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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics of the soul; for such is exactly what is commonly felt. No one perceives “I am essentially unconscious; I become conscious when consciousness is joined to me" or "consciousness becomes 'intimately' attached to me who am unconscious in nature”. The common feeling of all people is "I am essentially a knower”. Just as the knowledge, “I am a knower" is impossible in unconscious objects e.g. a pitcher etc. the knowledge, “I am a knower” would have been equally impossible in the Soul, if it were essentially unconscious. It is in this way that the Jaina philosophers show how knowledge of objects would be impossible for the soul, if it be held to be essentially unconscious. Another argument, advanced by the Naiyāyika's is as follows:-"I am a knower”; such a perception shows that the “I” and the “knowledge” or "consciousness” are separated; for, if the perception, “I am a knower” proves that the “I” and “knowledge" were identical, the perception, “I am wealthy” would have proved also the identity of the 'I' and 'Wealth'. The Jaina's contend that the perception, "I am a knower” does prove the identity of the 'I' and 'knowledge'; for, if the soul were not identified with consciousness, the perception, “I am a knower" would have been impossible for itself. If the Naiyāyika's contend that the soul, although essentially unconscious, becomes a knower, the Nyāya position itself is weakened thereby. The soul is the Substantive (Viseşya) and knowledge is the Adjective (Višeșaņa); when both the Substantive and the Adjective are perceived, we have the perception "I am a knower”. This is the Nyāya theory. But how is this knowledge of the 'l' and 'knowledge to be explained by the Naiyāyika ? The soul cannot have such perception; for, according to the Nyāya theory, the soul cannot directly know itself. If it be held that the 'I' and the 'knowledge' are perceived by another piece of knowledge, the fallacy of 'Infinite Regression' (Anavasthā) becomes irresistible; for, this another piece of knowledge is possible only when its Adjective knowledge-hood' is perceived along with it,--this again supposes a third piece of knowledge.--and so on. It is in this way that the cognition, “I am a knower”
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