is, when the question is the character of atoms, no difference which exists in itself. Therefore it will happen that in the case of numerous atoms, one will have a large vessel, and in the case of a few atoms, one will have a small one; but it will not happen that in the same state of combination the perception of the vase will arise in the case where there are many atoms, and that the perception of the cup will arise in the case where there are a few. 21 The difference is not found any longer in what is called the exiguous sphericity (parimandalya) of atoms. The opponent asks : Is it not that the atoms of the vase are precisely of one substance (dravya) other (than the cup), and that the atoms of the cup are also of one substance other (than the vase]? And how can one say that there is no difference in measure ? The author replies the following. 23 The difference in form does not reside in the atoms. Just as whatever they may be and however numerous they may be, they all exist in the substance, so whatever may be their measures, the atoms are all of an exiguous sphericity, and this sphericity of the atoms is

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47 ENGLISH TRANSLATION 56. Therefore the differentiation goes along with things substantially non-existent. The difference in forms lies only in the empirical things,95 but not in the atoms 26. The" pot and other things are only empirically true. 5c-d. For, if you remove one by one the atoms [of the pot, etc.] the perception illuminating the image of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away. Even " if that which is connected with them (sambandhin) is excluded, what substantially exist, do not cease to produce their own cognitions, as for example, the colour [blue,] " etc. precisely their unique character. Therefore how could one differentiate the perception [by means of] the difference of atoms? One will assert to this that the state of combination is gross. Now, since the atoms exist in substance, they ought to exist in " being which has no extension ", otherwise, if they had extension (digbhaga), they would not be capable of existing in substance. Therefore, since the atoms are not extended, wherefrom comes the difference of arrangement ? 24 Having thus refuted the difference of forms of atoms, the author concludes the following. ** Because they are extended. ** Because they are not extended. . ? According to the Vaislesikas, the vase, (cup), etc. are substantially existent. If the Vais'esika asks: How do you know that what are called vase, (cup), etc. exist by convention? The author replies the following. ? [The Vaislesika continues :) If one would exclude [entirely] the atoms one after another, the perception which possesses the representation of the vase, etc. having not arisen, how might it result form this that the vase, (cup), etc. might exist conventionally? The author replies the following. 29 If the vase, (cup) etc. were substantial beings, if even what is connected with them, was entirely excluded, they would not cease (to produced the perception (of colour, etc). [The Vaislesika replies :) If one excludes entirely the atoms one after another, the cohesion (samyoga) which produces (arambha)

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48 ALAMBANAPARIKSA It is 30, therefore, rationally deduced that the objects of different sensual cognitions do not exist externally. 6a-c. It is the object (artha) which exists internally in knowledge itself as a knowable aspect and which appears to us as if it exists externally. Though the external things are denied, what exists internally in knowledge itself [i.e. its knowable aspect] the substance, being destroyed, and [consequently, if] the vase is destroyed, is it not that the perception does not arise any more? What prevents the vase, [cup] etc. from being existent [substiantally] always (sarvada) and wherever this may be (sarvatra) [without their destruction]. [The author replies:] If the vase and other substantial things formed of parts (avayavidravya) exist beyond the atoms, when one says that the vase, [cup] etc. are constituted by atoms, is he willing to say (1) that the atoms exist in proper being as numerous as they may be, or (2) that they exist partly? In the [second] case, what is beyond the elements that produce one whole (avayavin) exists by means of a single element of this whole owing to which this [whole] is going to exist there; if [as in the first case] what is beyond the constituent elements does not exist that is going to exist in [its] proper nature [svarupena] howerer numerous the atoms may be; thus, the atoms as numerous as they may be, become one whole vase, [cup,] etc. consequently, when the unity component (that is to say the atoms) of the whole is destroyed, this whole does not exist any more substantially; because if it existed again, one would assert simultaneously several contradictory states (bhava). Having thus proved that three propositions are not capable of [demonstrating] that the external object is the perceivable object (alambana), [the author says] in conclusion: Since the atoms are not capable of being the perceivable object, therefore, etc. 30 Having thus refuted the principal doctrines of other schools whose proposed theories could be destroyed by means of wellestablished reasonings, the author, now, wishing to establish his principal doctrine on the perceivable object, says the following. 31 32 The opponent says: If there was no external object, is it not true that there would not be any conditional cause (pratyaya) of the perceivable object of consciousness? [The author replies :] Here, one is not in the error of non-existence of the conditional cause of the perceivable object; for,

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 49 and appears to us as though it is existent externally, serves as a condition of the actual object (alambanapratyaya) (to consciousness 3].. 6c-d. Because 34 consciousness is the essence [of the external object] and that [object essence of which is consciousness] acts as the condition [to conscious ness7.35 The internal consciousness appears as [manifold external] object (artha) and also arises from that [objective aspect of its own]. Thus the internal consciousness is endowed with two parts (i.e. image and cause) (which circumstance is absent in all the previous propositions] and therefore what exists internally in the consciousness (i.e. the objective aspect) is the object-condition (alambanapratyaya) to the consciousness. If only the objective appearance of consciousness is experienced, [it will be a part of the consciousness and appearing simultaneously with it]. How can a part of 33 For example, for the eye-diseased person (taimirika), appearances of hairs, flies, etc., appear in the perception with the forms of hairs, flies, etc., (real). Likewise, since the knowable aspect (grahya-bhaga) is capable of being characteristic of the object (artha), one calls it the conditional cause of the perceivable object (alambana). 3* Ths opponent asks again : Then how could the knowable aspect be the characteristic of the perceivable object? The author answers the following. 3. And also because, thanks to the maturity of impregnations (vasana=perfume) frequently repeated of the blue, yellow, etc., the perception (jnana) arises in possessing the characteristic of the blue, yellow, etc., this characteristic is the conditional cause of consciousness. 36 Mrs. S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, probably on the authority of Vinitadeva, translate this passage thus: As consciousness, [through the characteristics) of the object (artha) (which exists] internally (i.e., subjectively) (=the knowable aspect) possesses the characteristic of this object, this characteristic existing, the consciousness arises.

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50 ALAMBANAPARIKSA consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness 37 [itself] ? 38 7a. [Though the external object] is only a part [of the internal consciousness,] it is a condition (pratyaya) [to the consciousness], because it is invariably associated with the consciousness. [The objective aspect of consciousness,] though arising simultaneously with it, becomes condition to [the consciousness] which is produced by other [conditions]. "Logicians (naiyayika) say as below: The possession of existence (bhava) [by existence] and of non-existence (abhava) [by non-existence is the characteristic sign of successive productions of the cause and result, [this result] possessing the cause." 37 [The opponent says:] In all cases, one comprehends that what is perceivable internally existent (i.e., subjectvely) in the consciousness, be thus the appearance itself (=what appears). But, he will say, if this perceivable object (alambana) appears as an appearance designed (dessinee) by the character of what is perceivable (jneyakara), this perceivable object will be what appears at the same time as a part of this [appearance]. How could [such an appearance] be conditional cause (pratyaya) [of the object perceivable by the consciousness]? If it was possible, this would be oneself made by oneself " or, the knowable aspect (grahyabhaga) would produce the knowable aspect (grahyabhaga); horns of the right and left of the ox would themselves produce one by the other; this would be a formidable error (atiprasanga) [there]. 38 [To this objection the author replies the following]. 39 [The opponent says:] By means of discrimination of parts, it would be possible that oneself makes oneself, how would it be possible that it is what possesses the determinate cause (nimitta) without the confusion between the being of cause and of its result? The author replies the following. 10 That is to say, at the moment when the knowable aspect exists, the perception exists also; when it does not exist, [the perception] exists no more. Consequently these two [existences] which arise simultaneously are capable of being the cause and its result.

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 51 Or," 76. It becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force ? (sakti). It 43 is also possible successively that the objective appearance of consciousness (arthavabhasa), in order to give rise to a result homogeneous with itself, makes the force (sakti) seated in the [store-house] consciousness, and it is not contradictory "[to the reasoning). "Having thus explained that the existence (bhava) of the object (visaya) and the existence of that which perceives the object (visayin) exist at the same time, the author, now, explains that the existence of the object (visaya) and the existence of that which perceives the object (visayini) arise also successively (kramena). When the knowable aspect disposes (dispose) the dominant force, it objectivizes itself into a proper being which produces successively [consciousness]; for, while destroying itself, this knowable aspect deposits at this moment its dominant force on the Alayavijnana. If therefore this dominant force produces accompanying factors (sahakarin) at the second moment, it will produce a consciousness homogeneous with (the dominant force], but at this moment only. If the [dominant force] at this moment, does not produce the accompanying factors, when they arise in the third, fourth, or no matter what instant, this [dominant force], they having matured, will produce the same consciousness as this. * When one has this comprehension, he has no more difficulties "oneself is made by oneself" or "they arise at the same time" and others. Thus this blue and other [colours), the characteristics of the knowable aspect, which existed in the precedent perception produce the following perception which will have the characteristics of blue, yellow, red and other [colours]. 43 The opponent says: If the dominant force (s akti) produces the perception (jnana), the dominant force will be precisely the object (visaya), while the precedent knowable aspect will not be the object. [The author replies the following.] 44 If the dominant force is not determined (vyavasthita) [to the action] by the knowable aspect, this dominant force will not produce any more such perception. Consequently, since the perception

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52 ALAMBANAPARIKSA [The opponent says :) If only the self of consciousness constitutes the object-condition ; how should we explain [the saying that] the visual consciousness arises depending upon the eye and [form " (rupa)] ? [The author replies :) 7c-d. What is the sense-organ is [nothing but] the force itself (in consciousness] by virtue of its acting simultaneously [with the object] as an auxiliary cause (sahakarin) [for raising up of consciousness). The sense-organs are inferred from [the nature of] their results to be only the forces of consciousness, but never constituted of matters. 48 which is born of the dominant force, is also product of the knowable aspect, there is no any contradiction (virodha). [The idea that the interior] possesses two modalities is precisely possible according to the former proposition (paksa), for, the knowable aspect producing the perception similar to itself, [the interior possesses two modalities. 45 It is so because, the eye acting simultaneously with the force which had already appeared, had produced [visual] consciousness. But if the interior form had not appeared previously to the eye, how could it produce the visual consciousness in acting simulaneously with the interior form? 46 If the organs are made by elements, (as the Sarvastivadins assert,] there will be this difficulty raised by the opponent, but in our opinion, the proper nature of the dominant force (sakti) which one believes as the organ itself and which acts simultaneously [with the object (visaya)] is precisely the organ. Therefore, for us, just as the form is interior, the eye also is an interior proper being. 7[The opponent asks :) How could one know that the organ is the proper being of the dominant force ? [The author replies the following.] 46 For, one could infer merely some cause in considering the result, but one could not infer the genus (visesa) of the cause. For example, one could infer the fire on merely seeing the smoke, but one could not infer the genus of the fire and say if these are of herbs, of leaves [that burning); likewise, one could, solely by the

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 53 by the e of the one to exist without hat?! depend 8a. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness. That force be in consciousness, or in its self which is indescribable nature 50 : there is no difference in production of the result. 86-d. Thus the objective aspect (visayarupa) [of consciousness] and the force (s'akti) [called fruit characteristic of consciousness, make inference on the cause, but one could not deduce the genus of the cause, that is to say that which has been made by the elements, etc. 19 The opponent says: The dominant force (s akti) depends on the possessor of that force (s aktimat); for, without basis (adhara), the dominant force is not capable to exist. The possessor of the force (s'aktimat) is one of the organs; now this (organ] itself has been constituted by the elements. The author answers : If one considers the representation (vijnapti) of consciousness, [the conception] of one basis for the dominant force is not contradictory. This being admitted, if one basis is necessary, the consciousness (vijnana) itself is capable of being this basis (asraya); for, in the consciousness, there is a proper being which knows the object (visaya) and (at the same time) a proper being which knows itself (svasamvedana). 50 The opponent replies: while the dominant force residing in this [organ] made by the elements, produces one fruit different [from that of consciousness) the dominant force residing in consciousness produces [in its turn] one fruit different (from that which a compound of elements would produce]. [Now, you assert that) the organ consists in the dominant force [and] however the fruit of elements and that of consciousness are different: the organ does not reside thus in the dominant force, but it is necessarily composed of the elements, thus the dominant force would be capable of being sometime in consciousness and sometime in the proper nature inexplicable (anirdes'ya) (that is to say in the organ). The author replies: There is no any difference in the production of the fruit ; for, in all manner (sarvatha), to see the form, to hear the sound,] etc. are simply productions of the dominant force. 52 [The opponent asks :) Then what is thus the cause of the dominant force of the organ ? The author replies: Just as consciousness arises from the dominant force of the organ, so this dominant force of the

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54 ALAMBANAPARIKSA sense-organ] go mutually conditioned from immemorial time. Depending upon the force (sakti) called eye, and the interior form (antah rupa) arises the consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated from the perceivable object. These " two act mutually conditioned without beginning in time (anadikala). Sometime when the force scalled vasana] gets matured, consciousness is transformed into a form of object (visayakarata) and sometimes the force arises from the consciousness] endowed with the form of object. The consciousness and force, both may be said to be either different organ arises equally from the previous consciousness which causes the activity (avedha) of the organ, and this previous consciousness arises from the dominant force of the organ still more anterior. Thus, etc. 3 The opponent asks: Then wherefrom does this dominant force proceed ? The author replies: The dominant force proceeds also from the anterior consciousness which causes the activity of the organ; this consciousness in its turn proceeds from a dominant force more anterior, and this same dominant force proceeds from a consciousness still more anterior which has caused the activity of the organ. Thus these two, etc.. 54 Having thus explained that the dominant force of the organ and consciousness are beings (bhava) of the cause (hetu) and of the fruit (phala), the author, now, in order to explain that the dominant force and consciousness are reciprocally mutual causes and this without commencement in time, says : Sometime, etc. 55 The translation of this passage is done according to Paramartha. According to Vinitadeva, French translators have done thus : Sometime, in [the mind which possesses] the form of this [object) it is the dominant force (which is produced). 56 Then at this moment, the cause and its fruit arising reciprocally in an uninterrupted continuity, one says that the time is without commencement.

