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DHARMAPALA'S COMMENTARY
and with this intention the above statement was made. It is so lest the sound and other atoms should cause to raise up the consciousness of other sense-organ. Someone says: In the self of consciousness the gross form is not perceived; hence it is not object of itself 21 just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the theory that the image of consciousness is due to the bringing home of the real object-image upon consciousness is not reasonable, the saying that no gross-form is perceived as appertaining to consciousness is very appropriate.22
Thus we have spoken that
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atoms are not objects of consciousness."
The reason for this is that they do not possess the form [that is experienced in consciousness] and that the hypothesis that they are its objects is not well proved by any means of knowledge (pramāņa).
If so, [the opponent says,] then, let the aggregate of atoms be its object. [That could not be possible.] If you, [says the author,] desire to prove your proposition on the ground that all things spoken of (in the world) are established (as real); [then, I may reply that] your reason is not an established one; this will be a true logic.
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Though the aggregate possesses the image of consciousness".
2" Cf. Pramānav. vrtti, II, 211 : तस्मान्नार्थे न च ज्ञाने स्थूलाभासस्तदा
त्मन:
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It is not clear what the author has replied in regard to the fallacy of reason that has been pointed out by the opponent.
