________________
xii
the same is regarded as the object-cause (alambanapratyaya). The opponent asks: “How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness itself ? " Dīnnāga answers this question in two ways. The first answer is : · It is, though simultaneous, a condition, because it is associated invariably with consciousness : प्रत्ययो ऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सह. The second answer is : It becomes also a condition in succession by transmitting the force (s'akti) : 37477 cutia 7791C 11 (Alam. parīkņā, 7 a-b). Both these answers, according to Kumārila, are unsatisfactory and do not stand the strict scrutiny of the logicians. So he takes up the question for an impartial investigation and proves invalidity of those arguments of Dīnnāga in these verses :
अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षत्वाद्युगपच्चापि जन्मनि । ATTÀ DELA Ifera F21812359 $ala Il etc.
77 7andugri Fremaa wata I etc. (S'lokavārtika, S'ünyavada, 150-158 and 158-167). Similarly S'ankarācārya 1 also has, in his Bhāşya on the Brahmasūtras, summarized and demolished the whole structure of Dīnnāga's arguments found in the present work; and in doing so he quotes this line : afragmas a aftagghia I (Alam. par. 6 a-b) in the course of setting forth his own siddhanta. Similar criticisms
See my paper on “Sankarācārya on Buddhist Idealism" published in the Journal of Sri. Ven. Orien. Inst., Tirupati. Vol. I, part 3, pp. 71-85, where I have studied the Bhāsya in the light of original Buddhist sources.
