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Time
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may
How do we come to have an idea of the temporal order of phenomena? It is said that the idea of time is innate in us. This contention finds some support in the Kantian doctrine, according to which time is a form of intuition, an a-priori form of the inner sense-a sort of a coloured glass, as it were, through which the percipient self views the world. Although the a-priori character of the idea of time be admitted in the epistemological sense i.e. in the sense that it is a presupposition in all our experiential facts, the Kantian doctrine is psychologically untenable. Our ideas about the temporal order of phenomena are connected with our perceptions of change and difference in these phenomena along with a sense of continuity in them and are certainly developed from them. A thing, A, for instance, while maintaining its essential nature is found to be modified into Al; this modification of A is a change in A and is called Pariņāma. Secondly, the thing, A, which was stationary is found to have activity, Kriya, as it is called. While active, A presents itself as, say, Al. The activity may be due to some efforts in which case the Kriya is called the Prayogika; or it may be spontaneous or Vaiśrașika. In any case, perception of activitty in a stationary thing, gives an idea of some difference in it. Next, A may be viewed in relation to a different thing Al, for instance. In that case, it may appear as distant or Para from Al; that is, A may appear to come long after or long before Al. Or, it may appear as near, Apara to Al, i.e. simultaneous with it. In all these four cases of A viewed in relation to Al, we have the idea of a change or difference along with the idea of continuity. Our idea of a temporal order is based on and developed from such apprehensions of change with a continuous series. "All accounts of time", it is said, "agree in connecting it with change. A changeless content. . . . . is not in time. But though change is essential to time, time is not the mere qualitative form of change. Nor is it mere succession or the mere abstract relation of succession. For succession to be temporal, a relation of the terms is required such as to form a continuous and measurable series". We have shown above
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