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 55 from or identical with one another as one may 57 like. Thus " the interior object (which is not different from consciousness) is endowed with two factors, [image and cause] and therefore it is logically concluded that consciousness Lalone] is transformed into (external] object (visaya). The treatise on the examination of the object composed by Acarya Dinnaga is complete. * The opponent asks : Are the dominant force of the organ and that of the object different from the consciousness or not? If they are different, there is only difference in denominations, but the object is the same; because (at this moment] one admits (pratijna) an organ and a perceivable object (alambana) apart from consciousness. If they are not different, one could not say that this dominant force is the organ and that this dominant force is the object. The author replies: The dominant forces are the proper nature (atman) of differentiations (vis'esa) of a stage (avastha) and they exist conventionally (samvrtya); therefore, relying upon the mundane designation (laukikavyavahara) one could, as he likes, say that (sometime] consciousness on the one hand and (the organ and the object] on the other are of different nature (anyatva) and [sometime] of non-different nature (ananyatva). See additional notes. For, thus, some things which exist conventionally are in certain case designated by different denominations, for example, one says "the perfume of the sandalwood " (now, the perfume is not the same thing as the sandalwood) and in some other case they are designated by non different (denominations]; for example, one says "the vase is in such matter", etc. [now, the vase could not exist beyond the matter which constitutes]. 56 Thus, having demonstrated that the perceivable object (alambana) is truly interior, the author in conclusion, says the following

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY ON THE ALAMBANAPARIKSA In order to light up the wisdom In the vicious-and-dull-minded men, and In order to let them extirpate their evils who spoke, I pay homage to Him and investigate the [true] meaning [of the text]. Some philosophers accept the external things as object-causes of the consciousness of the eye and others. The fruit of investigation comprises the rejection of what is rejectable and the adoption of what is worth adopting; therefore the cause for both is set forth here. The word "others " includes the five-fold consciousness which arises having the support of material objects and the senses as accepted by other schools of philosophy. They conceive that the senses are directed each to an [invariable external] real object. But the consciousness born of the mind [as the sixth organ] is not to be accepted as correct; for, it is not directed to an Read in the Sanskrit text p. 21, lines 7-9, ga negari parasaMmataM rUpendriyAzrayapaJcavidhavijJAnaM saGgrahNAti /

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 57 invariable real object, but to an object which is only conventionally true, for example, the chariot' and the like. Though it may be permitted that the mental consciousness is conditioned by a real object endowed with parts (avayavin); yet it grasps also an object which is not its own and which lacks a form similar to one reflected in consciousness. But for the consciousness of the eye and others, there is well-known separate object invariably associated with each of the senses. No such fixity of object is arrived at in the case of mental consciousness. Moreover, the Truth in its essence is to be realised inwardly by a knowledge born of the repeated practice of trance, and never becomes the object of the discriminative thought (tarka=manas); and again it appears as though it is perceivable, yet it shines as object only of a supreme knowledge born of contemplating what is heard and what is thought out, [and not at all of the mental consciousness]. Thus the object of the mental consciousness becomes absolutely non-existent. For, this object can be no capable of being conditioncause at the moment of its origination ;* nor can it be so in the past and future moments, because the things of past and future are non-entities just like the uncomposite elements of existence, [ether, etc). For this ? Cf. Tattvas. pan. p. 206; Nyayavartika, p. 80--1 where different explanations are given for rathadivat. * Read in the Sanskrit text p. 21, line 11, jafa Haifastahazfadrvyprtyymnggiikriyte| '? Read in the Sanskrit text p. 22, line, 4 svasamutpattau for svasaMtatau /

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58 ALAMBANAPARIKSA reason, the word "others" is said to include the body of five sorts of consciousness. Then, if [you say that] the mental consciousness owes its existence to what is brought home by the sensual consciousness; ' how is that also possible ? It cannot take place either in the same moment as the sensual consciousness or in the immediate next moment. It is not possible in the immediate next moment, because the object like the colour, etc., has already been vanished away in the immediate next moment. Nor does the object of the present moment become condition to it, because it has been grasped by sensual consciousness. [If you say that] the mental consciousness grasps naturally the external object of its own accord, then there will be no possibility of existence of the blind or deaf, etc. [To accept] a sense faculty other than the eye, etc. is contradictory to the inferential knowledge. The denial of extra material object [which may suit to the mental consciousness being gladly admitted, why should we entertain a bias for the mental consciousness alone? To the visual and other consciousness material things serving as supporting causes become bases." [But to the mental consciousness there is no such thing as basis.) What is short of basis, has by nature no Read in the text, p. 22, line, 6, sprafatarECHTOL Halfagran i Whole discussion below, cf. 971091fafa, II, 239--244... * Cf. Tattvas. pan. p. 825 ; Nyayabindutika. p. 10. Read in the Sanskrit text, p. 22, line 12, zeifafagrarai rUpamAzrayapratyayaHsat AyatanaM bhavati /

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 59 function to perform, and therefore is to be non-existent; [e.g. ether). So also is the case with the mind. [Though] the object (alambana) may be [proved by] the perceptive knowledge, yet, since it consists in the nature of being grasped (r) (grahyasvabhava), it is absolutely unreal. So we consider it right to reject the nature of its being object (alambanata) and thereby the nature of its being basis (asryayata). However, the force (s'akti) which constitutes the sense faculty and which acts simultaneously [with consciousness] will imagin it to exist. An external thing, etc. . It is perceived that there is some object other than this [consciousness]. This [consciousness] makes known [to us] something opposite [to itself]. That something is called object since it is (as it were] capable of being grasped by an entity other than itself. How could one say that something (e.g. perception) depends upon mere collocation (samagri) ? For, the collocation is not properly a substance. [If one argues that we should accept that principle in accordance with the Tathagata's teaching in respect of the two-fold Truth, failing which] the Tathagata's Truth will be far amiss from correctly understood. This argument goes by itself against the reasonings preceding and 9 Cf. Nyayavartika, p. 521 where some anumaha is referred to thus : a fanlagfafiti faqat: piecara agarraga i atc94a1at p. 656: atra vijJAnavAdI svapakSe pramANamAha-na citta0 / 9 This seems to be a reference to the Madhyamika's standpoint. Cf. ATASIT asia, etc., in the Bhavasarkranti sutra, $ 11.

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA succeding. But, for my own part; where is [the possibility of] incurring such a fallacy? For, I have accepted that it depends upon a substance (dravya) as well as collocation (samagri). Now it follows that even if some other objection is raised, that also may be taken to be answered. 60 They postulate the subtle atom" Though the subtle atom perishes as soon as it appears, yet two substances serve as a cause, but not collocation [of atoms]. For example, things, colour and others, though they are simultaneously present before the senses, become objects [only of their respective senses] without any confusion on account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a particular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. All substances are perishing, yet the double atom which is capable of existing [at the time of grasping] serves as the object 10 cause. 66 "Because the atom serves as cause for that." The word that" means the consciousness of the It arises on a contact [of the sense-organ] eye, etc. with the object constituted of parts. So say some [Acaryas]: Among the causes, that which acts as the productive cause becomes its actual object." 10 Contrast the Tattvasangrahapan. p. 55 fexagP: 1 Bhavaviveka calls 2 atoms as a dravya v. Ui, Vais'esika philosophy, p. 131. "Read in the Sanskrit text p. 23, line 14: pratyayeSu vijJAnasya utpAdakahetuH / Cf. Slokavartika, p. 285 lambanatvam / znu: 7: utpAdakasyaivA

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 61 "Or some others postulate the aggregate of atoms' The advocates of this doctrine say that the aggregate formed of atoms serves as the actual object of consciousness. "Because consciousness arises represent ing the image of the aggregate of atoms." The aggregate is believed to be the actual object of consciousness, since it is born of the aggregate [and endowed with its image]. It is as somebody says: "A thing whose form is represented in a consciousness is really its object." 12 Both these disputants say: [Here the following thesis is intended to be formulated : consciousness has an aggregate thing as its object; because it is endowed with the form of that aggregate object]. Now, if [the idealist objects that] this reason is invalid and cannot be formulated as such ; for, it lacks an appropriate example just as the second reason which could prove the validity of the first one does. [Moreover, says the idealist, the reason is not recognised by us ; because we do not accept that the image represented in consciousness pertains to an external aggregate thing, nor do we consider real the aggregate apart from its parts i.e. atoms. Therefore we do not have anything external corresponding to the gross form found in consciousness. We may now, answer that] the general quality of atoms (paramanusamanyalaksana) while acting as actual " We may conveniently read in Sanskrit p. 23, line 20, yat vijJAnaM yadAkArayuktam , etc. Cf. Pramanavartika : tatra buddhiyedAkArA JEA FARIyana Il Vytti : 072424 3004124: 1

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62 ALAMBANAPARIKSA object of consciousness will cause a gross form to appear in it. But if you assume that there is no external thing which may serve as a cause to consciousness'' ; [then] there is a fault of the subject of your thesis being contradicted in its own character. So also is your probandum (dharma=sadhyadharma) unknown to us. If you say that what has been recognised by the opponent as an accepted fact, can only be formulated as an appropriate example, then the same is also to be applied in respect of Probandum (you cannot prove by means of inference a thing which is impossible to prove]. However, one whose mind is bent on supreme pramana, says : By what reason the two reasons, source of dispute can be made valid, that reason is not to be found because of lack of example which is recognised both by us. Hence in what manner may the representation of the image in consciousness be established as valid reason ?15 "Though atoms serve as causes," etc. as accepted [by the advocates of atoms, that is, soine of the early Buddhists and Jains]. The atom by itself cannot serve as the cause of the consciousness for the reason that it is not perceived and hence non-existent; 13 Vijnanam Svamsalambanan is the thesis of the Vijnana. vadin. This view has been much criticised by Kumarila and Udyotakara ; (Slokavartika and N. Vartika with Tika and N. Sutra IV, 2, 26). " Read in Sanskrit p 24, line 4 : af#: szegfartaale:enta i aer dharmavacanamaprasiddham / 15 Read in Sanskrit: agrareto: gtaa!

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 63 yet the body of atoms does so. However, they become objects mutually unconnected.!6 "Like the senses ". Just as a sense-faculty, though it serves as a basis of the association of consciousness, never becomes its object; because it does not bear the image of the sensefaculty; so also atoms. What do not possess the image of consciousness are not considered to be its objects. Therefore it is said : [25] " That is the object " "The form of its own " means the image of consciousness itself. "Consciousness grasps" means it determines. 17 .: How is it known that consciousness grasps only the form of its own ? "Because it arises in that form." This refers to the mind, [the preceding moment of consciousness]. Consciousness arises in a form which resembles the mind. When there is a mutual correspondence or co-ordination (sarupya) between the consciousness and the object-image, then we call it grasping of the object by consciousness. In fact, for you, there is no object grasped beyond consciousness. How could you, then, explain the causality of the object nonexistent apart from consciousness for rising up of its 16 According to Kasmira Vaibhasikas and Bhadanta Vasu. bandhu atoms never get combined, (na sprsanti), see. Additional Notes below. 17 Read in Sanskrit: Eqer Flare gaya i farafga faitza i Cf. Pramanavar. vitti, p. 230: 37191274473 fa94 TALI

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64 ALAMBANAPARIKSA consciousness? Yet there is already in the preceding moment the object-image. When this object-image is brought home in the self of consciousness just like an image in the mirror, it is considered that the consciousness has grasped its object, [and also that the latter has produced the former]. The self of the double atom does not represent the image reflected upon consciousness. If it does so, then we may consider the atom also to be its object. " Like the sense organ ". Though it serves as the cause, it becomes no object. If you accept that whichever is cause, is object, then the sense-faculty also could possibly become object. [It is also not possible to argue that mere causality is not criterion for its being object of consciousness, but a causal element which is endowed with the image felt in consciousness is so; because] it has already been stated that the reason, the possession of the image in consciousness suffers a fallacy of its being not established. Thus we have to concede that the mind, i.e. the preceding moment of consciousness serves not merely as cause [of the following moment of consciousness], but it appears both as the sense-faculty as well the image of the object. If you establish as the cause what has been stated above, i.e., atomso; then, atoms being the cause, how does it follow that the same becomes object ? [If you say that the causality and objectivity are mutually concomitant and found invariably together] 19 Read in Sanskrit p. 25, line 16: afa petr[a] FTUA, etc.

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 65 then, the sense-faculty being the cause, that also will become object. [Because the sense-faculty never becomes object of any consciousness] the said concomitance incurs [26] a fallacy of inconclusiveness. Such being your proposition, we establish 20 this : "Because atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness," etc. Why is this sentence? It purports to establish our own proposition. One cannot consider one's proposition to be established by merely criticising other's thesis. In order to formulate his own proposition, (Acarya says thus:) thesis : atoms do not become objects of consciousness ; reason : because they do not manifest the form found in their consciousness; example: like a sensefaculty. If the above phrase indicates that this is the reason for this proposition, it would follow that the author of the S'astra having first set forth his opponent's proposition, propounds his own one which goes in agreement with his opponent's. And now the author, having paid his attention to the refutation of the opponent's proposition, would exhibit many defects upon it and set it aside ultimately. [In arguing thus] the thesis which never varies that (i.e. reason) will be asserted. Other thesis which always varies (the reason] will be dissented. At the outset the opponent raises an objection (dusana) [to the above proposition] pointing out to its inconclusive reasoning. How false a syllogism you 30 Read in Sanskrit p. 26, line 1: 791 TL (21EUR 1]

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66 ALAMBANAPARIKNA have formulated ! Even the ordinary folk says that the reason which is found separated from and never associated with the object to be proved (sadhya) is not at all a reason, but such reason gives rise to the doubt as to the existence of the object to be proved. Therefore you should formulate some other syllogism. Your reason "The atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness" may sometimes exist in the atoms whose innate natures are undetermined. But the resolve is not correct that consciousness always arises in co-ordination with the image [of the object]. Therefore there is no room for your determination that the atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness. It ought to be stated on the other hand, that they are of indeterminate natures. However, this much is certain that what produces consciousness does not become its object just like the atom of sensefaculty. There are well-known other different causes which produce the visual consciousness; none of them makes known to us the innate natures of atoms, because consciousness never exhibits their forms. What has been stated in respect of the sensual consciousness may also be equally applied to the other types of consciousness. The sense-faculty given above as example is in fact stated with a view of particularisation (pradars'anartham) and other example may also be obtained by way of implication (arthapatti). Thus the statement of the above reason also becomes useless. [27] [The author replies:] The atom, though it functions as cause, becomes no actual object of consciousness,

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY and with this intention the above statement was made. It is so lest the sound and other atoms should cause to raise up the consciousness of other sense-organ. Someone says: In the self of consciousness the gross form is not perceived; hence it is not object of itself 21 just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the theory that the image of consciousness is due to the bringing home of the real object-image upon consciousness is not reasonable, the saying that no gross-form is perceived as appertaining to consciousness is very appropriate.22 Thus we have spoken that 66 67 atoms are not objects of consciousness." The reason for this is that they do not possess the form [that is experienced in consciousness] and that the hypothesis that they are its objects is not well proved by any means of knowledge (pramana). If so, [the opponent says,] then, let the aggregate of atoms be its object. [That could not be possible.] If you, [says the author,] desire to prove your proposition on the ground that all things spoken of (in the world) are established (as real); [then, I may reply that] your reason is not an established one; this will be a true logic. ae Though the aggregate possesses the image of consciousness". 2" Cf. Pramanav. vrtti, II, 211 : tasmAnnArthe na ca jJAne sthUlAbhAsastadA tmana: 22 It is not clear what the author has replied in regard to the fallacy of reason that has been pointed out by the opponent.

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68 ALAMBANAPARIKSA And it may become object ; yet it does not act as its cause. For, "consciousness does not arise from the aggregate." Aggregate-consciousness bears a form (similar to) the aggregate. But it does not produce consciousness. How can this be the cause for it ? Since it has no characteristic of an object (alambanalaksana), it could not (be proved to) exist. As regards the nature of what has been previously spoken of, i.e., atom, it lacks the form felt in consciousness. What is, then, characterised as object ? "Every object which necessarily produces the consciousness possessed of the image similar to itself (i.e., the object), is said to be its proper object". [28] In accordance with (the process of arising of] the object-consciousness, [we say that] what is a productive cause of consciousness, that is only its object. Somebody says : Every object necessarily is the cause of the mind and mental elements. This object having produced [consciousness) is spoken of as if it was really grasped [by its consciousness] and then it was always designated as its actual object. What object possesses the two-fold characteristic (i.e., causality and form) that becomes object. When there arises the fact of production, [the talk of it as] object (alambana) also arises. It is said in the scripture : When this fact arises, (or exists), this (other) fact also arises. This formula refers to the theory of dependent causation.

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 69 Since what is the productive cause for that consciousness is a condition for production, we assume that this is a thing [to serve] as object. At the first sight of a thing only the thing-in-itself (svalaksana) is perceived and nothing more; so we do not call the more (i.e., generality) as object (alambana). " The aggregate of atoms does not produce consciousness; because it is not an entity in substance ". The aggregate is not a real entity ; because it cannot be described either as different from or as one with its constituents. Whichever is nonentity has possibly no efficiency of producing any result, "Like the double moon ". The second moon does not cause to raise up the consciousness of the second moon [as it does not exist in substance]. If so, what is the cause of representing that image [in consciousness]? "Because of the defect of the senses". When the eye has its sight disturbed by cataract and other diseases, then the appearance of the double moon appears and that, too, not as a real entity. [29] " The double moon-cognition has not an object, though the image of the double moon is reflected in it". The double moon does not become object of its consciousness though the latter is endowed with the image of the double moon; because this does not produce consciousness.

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA "Similarly the aggregate, as it does not exist in substance, does not act as cause for its consciousness". Since it is not a real entity just like the double moon, it proves certain that the aggregate is not at all the cause. Hence "It does not become object." Here again the word " the double moon" is repeated. The example of the double moon, it is to be understood, shows the reason, the possession of the image [by consciousness] to be an inconclusive one. The existence of an object for every consciousness can also be achieved through a common logic; hence your proposition involves the defect of contradiction. [This argument is not valid ; for] the visual consciousness arises through the eye (only), but neither through the aggregate such as a patch of blue, etc. nor through the atom ; since the consciousness is not produced by both of them just like the consciousness born of the senses other the eye. This example is acceptable to all. So nothing else is to be mentioned. The example, "the double moon" does not exist in substance, hence that, having the nature of uncausal object, proves the same (i.e. absence of the cause for the aggregate-consciousness). Though the double moon-consciousness is endowed with the image of the double moon, there is no real object (corresponding to it]. The expression also happens even in the absence of its causal object.

