Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

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The Problem of Reals
सरलोयमित्याद्याकारं हि प्रत्यक्षं प्रपंचस्य सत्यतामेव व्यवस्यति, सरलादि प्रतिनियतपदार्थपरिच्छेदात्मनस्तस्य उत्पादात्, इतरेतरविविक्तवस्तूनामेव अथ कथमेतत् प्रत्यक्षं पक्ष प्रतिक्षेपकम् ? तद्धि विधायकमेव, इति तथा तथा ब्रह्मव विदधाति, न पुनः प्रपंच सत्यतां प्ररुपयति। सा हि तदा परुपिता स्यात् यदीतरस्मिन्नितरेषां प्रतिषेधः कृतः स्यात्। न चेवं निषेधे कुण्ठत्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्येति चेत्-तदयुक्तम्। यतो विधायकमिति कोऽर्थः ? इदमिति वस्तुस्वरुपं गृह्णाति नान्यस्वरुपं प्रतिषंधति प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् मैवम्। अन्यरुपनिषेधमन्तरैण तत्स्वरुपपरिच्छेदस्याम्प्यसंपतेः। पीतादिव्यवच्छिन्नं हि नीलमिति गृहीतं भवति, नेतरथा।
“Perceptions, such as 'this is a Sarala tree' etc., consist. in apprehensions of definite, individual objects e.g. the Sarala tree and so on and as such, prove the reality of the Prapança (i.e. variety or multiplicity of things). The word, Prapança itself refers to distinct and varied reals. It may be contended (by the Vedāntist): 'Perception has for its object the Positive Real; hence in the varied objects of the world, it posits the Brahma; it does not prove the reality of the varied objects in and by themselves; perception would have proved the reality of an individual object, if it had presented it as distinguished from another object; perception, however, has no element of negation in it and therefore, it does not presentits object as distinguished from other objects. This contention is not correct. For, what do you mean by Vidhāyaka or determiner of the Positive character ? If you say that by Vidhāyaka it is meant that perception grasps only the positive nature of its object and does not negate (in it) the nature of other things, your position is wrong; for, without negating the nature of other things in it, an apprehension of the positive nature of a thing is impossible. A Blue Object is perceived as distinguished from Yellow ones, etc., and not otherwise.”
ÇĀRVĀKA THEORY OF MATTER AS THE Basic REALITY
The Çārvāka or the Indian materialist school was opposed to the nihilism of the Buddhist Śūnyavāda on the one hand and to the monism of the Grammarian, 'Sābdādvaita