Aptamimansa

Author(s): Vijay K Jain
Publisher: Vikalp Printers
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/007744/1

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Acarya Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa (Devagamastotra) Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord AcArya samantabhadra viracita AptamImAMsA ( devAgamastotra) Divine Blessings: Acarya 108 Vidyananda Muni VIJAY K. JAIN

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Acarya Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa (Devagamastotra) Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord AcArya samantabhadra viracita AptamImAMsA ( devAgamastotra)

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Acarya Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa (Devagamastotra) Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord AcArya samantabhadra viracita AptamImAMsA (devAgamastotra) Divine Blessings: Acarya 108 Vidyananda Muni Vijay K. Jain vikalpa

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(iv) Front cover: This beautiful black idol of the twentysecond Tirthankara, Lord Neminatha, is installed in Old Jain Temple, Hastinapur, Uttar Pradesh. Conch shell (sankha) is the symbol of the Lord. Acarya Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa (Devagamastotra) Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord Vijay K. Jain Non-Copyright This work may be reproduced, translated and published in any language without any special permission provided that it is true to the original and that a mention is made of the source. ISBN 81-903639-8-0 Rs.500/ Published, in the year 2016, by: Vikalp Printers Anekant Palace, 29 Rajpur Road Dehradun-248001 (Uttarakhand) India www.vikalpprinters.com E-mail: vikalp_printers@rediffmail.com Tel.: (0135) 2658971 Printed at: Vikalp Printers, Dehradun

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maMgala AzIrvAda - paramapUjya AcAryazrI vidyAnanda jI munirAja sarvAntavattadguNamukhyakalpaM sarvAntazUnyaM ca mitho'napekSam / sarvApadAmantakaraM nirantaM sarvodayaM tIrthamidaM tavaiva // AcArya samantabhadra, yuktyanuzAsanam, gAthA 62 (v)

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Aptamimamsa artha ApakA tIrtha, zAsana sarvAntavAn hai aura gauNa tathA mukhya kI kalpanA ko sAtha meM lie hue hai| jo zAsana - vAkya dharmoM meM pArasparika apekSA kA pratipAdana nahIM karatA, vaha sarvadharmoM se zUnya hai| ataH ApakA hI yaha zAsanatIrtha sarva duHkhoM kA anta karane vAlA hai, yahI niranta hai aura yahI saba prANiyoM ke abhyudaya kA kAraNa tathA AtmA ke pUrNa abhyudaya kA sAdhaka aisA sarvodaya - tIrtha hai| AcArya samantabhadra praNIta AptamImAMsA kA aMgrejI bhASA meM anuvAda evaM vivecana karake dharmAnurAgI zrI vijaya kumAra jI ne bahuta hI mahattvapUrNa kArya kiyA hai| isase sampUrNa vizva ko AcArya samantabhadra ke anupama vacanoM ko samajhane kA saubhAgya prApta hogaa| ve pahale bhI isI prakAra ke aneka utkRSTa granthoM ko zuddhatA evaM sundaratA ke sAtha prakAzita kara cuke haiN| merA unako bahuta - bahuta maMgala AzIrvAda hai| zubhAzIrvAda navambara 2015 kundakunda bhAratI, naI dillI (vi) AcArya vidyAnanda muni

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maMgala AzIrvAda - AcArya zrI vidyAnanda jI munirAja PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENT VIJAY K. JAIN - BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8 Section 9 Section 10 CONTENTS GENERAL INDEX INDEX OF VERSES Verses 1-23 Verses 24-36 Verses 37-60 Verses 61-72 Verses 73-75 Verses 76-78 Verses 79-87 Verses 88-91 Verses 92-95 Verses 96-114 GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION 1 (v) (viii) (xxi) (xxiv) 3 47 67 103 119 125 129 139 143 149 177 189 200 (vii)