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 71 If you ask me : Well, there exists no second moon; how does one directly perceive the two images of the moon ? Let me explain this. Because of some potent force (s'akti) laid down within consciousness, it appears as though it is the consciousness endowed with the image of the second moon. Just as a man, while asleep, dreams that he actually sees many objects, and also imagines in dream that he discharges so many false acts ; so also he imagines another moon upon the single moon. [30] Some philosophers say: When the eye-consciousness happens to exist simultaneously [with its alambana] and since it has been criticised that both these under such circumstances, arise in order, i.e. one after the other, immediately after these two images, a mental thought arises murmuring: 'I perceive the second moon.' Some others say: It is due to a mistake in number 24 [of the two instead of one] in the moon, that mistake, too, happens out of the defect in the organ of the sight. If you do not admit the proposition of an external object, then the vision of gross form will be merely a perversive thought. [The author says: ] Mental consciousness does not arise immediately after the eye-consciousness and its alambana coming into exisience [as you previously stated], but it does so only simultaneously and depending upon the images of these two. Then, [asks the opponent,] how does an understanding arise that I see the 23 See Pramanavartika, II, 294 : HAE autcm ( = #01197ca:) i 24 See Prakaranapancika, p. 38, verses 58-60. 10

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA double moon ? [The author replies : If you stick to your view,] tell me : why does not the cognition arise of the double sound at a time immediately after the soundobject and its consciousness being present ? It is also impossible to assume that the mental consciousness arises successively in the case of a man who possesses the organ of the eye in a sound condition. Tell me, on what basis, are accomplished many and different things : the material objects, senses, their consciousness and their cognizable varieties (without intervention of the mental consciousness]? [So we must accept that there also arises simultaneously the mental consciousness by virtue of which we are able to congnize many and varied things.] One who says that I perceive the single moon as double and accepts that there is the external object apart from consciousness, how will that man also explain the mistake in number causing the delusion of the double moon to arise ? [That is to say, he must also resort to the aid of mental consciousness to explain it satisfactorily.] "As both atoms and their aggregates are defective in one or other respect, they are not real objects of consciousness." The alambana consists in two parts, viz. representation of its own image and causality for its consciousness. The atom lacks in the first part, i.e. its image is not represented in consciousness, and the aggregate is devoid of the second part, i.e., causality. Thus these two defects as have been discussed, point

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY out to the identity between the object and its consciousness. [31] "Some Acaryas hold that the combined form of atoms (sancitakara) is the cause of consciousness". 73 In each atom there exists the combined form. That alone is perceived as the gross form in proportion to the number of atoms. That combined form, too, is real and produces the consciousness of the form of its self; because it exists in substance. "( It becomes the actual object "; because it fulfils the said two conditions. This (combined form) is already an accomplished fact. Hence no question arises whether it is the same as the atom itself or not so. "All things are possessed of many forms". These atoms themselves are regarded as possessed of atomic form as well as combined form. How can a single element be described to possess two forms? All things which are collocations of material elements are considered to be of four great elements, earth, etc. as their essence, and have many forms. They are naturally possessed of distinct forces [each]. [For example,] the image of the blue and other colours existing in a substance-element and the same existing in a senseorgan are known to be quite different [from each other]. In the atom, among many forms "there also exists the combined form."

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74 ALAMBANAPARIKSA Only this form becomes object of the consciousness of the eye, etc. So it becomes "the direct object of perception ". If so, why do you not say that cognition of atoms is possessed of combined form ? [You admit that] the atom is of combined form. Why do you not likewise admit that its cognition is also of the combined form ? Why do you only say: "There exists the combined form in the atom " [32] This sentence, having the nature of a sentence formulated to that effect, shows as well that their cognitions are possessed of the combined form.of atoms. If so, binary atom has the form of binary atom, how has it combined form ? Only the aggregates of different atoms are admitted in this system of thought; and these aggregates themselves constitute the combined forms. It is for this reason that they are not considered to be] existent in substance. This point has already been mentioned; why is it repeated again? With some other motive it is done so. [That motive is his :] Though the substance-elements are each different in their nature, yet it is to be understood that this combined form is related to their mere collocation. When we analyse it, no more exists the combined form. Moreover, though all things are regarded only as the aggregates of atoms, still each thing has a relative difference, and we may perceive it in each substance. However, the scriptural passage like "What is material element, blue, (etc.), that is the earth element (prthividhatu)"

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 75 is to be interpreted as a sentence intended to demonstrate the Truth. . . .25 If so, how is it that atoms are not perceived by senses ? and how are they perceived only by the knowl-- edge of Tathata, Suchness ? [The opponent continues :). "The atomic form becomes no object of the (sensual] consciousness". This does not become object of the sensual consciousness; hence it is beyond the senses. The object which does not fall within the operation of senses, ought to be cognized only by the knowledge penetrating into Suchness. What is the argument for such an assumption? It is simply this : the atomic form never comes within the range of direct perception ; " just like its solidity and other attributes." Blue and other colours "though really existent in atoms, do not become objects of the visual and other consciousness." [33] Because the powers of senses are related to particular objects (only, not to all]. "So also atomic form." This is not contradicted, but consented to by both parties. The opponent objects : Let the atomic form appear as perceptible and not solidity, because they, both differ one from the other in nature. We reply : That property [of atoms] is accepted as probans * Since the exact Sanskrit equivalent of the Chinese expression, chi chih is not ascertainable, the passage, garan... JETT: is left untranslated.

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76 ALAMBANAPARIKSA which is common to all ten bases formed by the material elements; hence no fallacy of exclusion of reason from the sapaksadrstanta. Therefore this formulation [of syllogism) is in no way defective. 26 "[Different] perceptions of pot, cup, etc., will be identical " for you who hold thus, (that is, the things are mere aggregates of atoms). For, consciousness does not differ as its object does not differ ; and the sensual -consciousness assumes its form in accordance with the object lying ahead (or in front). The opponent asks: How do you know that there is no difference in the object of consciousness ? The author answers : "There exists no distinction among the many atoms of pot, cup, etc." [though the number "many" may vary in each casej. This sentence means this: Though the atoms in their combined forms become objects of our cognition, yet, while the self-nature of the pot, etc., being cognized, there exists even among the many aggregates of atoms, no such character that can distinguish one aggregate of atoms from the other??. Because we do not admit [as real] the combined form distinct in each aggregate, apart from their own real [atomic] forms, the sensual consciousness that has arisen depending upon that form will be identical. It is thereby settled that only the * The prayoga may be like this: 30a1art a fagfafapet: 1 370tvAt / yadyadaNu na tadvijJAptiviSayaH / yathA kaThinatAdi. ?Read 3a4fafaitas94 in the Sanskrit text, p. 33, 1. 13 above.

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77 self-nature of atoms is object (alambana). And in the undifferentiated form of atoms, there exists no element that causes to produce some discriminating and reinvestigating thought [regarding the differentiated gross form, such as pot, etc.]; for, such thought will be a separate one, just as a thought springing up from a blue patch, etc. [That being the case, the discriminating thought of gross form, pot, etc., will arise only when there is present the causal element.. That causal element being absent, our idea of gross form is baseless.] DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY "If [the opponent says that] the perception differs on account of differences in the forms [of the pot, etc.]." 66 [34] Here the form" means the image that distinguishes itself in each case. The pot and cup are distinguishable in their forms by virtue of their different parts, neck, belly and bottom, etc., and our cognitions. differ on that account. The author replies: It is quite true, "but the [different forms] do not exist in substance." No atoms constituting the object cognized by the sensual consciousness, are varied [in their size]. Though the aggregates of atoms are true empirically, yet they, being closely analysed, do not fall within the cognizance of senses. [There remain as real only atoms, and never the aggregates.] The [real] objects of cognition (i.e. atoms) which are identical in form, cannot, properly

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78 ALAMBANAPARIKSA speaking, become causes for different forms of cognitions. [The opponent asks:] How do you know that there exists no distinction in form among the atoms? [The author replies :) "Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension ". All objects are constituted of parts and these parts necessarily admit of distinction of forms. The proper nature of atoms, however, is devoid of any part and very subtle. Therefore how can we assign to it any distinction of form ? "Though the pot, cup, etc., are (apparently) varied objects, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic nature." For, anything destitute of parts, neither increases nor decreases. [35] "We therefore understand that there is no reality" in the aggregates of atoms. Everything composed of parts, has a form which is attributed to it, and not real of its own; and as such it does not fall within the domain of senses. Thus the opinion has been above criticised after a careful study that the aggregates of atoms tend to show their different real forms. Therefore [different] cognitions of pot, cup, etc., are, in fact, destitute of real objects different [in form] just as the feelings of happiness and misery are. Thus [it is clear that] atoms do not distinguish objects.

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 79 Nor can the form (perceived by our senses] be proper nature of that object. Or "If the distinction in parts is inferred (lit. spoken of) on account of the distinction in forms." This sentence intends to show that the proposition that nothing that is non-differentiated [in its nature] becomes object incurs a logical fallacy called siddhasadhana, proving of what is already well-known. The opponents hold that the atom is in fact a thing which is not distinguishable in its nature, yet the different cognitions happen on account of differences in forms. We also admit that the atom is an undistinguishable object. Therefore this proposition incurs the fallacy of siddhasadhana 28. The sentence, "Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension" shows the conclusion to be invalid that the difference in substances, (i.e., component parts, atoms) causes difference in objects [composed of substances]. Or, it makes clear that the cognitions of the pot and cup, etc., do not bear the images of atoms; hence the atoms are not their actual objects in as much as they are not objects of other cognitions; by "other cognitions" is meant either mental consciousness or one born of other senses; for, a condition of some blue patch being present, the cognition (born thereof) does not 28 This retort of the siddhasadhanadosa is not convincing as it stands in the text of the Chinese version. 11

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80 ALAMBANAPARIKSA bear the image of some yellow patch. Though the qualities of atoms are many, they cannot be differentiated one another in any way; but the sensual cognitions, however, are distinguishable one another in their forms; therefore the forms felt in the cognitions are not of the atoms. [36] Or, we may take that the following idea is intended in the verse: An objection that the atoms are distinguishable by themselves has been put forth and answered in order. If the aggregates of atoms are regarded as having forms other than that of atoms, then it is logically to be established that those forms of the aggregates are not real. There is also some other reasoning to be mentioned here thus : "If those atoms are removed one by one, the perceptions of the pot, etc., do not arise." Things, that we speak of, like the pot, etc., are not real things just like sena, army and other aggregates, so they do not exist in substance. The following is another mode of reasoning : "What objects are not found separated from what objects, that former objects are not differentiated from that slatter] objects. [Aggregates are not found separated from atoms, so the aggregates are not to be differentiated from atoms]." The distinguished form {experienced in cognising the pot, etc.,] is other than the one (pertaining to atoms]; ** Read in the Sanskrit text, p. 35, 1. 17 : RATUGI ara sfa faTOT, sfoafasinarang Pagtatateraret , etc.

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 81 because that cognition experiences the forms of the objects like the pot, etc. This inference contradicts the real state of things. For example, when the soundobject is present, no cognition of a blue patch would arise in us. However, although it may be admitted that the aggregate is grasped and some other thing is experienced ; yet it is absolutely impossible to prove that there is distinction among the forms of atoms. "[It is the object] which exists internally [in knowledge itself] as a knowable aspect." This line establishes what the actual object of consciousness is according to the author. If, in general analysis [of a cognition], there is no object [being regarded as one separate from consciousness]; then it evolves lokavirodha, contradiction with the world-a defect for one's own proposition, For, the scriptures state four conditions [for rising up a consciousness]. The word "internally " shows that there is no object-cause apart from the inner consciousness. [37] The word "knowable aspect" shows that the thing in the form of object is consciousness-product (vijnanaparinama). Thus the idea of the external that exists in consciousness is grasped as an external object. Now the contradiction with the experience of world comes in; for, men of the world all accept the objects as externally existing. Therefore the author says "as if it exists externally." The real object, however, does not exist apart from consciousness. Its knowable aspect "appears to us as if it exists externally."

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82 ALAMBANAPARIKSA The expression "I see the object externally" is: based upon wrong belief just as the visual consciousness of the hair-like thing in the sky, etc. "Though the external things are denied." The external thing does not exist in reality, because it is not experienced as such. If we examine it very carefully with reasoning, we do not experience it externally and in its own invariable essence. Though the opponent. may admit [a thing] characterised as external and existing in substance, yet it cannot become the objectcause of consciousness. Nor is the form of atoms experienced ; because the atoms possess no forms. [experienced in our cognitions]. "[That grahyamsa] which appears to us as though existent externally, serves as the actual object-cause." Because [that alone] possesses the form of that (i.e., object). [To prove the above the following syllogism is formulated.] Whatever thing possesses whatever form, that thing is identical with that form ; for example, the causality is possessed of its own form, [i.e., the nature of being cause; that causality is not distinct from the nature of being cause]. Again the author shows some distinct character of the actual object (alambana) when he says: "Because consciousness is the essence of that [i.e., object]," etc. [38] It is clear that the external thing which is an illusion, does not exist as an object. The form of an

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 83. object follows only in comformity with our mental imagination; and it is not real; for, if that which is imagined is separated from consciousness; there is nothing left in the external. 66 "The forms of the experienced objects do not originally exist apart from consciousness." Hence it is called the knowable in its essence: existing internally". The word "internally" indicates. that the knowable does not exist beyond consciousness.. The knowable, [externally] non-existent by its nature is regarded as existent internally. (C It also arises from that." A part of consciousness may arise, sometime from: itself, 'because the seventy-fifth element (i.e. consciousness) has a special character. Since no consciousness arises in separation from its object (jneya), that part [of consciousness] (i.e. the knowable aspect) is produced. by consciousness itself, and we need not admit a fifth cause for it. "Because (consciousness) is endowed with two parts (i.e. image and cause)." It is clear that it is the actual object and to be shown as a proof [for our proposition] because of its being decisive argument 30 (i.e. its double nature). This object of double characteristic alone is considered to be probans (sadhana). What is the external thing other than [this object], that is not to be regarded as condition-cause for consciousness; [for example] things 30 Omit the word "a" in the Sanskrit text, p. 38, 1. 11.

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84 ALAMBANAPARIKSA experienced in dream-thought [cannot at all serve as its causes]. 31 What is said to be of a double character, becomes a single proof (ekam sadhanam); thus only consciousness (i.e. its knowable aspect) is endowed with the image of object, and also gives rise to another consciousness. Therefore a part of consciousness becomes a single proof (ekam pramanam) on account of its discharging these two functions. Now, though what exists internally in consciousness is admitted (as condition-cause] ; [39] since it has been examined that the external things are of unreal character, there can be no other real character thereof. The object is experienced only in pursuance of our mental habitual imagination. But the image of object is immanent in consciousness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. [The opponent asks :] "How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition [to consciousness itself]?" [Author replies :] The knowable aspect (grahyais'a), as it does not exist without consciousness, gives rise to another consciousness. [The opponent continues :) Now, (you have] a fallacy called self-affecting (svarupavirodha ); since 31 Here prayoga may be thus : fagia Faik 227 i anapargia i yanna dharmadvayavat na tat Alambanam / yathA svapnAvasthAyAM prakAzamAno'rthaH / 32 = 316hfa fengi fantaata: 1

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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY 85 it is yet only a part of consciousness just like its part that grasps. [When it becomes as being grasped,] it cannot at the same time serve as a cause. [We always experience that] consciousness arises as being discoloured by the forms of the external things. The image-part of consciousness springs up simultaneously with consciousness; it cannot act as cause for the latter; because no two things simultaneously arising act mutually as cause and effect; for example, a pair of horns of a cow. Moreover, we do not say that an object is co-existent with its self which is no other than that object. For, the term 'co-existence' denotes some connection between two distinct objects. But you do not admit that there is an object distinct from consciousness. Therefore how can you call such an object co-existent? [The author replies :] It is true. But, as different images [in consciousness] are [experienced], we describe them [as if they are] distinct [from consciousness]. We assume that consciousness is possessed of distinc*tions [in itself] for the reason that there exists the divergence between the perceptible part and image-part [of consciousness]. [The opponent continues :] If it is so; then, the nature of being condition-cause (pratyayatva) will [as you assume] constitute what is grasped (grahya). No object of assumed character could be regarded as possessing the self-substance. Now such an object 33 See Parthasarathimis'ra, Slokavartikavyakhya, p. 309; artucada Haai aluca I (V. Additional Notes, last page.)

