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DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY
79 Nor can the form (perceived by our senses] be proper nature of that object.
Or
“If the distinction in parts is inferred (lit. spoken of) on account of the distinction in forms."
This sentence intends to show that the proposition that nothing that is non-differentiated [in its nature] becomes object incurs a logical fallacy called siddhasādhana, proving of what is already well-known. The opponents hold that the atom is in fact a thing which is not distinguishable in its nature, yet the different cognitions happen on account of differences in forms. We also admit that the atom is an undistinguishable object. Therefore this proposition incurs the fallacy of siddhasadhana 28.
The sentence, “Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension” shows the conclusion to be invalid that the difference in substances, (i.e., component parts, atoms) causes difference in objects [composed of substances].
Or, it makes clear that the cognitions of the pot and cup, etc., do not bear the images of atoms; hence the atoms are not their actual objects in as much as they are not objects of other cognitions; by “other cognitions” is meant either mental consciousness or one born of other senses; for, a condition of some blue patch being present, the cognition (born thereof) does not
28 This retort of the siddhasādhanadoşa is not convincing as it stands in the text of the Chinese version.
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