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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
a thing real. A Ring exists; but experience shows that it is not absolutely real on that account. A Chair also exists and the Ring does not exist as a Chair. Thus an element of non-existence is involved in the reality of the Ring and the mistake of unthinking ultra-practicalism lies in denying or ignoring this aspect of non-existence in a thing of experience, which is not unoften of serious consequences. Let us consider the position of the Buddhist Vijñānavāda or thorough-going subjective idealism. It starts from the proposition.
भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारणं सैव चोच्यते ।
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM
The origination, the activity and the agent are all identical. What we call a thing outside and external to us has origin and persistence in our mind. What, then, is the result?
न चित्तव्यतिरेकिणो विषया ग्राह्यत्वाद्वेदनावदिति । न्यायवार्तिकम् । Objects are perceived by our mind; therefore, just like our feelings, the objects have no existence apart from and independent of our mind. The Buddhist idealists' theory of reality is thus exactly Berkeleyan.
Its Esse is its Percipi.-The Jaina's admit that the outside real is no doubt knowable and perceptible but our experience tells us that it is certainly more. Every one feels that the object of his experience is not his creation but has an existence independent of him.
SUNYAVĀDA OR VOIDISM
The Sunyavādin's or the philosophical Voidists declared that nothing is real, that neither the thing perceived as existing outside us nor ourselves, the percipients are real. This theory is absurd. Its suicidal character, was exposed in India centuries before Descartes put forward the criticism, 'Dubito ergo Cogito ergo sum', One's internal experience would repudiate this voidist contention. Thus it is that while the ultra-practicalists unduly emphasised the
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