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA becomes something other than the condition-cause indeed. $86 [The author answers:] This is not contradictory [to our experience]. [The preceding moment of] consciousness, as it has been grasped as a distinct object, is accepted as a condition-cause just like its disappearance of immediate preceding moment (samanantaranirodha) a condition-cause. The moment a consciousness of homogeneous character (sabhaga) disappears, the same consciousness is regarded as cause into four ways.34 34 Four causes are hetu, alambana, samanantara and adhipati.

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TIBETAN VERSION OF THE ALAMBANAPARIKSA RGYA. GAR. SKAD. DUIA. LAM. BA. NA. PA. RI. KSA II BOD. SKAD. DUI DMIGS. PA. BRTAG. PA || Sans. rgyas. dan. byan. chub. sems. dpah. thams. cad. la. phyag. Atshal. lo ll 1. Dban. poai. rnam. par. rig. pahi. rgyul . phra. rab. rdul. dag. yin. mod. kyi I der. mi. snan. phyir. deni. yul. ni ! rdul. phran. ma. yin. dban. po. bzhin || 2. gan. Itar. snan. de. de. las. min rdzas. su. med. phyir. zla. gnis. bzhin ! de. Itar. phyi. rol. gni. gar. yan ! blo. yi. yul. du. mi. run. no 11 3. kha. cig. hdus. pahi. rnam. pa. dag! sgrub. pa. yin. par. hdod. par. byed I * rdul. phran. rnam. pa. rnam. rig. gi ! don. min. sra. nid. la. sogs. bzhin II 4. de. dag. Itar. na. bum. pa. dan / kham. phor. sogs. blo. mtshuns. par. hgyurl gal. te. rnam. pahi. dbye. bas. dbye de. ni. rdul. phran. rdzas. yod. la 11 12

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA 5. med. de. tshad. dbye. med. phyir. ro ! de. phyir. de. rdzas. med. la. yod! rdul. phran. yons. su. bsal. na. ni! der. snan. s'es. pa. nams. hgyur. phyir || 6. nan. gi. s'es. byahi. no. bo. ni ! phyi. rol. ltar. snan. gan. yin. te ! don. yin. rnam. s'es. no. boni. phyir | deni. rkyen. nid. kyan. yin. phyir. ro II 7. gcig. chahan. mi. hkhrul. phyir. na. rkyen! nus. pa. hjog. phyir. rim. gyis. yin Ihan. cig. byed. dban. nus. pa. yi ! no. bo. gan. yin. dban. pohan. yin II 8. de. yan. rnam. rig. la. mi. hgal | de. Itar. yul. gyi. no. bo. dan 1 nus. pa, phan. tshun. rgyu. can. dan / thog. ma. med. dus. hjug. yin || Dmigs. pa. brtag. pa. rab. tu. byed. pa. slob. dpon. phyogs. kyi. glan. pos. mdzad. pa. rdzogs. so II

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TIBETAN VERSION OF THE ALAMBANAPARIKSAVRTTI RGYA. GAR. SKAD. DU A. LAM. BA. NA. PA. RI. KSA. BRTTI || BOD. SKAD. DU DMIGS. PA. BRTAG. PAHI. HGREL. PA|| Sans. rgyas. dan. byan. chub. sems. dpah. thams. cad. la. phyag. htshal. loll Gan. dag. mig. la. sogs. pahi. rnam. par. s'es. pahi. dmigs. pa. phyi. rol. gyi. don. yin. par. hdod. pa. de. dag. ni. dehi. rgyu. yin. pahi. phyir. rdul. phra. rab. dag. yin. pa. ham. der. snan. bahi. s'es. pa. skye. bahi. phyir. de. hdus. pa. yin. par. rtog. gran. na de. la. re. zhig. dban. pohi. rnam. par. rig. pahi. rgyu | phra. rab. rdul. dag. yin. mod. kyil der. mi. snan. phyir. dehi. yul. nil rdul. phran. ma. yin. dban. po. bzhin || 1 || yul. zhes. bya. ba. ni. s'es. pas. ran. gi. no. bo. nes. par. hdzin. pa. yin. tel dehi. rnam. par. skye. bahi.

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90 ALAMBANAPARIKSA phyir. roll rdul. phra. mo. dag. ni. deni. rgyu. nid. yin. du. zin. kyan. de. Ita. ma. yin. te. dban. po. bzhin. no II de. Itar. na. re. zhig. rdul. phra. mo. dag. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no 11 hdus. pa. ni. der. snan. ba. nid. yin. du. zin. kyan! gan. Itar. snan. de. de. las. min! don. gan. zhig. ran, snan, bahi. rnam. par. rig. pa. skyed. pa. de. ni. dmigs. pa. yin. par. rigs. telhdi. Itar. de. ni. skye. bahi. rkyen. nid. du. bs'ad. pas. so Il hdus. pa. ni. de. Ita. yan. ma. yin. tel rdzas. su. med. phyir. zla. gnis. bzhin! dban. po. ma. tshan. bahi. phyir, zla. ba. gnis. mthon. ba. ni. der. snan. ba. nid. yin. du. zin. kyan. deni. yul. ma. yin. no II de. bzhin. du. rdzas. su. yod. pa. ma. yin, pa. nid. kyis. rgyu. ma. yin. pahi. phyir. hdus. pa. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no II de. ltar. phyi. rol. gni. gar. yan | blo. yi. yul. du. mi. run. no II 2 || yan. lag. gcid. ma. tshan. bahi. phyirl phyi. rol. gyi. rdul. phra. mo. dan. tshogs. pa. zhes, bya. bahi don. ni. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no || hdi. la. ni. kha. cig. hdus. pahi. rnam. pa. dag! sgrub. pa. yin. par. Thdod. par. byed | don. thams. cad. ni. rnam. pa. du. ma. can. yin. pas. de. la. rnam. pa. hgah. zhig. gis. mnon. sum. du. hdod. do Il rdul. phra. rab. rnams. la. yan. hdus. par. snan. bahi. s'es. pa. bskyed. pahi. rgyuhi. dnos. po. yod. do 11

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TIBETAN VERSION 91 rdul. phran. rnam. pa. rnam. rig. gi! don. min. sra. nid. la. sogs. bzhin || 3 || ji. Itar. sra. ba. nid. la. sogs. pa. ni. yod. bzhin. du. yan. mig. gi. bloni. yul. ma. yin. pa. Itar. rdul. phra. mo. nid. kyan. hdraho 11 de. dag. ltar. na. bum. pa. dan! kham. phor. sogs. blo. mtshuns. par. hgyur | bum. pa. dan. kham. phor. la. sogs. pahi. rdul. phra. mo. rnams. la. ni. man. du. zin. kyan. khyad. par. hgah. yan. med. do Il gal. te. rnam. pahi. dbye. bas. dbye gal. te. hdi. snam. du. mgrin. pa. la. sogs. pahi. rnam. pahi. khyad. par. las. gan. gis. na. bloni. khyad. par. du. hgyur. bahi. khyad. par. yod. do. snam. du. sems. na. khyad. par. hdi. ni. bum. pa. la. sogs. pa. la. yod. kyi de. ni. rdul. phran. rdzas. yod. la |4 || med. de. tshad. dbye. med. phyir. ro ! rdul. phra. rab. rnams. ni. rdzas. gzhan. yin. du. zin. kyan. zlum. po. la. ni. med. do || de. phyir. de. rdzas. med. la. yod | rnam. pahi. dbye. ba. ni. kun. rdzob. tu. yod. pa. dag. kho. na. la. yod. kyi. rdul. phra. mo. rnams. la. ma. yin. no ll bum. pa. la. sogs. pa. ni. kun. rdzob. tu. yod. pa. nid. de ! rdul. phran. yons. su. bsal. na. nil der. snan. s'es. pa. nams. hgyur. phyir || 5 ||

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA rdzas. su. yod. pa. rnams. la. ni. hbrel. pa. can. bsal. du. zin. kyan. kha. dog. la. sogs. pa. bhzin. du. ran. gi. blo. hdod. pa. med. doll de. Ita. bas. na. dban. pohi. blo. rnams. kyi. yul. ni. phyi. rol. na. ma. yin. par. hthad. doll 92 nan. gi. s'es. byahi. no. bo. nil phyi. rol. ltar. snan. gan. yin. tel don. yin phyi. rol. gyi. don. med. bzhin. du. phyi. rol. Ita bur. snan. ba. nan. na. yod. pa. kho. na. dmigs. pahi.. rkyen. yin. no ll rnam. s'es. no. bohi. phyir dehi. rkyen. nid. kyan. yin. phyir. ro || 6 || nan. gi. rnam. par. s'es. pa. ni. don. du. snan, ba.. dan de. las. skyes. pa. yin. pas chos. nid, gnis. dan. I Idan. pahi. phyir. nan. na. yod. pa. kho. na. dmigs.. pahi. rkyen. yin. no l re. zhig. de. ltar. snan. ba. nid. yin. la. reg. na dehi. phyogs. gcig. po. lhan. cig. skyes. pa. go. ji. ltar. rkyen. yin. zhe. na gcig. chahan. mi. hkhrul. phyir. na. rkyen | lhan. cig. par. gyur. du. zin. kyan. hkhrul. ba. med.. pahi. phyir. gzhan. las. skyes. pahi. rkyen. du. hgyur. tel hdi. ltar. gtan. tshigs. pa. dag. ni. yod. pa. dan. med. pa. dag. gi. de. dan. Idan. pa. nid. ni. rgyu. dan. hbras. bu. rgyu. dan. Idan. pahi. rim. gis. skye. ba.. dag. gi. yan. mtshan. nid. yin. par. smraho ||

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TIBETAN VERSION 93 yan. na. nus. pa. hjog. phyir. rim. gyis. yin! rim. gyis. kyan. yin. tel don. du. snan. ba. de. ni. ran. dan. mthun. pahi. Ibras. bu. skyed. par. byed. pahi. nus. pa. rnam. par. s'es. pahi. rten. can. byed. pas. mi. hgal. lo II gal. te. ho. na. nan. gi. gzugs. kho. na. dmigs. pahi. rkyen. yin. na 1 ji. ltar. de. dan. mig. la. brten. nas. mig. gi. rnam. par. s'es. pa. skye. zhe. na! Than. cig. byed. dban nus. pa. yil no. bo. gan. yin. dban. pohan. yin 11 7 || dban. po. ni. ran. gi. hbras. bu. las. nus. pahi. no. bo. nid. du. rjes. su. dpag. gi. htyui. ba. las, gyur. pa. nid. du. ni. ma. yin. no 11 de. yan. rnam. rig. la. mi. hgall nus. pa. ni. rnam. par. s'es. pa. la. yod. kyan. run I bstan. tu. med. pahi. ran. gi. no. bo. la. yod. kyan. run. ste. hbras. bu. bskyed. pa. la. khyad. par. med. do II de. Itar. yul. gyi. no. bo. dan! nus. pa. phan. tshun. rgyu. can. dan! thog, ma. med. dus. hjug. yin || 8 || mig. ces. bya. bahi. nus. pa. dan l nan. gi. gzugs. la. brten. nas. rnam. par. s'es. pa. don. du. snan. ba. dmigs. kyis. ma. phye. ba. skyehol hdi. gnis, kyan. phan. tshun. gyi. rgyu. can. dan l thog. ma. med. pahi. dus. pa yin. tel res. hgah. ni. nus. pa. yons. su. smin. pa. las. rnam. par. s'es. pa. ni. yul. gyi. rnam. pa. nid. du. Abyun. la. res. hgah. ni. deni. rnam. pa. la. nus. paho ll rnam. par.

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94 ALAMBANAPARIKSA s'es. pa. dan. de. gnis. gzhan. nid. dan I gzhan. ma. yin. pa. nid. du. ci. dgar. brjod. par. byaho || de. Itar. na. nan. gi. dmigs. pa. ni. chos. nid. gnis. dan. Idan. pahi. phyir. yul. nid. du. hthod. do II Dmigs. pa. brtag. pahi. hgrel. pa. slob. dpon. phyogs. kyi. glan pos. mdzad. pa. rdzogs. so II

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ADDITIONAL NOTES Page 3, line 1. f3793 311379an Trims'ikabhasya ed. S. Levi, p. 21. 17 faqe 31TION (=8773297) | Mad. vitti ed. L. V. Poussin p. 364, 7. Alambana stands for alambanapratyaya-So explain the Chinese translators, Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang. It may also be clear from Dharmapala's comment, pp. 21-22 above. Alambanapratya is explained by Candrakirti : utpadyamAno dharmo yena Alambanena geged a JEU 3773rCASET: Mad. vitti, p. 77, 2. (Cf. S'alistamba Sutra : agfasmaet ... 59A1Fanti Fazifa i Ibid. pp. 567, 9.) 3117764aSEITSETAR I fasina1977 ET TETTIITATSISAH 31/SESAIA: Hafal: 1 Madhyamakavatara (Sanskrit text) pp. 12, 2. Another interpretation is also given by him : GYERTYTT fangar aga 399AFT 37259a3fegrua eta traata gera a 317557619977: 1 Ibid. p. 12, 7. According to this interpretation alambana is an element (dharma) by support of which a consciousness arises, that is to say, a supporting element in the process of cognition is alambana. S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, on the authority of the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu (chaps. I and II, p. 307, 11. 5-6) and of the Triss'ikabhasya of Sthiramati, p. 21 (afari aa- (= faqq) fastat atatarats29677591FROTA) translate everywhere the term alambana as " perceivable object". And Yasomitra's comment makes the point clearer : JET Tashart TGIOFAri ada gey 34/57ani Haa I Haarpfafa pp. 1, 18, 17. P. 3, 1. 1. Fifco Dharmapala comments that the five-fold consciousness is meant here. Hiuan Tsang follows him. But, according to Paramartha six-fold consciousness is meant there with addition of manovijnana. Vinitadeva is said to agree with Para. martha here. 13

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ALAMBANAPARIKSA P. 3, 1. 2. Omit in the Sanskrit text the word "START" after dataTT. P.3, 11. 1-3. Vasubandhu in his Viss'ika and its bhasya, speaks of three different opinions on the external things: (1) The first opinion is that the object of our cognition is one (eka), i.e. one whole (avayavin); (2) the second one is that it is many, i.e. atoms, and (3) the third view is: it is the collocation of atonis (sanghata). The first opinion is held by Vais'esikas. The holders of other two views are not named there (see Appendix A, p. 105 below). According to the commentary of Vinitadeva on the Vimsakaprakarana as recorded by the French translators, the second opinion, that is referred to by Dinnaga as the first, is that the numerous atoms exist allowing amongst themselves some intermediate space=rdul. phra. rab. phrag. can. de. gnas. du. ma. The third one that is referred to by D. as the second, affirms that the atoms exist without any intermediate space amongst themselves =rdul. phra. rab. de. dag. bar. med. par. gnas; that is to say, these atoms which have reciprocal support are united=phan. thsun. bltos. pa. dan. bcas. pahi. rdul. phra, rab. de. dag. nid. hdus. pa (French trans., p. 48, n. 3). Again Vasubandhu in his Kosa, says that it is the Kasmira Vaibhasikas who hold that the atoms exist with some interspace and in close vicinity, (ATFART: 241977:) but do not get combined, and that Bhadanta (Vasubandhu] asserts that the atoms exist without any interspace, and due to this, they are called "combined " (nirantaratve tu sprsta samjna). Compare Tattvasangraha with Panjika, p. 197 : FATAJatareyaztet eiga faza: 1 arcefferanan faat aina II. ... agit ara fata FEATRICIiacaatszafcafaa: 1 See again on p. 552 : Bhadanta-S'ubhagupta's view : Alatafafogadatai Ascerai 196EU sthUla iti mAnaso vibhramo bhavati / But there is no real combination of atoms (sparso na asti). See Abh. Kosa, Tib. text, pp. 82-3). Both these schools seem to hold that the atoms are direct objects of our cognition. Therefore Dirnaga might have included both these opinions in the first of the two. He might have meant by the theory of sanghata the Vais'esikas' opinion. This may be clear from I.

