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ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ
succeding. But, for my own part; where is [the possibility of] incurring such a fallacy? For, I have accepted that it depends upon a substance (dravya) as well as collocation (samagri). Now it follows that even if some other objection is raised, that also may be taken to be answered.
60
They postulate the subtle atom"
Though the subtle atom perishes as soon as it appears, yet two substances serve as a cause, but not collocation [of atoms]. For example, things, colour and others, though they are simultaneously present before the senses, become objects [only of their respective senses] without any confusion on account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a particular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. All substances are perishing, yet the double atom which is capable of existing [at the time of grasping] serves as the object
10
cause.
66
"Because the atom serves as cause for that."
The word that" means the consciousness of the It arises on a contact [of the sense-organ] eye, etc. with the object constituted of parts. So say some [Acaryas]: Among the causes, that which acts as the productive cause becomes its actual object."
10
Contrast the Tattvasangrahapañ. p. 55 fexag¶: 1 Bhāvaviveka calls 2 atoms as a dravya v. Ui, Vais'eşika philosophy, p. 131.
"Read in the Sanskrit text p. 23, line 14: प्रत्ययेषु विज्ञानस्य उत्पादकहेतुः । Cf. Slokavārtika, p. 285 लम्बनत्वम् ।
znů: 7: उत्पादकस्यैवा
