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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
matter of fact attribute those qualities to the substance. We shall have occasion hereafter to refer to Vātsāyana's conception of a mode of Tejas which has neither the brilliance nor the heat of fire explicit in it (अनुद्भतरूपस्पर्शोऽप्रत्यक्षः). According to the Naiyāyika's, sound is a quality of Ākāśa which is one all-pervasive substance. Yet, sound is neither everywhere nor always heard. We have already referred to the Jaina reply to the objection to the doctrine of the substantiality of Aloka. We have seen how the objectors contended that in Aloka, admittedly there was no object, so that the question of giving space to objects which is the attribute of Space, cannot arise in the case of Aloka, a part of real space after all. We have seen how the Jaina philosophers defended the substantiality of the Aloka by pointing out that although the attribute of giving space to objects was not explicit in the Aloka, it was nevertheless implicit in it. Again, as will be seen hereafter, according to the Jaina's, the liberated soul rests in perfect peace, far away at the top of the universe and is not affected by nor affects the course of the mundane spheres. It has no need of exercising nor ever exercises any power which thus lies inchoate and unused byit. Yet, Ananta-vīrya or infinite power is said to be one of the Ananta-çatuştaya's or four infinite attributes of a liberated soul. It thus appears to us that the Indian thinkers attribute a quality to a substance, although the former is not explicit in it. The Bhūta's are substances in subtlest forms; the material qualities, attributed to them are not explicit in them; they are described in terms of those material qualities because they are their backgrounds. They are not thus bits of gross matter but only potencies, almost immaterial in character.
Thus if the non-Indian standpoint with respect to the elements was empiric, that of the Indian philosophers was clearly metaphysical. The former consisted in finding out, if possible, the ultimate simple substances; the latter wanted to show what must be the nature of the elements, whatever they may be—in order that the sensuous qualities of the gross matters of our experience may be explained.
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