Aptamimansa

Author(s): Vijay K Jain
Publisher: Vikalp Printers

Page 37

Verse 5
अत्थं अक्खणिवदिदं ईहापुव्वेहिं जे विजाणंति । तेसिं परोक्खभूदं णादुमसक्कं ति पण्णत्तं ॥१-४०॥ It is declared that for those who (are accustomed to) know the objects of knowledge by means of discrimination and other stages (of perception?) it is impossible to know the objects, past and future, that are not within the range of the senses.
Upadhye, A.N. (1935), “Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasāra”, p. 52-53.
Sensory knowledge ascertains, in stages, the nature of an object through the use of the senses. The past and the future modes of the object remain beyond the scope of such knowledge as these do not reach the senses. Besides, minute objects like the atoms, distant objects like the heaven and Mount Meru, and non-material objects like the soul, virtue and vice, also remain beyond the scope of sensory knowledge. Only the gross objects like the pot and the board are known by the senses and, therefore, sensory knowledge is indirect, inadequate, and fit to be discarded. Those possessing sensory knowledge, to whatever degree, cannot be called the Omniscient (sarvajña).
Things which are minute and remote in space or time are directly perceived by the Arhat, since these are cognizable, just as the objects of our perception that are well ascertained. The reason assigned here is not fallacious because these are made the subject of the minor premise.
In Aștasahasrī, Ācārya Vidyānanda employs anumeya and
1. Sensory knowledge, being not immediate, has four sequential stages:
outlinear grasp or apprehension - avagraha; discrimination or speculation - īhā; judgement - avāya; and retention of the judgement - dharană. Such stages are not present when omniscience is functioning.
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