Book Title: Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics
Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

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Page 378
________________ Soul attributed a sort of derivative or transferred consciousness to them. Proceeding onward, we considered next the nature and the attributes of the soul. We have considered its various modes and have seen that lowest in the scale are the microscopic one-sensed animalcules and higher up, in a graduated series, as it were, are the various species of creatures in various degrees of perfection. Highest in the series of conscious beings are the Omniscient. We have cursorily referred to omniscience at various places but the discourse on the Jaina theory of the Jiva will not be complete without a fuller treatment of the subject viz: omniscience; and it is consistent with the order in which we have discussed the various reals of the Jaina metaphysic that the discourse should be closed with a consideration of omniscience and the omniscient. This is also important in view of the fact that the Jaina thinkers recognise no creator God but look upon the omniscient as their God. 363 THE POSSIBILITY OF OMNISCIENCE: THE MIMĀMSĀ AND THE JAINA VIEWS MIMAMSA VIEW-IMPOSSIBILITY OF OMNISCIENCE The philosophers of the Mīmāmsā school, through various modes of arguments establish that there can be no omniscient being at all. Their argument may be grouped into two parts. In the first place, they contend that there is no Pramāņa or reason in support of the doctrine of omniscience. Secondly, they show that omniscience is something impossible. MIMAMSA ARGUMENTS As regards the first line of their arguments, the Mīmāmsaka's begin by pointing out that Pratyakṣa (direct perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (analogy), Agama (authoritative sayings) and Arthāpatti (necessary implication) are the five sources of valid knowledge. Bhatta adds Abhāva (non-existence) as the sixth source of knowledge. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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