Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai

Page 44

The Problem of Reals
29 सत: खल्वभिव्यक्तियंक्ता। न च देहदशायाः प्राक् भूतेषु चैतन्यसत्तासाधक प्रत्यक्षमस्ति, तस्यैन्द्रियकस्यातीन्द्रिये तस्मिन्नप्रवर्तनात् ।
--TTFTTTTTTT Consciousness is immaterial; so how can it come out of Matter which is essentially unconscious ? The intoxicating power must be held to be something material; otherwise, it cannot arise from a combination of material substances. If the Body was the cause of Consciousness, a dead man must have Consciousness, because a dead man's Body remains intact. Then again, if the quantity of the Body was a measure of Intelligence, the big animals like elephants or whales would have been vastly more intelligent than man. If the word 'Brain' was substituted for the word 'Body' here, this Indian criticism of the materialistic doctrine would resemble its criticism in modern times. The Çārvākas point out that when the Body is wounded, Consciousness is found to be impaired; when on the other hand, the Body gets good nourishment, Intelligence is found to be better developed. Does it not show that it is the Body that generates Consciousness? The Jainas refute the Çārvāka's suggestion by saying that the Çārvāka's propositions show only that the Body is the instrument or vehicle through which the conscious principle works, so that with the deterioration or improvement of the Body, Consciousness becomes modified. Then again, it is not always true that any and every change in the Body is followed by a corresponding change is Consciousness. It is often found that a person engrossed in meditations or contemplative thoughts or otherwise deeply engaged, would be uninfluenced by even serious changes in his Body, e.g. hurt or a bad cut. This establishes that the conscious principle is essentially different from the Body. This is confirmed by the fact that for many conscious states e.g. joy, sorrow, fear, grief, wisdom etc., we shall be searching causes in the Body in vain. Feelings such as, 'I am happy', 'I am sorry', etc. show that the conscious principle, the 'I' is different from the Body. The Çārvākas contend that really such feelings refer to the Body and in support of their contention they refer to such expres