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PREFACE Acurya Samantabhadra - the embodiment of right faith, knowledge, and conduct Acarya Samantabhadra was a great Digambara ascetic endowed A with exceptional knowledge of the Jaina doctrine. He preached and propagated, far and wide, core principles of the doctrine by visiting many places in India. His literary and philosophical talents are not open to dispute; many inscriptions and works by subsequent Jaina Acaryas have extolled his virtues as well as his works in superlative terms. A case in point is the assertion by Acarya Jinasena in Adipuranal: namaH samantabhadrAya mahate kavivedhase / 4&104 FAYHT: 040184: 1143 11 I bow to Acarya Samantrabhadra, the ultimate creator (Brahma) among all poets, whose words are like a stroke of lightning which tears apart mountains of misconceptions. kavInAM gamakAnAM ca vAdinAM vAgminAmapi / 421: 414-7745TL HET ESTHvild 11 44 11 Acarya Samantrabhadra's glory reigned supreme among all poets, scholars, disputants, and preachers; he was like a jewel on their heads. Four exceptional qualities of Acarya Samantabhadra have been mentioned: 1) poetic skill (kavitva) which made his compositions excellent in terms of profoundness of content and grandiosity of expression; 2) intellectual authority (gamakatva) because of which he was able to explore and expound deep meanings of profound religious texts; 3) debating skill (vaditva) which made him capable of reasoning out the most difficult philosophical disputes; and 4) charming (viii)

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Preface eloquence (vagmitva) that engendered admiration for his truthfulness and straightforwardness even in the minds of his adversaries. Acarya Narendrasena in Siddhantasarasamgraha2, a widely read Sanskrit text dealing with the seven substances (tattvas), avers that only the most fortunate human beings get access to the words of Acurya Samantabhadra: zrImatsamantabhadrasya devasyApi vaco'nagham / YIfUHI Gaf4 26-11 are aer yat: 11 11 11 Just as the attainment of human birth is difficult, it is extremely rare to get access to the incontrovertible words of the Most Learned Acarya Samantrabhadra. sudurlabhamapi prAptaM tatkarmaprazamAdiha / 7 THAT HTETET E 67 a RT: 11 12 11 Only when the inauspicious (asubha) karmas of a man get to quiescence is he able to come face-to-face with the holy words of Acarya Samantrabhadra. Those who fail to adopt the path of piety even after exposure to his words can only be said to have been overwhelmed by delusion. Acarya Samantabhadra has not only been termed a brilliant grammarian, logician and philosopher, he has been recognized as an unmatched disputant and great preacher of the Jaina doctrine. Acarya Subhacandra in Jnanarnavah3 has likened the poetic compositions of Suami Samantabhadra to the bright rays of the sun. Acarya Jinasena, author of Harivansapurana4, has likened the expositions of Acarya Samantabhadra to the words of Lord Mahavira: jIvasiddhividhAyIha kRtayuktyanuzAsanam / 29: 44746 pag airpla facand 11 29 11 The words of Acarya Samantabhadra, the composer of Jivasiddhi (ix)

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Aptamimamsa (discourse on the path to liberation) and Yuktyanusasana (discourse on the merits and demerits of different standpoints), carry the same glory as the words of Lord Mahavira. It is mentioned in Jaina literature5 that Acarya Samantabhadra once introduced himself to the king of Varanasi as: AcAryo'haM kavirahamahaM vAdirAT paNDito'ham, (x) daivajJo'haM bhiSagahamahaM mAntrikastAntriko'ham / rAjannasyAM jaladhivalayAmekhalAyAmilAyA mAjJAsiddhaH kimiti bahunA siddhasArasvato'ham / / O king! I am a preceptor (acarya), a poet (kavi), foremost among the interpreters of the sacred scriptures (vadi), a scholar (pandita), an astrologer (jyotisi), a practitioner of medicine (vaidya), a reciter of spells (mantrika), and skilled in mystical incantations (tantrika). Do I need say more? My utterances become inviolable commands (ajnasiddha), and I have subjugated the goddess of learning Sarasvati (sarasvatasiddha). The personality of Acarya Samantabhadra was a rare combination of the Three Jewels (ratnatraya) of Jainism pristine faith, knowledge, and conduct - that are empirically considered essential to the attainment of liberation. He was one of the most impelling proponents of the Jaina doctrine of anekantavada - a philosophical system which maintains that reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete apprehension of it must necessarily take into account all these aspects. Non-appreciation of this doctrine has caused the other philosophical systems fall into the trap of one-sided, incomplete, and unsustainable dogmas that fail to explain the Truth. The words of Acarya Samantabhadra are incontrovertible as these are guarded by the Jaina doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) - a system of scientific safeguards that aims at maintaining proper consistency in metaphysical thought. -

