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Reals in the faina Metaphysics (attention) to carry on these mental processes. It may also be pointed out that as the Buddhists chose to call Vijñāna and the Ālaya-Vijñāna (called Manas by the Buddhists) Ātmā, the Jaina's so far as their doctrine of the Bhāva-Manas was concerned, may be said to have admitted (though but superficially) the Buddhists' doctrine also that Manas was Ātmā'.
MANAS, DISTINGUISHED FROM ĀTMĀ
But as has been said already, excepting the Buddhists: most of the Indian schools including the Jaina’s distinguish Manas from Ātmā. The Jaina's point out that the Ātmā as the underlying subject of all cognitions is found to persist even when the functions of recollection etc., (Manas) are absent and inoperative. Ātmā is thus different from Manas:
'मनो निवृत्तावात्मनोऽवस्थानात् स्यादन्यत्।'
VEDĀNTA THEORY OF MANAS
According to Sankara, Ātmā in itself is Nirvikāra or rigid unity consisting in pure changeless consciousness; it is not possible for it to evolve the changing, determined and finite consciousness associated with a mundane being. Then again, the sense-organs and the objects are always there;
1 Although Akalanka sticks to the Jaina contention that Manas including the Bhāva-Manas is Paudgalika i.e. material and although he says,
'भावमनस्तावद् लब्ध्युपयोगलक्षणं पुद्गलालम्बनत्वात् पौद्गलिकम्।' one would scarcely fail to see that Labdhi and Upayoga, the static and the dynamic aspects of the Bhāva-Manas, so to say, are but aspects of the soul. To this very limited extent, the Jaina's seem to agree, on the one hand with the modern European thinkers that mind is soul and on the other hand with some of the ancient Indian thinkers who identified Manas with Ātmā.
'तथात्मनः एव तत्क्ष्तयोपशमापेक्षस्य मनः परिणामादेशात् स्यादनन्यत्।' In some respects (Syāt), the Atmā is identical with the Manas in as much as on the removal of the knowledge-obscuring and other Karma's, from the soul, Manas emerges.
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