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97 Vinitadeva's comment p. 47 above. It may also be pointed out here that Kamalas'ila has recorded three views on the atomic theory (see his Panjika, p. 556, 8, and my paper "Sankara on Buddhist Idealism," published in the Journal of S. V. Oriental Institute, Vol. I, part 2, p. 82.) Jainas are also credited with the opinion that the atoms are direct objects of our perception. (See note 6 on p. 4 above). P. 3, 1. 4. A long note has heen put on the word "vijnapti " by S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer. P. 3, 1. 8. According to the Chinese translations, we may read in Sanskrit : saGghAtaH tadAbha:, etc. P. 4, 1. 1. We may read in the Sanskrit sa eva hyutpattipratyaya iti ADDITIONAL NOTES (bsad. pas. so) for : . . . ucyate / According to Vinitadeva pratyaya is meant nimittapratyaya, see French trans. p. 52, 1. 7. Ibid., and p. 43, 2. Dharmapala also here refers to the Agama, asmin sati idaM bhavati, etc. P. 4, 1. 9. kecana / Dharmapala does not give any indication as to who were the advocates of this opinion. Vinitadeva says that this is the opinion of Vagbhata and others-which is not confirmed in Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus (pp. 311-313). Kouechi, the commentator on the Siddhi of Hiuan Tsang presents this third thesis as that of Sanghabhadra, (see La Siddhi, p. 45, and Fren. Trans. p. 52. n. 11). I have already pointed out that Bhadanta Subhagupta might be a representative of this view in later period (see note 4, on p. 4 above). The earlier Buddhists, Sarvastivadins may also be said to have held this opinion. Cf. Tattvasangraha, p. 197: samAnajvAlAsaMbhUte ryathA dIpena vibhramaH / ... tathA nairantaryasthitAne kasUkSmatattatpadArthasaMatsafa: st: cp. Ibid., p. 552, Sabhagupta's view: paramANUnAmavicchannadezAnAM sajAtIyAnAM yugapadgrahaNe sthUla iti mAnaso vibhramo bhavati / Observe Vinitadeva's comment below : saJcitAkAra: = sthUlAkAraH / P. 4, 1. 9. rsgrub pa. Hiuan Tsang translates it as pratyaya. But Paramartha explains thus : aNavaH saJcitAH padArthasAdhanAni / see p. 13 above. Vinitadeva comments thus: hdus. pahi. rnam. pa. rnam. par. s'es. pahi. rgyu nid. hgyur. ro: the state of

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98 ALAMBANAPARIKSA combination becomes as the cause of the consciousness. (See Fren. Trans. p. 52, n. 12). P. 4, 1. 9. Vinitadeva says that the state of combination is here the gross form, sancitakara=sthulakara. See La Siddhi, p. 45. (Fren. trans., p. 53, n. 13). P. 4, 1. 12 ver. 3 a-b. According to Vinitadeva this is the statement of the opponent. Dharmapala also seems to have meant the same. So we may supply before this the following: afaatar: 7 sfoaralt: 1 u EIT, 3796987: FOTI See Dharmapala's comment here. But Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang interpret that this is the refutation of the above view by the author. P. 5, 1. 3 ver. 4 c-d. Hiuan Tsang introduces this line thus : cakSurAdivijJAnakAraNaparamANusaJcitAkArAvAde punarasti doSAntaram / P. 5, 1. 6. Note Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang have much simplified this sentence. See p. 14 above. P. 5, 1. 15. See Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang for clearer interpretation of the passage. Ver. 5 c-d. cp. Nyaya Sutra, IV, 2, 25 : ggar fala caraAtarai yAthAtmyAnupalabdhistantvapakaSaNe paTasadbhAvAnupalabdhivat tdnuplbdhiH| P. 5, 1. 17. According to Vinitadeva, the nature which is capable of being perceived is the characteristic of the object, that is to say, the knowable aspect (grahyabhaga). (Fren. Trans.) See Dharmapala's comment : 790 Tais: fastarf UTA: faqalariset bhavati iti pradarzayati / see p. 36. P.6, 1. 1. Here Paramartha's version agrees with Dharmapala's comment. Ver 7 a-b: quoted by Parthasarathi Mis'ra in him comment on S'lokavartika, pp. 311, 312: pratyayo'vyabhicAritvAtsaha zaktatharparNAtkramAt / P. 6, 1. 8. There are 4 pratyayas, (1) hetu, (2) samantara, (3)alambana, (4) adhipati. Abhidh-koslavyakhya, p. 18, 22. These are well explained in the Madhyamakavitti, p. 77. P.6, 1. 9. The following is the Tibetan text: Yod. pa, daii. med. pa. dag. gi. de. dag. Idan. pa. nid. ni. rgyu. dan. hbras bu.

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99 rgyu. dan. Idan. pahi. rim. gyis. skye. ba. dag. gi. yan. mtshan. nid. yin. pa., lit. : bhAvAbhAvayostadvattA hi hetuhetumatphalayoH krameNa jAyamAnayorapi lakSaNam / Both Paramartha and Hiuan Tsang are not very helpful in interpreting this quotation. P. 6, 1. 13. This is a quotation from a Sutra. See e.g. S'alistamba Sutra : cakSuH pratItya rUpaM ca ...... cakSurvijJAnamutpadyate Madhya.. vrtti, p. 567, 8 and p. 6, with notes thereon by Prof. Poussin. P. 7, 1. 1. This view is much criticised by Candrakirti. See his Madh. Avatara, my restored Sanskrit text with Bhasya, VI, 62 ff. and 57-9. ADDITIONAL NOTES P. 7, 1. 4. According to Dinnaga, the nature of the organ is inexplicable. So he seems to have anticipated all criticisms levelled by Candrakirti against his view that the sense-organs are some forces (s'akti). P. 7, 1. 7. Cp. S'lokavartika, S'unyavada, ver. 17 : aratragal caiva jJAnazaktayoranAdikA / P. 7, 1. 9. The consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated" is explained in the commentary of Vinitadeva thus: ma. nes. pahi. don. gyi. rnam. pa. can. gyi, rnam. par. s'es. pa-consciousness possessing the characteristics of the object not differentiated. That is, according to the doctrine of those who affirm the external object, the .consciousness arises depending upon the object substantially differentiated. But the school of Vijnaptimatrata does not accept the object substantially differentiated. 66 66 Vinitadeva, after having given another explanation on the bahyarthajnana, says: "Other [school] asserts: It is the consciousness which appears as an inexpressible object. Vinitadeva refutes this assertion in these terms: "But, in this case, there is every necessity to say inexpressible". For, all the proper characteristics are inexpressible. Therefore, if the perception which appears as these proper characteristics, arises, what arises in reality? (sic). If one says: one could not assert that the perception arises in possessing the characteristic 66

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100 ALAMBANAPARIKSA of the object", then, is it that which is not expressible, because there is nothing, or because it is there justly the proper characteristic? In all cases, if it is so (1) because there is nothing, this not logic, for one could express the very non-existence. For example, one could express the horns of a rabbit, etc. If it is so (2) because it is justly the proper characteristic, we have just refuted this [proposition, in saying all the proper characteristics are inexpressible]. What Paramartha translates on this subject by: louan che pu ko yen chi hsiang (=afasianfaezyc9g) is justly this last doctrine which Vinitadeva has just refuted." (Fren. trans.) Parthasarathi Mis'ra has ably presented the standpoint of the Vijnanavadins that the object, blue, etc. is not different from its consciousness, see his comment on S'lokavartika, p. 274. P. 7, 1. 11, and p. 54. 1. 12. After "C different" and non different" Paramartha adds "C inexpressible" pu ko chouo, anabhilapya, (or anirvacya). One could not find this word either in the Tibetan text or in the text of Hiuan Tsang. But, if one takes account of the phrase of Vinitadeva one could explain why "inexpressible" finds its way in the text of Paramartha. Vinitadeva in his commentary, says: (gal. te. dnos. kyi. tshul. dpyad. na. ni. dehhi. tshe. nus. pa. rnams. gnas. skabs. kyi. khyad. par. gyi. bdag. nid. yin. pas. kun. rdzob. tu. yod. pahi. phyir. rnam. par. s'es. pa, las. gzhan. nid. dam. gzhan. ma. yin. pa. nid. du. brjod. par. bya. ba. ma. yin. no.) "If one examines transcendently (paramarthena) the proper nature [of dominant forces], they are then inexpressible whether they are or not of a nature different from consciousness. For, being the proper nature of a characteristic of a stage of forces (s'akti), they exist but conventionally" (s'aktinam avasthavis'esatmakatvena samvrtisattvat). This explanation signifies: things being not capable of existing in proper nature, one could not give them any designations" different" or non different", but one could simply call them 77 different 66 or non different" when they are considered as conventional things." 66 CC

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ADDITIONAL NOTES 101 This is justly the principal doctrine of Nagarjuna; for, in the opinion of Paramartha, one finds always the trace of the ideas of Nagarjuna rather than in that of Hiuan Tsang. Thus the thesis of a conception "inexpressible" will not be accidental, but rather fundamental. (Fren. trans.) French translators have taken the Tibetan word. "gnas skabs', to be "avukas a " and therefore rendered "lieu determine." But the exact Sanskrit equivalent will be here" avastha"="stage" or "condition." P. 39, 1. 13. gacha tah; cf. Parthasarathi Misra's comment on Slokavar. p. 309 : Arcaha Hai Terahi . P. 42, 1. 2. "Consciousness grasps the form of its own ": cf. Ibid., p. 325 : Hacarsit a fHall i agarcha: sacai dwafai P. 50. n. 37, horns of the right and left of the ox, etc. cp. Ibid., p. 310. HouffaTIFICI P. 50, n. 40. Cf. Ibid., p. 310. ver. 153. grauifaathia I: 1 P. 54, 1. 6. Undifferentiated from the perceivable object. cf. Ibid., p. 325: scarats a Har I 1. 12. Ibid., p. 342 ver. 255. PP. 56-57 (pp. 22-23). Compare the crittcism of the sixth sense, manas as accepted by Earlier Buddhists and Naiyayikas, etc. with the verse : na sukhAdi prameyaM vA mano vAstIndriyAntaram / aniSedhAdupAttazceda-yendriyastaM vRthA // Cited from Dinnaga by Vacaspati Mis'ra in his Nyayavar. tatparyatika, p. 97. It is to be understood that the Vijnanavadins deny only the material character of the manas as accepted by Realists, but do not deny it as such. Note Yas'omitra's Comm. : ftrarcatata g 93. faatasufafritscafea RTVT: ) (Abh. Kos'avya. p 40, 1. 24). As to the opinion of the Earlier Buddhists, the same authority remarks: tAmraparNIyA api hRdayavastu manovijJAnadhAtorAzrayaM kalpayanti / taccArUpyadhAtAvapi vidyata iti varNayanti / ArUpyadhAtAvapi hi teSAM rUpamabhipretam / ArUpya iti ca ISadarthe AGa / 3119 safaf 1 (ibid.).

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102 ALAMBANAPARIKSA According to the Vaibhasika-Sautrantikas, manas is defined by Vasubhandhu as below : SaSNAmanantarAtItaM vijJAnaM yaddhi tanmanaH / SaSThAzrayaprasiddhayartha dhAtavo'STAdaza smRtAH // Abh. Kosa, I, 17. Santaraksita also explains it in the same manner : cakSurAdyatiriktaM tu mno'smaabhirpiissyte| SaNNAmanantarodbhUtapratyayo yo hi tanmanaH // Tattvas. p. 209, ver.631. Speaking of the manas, Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky writes: Yogacara-Sautrantikas do not admit manas as 6th organ. The Older Hinayanists reckon 6 organs of senses, 5 outer senses and one inner sense. The Realists, Naiyayikas, Mimamsakas and Sankhyas characterise mind as a 6th organ. The Madhyamikas and Vedantins also do the same. (Buddh. Logic. II, p. 318, n. 9). ___P. 57, 1. 15 and p. 22, 1. 1. (tarkAgocaratvAt ) Cf. Vasubandhu's Vimsikabhasya, ed. S. Levi, p. 11. tarkAviSayatvAt / kasya punaH sA sarvathA gocara ityAha / buddhgocrH|| P. 58, n. 5. Tattvas. panjika, p. 825 : yadyapi tat (manaH) sarvaviSayam / tathApi na tasya svAtantryeNArthagrahaNavyApAro'sti / andhabadhirAdyabhAvaprasaGgAt / Cp. Nyayabindutikatippani, p. 27, 1. 1. P. 61, last line. There are two views regarding sarighata (=baramanusamanyalaksana), viz. one is held by Kasmira Vaibhasikas, and the other probably by other Vaibhasikas. In his Kosabhasya, Vasubandhu has clearly expressed the former's view thus : kAzmIra[vaibhASikA] AhuH / [paramANavo] na spRsheyuH| . . . . . sAvayavAH prasajyeran / niravayavA hi paramANavaH / . . . . tadevaiSAM nirantaratvaM yanmadhye nAsti kiJcit [AlokAdi] / api khalu saMghAtA: sAvayavAH spRzanti ityadoSaH / (Abhi. Kosa, Tib. text, p. 82.) a. Cf. saMghAtAstu parasparaM saMyujyante iti kAzmIravaibhASikA: / His Vimsika bhasya, p. 7, 1. 10., and p. 106 below,

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ADDITIONAL NOTES 103 This sanghata is, for them, different from atoms (v. Yas'omitra's comment : yathA vaibhASikA: kalpayanti / p. 89, 1. 20). Other Vaibhasikas, on the other hand, maintain that the aggregates are not different from atoms : na ca paramANubhyo'nye sNghaataaH| ta eva saMghAte spRzyante / yathA ruupynte| (Abh. Kosa, Tib. p. 83, 1. 15). ya: paramANUnAM saMghAtaH na sa tebhyo'rthAntaram / (Vimsika bhasya, p. 7, 1. 11 and p. 106 below). According to Dharmakirti, Dirnaga pleads for the external reality from the standpoint of the latter Vaibhasikas. This will be clear from the following extracts: saJcita: samudAya: sa sAmAnyaM tatra cAkSadhIH / sAmAnyabuddhizvAvazyaM vikalpenAnubadhyate // pramANavArtikavRtti, II, 194. vRttiH| nanu saJcitAlamvanA: pazcavijJAnakAyA iti siddhAntaH / tatrAnekArthajanyatvAt svArtha sAmAnyagocara' iti coktam (prmaannsmuccye)| avAha / arthAntarAbhisambandhAt jAyante ye'Navo'pare / uktAste saJcitAste hi nimittaM jJAnajanmanaH // Ibid., 195. vRttiH / uktAH saJcitAlambanAH [paJca] vijJAnakAyA ityAdau / jJAnajanmanasta eva hi nimittamuktAH tatrAnekArthajanyatvAdityAdinA / aNUnAM sa vizeSazca nAntareNAparAnaNUn / tadekAniyamAt jJAnamuktaM sAmAnyagocaram // Ibid., 196. vRttiH / aNUnAM sa ca jJAnajananasAmarthyalakSaNo vizeSaH . . . . . / na hi pratyekamaNavo dRshyaaH| kintu sahitA eva / . . . . ekasmin paramANau jJAnasyAniyamAt sAmAnyagocaraM saJcitaparamANusaMghAtaviSayaM jJAnamuktaM tattvavAdinA / na tu paramANvatiriktasAmAnyaviSayam / Exactly this same opinion is expressed by the opponents in saying the general quality of atoms ", etc. ___P. 61, n. 12. tatra buddhiryadAkArA, etc. Pramanavar. II, 224, p. 73, 1. 3. The holders of this view may be some of the Vaibhasikas who maintain that the single atoms are not objects of our cognition, but their generality (samanya = sancita) does so. Cf. the above extracts from Pramanavar. and vrtti thereon.