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Preface Several Jaina scriptures6 have mentioned that Acarya Samantabhadra was destined to attain the highest and supreme status of a Tirthankara (a ford-maker for the others to cross the ocean of worldly cycle of births and deaths - samsara). As a Tirthankara he will propagate Truth for the welfare of all living beings and will be worshipped by the lords of the devas and the men during the five most auspicious events (panca kalyanaka)* that must take place in the life of a Tirtharkara. The time when Acarya Samantabhadra flourished cannot be ascertained with great precision. Jugalkishore Mukhtar7, after due research and detailed analysis as presented in his Preface to Ratnakarandaka-sravakacara, has arrived at the conclusion that Acarya Samantabhadra must have lived after Acarya Kundakunda and Acarya Umasvami but before Acarya Pujyapada. Broadly, he has fixed Acarya Samantabhadra's time as the second or the third century, Vikram Samvata (VS). As Gregorian Year 2000 CE corresponds to Year 2057 in the VS calendar, Acarya Samantabhadra's time can be fixed around the second century CE. Acarya Samantabhadra is known to have authored the following profound treatises: *The five most auspicious events (panca kalyanaka) in the life of the Tirthankara are: 1. garbha kalyanaka: when the soul of the Tirtharkara enters the Mother's womb. 2. janma kalyanaka: on the birth of the Tirthankara. 3. dikna kalyanaka (or tapa-kalyanaka): when the Tirthankara renounces all worldly possessions and becomes an ascetic. 4. jnana kalyanaka: when the Tirthankara attains omniscience (kevalajnana). 5. moksa-kalyanaka (or nirvana-kalyanaka): when the Tirthankara finally attains liberation (moksa or nirvana) and becomes a Siddha. (xi)

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Aptamimamsa Aptamimamsa or Devagamastotra Ratnakarandaka-sravakacara Svayambhustotra Yuktyanusasana Stutividya or Jinasataka or Jinastutisataka or Jinasatakalankara Jivasiddhi Gandhahastimahabhasya Uncertainty prevails about the existence of the last two treatises. Aptamimamsa, known also as Devagama or Devagamastotra, is a treatise of 114 verses which discusses in a philosophical-cum-logical manner the Jaina view of Reality, starting with the concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. Devotion to a deity without proper assessment and understanding of its praiseworthiness leads to naught in terms of utility. Blind faith based on traditional values and without the use of own power of discrimination leads to superstitions. Superstitions arise from ignorance and keep the worshipper overwhelmed with expectations and fear, just the opposite of the very purpose of adoration. Adoration is laudable only if it renders tranquility and equanimity to the mind of the worshipper. In the opening verse of Aptamimamsa, Acarya Samantabhadra questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish, in Verse 6, the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being: You only are such an Omniscient, free from all defects, because your words are not in contradiction with either the reason or the scripture. The proof of non-contradiction of your words lies in the fact that your tenets (about liberation etc.) are unopposed to what has been established through the known sources of knowledge. After having established that it was certainly possible to attain omniscience, and employing the doctrine of conditional predications (xii)

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Preface (syadvada), Acarya Samantabhadra faults certain prevailing conceptions that were based on absolutism: existence (bhavaikanta) and non-existence (abhavaikanta), non-dualism (advaita-ekanta) and separateness (prthaktva-ekanta), and permanence (nityatva-ekanta) and momentariness (ksanika-ekanta). He asserts that the entity (dharmi) and its attribute (dharma) are neither absolutely dependent (apeksika) nor absolutely independent (anapeksika). Only an entity which has general (samanya - concerning the substance, dravya) and particular (visesa - concerning the mode, paryaya) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. Substance without its modification and modification without its substance cannot be the subject of valid knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge. He goes on to clarify certain other burning issues and misconceptions. In Verse 91 he asserts that both fate and human-effort are jointly responsible for desirable and undesirable effects. The desirable and undesirable effects that one begets without premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's fate (daiva). The desirable and undesirable effects that one begets in consequence of premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's human-effort (paurusa). In Verse 95 the Acarya asserts that our auspicious (visudhi) or inauspicious (samklesa) kinds of dispositions cause the influx of meritorious (punya) or demeritorious (papa) karmas. In Verse 98 we are told that bondage (bandha) is caused due to ignorance (ajnana) accompanied by delusion (moha), and bondage is not caused due to ignorance (ajnana) not accompanied by delusion (moha). Highlighting the indispensability of syadvada, in Verse 105, it is asserted that syadvada, the doctrine of conditional predications, and kevalajnana, omniscience, are both illuminators of the substances of reality. The difference between the two is that while kevalajnana illumines directly, syadvada illumines indirectly. Three profound commentaries in Sanskrit on Aptamimamsa are available: Astasati (known also as Aptamimamsabhasya) of Acarya Akalankadeva comprising 800 verses, Astasahsri (known also as (xiii)

