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Mahāyāna Philosophy
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with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhūti saying to the Buddha that vedanā (feeling), samjñā (concepts) and the samskāras (conformations) are all māyā (illusion)". All the skandhas, dhātus (elements) and āyatanas are void and absolute cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, and this absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge (prajñāpāramitā). Everything being void there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (śāśvata) nor non-eternal (aśāśvata) but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness"(tathată) and consider all things as void. The saint (bodhisattva) has to establish himself in all the virtues (pāramitā), benevolence (dānapāramitā), the virtue of character (śīlapāramitā), the virtue of forbearance (kșantipāramitā), the virtue of tenacity and strength (vīryyapāramitā) and the virtue of meditation (dhyānapăramitā). The saint (bodhisattva) is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvāna. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his work on the strength of his pāramitās, though in reality there is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who is to help him to attain it? The true prajñāpāramitā is the absolute cessation of all appearance (yah anupalambhaḥ sarvadharmāmānn sa prajaparamita ityucyate).
The Mahāyāna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that of Śūnyavāda or the Madhyamika doctrine and Vijñānavāda.
The difference between Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda (the theory that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But while the Śūnyavādins were more busy in showing this indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijñānavādins, tacitly accepting Astasähasrikāprajñāpäramitā, p. 16.
? Ibid. p. 177 3 Ibid. p. 21.
• Ibid. p. 177