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104 ALAMBANAPARIKNA P. 85, 1. 10. (=p. 39, 1. 9). This objection, according to Nyayaviniscaya of Akalarka, has been made by Bhadanta Slubhagupta; see Subhagupta's passage cited by Akalaika : tatra bhadanta zubhaguptastvAha / viruddho'yaM hetu: (sahopalambhaH) / yasmAt , sahazabdazca loke'nyo(syA)navAnyena vinA kvacit / viruddho'yaM tato heturyadyasti sahavedanam // ___ (Nyayaviniscaya, Akalarikatraya, pp. 159-60). P. 85, n. 33. The idea is well expressed by Dharmakirti in this verse: bhinnakAlaM kathaM grAhyamiti cet grAhyatAM viduH / hetutvameva yuktijJAH jJAnAkArArpaNakSamam // Pramanavartika, II, 247. This verse is often quoted by other writers: Vacaspatimis'ra ; N. Tatparyatika, p. 101 ; Parthasarathimis'ra : S'lok. Comment, p. 283 and Advayavajrasangraha, p. 17.

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APPENDIX VASUBANDHU'S CRITICISM OF THE EXTERNAL THINGS . [The following is the extract from Vasubandhu's Vims'ika with bhasya, ed. S. Levi. Vasubandhu, the *earlier champion of the Vijhanavada school, criticises, there, in his own way, the views of those who hold the external things to be real. I have reproduced the particular portion of Vasubandhu's arguments in favour of his thesis, vijnaptimatrata, reality of only consciousness and nothing else, to facilitate comparison with Dinnaga's method of argument.] na tadekaM na cAnekaM viSayaH paramANuzaH / na ca te saMhatA yasmAtparamANuna sidhyati // 11 // iti kimuktaM bhavati / yattadrUpAdikamAyatanaM rUpAdivijJaptInAM pratyeka viSaya. syAt , tadekaM vA syAt yathAvayavirUpaM kalpyate vaizeSikaiH / anekaM vA paramANuzaH / saMhatA vA ta eva paramANavaH / na tAvadekaM viSayo bhavati / avayavebhyo'nyasyAvayavirUpasya kvacidapyagrahaNAt / nApyanekam paramANUnAM

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106 ALAMBANAPARIKSA pratyekamagrahaNAt / nApi te saMhatA viSayIbhavanti / yasmAtparamANurekaM dravyaM na sidhyati / kathaM na sidhyati / yasmAt / SaTkena yugapadyogAtparamANoH SaDaMzatA' / SaDbhyo digbhyaH SaDbhiH paramANubhiryugapadyoge sati paramANoH SaDaMzatA prApnoti / ekasya yo dezaH tatrAnyasyAsaMbhavAt / ___SaNNAM samAnadezatvAtpiNDaH syAdaNumAtrakaH // 12 // atha ya evaikasya paramANordezaH sa eSa SaNNAm / tena sarveSAM samAnadezatvAtsarvaH piNDaH paramANumAtraH syAt paraspara [7]vyatirekAditi na kazcitpiNDo dRzyaH syAt / naiva hi paramANavaH saMyujyante, niravayavatvAt / mA bhUdeSa doSaprasaGgaH / saMhatAstu parasparaM saMyujyante iti kAzmIravaibhASikAH / ta idaM praSTavyAH / yaH paramANUnAM saMghAto na sa tebhyo'rthAntaramiti / ___paramANorasaMyoge tatsaMghAte'sti kasya saH / / saMyoga iti vartate / na cAnavayavatvena tatsaMyogo na sidhyati // 13 // _icf. Abhidharmakosabhasya (Tib.), p. 83, 17-19; and Vyakhya, p. 89 : paramANvapariniSpattiM vaktukAma prAcAryo vicArayati / yadi paramANorekasya pUrvAdidigbhAgabheda: kalpyeta / etc. atra sAdhanam / na niravayavaH paramANuH, digbhAgabhedavattvAt / mASarAzivat iti / tadetadigbhAgabhedavattvaM necchanti vaibhASikA: / digbhAgabhedo hi saMghAtarUpANAmeva kalpyate / evaJca te varNayanti / dharmataiveyaM yatsapratighAnAM bhinnadezatvam / teSAM nairantaryeNAvasthAnAd abhinnadezatvaM mA bhUditi sAntarANAmapi sapratighatvena gatiH pratibadhyata iti // ' Abh. Kosabhasya (Tib.), p. 82, 19 : saMghAtA: sAvayavatvAt spRzanti / Vyakhya, p. 89, 7. Ibid., p. 89, 20.

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APPENDIX 107 atha saMghAtA apyanyonyaM na saMyujyante / na tarhi paramANUnAM niravayavatvAtsaMyogo na sidhyatIti vaktavyam / sAvayavasyApi hi saMghAtasya saMyogAnabhyupagamAt / tasmAt paramANurekaM dravyaM na sidhyati / yadi paramANoH saMyoga iSyate yadi vA neSyate / digbhAgabhedo yasyAsti tasyaikatvaM na yujyate / ___ anyo hi paramANoH pUrvadigbhAgo yAvadadhodigbhAga iti digbhAgabhede sati kathaM tadAtmakasya, paramANorekatvaM yokSyate / chAyAvRtI kathaM vA yadyekaikasya paramANodigbhAgabhedo na syAd Adityodaye kathamanyatra chAyA bhavati anyatrAtapaH / na hi tasyAnyaH pradezo'sti yatrAtapo na syAt / AvaraNaJca kathaM bhavati paramANoH paramANvantareNa yadi digbhAgabhedo neSyate / na hi kazcidapi paramANoH parabhAgo'sti yatrAgamanAdanyenAnyasya pratighAtaH syAt / asati ca pratighAte sarveSAM samAnadezatvAtsarvaH saMghAtaH paramANumAtraH syAdityuktam / kimevaM neSyate piNDasya te chAyAvRtI na paramANoriti / kiM khalu paramANubhyo'nyaH piNDa iSyate yasya te syAtAm / netyAha / anyo na piNDazcenna tasya te // 14 // ___ yadi nAnyaH paramANubhyaH piNDa iSyate na te tasya iti siddhaM bhavati / saMnivezaparikalpa eSaH / paramANuH saghAta iti vA kimanayA cintayA, lakSaNantu rUpAdi yadi na pratiSidhyate / kiM punasteSAM lakSaNaM cakSurAdiviSayatvaM nIlAditvaJca / tadevedaM saMpradhAryate / yattaccakSurAdInAM viSayo

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108 ALAMBANAPARIKSA nIlapItAdikamiSyate / kiM tadekaM dravyam athavA tadanekamiti / kizcAtaH / anekatve doSa uktaH / ekatve na krameNetiyugapanna grahAgrahau / vicchinnAnekavRttizca sUkSmAnIkSA ca no bhavet // 15 // yadi yAvadavicchinnaM nAnekaM cakSuSo viSayaH tadekaM dravyaM kalpyate / pRthivyAM krameNetirna syAt / gamanamityarthaH / sakRtpAdaprakSepeNa sarvasya gatatvAt / arvAgbhAgasya ca grahaNaM parabhAgasya cAgrahaNaM yugapanna syAt / na hi tasyaiva tadAnIM grahaNazcAgrahaNaJca yuktam / vicchinnasya cAnekasya hastyazvAdikasya anekatra vRttirna syAt , yatraiva hyekaM tatraivAparamiti kathaM tayoviccheda iSyate / kathaM vA tadekaM yatprAptaJca tAbhyAm na ca prAptamantarAle tacchUnyagrahaNAt / sUkSmANAJcaudakajantUnAM sthUlaiH samAnarUpANAmanIkSaNaM na syAt / yadi lakSaNabhedAdeva dravyAntaratvaM kalpyate nAnyathA / tasmAdavazyaM paramANuzo bhedaH kalpayitavyaH / sa caiko na sidhyati / tasyAsiddhau rUpAdInAM cakSurAdiviSayatvamasiddhamiti siddhaM vijJaptimAtraM bhavatIti // pramANavazAdastitvaM nAstitvaM vA nirdhAryate / sarveSAJca pramANAnAM pratyakSaM pramANaM gariSThamityasatyarthe kathamiyaM buddhirbhavati pratyakSamiti / pratyakSabuddhiH svapnAdau yathA vinApyartheneti pUrvameva jJApitam / sA ca yadA tadA / - na so'rtho dRzyate tasya pratyakSatvaM kathaM matam // 16 // yadA ca sA pratyakSabuddhi(na)bhavati idaM me pratyakSamiti / tadA na so'rtho dRzyate / manovijJAnenaiva paricchedAt cakSurvijJAnasya ca tadA niruddha

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APPENDIX 109 tvAditi kathaM tasya pratyakSatvamiSTam / vizeSeNa tu kSaNikasya viSayasya tadAnIM niruddhameva tadrUpaM rasAdikaM vA // nAnanubhUtaM manovijJAnena smaryata ityavazyamarthAnubhavena bhavitavyam / tacca darzanamityevaM tadviSayasya rUpAdeH pratyakSatvaM matam / asiddhamidam anubhUtasyArthasya smaraNaM bhavatIti / yasmAt / uktaM yathA tadAbhAsA vijJaptiH vinApyarthena yathArthAbhAsA cakSurvijJAnAdikA vijJaptirutpadyate tathoktam / smaraNaM ttH| tato hi vijJapteH smRtisaMprayuktA tatpratibhAsaiva rUpAdivikalpikA manovijJaptirutpadyata iti na smRtyutpAdAdarthAnubhavaH sidhyati // yadi yathA svapne vijJaptirabhUtArthaviSayA tathA jAgrato'pi syAt / tathaiva tadabhAvaM lokaH svayamavagacchet / na caivaM bhavati / tasmAnna svapna ivArthopalabdhiH sarvA. nirarthikA / idamajJApakam / yasmAt / svapne dRgviSayAbhAvaM nAprabuddho'vagacchati // 17 // evaM vitathavikalpAbhyAsavAsanAnidrayA prasupto lokaH svapna ivAbhUtamarthaM pazyan aprabuddhastadabhAvaM yathAvannAvagacchati / yadA tu tatpratipakSalokottaranirvikalpajJAnalAbhAtprabuddho bhavati / tadA 'tatpRSThalabdhazuddhalaukikajJAnasaMmukhIbhAvAt viSayAbhAvaM yathAvadavagacchatIti samAnametat // See Mahayanasutralankara XIV, 43 with Bhasya.

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110 ALAMBANAPARIKSA STHIRAMATI ON THE EXTERNAL THINGS [The following extract is from the Bhasya (pp. 16-17) of Sthiramati on Vasubandhu's Trimsika, ed. S. Levi. Sthiramati is well-known to be one of the champions of the Agamanusari Vijnanavada school. It will be seen from the extract below, that he has put forth for his view the arguments which are almost similar to those of his two predecessors, Vasubandhu and Dinnaga.] kathametadgamyate vinA bAhayenArthena vijJAnamevArthAkAramutpadyata iti / bAyo hyarthaH svAbhAsavijJAnajanakatvena vijJAnasyAlambanapratyaya iSyate na kAraNatvamAtreNa samanantarAdipratyayAdivizeSAprasaGgAt / na ca saJcitamavayavasaMhatimAtrAd anyad vidyate / tadavayavAn apohya saJcitAkAravijJAnAbhAvAt / tasmAdvinaiva bAhyenArthena vijJAnaM saJcitAkAramutpadyate / na ca paramANava eva saJcitAstasyAlambanam , paramANUnAm atadAkAratvAt / na hyasaJcitAvasthAtaH saJcitAvasthAyAM paramANUnAM kazcidAtmAtizayaH / tasmAd asaJcitavat saJcitA api paramANavo naivAlambanam // anyastu manyate / ekaikaparamANuranyanirapekSyo'tIndriyaH / bahavastu parasparApekSyA indriyagrAhyAH / teSAmapi sApekSanirapekSayorAtmAtizayAbhAvAd ekAntenendriyagrAhyatvam atIndriyatvaM vA / yadi ca paramANava eva parasparApekSA vijJAnasya viSayIbhavanti / evaM sati yo'yaM ghaTakuDyAdyAkArabhedo vijJAne sa na syAt / 'paramANUnAmatadAkAratvAt / na cAnyanirbhAsasya vijJAnasya anyAkAro viSayo yujyate / atiprasaGgAt / na ca paramANavaH stambhAdivat paramArthataH

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APPENDIX 111 santi / arvAGmadhyaparabhAgasadbhAvAt / tadanabhyupagame vA pUrvadakSiNAparottarAdidigbhedo yaH sa paramANo na syAt / tatazca vijJAnavat paramANorapyamUrtatvamadezasthatvaJca prasajyate / evaM bAhyArthAbhAvAd vijJAnamevArthAkAramutpadyate / svapnavijJAnavad ityabhyupeyam / vedanAdayo'pi nAtItA nA[nA]gatAstadAkAravijJAnajanakAH / niruddhAjAtatvAt / na ca vartamAnA vartamAnajanakAH / utpadyamAnAvasthAyAmasattvAd utpannAvasthAyAM vijJAnasyApi tadAkAreNotpannatvAn na kiJcit kartavyamastIti manovijJAnamapyanAlambanamevotpadyate / / YOGACARAS' CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA (DHARMAS) mahAyAnazatadharmavidyAmukham bodhisattvavasubandhukRtam * Mahayanasatadharmacidyamaikham [The following is the Sanskrit translation of a trea. tise above named from the Chinese version of Hiuan __ * Nanjio No. 1213. Shanghai ed. Vol. marked lai, part 10, fol. 11a. 15

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112 ALAMBANAPARIRNA Tsang. It is attributed to Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. It will be clear from the perusal of the treatise that it is merely a catalogue of a hundred dharmas into which the Yogacaras have classified the things external as well as internal as against the Vaibhasikas who have put them into seventy-five items. A detailed account of the classification of dharmas made by Vaibhasikas is given by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky in his Central Conception of Buddhism ; Appendix.] . yathAha bhagavAn / sarvadharmA nirAtmakA iti / tatra] ke sarvadharmAH / kiM nairAtmyam / sarvadharmAH saMkSepeNa paJcavidhAH-1 cittadharmaH, 2 caitasikadharmaH, 3 rUpadharmaH, 4 cittaviprayuktasaMskAradharmaH, 5 asaMskRtadharma iti / __prathamazcittadharmaH saMkSepeNa aSTaprakAro bhavati / 1 cakSurvijJAnam , 2 zrotravijJAnam , 3 ghrANavijJAnam , 4 jihvAvijJAnam , 5 kAyavijJAnam , 6 manovijJAnam , 7 mananavijJAnam (=kliSTaM mano0), 8 'AlayavijJAnamiti / dvitIyazcaitasikadharmaH saMkSepeNa ekapaJcAzadvidhaH SaDrAziSu vibhaktaH / + See Mah. Sutralankara, XI, 37. Prakaranaryavaca s'astra. as quoted by Prof. Tucci; v his article, The Idealistic School in Buddhism, p. 8, published in the Dacca University Bulletin, No.XII. The Vaibhasikas do not accept the last two types of consci. ousness, manana and Alayavijnana, and bring the other types under one group, vijnana, counted as one dharma. According to the Vaibhasikas Cetasikadharmas are only 46: (1) Cittamahabhumikah 10, (2) Kusalamahabhumikadhariah 10 (3) Klesamahabhtimikadharmah 6, (4) Akusalamahabhumika. dharmah 2, (5) Upakles'a-(paritta) bhumikadharmah 10, (6) Aniyatabhumikadharmah 8: Total 46.