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Aptamimamsa Aptamimamsalankara or Devagamalankara) of Acarya Vidyananda comprising 8000 verses, and a comparatively brief treatise Aptamimamsavitti (known also as Devagamavitti) of Acarya Vasunandi. Ratnakarandaka-sravakacara is a celebrated and perhaps the earliest Digambara work on the conduct required of a Jaina householder (sravaka) for the acquisition and safekeeping of the Three Jewels (ratnatraya) comprising right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Svayambhustotra is a fine composition in Sanskrit dedicated to the adoration of the Twenty-four Tirthankara, the Most Worshipful Supreme Beings. Through its 143 verses Svayambhustotra not only enriches reader's devotion, knowledge, and conduct but also frees his mind from blind faith and superstitions. Rid of ignorance and established firmly in the right faith, the reader's mind experiences ineffable tranquility and equanimity. Yuktyanusasana, comprising 64 verses, evaluates in a logical manner the beliefs that lead to the attainment of the state of Supreme Bliss as against those that lead to the continuous wandering in the three worlds. Stutividya (Jinasataka), as the name suggests, is the adoration of the Supreme Beings (Tirthankara). Acarya Samantabhadra has skillfully used highly ornamental language in this work; for instance, the first half of the line of a verse becomes its second half by using the same letters in reverse order*. Notwithstanding the floridity of language, each of the 116 verses of the treatise carries profound * Verse 10 reads as under: bhAsate vibhutA'stonA nA stotA bhuvi te sabhAH / 21: fal: a TGI I IR ildegal: forum In both lines, the latter half is the reverse arrangement of letters used in the first half. (xiv)

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Preface meaning; when assimilated properly it leads to the destruction of inimical karmas. There is a story that finds mention in several Jaina texts about the hardship that Acarya Samantabhadra had to endure while he was an ascetic. Although there are variations in some elements of the story, the essential gist is as follows: Svami Samantabhadra, in his early stage of asceticism, was attacked with a disease known as bhasmaka which refers, in Ayurveda, to the condition of insatiable hunger or appetite. The stomach has digestive power or "fire" (jatharagni) that drives all digestion and when it becomes very strong, food digests very quickly and produces hunger and desire for more food. As food gets digested very quickly, the throat remains dry and a burning sensation prevails. According to Ayurveda, air (vata), bile (pitta) and phlegm (kapha) are essential elements in human body and a distortion in their balance gives rise to health problems. When kapha becomes weak and vata and pitta become strong, any food eaten gets immediately reduced to ashes (bhasma). The complications include jaundice, anemia, yellow skin, diarrhoea, urine anomalies, colic, unconsciousness, hemorrhage, hyperacidity and burning pain. The body progressively gets emaciated and weak. The only way to cure the disease is to eat in profuse quantity rich and stodgy food. It is impossible for a Jaina (Digambara) saint to eat more than once a day or in excess of his customary intake which is less than the fill. Not deviating in the least from such restrictions, Svami Samantabhadra tried to endure the affliction through strong resolve. Finding the disease intractable, he ultimately thought of embracing passionless death by resorting to the vow of sallekhana, as allowed in Jainism. Svami Samantabhadra approached his Preceptor to get his approval for the proposed vow of sallekhana. The Preceptor, an accomplished visionary, foresaw that Svami Samantabhadra had many more years still left in his life, and that he was destined to be a (xv)

