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DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY
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it is yet only a part of consciousness just like its part that grasps. [When it becomes as being grasped,] it cannot at the same time serve as a cause. [We always experience that] consciousness arises as being discoloured by the forms of the external things. The image-part of consciousness springs up simultaneously with consciousness; it cannot act as cause for the latter; because no two things simultaneously arising act mutually as cause and effect; for example, a pair of horns of a cow. Moreover, we do not say that an object is co-existent with its self which is no other than that object. For, the term 'co-existence' denotes some connection between two distinct objects. But you do not admit that there is an object distinct from consciousness. Therefore how can you call such an object co-existent?
[The author replies :] It is true. But, as different images [in consciousness] are [experienced], we describe them [as if they are] distinct [from consciousness]. We assume that consciousness is possessed of distinc·tions [in itself] for the reason that there exists the
divergence between the perceptible part and image-part [of consciousness].
[The opponent continues :] If it is so; then, the nature of being condition-cause (pratyayatva) will [as you assume] constitute what is grasped (grahya). No object of assumed character could be regarded as possessing the self-substance. Now such an object
33 See Pārthasārathimis'ra, Slokavārtikavyākhyā, p. 309; artucada Haai aluca I (V. Additional Notes, last page.)