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APPENDIX 113 1. sarvatragAH paJca viniyatabhUmikAH paJca kuzalA ekAdaza 11 klezAH SaT 5. upaklezA viMzatiH - 6. aniyatAzcatvAraH iti / 4 Total 51 (1) paJca sarvatragAH-1 manaskAraH, 2 sparzaH, 3 vedanA, 4 saMjJA, 5 cetnaa| . (2) paJca viniyatabhUmikAH'-1 chandaH, 2 adhimokSaH, 3 smRtiH, 4 samAdhiH, 5 matiH / __ (3) ekAdaza kuzalAH-1 zraddhA, 2 vIryam , 3 hIH, 4 apatrapA, 5 alobhaH, 6 adveSaH, 7 amohaH, 8 prazrabdhiH , 9 apramAdaH, 10 upekSA, 11 ahiNsaa|| (4) SaT klezAH-1 rAgaH, 2 pratidhaH, 3 mAnaH, 4 mohaH, 5 vicikitsA, 6 'mibhyAdRSTiH / cittamaha group and the oc: Bhasya. pp. 3 These are mentioned by Vasubandhu in his Trims'ika, vers. 3c-d and explained by Sthiramati in his Bhasya thereon. Trims'ika, ver. 10 b-c; Bhasya. pp. 25-6. It may be noted that this group and the previous one are put under one class, cittamahabhumikah by the Vaibhasikas. Trims'ika, ver. 100-11a-c; Bhasya, pp. 26-28. The Vaibhasikas omit amoha in this group. Trim. ver, 11c-12a; Bhasya p. 28-9. The Vaibhasikas count them thus : 1. moha, 2. pramada, 3. kausidya, 4. asraddha, 5. stya. na, 6. auddhatya which are, omitting moha, counted amongst 20 upakles as by Yogacaras. 'Lit. asamyagdRSTi: Sthiramati explains it as paica satkaya. drstayah.

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114 ALAMBANAPARIKNA (5) viMzatirupaklezAH'-1 krodhaH, 2 upanAhaH, 3 pradAzaH, 4 prakSaH, 5 mAyA, 6 madaH, 7 zAThyam , 8 vihiMsA, 9 IrSyA, 10 mAtsaryam , 11 degAhIkyam , 12 anapatrApyam , 13 Azraddhayam , 14 kausIdyam , 15 pramAdaH, 16 styAnam , 17 uddhavaH, 18 'muSitA smRtiH, 19 asaMprajanyam , 20 vikSepaH / (6) catvAro'niyatAH' - 1 middham , 2 kaukRtyam , 3 vitarkaH 4 vicAraH / ___tRtIyo rUpadharmaH saMkSepeNa ekAdazavidhaH - 1 cakSuH, 2 zrotram , 3 ghrANam , 4 jihvA, 5 kAyaH, 6 rUpam , 7 zabdaH, 8 gandhaH, 9 rasaH, 10 sparzaH, 11 dharmAyatanasaMgRhItaM 'rUpam / __caturthazcittaviprayuktasaMskAradharmaH saMkSepeNa caturviMzatividhaH-- 1 prAptiH, 2 jIvitam , 3 nikAyasabhAgatA, 4 pRthagjAtiH, 5 asaMjJi Trim. ver. 12b-13; Bhasya, pp. 30-31. The Vaibhasikas accept only the first ten upakleslas of this group. These two dharmas (ahrikhya and anapatrapya) are put by the Vaibhasikas under akus alamahabhumikadarma. 10 Trim. ver. 14; Bhasya, pp. 31-33. These are, for the Vaibhasikas the first four of 8 aniyatabhumikadharmah. The other four aniy. dharmah, raga, dvesa, mana, and vicikitsa are counted by Yogacaras amongst 6 klesas. Some of the klesa and upaklesa groups are mentioned in the Dhammadayadasutta (Majjhima, I, 3, p. 15): lobha, dosa, kodha, upanaha, makkha, palasa, issa, maccheram, maya, satheyyam, thambha, sarambha, mana, atimana, mada, pamada. These are again. mentioned as upakles'a of the mind in the Vatthupamasutta (Maj. I, 7, p. 36f.) "This is avijnapti for the Vaibhasikas. " According to the Vaibhasikas they are only 14, vis. Nos. 1-3, 5-14 : thus 13 in the above list of Yogacaras and aprapti being added, 14 dharmas are counted. 13 Chinese has ming-hen which means literally "life-hatred ". I think the character hen is a mistake for ken, source ; so I have taken both ming-ken to mean jivitendriya or simply jivita, the 7th dharma in the Vaibhasikas' list.

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115 samApatti:, 6 nirodhasamApattiH, 7 asaMjJivipAkaH, 8 nAmakAyaH, 9 padakAyaH, 10 vyaJjanakAya:, 11 jAtiH, 12 jarA, 13 sthitiH, 14 anityatA, 15 pravRtti: or srotaH santatiH 16 evaMbhAgIya : or samAdhyantaram, 17 pratibandhaH, 18 jAvanyam, 19 kramaH, 20 dezaH or dikU, 21 kAlaH, 22 saMkhyA, 23 sAmagrI or saMyogaH, 24 bhedaH or viyogaH / paJcamo'saMskRtadharmaH saMkSepeNa SahnidhaH - 1 AkAzaH, 2 pratisaMkhyAnirodhaH, 3 apratisaMkhyA nirodhaH, 4 acala nirodhaH, 5 saMjJAvedayitanirodhaH, 6 tathatA / 1 uktaM nairAtmyaM saMkSepeNa dvividham - 2 pudgalanairAtmyam 2 dharma - iti mahAyAnazatadharmavidyAmukham nairAtmyam / APPENDIX 1. Cittadharmak 2. Cetasikadharmah 8 51 3. Rupadharmal 11 4. Cittaviprayuktasamskaradharmal 24 5. Asamskrtadharmah 6 Total 100 " The Vaibhasikas admit only the first 3 asamkrtas. 15 The Vaibhasikas do not admit dharmanairatmya; dharmas for them are real entities. Nairatmya means " parikalpitapudgala dharmAbhAva' and not "sarvathaivAbhAva " ; see Mah. Sutralakara, XI, 47. "" One may refer to S. Yamakami Sogan; System of Buddhist Thought, pp. 217-229 for a clear exposition in English of all the terms mentioned in this treatise.

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116 ALAMBANAPARIKSA D CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA (DHARMAS) ACCORDING TO THE SAUTRANTIKAS [It is already known that the Sautrantikas as against the Vaibhasikas, reduced the number of Dharmas to forty-three. But how they have worked it out actually is not as yet known either from the Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan source. However, some hints as to the method of their classification of things are found in the Sivajnanasidhiyar, (second part, parapaksa) and commentary thereon. The Sidhiyar, a polemical treatise in Tamil on S'aiva philosophy was composed by Arunandi Sivacaryar, a great S'aivait scholar of South India, who flourished in 1275-1325 A.D. The relevant portion of the section, Sautrantikamata1 of the Sidhiyar is given below with the commentary which supplements the text with a very valuable necessary information on the subject.] Text: There are only two pramanas, pratyaksa 2 and anumana. The momentary knowledge and the knowable are their objects. These objects get divided 'This Section is studied and translated in full by the present writer and published in the Journal of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 176-191. 2 The commentator, Jnanaprakas'ar in explainning pratyaksa, quotes Dharmakirti: It is divided into four : idriyapratyaksa manasapr. yogapr. and svasamvedanapr. See Nyayabindu, I. 4-11.

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APPENDIX 117 into four, viz. rupa, arupa, nirvana and vyavahara. Each one of these four objects is again divided into two, and therefore they become eight in all, (ver. 3). Two kinds of rupa are: upadanarupa and upadaya-rupa. Two kinds of arupa are: citta and karman. Two kinds of nirvana are: sopadhis'esanir. and nirupadhis'esanirvana. Two kinds of vyavahara are: sad. and asadvyavahara, (ver. 4). Four upadanarupas are: earth, water, fire and air. Four upadayarupas are: hardness, attraction, mo tion and heat. Rupa is what is produced from the combination of the above eight elements (4 upadanar. and 4 upadayar.). Citta is that which cognizes a thing cognizable through the senses. Karman is to discriminate what is good and what is bad, (ver. 5). Commentary: The author intends to bring all the five groups of elements of the Buddhists indicated in this verse No. 5. Of these five groups, rupa includes eight elements, four upadanarupas and four upadayarupas; vedana three, kus'ala, akusala and kusalakusala; samjna six, five sense organs and one citta; 3 This is partly in harmony with Yos'omitra's comment:f hi bruvate / bhUtavikAravizeSA evendriyANIti / pravacane tu naivam / kiM tarhi / rUpAdivyatiriktAni acchAni atIndriyANi svavijJAnAnumeyAni indriyANi yeSAM cakSurAdInyadhiSThAaf p. 24-25. See. My paper on Sarvastivada in Sankarabhasya, publ. in the Jour. of Orien. Research, Madras, Vol. XI, p. 28.

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118 ALAMBANAPARIKSA vijnana six, vijnanas corresponding to the six above and sainskara twenty, ten good acts and ten bad acts.* Thus they work out forty-three in all. So says their Scripture: ettttivai yuruvmuunnnrru veetnnnai yaarrunyaannn, mottttiy kurrippooraarru ceykai miruptaakk, kttttiy pnyckntngknnttinnnirr pngkmaakit, totttt naarrpttu muunnnrrunycukt nuurrrrunnivu taannnee. "It is the siddhanta of the scriptures of the Buddhists that the forty-three [dharmas] which are momentary are counted in five skandhas which are built up of eight rupas, three vedanas, six jnanas, their corresponding six samjnas and twenty samskaras." [It may be noted that the asamsksta elements, akas'a, etc. which are not real entities for the Sautrantikas, are not counted in the above list.] These ten good and ten bad acts are the same as dasa kusalas. and dasakusalas divided into three, vacika, kayika and manasika.

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SANSKRIT INDEX (Roman figures refer to verses and Arabic ones to pages) akSavat I, 26 atadAkAratvAt 26 atadAbhatA I, 26 aNusvarUpaM niraMzam 34 aNvAkAro (na vijJaptiviSayaH) III, 32 adhyavasAyAntara 33 ananyatvam (vijJAnazaktyo : 7 anirdhAritasvabhAvaH (paramANu:) 26 anaikAntika(doSa) 26 (triH), 29 anta: VI, 38 anyatvam (vijJAnazaktyoH )7 anyonyahetukau (zaktiviSayau) 7 apArthaka 26 abhedaH (vijJAnArthayoH) 30 artha 23 arthAnubhava 109 arthApatti 26 asaMghAtatvopalambha 27 asiddhi (doSa) 25, 35 AkArabheda 33, 34 Agama 28 Adarza vimbavat 25 AnurUpya (= sArUpya) 25 AropitAkAra (avayavin) 35 Alambana (dvividha) 3, (= utpattipratyaya) 4, (dvayaMza) 30,-lakSaNa 27-28 AlambanAdavibhaktaM (vijJAnam ) 7 AzayAntara 32 indriyam (zaktirUpaM na bhautika) VII, 10, 24, 25 -paramANuvat 26, 27 -buddheH (AkArotpatti) 33 -vijJAnAnAM vizeSAkAratva 35 -vaikalya 28 -zakti: pratiniyatA 23, 33 upacayApacayAbhAva 34 ekAGgavaikalya 4 etacchAstra 32 kaThinatAdivat III, 32, 33 kazcit or kecit 23, 27, 28, 30 kAraNatAdi (yathA-) 37 kezAdyavabhAsi (yathA-)37

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120 ALAMBANAPARIKSA kSaNika (viSaya) 109 pArimANDalya 5 grAhakAMzavat 39 piNDa (= saGghAta) 106, 107 grAhyatva (= pratyayatva) 39 pratighAta 107 gAhyAMza (= aNu) I, 36, 39 pratItyasamutpannatA 28 cittacaita 28 pratyakSa 108 'chAyAvRtI 107 pratyaya (caturvidha) 36, 39 tatva 22;-vacana 32 pramANa (anyat ) 26; (eka) 38 tathatAjJAna 32 prayoga 32 tathAgata 23 badhirAndhAdi 22 tadAkAra(yuktatva)hetu 24, 25, bahirvat VI, 37 27, 29 bahvAkAra 31 tAratamya 32 bAhyalakSaNa 37 digbhAgabheda 107, 111 bAhyavastu (mithyA) 38, 39 dRSTAnta (sAdhAraNa-) 24, 29 bAhyArtha (vinA-) 110 dvicandra II, 4, 28, 29, bhAga 38 (matabheda) 30 manas (na SaSThendriyam ) 20-21, 25 dvayaNukamAlambanam 23 -vijJAna 108, 109, 111, (pAnirvikalpajJAna (lokottara--) 109 Thika-) 30 naiyyAyika 6 rathAdivat 21 pakSadharma 33 rUpAdi 107, pakSasthApana 27 -asiddhi 108 pakSA( = nyAyA)ntara 36 lokavirodha 36, 37 paJcasaptatipadArtha (= vijJAna) 38 laukikajJAna (zuddha-) 109 parapakSa 26 laukikAnAm 37 paramANu (bAhyArtha) 3, (abhinna) 35, vAdina (dvi) 24 (abhedaka) 35, (niravayava) 34, (apra- vAstavAkAra 33 tyakSa) 32, (anirdhAritasvabhAva) 26. vijJaptimAtra 108 -sAmAnyalakSaNamAlambanam 24, (a- vijJAnapariNAma 36 saMyuktatvena Alambanatvam ) 24, viziSTazakti 31 -kAya 24, (na ekaM dravyam ) 106 viSaya (=jJAnasvarUpa) 3

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INDEX 121 viSayAbhAva 109 vRtti (dvi) 38 vedanAdi 111 vaibhASika 117, n., kAzmIra-106 zakti VII, VIII, 7 zAstrakAra 26 zRGgadvaya (yathA-) 39 saGghAta 27, (bAhyArtha) 3, 102-3; (na dravyam ) 28, (sAMvRta) 33, 34 (vyatyastAkAra) 36, 106 saJcaya 32 saJcita 110 saJcitAkAra III, 31, 32, 33 sabhAgavijJAna 39 samanantarAdi 110 samanantaranirodha (yathA-) 39 sarvabhAva (bhautika) 31, 32 saha VII, 39 sAdhana (dviprakAra) 38 sAmagrI 23 sArthaka 27 siddhasAdhana 35 sukhadu:khavedanavat 35 supta (dRSTAnta) 29 sUtra 17, 36 senAdivat 36 sthUladRSTi 30 smaraNa 109 svapakSe Alambana 36 svapnAdau yathA 108 svapnAvasthAyAm (yathA-) 38 svapratijJA 26 svarUpavirodhadoSa (= viruddhahetu) 39 svalakSaNa 28 hetudvaya (vAdamUla-) 24 hetuphala 17

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ENGLISH GENERAL INDEX . (Figures refer to pages) Abhidharmakosa (BB. ed.) 95, 96, 102, 103 Advayavajrasangraha 104 aggregate (not real entity) 69, 70 (empirical), 77, -of-atoms. object theory) 42 ff, 61 ff, 105 f. AKALANKA 104 akara, v. form, image ananyatva 55n.57, explained 100 : anirdes ya 53n.50 anyatva 55n.57, 100 ARUNANDISIVACARYA 116 artha 42n.5, 43n.9 arthapatti 66 atiprasanga 50n.37; (ans wered) n.40 atom (its indeterminate nature) 66 (atom-object-theory) 41, 60, 106 (atom-generality-object theory) 61-62, 103 avayavin 57 alambana, (dvibhaga, 45n.16; "laksana 68; -ta 59; (ex planation of) 95 ulayavijnana 51n.42 asraya 53 n.49; -ta 59 avedha 54 n.52 Bhavasankrantisutra 59 n. BHAVAVIVEKA 60 n. buddhivis'esa 46 n.20 Buddhist 62 CANDRAKIRTI 95, 99 causality 82 cause, mutual- 54; -inference 52 n.48 characteristic, two-fold. (of ob ject) 68 chariot (as example) 57 cittacaitta 43 n.9 cohesion, saryoga 47 n.29 concomitant, mutually- 64. condidition (-simultaneous) 50, 84; (-in succession) 51 n. 42; two- 73 consciousness, -of the hair-like thing 82 ; five-fold-- 56; sen sual- 76 contradictory, not-53 n.49 co-ordination 63, 66 dependent causation 68 Dhammadayadasutta 114, n DHARMAPALA 95, 97, 98 DHARMAKIRTI 103-4 digbhag (of atoms) 47 n.23 DINNAGA 96, 99, 101, 103, 105, 110 dravyatah 43 n.11 elements, great- 44 n. 14 externally, "as if it exists- " 81 force, s'akti, 51

