Book Title: Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics
Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

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Page 379
________________ 364 Reals in the Faina Metaphysics The Mimāmsaka's state that none of these Pramāņa's establish the existence of an omniscient being. The Pratyakşa is generally what we call sensuous perception. Visual perceptions of colour and form, auditory apprehensions of sound are for example, Pratyakșa. Pratyakşa yields knowledge only of so much of a thing as comes in contact afation with the sense-organs; the remaining part of the object which does not so come in contact with the sense-organs remains outside the ambit of the Pratyakşa. The range of the Pratyakșa is thus limited. We see, for instance, persons outside us; but the complexion, the form, the shape etc. of their bodies only are the objects of our Pratyakşa. We cannot perceive what is in their mind. Now, if the contents of the mind of a person are outside the range of our sensuous knowledge, how shall we be able to have a Pratyakṣa or direct perception of an omniscient being? As it is imposible for us to have a direct apprehension of even the limited number of ideas which another has in his mind, it can on no account be stated that it is possible for us to have a Pratyakṣa of an omniscient being, in whose mind the ideas of all objects (beginningless, endless, past, present, future, subtle etc.)—37A TETA-TraratariaTATATE , Pare present in one eternal Now. Coming to Anumāna, we find that it consists in a knowledge about a hitherto unknown object from the knowledge of a given object with which the former is invariably 3ffaa täta connected. The stock example of Anumāna is the inference of fire in a hill from the observation of smoke there. In all Anumāna, it is clear, the Hetu or ground should be competent. In the inference of fire, smoke is the valid Hetu, because an inseparable connection between fire (the Sādhya or the proven) and smoke (the Hetu or the reason) is well known. Conversely where such invariable relationship between the proven and the reason is not known inference becomes impossible. To establish omniscience, only that would be a good Hetu with which omniscience is known to be invariably connected. But how is such Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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