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Āptamīmāṁsā
the doer of that deed. Thus on the part of the former moment of cognition there is ‘loss of deed', because it does not experience the fruit of the deed done by itself, and on the part of the latter moment of cognition there is ‘enjoyment of a deed not done', because of enjoyment of fruit of deed not done by itself, but by another. 1
In regard to an object experienced by a prior awareness, a memory on the part of later awareness is not possible because they are other than it; like awareness on the part of another series. For a thing seen by one is not remembered by another; otherwise a thing seen by one person would be remembered by all. And, if there is no recollection, whence in the world comes the begetting of recognition? Recognition (pratyabhijñāna) arises from both recollection and (original) experience; it is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of pratyakşa and smaraṇa (memory). For the maintainers of momentary destruction, memory does not fit in.
1. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), “The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo
Doctrine - Śrī Mallişeņa Suri's Syādvāda-Manjarī”, p. 119.
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