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INDEX 123 form (akara), 42; -attributed 78; atomic- 45, 75; com- bined--(sancitakara) 44 n. 14; (sancitakara-object-theory and its refutation) 44, 45 n.19, 73-74; gross-67, 73; (distinc- tion in.) 46-47, 79; many. 44, 73 ; undifferentiated - 77 "form" 77; -- (due to imagina tion) 83 grahyabhaga 49 n. 33, 50 n.37 grahyams'a 82, 84 grahyasvabhava 59 happiness, feeling of - 78 HIUEN TSANG 95, 97, 100, 112 image, (-immanent in cons.) 84 "internally " 81, 83 1-TSING 21 Jains 62, 97 JNANAPRAKASA 116 n. KAMALASILA 97 "knowable aspect" 81 KUMARILA 62, n. LEVI, SYLVAIN 95, 105, 110 lokavirodha 81 Madhyamakavrtti 98 Madhyamakavatara (Sanskrit text) 95, 99 Madhyamika 59 n., 102 Mahayanasutralankara 109 n., 112 n., 115 n. "many" 76 MEYAR, HENRY 42, 49, 54, 95, 101 mind (not the 6th sense) 55-58; (as sense and object) 64, (opi. nion on-) 101-102 mirror, image in- 64 misery, feeling of- 78 modolities, two- 54 n.44 moon, double-- 43, 69-71; (views) 71-72 NAGARJUNA, doctrine of -101 Naiyayika 50, 101 Nyayabindu (BB.) 58 n. Nyaybindutikatippani (BB.)102 Nyayavartika (Chawk.) 57, n., 59, n. Nyayav. tatparyatika (Chawk.) 104 Nyayaviniscaya (Sindh Jain Series) 104 Nyayasutra 98 object (explained) 43,n.7; -cause 41 ff.; -image 67 objection (dusana) 65 parts, two-- (of alambana) 72, (of cons.) 83 PARAMARTHA 54 n. 55, 95, 97-101 parimandalya 46 n. 21 PARTHASARATHI MISRA 85, n., 98, 100, 101, 104 POUSSIN, L.V. 95, 99 pradars anartham 66 Prakaranapancika (Chawk.) 71, n. Prakaranaryavacasastra 112,n. pramana, ekam-84 Pramanavartika (Rahula's ed.) 58, n., 61, n., 67, n., 71 n., 103, 104 pratijna 55 n. 57 pratyaya 85 reason (inconclusive) 65, 70 ; (its exclusion) 76; (not established) 67 reinvestigating 77 resolve 66 sabhhaga 86 sahakarin 51 n.42 s'akti (=sense-faculty). 52, 53, 59,-mat 53 n. 49 samanantaranirodha 86 samurtya 55 n.57 SANGHABHADRA 97 Sankhya 102

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124 ALAMBANAPARIKSA sancitakara, v. form SANTARAKSITA 102 sandal wood 55, n. 57 sapaksad rstanta 76 sadhana 83, 84 sadhyadharma 62 samagri 59 samanya (=sancita) 103 sarupya 63, 66 Sarvastivadin 52 n.46, 97 Sastra 43 n.9; author of-65 scripture 81 sena, army 80 senses, passim; power of -75, (explained) 52 siddhasadhana 79 Sivajnanasiddhiyar 116 Sautrantika 116 SUBHAGUPTA 96, 104 Slokavartika (Chawk.) 60, n., 85 n., 99-101 solidity (kathinata) 45, 75 sound-object 81 STCHERBATSKY, Th. 102, 112 STHIRAMATI 95, 113 n. --on the external thing 110 svalaksana 69 svarupavirodha 84 svasamvedana 53 n. 49 syllogism 66, 82, formulation of -76 TARANATHA 97 taimirika 49 n. 33 tarka 57 tathata, suchness 75 Tathagata 59 Tattvasangraha (GOS.) 57, n., 58, n., 60, n., 96, 97, 102 thesis (formulated) 65 thing, (external), passim (of great elements) 73 (of distinct force) 73 different views on-) 96; Vasubandhu's criticism of 105-9. Sthiramati on-110-111 Trimsikabhasya 95; Extract from-110 TUCCI, G. 112, n. VACASPATI MISRA 104 VAGBHATA 44 n. 13, 97 Vaibhasika 112; Kasmira-63, n.. 96, 102 Vaibhasika-Sautrantika 102 Vaisesika 47 nn. 27-28 ; (re. futed) 48 n. 29, 96, 103 vasana 49 n. 35, 54 VASUBANDHU 95, 96, 102, 105-112, (Bhadanta-) 63, n.,98 Vatthupama Sutta 114. n Vimsikabhasya 96, 102, 103 ; Extract from-105.9 Vijnanaparinama 81 Vijnanavadin 62, n., 101, 110 VINITADEVA 49n.36; 54 n. 55, 95-99. (His criticism of other school) 100 visayakarata 54 Vedantin 102 vyavahara 43 n. 9 UDYOTAKARA 62, n. UI, H. 60 YAMAGUCHI, SUSUMA 42, 49, 54, 95, 101 YAMAKAMI SOGEN 115, n. YASOMITRA 95, 101, 103, 117, n. Yogacara-Sautrantika 102

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TIBETAN INDEX (With AUTHORISED SKT. EQUIVALENT) (Figures refer to verses) kyan, apica 6 rkyen, pratyaya 7 gan, yat 6 rgyu, karana 1 ci. dgar, yathestai, vrtti ad 7 gcig. chahar, ekamso'pi (Origi- - nal : saha) 7 de. ni, sah, vitti ad 7 de hi, tasyah 1. de hi. rkyen. nid . . . yin phyir. ro, tatpratyayataya 6 der. mi. snar. phyir, atadabha. taya 1 don, artha 6 don. du. snan. ba, arthavabhasa, vrtti ad 7 * hdus. pahi. rnam. pa, sancita. kara 3 rdul. phran, anu (Original : sah) 1 nan. gi, antah 6 nus. pa, slaktin, vrtti ad 7 nus. pa. hjog. phyir, slaktyarpa snan . . yin. te, avabhasate 6 phyi. rol. ltar, bahirvat 6 phra. rab. rdul, anu.(Orig.: gra hyamsa) 1 byed. pas, karotiti. vrtti ad 7 dban. po. bzhin, aksavat 1 dban. pohi. rnam. par. rig, indri yavijnapti. 1 hbras. bu. skyed. par. byeda pahi, karyotpadaka (Orig. : -utpattaye) vrtti ad 7 mi. hkhrul. phyir. ro, avyabhi caritvat 7 mi. hgol. lo, avirodha, vitti ad 7 mod. kyi, yadyapi 1 zlum. po, parimandalya, vrtti ad 4 d. yan. lag. gcig. ma. tshan, ekarga vaikalya, vrtti ad 2 c. d. yul, visaya 1 ran. dan. mthun. pahi, svanu rupa. vytti ad 7 rim. gyis, kramat 7,--kyan, kra menapi, vrtti ad 7 s'es. byahi. no. bo, jneyarupa 6 sra. nid. la. sogs. bzhin, kathi natadivat 3 nat 7 rnam. par. ses. pahi. rten can, vijnanadharam, vrtti ad 7 rnam. pa. sles. no. bohi phyir, vijnanarupatvat 6

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PUBLICATIONS OF THE ADYAR LIBRARY (The Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras, S. India) Rs. A. 1. A PRELIMINARY LIST OF THE SAMSKRT AND PRAKRT MSS. in the Adyar Library. (Samskrt-Devanagari) 1910 Boards ... 18 Cloth ... 2 2. A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE SAMSKkT MSS. in the Adyar Library. By F. O. Schrader, Ph.D., Vol. I, Upahisads 1912. Cloth ... 50 3. THE MINOR UPANISADS (Samskrt) critically edited for the Adyar Library. By F. O. Schrader, Ph.D., Vol. I.-Samnyasa 1912. Cloth ... 100 4. AHIRBUDHNYA-SAMHITA OF THE PANCARATRA AGAMA (Samskrt), Edited under the supervision of F. O. Schrader, Ph.D., 2 Vols. 1916 Cloth ... 10 O 5. INTRODUCTION (English) TO THE PANCARATRA AND THE AHIR BUDHNYA SANHITA. By F. O. Schrader, Ph.D. 1916. Cloth ... 3 6. YOGA UPANISADS-20--with the Commentary of S'ri Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Edited by Pandit A. Mahadeva Sastri, B.A. 1920 ... 50 7. SAMANYA VEDANTA UPANISADS-24-with the commentary of Sri Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Edited by Pandit A. Mahadeva Sastri, B.A. 1921 ... 50 8. VAISNAVA UPANISADS-14-with the Commentary of S'ri Upani sad Brahma Yogin. Edited by Pandit A. Mahadeva Sastri, B.A. 1923 ... 4 0 9. S'AIVA UPANISADS-15--with the Commentary of Sri Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Edited by A. Mahadeva Sastri, B.A. 1925... 30 10. S'AKTA UPANISADS-8--with the Commentary of S'ri Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Edited by Pandit A. Mahadeva Sastri, B.A. 1925 28 11. CATALOGUE OF SAMSKkT MSS. in the Adyar Library (revised). Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.), 2 Vols. 1926 and 1928 Each ... 3 12 12. SAMNYASA UPANISADS-17-with the Commentary of S'ri Upanisad Brahmayogin. Edited by T. R. Chintamani, M.A., and the Pandits of the Adyar Library, under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) 1929 4 0 13. RUKMINI KALYANA MAHA KAVYA by Rajacudamani Diksita. Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library and Mr. T. R. Chintamani, M.A., under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) 1929 ... 20 14. UNPUBLISHED MINOR UPANISADS with the Commentary of Sri Upanisad Brahma Yogin. Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library, under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) 1933 50 15. TEN MAJOR UPANISADS with the Commentary of Sri Upanisad Brahma Yogin, Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library 17

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Rs. A. under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) Is'a to Aitareya Vol. I --1935 ... 48 Chandogya and BIhadaranyaka Vol. II -1936 60 Vol. I Boards ... . 9 8 Vol. II 30 2 4 16. MelaRAGAMALIKA of Mahavaidyanatha S'ivan. Edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. 1937 20 7. SAMGRAHACUDAMANI--Edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. with a critical Introduction in English by T. R. Srinivasa Aiyangar, B.A., L.T. 1938 50 18. PRATYABHIJNAHRDAYAM (The Secret of Recognition) with English Translation and Notes by Dr. K. F. Leidecker, M.A., Ph.D.; Text edited by the Staff of the Adyar Library under the direction of Dr. G. Srinivasa Murti, B.A., B.L., M.B.&C.M., Vaidyaratna, Hon. Director, Adyar Library. 1938 19. BHAVASANKRANTI-SUTRA AND NAGARJUNA's BHAVASAMKRANTI s'ASTRA-with the Commentary of Maitreyinatha--with English Translation by Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Tirupati. 1938 24 20. YOGA UPANISADS. Translated into English by T. R. Srinivasa Aiyangar, B.A., L.T., and Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. 1938 50 21. * WHERE THEOSOPHY AND SCIENCE MEET (in four Parts) by a body of experts-Edited by Professor D. D. Kanga, M.A., I.E.S. (Retd.) Part 1. Nature-From Macrocosm to Microcosm ... 1 14 Part 2. Man-From Atom to Man 1 14 Part 3. God-From Humanity to Divinity Part 4. Some Practical Applications 1938 22. RGVEDAVYAKHYA, MADHAVAKkTA-Edited by Dr. C. Kunhan - Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) 1939 60 23. THE NUMBER OF RASAS. By V. Raghavan, M.A., Ph.D., Depart ment of Sanskrit, University of Madras, with a Foreword by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, M.A., formerly Professor of Samskrt Maharajah's College, Mysore, 1940 24. SAMANYA VEDANTA UPANISADS-Translated into English by T. R. Srinivasa Aiyangar, B.A., L.T., and Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S., 1941 ... 50 5 25. BHAGAVADGITARTHAPRAKAS'IKA of Upanisad Brahmayogin (Sams krt). Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library with an Introduc tion by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.), 1941 ... 26. SAMAVEDA-SANHITA-With the Commentaries of Madhava and Bharatasvamin. Edited by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.), 1941 6 o 27. RAJA DHARMA (Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao Lectures, 1938, University of Madras) by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., 1941 . ... 3 8 28. VARIVASYARAHASYAM of Bhasuranandanatha (2nd Edition) by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. (with English Translation)1941 ... 28 2 4 30 Published under the auspices of the Adyar Library Association.

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RS. A. 29. VYAVAHARANIRNAYA OF VARADARAJA--Edited by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T. Adyar Library, 1941 30. SAMGITARATNAKARA-With the Commentaries of Catura Kalli natha and Simhabhupala. Edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S., Vol. I, 1941 31. CATALOGUE OF THE ADYAR LIBRARY, Western Section part 1 - prepared under the direction of Bhikshu Arya Asanga, Jt. Director and Curator, Western Section, Adyar Library, 1942. 50 32. ALAMBANAPARIKSA AND VRTTI by Dinnaga with English transla tion, Tibetan text etc. by Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Tirupati, 1942 ... 3 8 33. SOME CONCEPTS OF ALANKARA S'ASTRA by Dr. V. Raghavan, M.A., Ph. D., University of Madras, 1942 PAMPHLETS A VARIANT VERSION OF THE EKAGNIKANDA (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, October, 1939). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. 0 3 THE RAJAMRGANKA OF BHOJA (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, October, 1940). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. ... 04 THE SAT PANCAS'IKA, a Silpas'astra manual. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, February 1942). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. ... 05 IN THE PRESS 1. AS'VALAYANAGRHYA-SOTRA-With Devasvami Bhasya-Edited by Swami Ravi Tirtha. 2. ASVALAYANAGRHYA-SOTRA (Bhasya of Devasvami). Translated into Eng lish by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 3. TiVANANDANAM OF ANANDARAYAMAKHI with a Commentary by Vaidya ratna Pandit M. Duraiswami Aiyangar. Edited by Vaidyaratna G. Srinivasa Murti, B.A., B.L., M. B. & C. M. and Vaidyaratna Pandit M. Duraiswami Aiyangar. 4. S'RI PANCARATRA Raksa of Sri Vedanta Des'ika-Edited by Vaidya ratna Pandit M. Duraiswami Aiyangar and Vedanta S'iromani T. Venugopalacharya. 5. VAISNAVA UPANISADS-Translated into English by T. R. Srinivasa Aiyangar B.A., L.T. 6. A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE of the Manuscripts in the Adyar Library by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L., under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.)--Vedic. 7. USANIRUDDHO of Rama Panivada. Edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. and Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.). 8. NYAYAKUSUMANJALI of Udayanacarya-Translated into English by Swami Ravi Tirtha. 9. THE APASTAMBASMkTI-Edited by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 10. THE ACYUTARAVABHYUDAYAM of Rajanatha Dindima-Sargas 7 to 12 by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library.

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11. VEDANTA PARIBHANA- with English translation and Notes by Prof. S, Suryanarayana Sastri, M. A., B. Sc. (Oxon.), Reader, Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras. 12. CATURDAS'ALAKSANI OF GADADHARA with Five Commentaries-Edited by Pandit N. Santanam Aiyar. Agents for our publications : THE THEOSOPHICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE Adyar, Madras, S. India WORKS UNDER PREPARATION 1. GAUTMASMRTI-Edited by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 2. THE KALADARSA OF ADITYA BHATTA-Edited by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 3. THE VISNUSMRTI-With the Kes'ava Vaijayanti of Nanda Pandita. Edited by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library. 4. PAKSATA OF GADADHARA-with four commentaries by Pandit N. Santa nam Aiyar. 5. AVAYAVA OF GADADHARA-with four commentaries by Pandit N. Santa nam Aiyar. 6. VRTTARATNAVALI-with commentary, English Translation and Notes by H. G. Narahari, M.A. Adyar Library. K. V. 1.. Adyar Libres by Pand BRAHMAVIDYA THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN Director: DR. G. SRINIVASA Murti, B.A., B.L., M.B. & C.M., VAIDYARATNA Editor: Prof. C. KUNHAN RAJA, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.) Rates of Subscription : Life Subscription Rs. 100 or $ 50 PS 10 Per Annum Single Copy India & Ceylon ... Rs. 6 Rs. 2-8 U.S. A. ... $ 3 $. 1.25 British Empire ... Sh. 12 Sh. 5 Other Countries ... Rs. 9 Rs. 3-8 All Communications to be addressed to: THE DIRECTOR, Adyar Library, Adyar, Madras, S. India.