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Aptamimamsa great exponent of Jainism. He, therefore, forbade Svami Samantabhadra from undertaking the vow of sallekhana and asked him to free himself from the symbols and restrictions of Jaina sainthood till the time his disease got cured. Suami Samantabhadra made obeisance to his Preceptor and, with a heavy heart, took leave of him. Discarding nakedness and smearing his body with ash, he adopted the exterior of a Hindu saint. He started taking food that would cure him of his disease. He reached the town of Kanci, ruled by Sivakoti, a staunch follower of Lord Siva. Sivakoti had built a Siva temple in Kanci where large amount of food was being offered daily to the deity (Sivalinga). Saint Samantabhadra told the king that he had the power to make the deity consume food being offered. The king accepted the offer. Closing the doors of the temple, Saint Samantabhadra ate the heap of food offering. When the doors were opened, everyone was highly impressed with the so-called divine feat of the saint. This continued for a few days. As the disease of Saint Samantabhadra got mitigated with the passage of time, he was no longer able to eat all food being offered to Lord Siva. The king became suspicious of the purported divine power of the saint and ordered his actions to be watched, keeping the doors of the temple open. Saint Samantabhadra grasped the gravity of the situation and took it as an external calamity (upasagra) befalling him. Vowing not to take any food until the end of the calamity and discarding all attachment to his body, he started the adoration of the Twenty-four Tirthankara. As Saint Samantabhadra reached the adoration of the eighth Tirthankara, Lord Candraprabha, and as he gazed at the idol of the reigning deity (Sivalinga), due to some divine intervention, it burst, revealing a beautiful and magnificent image of Lord Candraprabha, to the wonder and astonishment of all present. Saint Samantabhadra finished the adoration of the remaining sixteen Tirthankara. This miracle led King Sivakoti and his younger brother Sivayana fall at his feet. After completing the adoration of the Twenty-four Tirthankara, (xvi)

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Preface Saint Samantabhadra gave his blessings to the two brothers. This story portrays the environment in which the composition of the most sacred text Svayambhustotra took place. As Saint Samantabhadra got cured of his disease, he reinitiated himself into the order of holy Jaina asceticism. King Sivakoti and his brother Sivayana, highly impressed with the Jaina doctrine and the power of true adoration, left their worldly pursuits and became Acarya Samantabhadra's disciples. I make obeisance humble at the worshipful feet of Acarya Samantabhadra who had unmatched intellect to discern the right from the wrong and illumined, through profound compositions, the right path that leads to Supreme Bliss. Acarya Vidyananda - the worthy Supreme Being to meditate on Fifty-two years ago, in 1963, Acarya Vidyananda (b. 1925) took to the arduous path of Digambara asceticism (muni). "I do not belong to others nor do others belong to me; there is nothing that is mine here." Thus determined and conquering his senses he took to the excellent form in which he was born (renouncing all clothes, naked). A featherwhisk (picchi) - the implement of compassion, a water-pot (kamandalu) - the implement of purity, and the Scripture (sastra) - the implement of knowledge, became his only material companions. Abandoning all attachment and aversion, and having grasped the reality of the substances (tattvas), including the soul and the non-soul, Acarya Vidyananda is ever engaged in the realization of the supreme status of the Self. This is the only path available to the bhavya* souls striving to attain liberation. His pious figure, turned golden by the fire of austerities (tapas) and rid of all encumbrances, external and * endowed with inherent capacity to attain liberation (xvii)

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Aptamimamsa internal, personifies and propagates the teachings of Lord Jina. Acarya Nemicandra has asserted in Dravyasmgraha8 that the Chief Preceptor (Acarya) is worthy of meditation: dasaNaNANapahANe vIriyacArittavaratavAyAre / 3tuo us a G5 H Strefa yuit Et347 1152|1| Those who themselves practise the five-fold observances in regard to faith (darsanacara), knowledge (jnanacara), power (viryacara), conduct (caritracara), and austerities (tapacara), and guide disciples to follow these observances, are the Chief Preceptors (Acaryas), worthy of meditation. Believing that the pure Self is the only object belonging to the Self and all other objects, including the karmic matter (dravyakarma and nokarma), are alien is the observance in regard to faith (darsanacara). Reckoning that the pure Self has no delusion, is distinct from attachment and aversion, knowledge itself, and sticking to this notion always is the observance in regard to knowledge (jnanacara). Being free from attachment etc. is right conduct. Getting always engrossed in the pure Self, free from all corrupting dispositions, is the observance in regard to conduct (caritracara). Performance of penances with due control of the senses constitutes the observance in regard to austerities (tapacara). Carrying out the above mentioned four observances with full vigour and intensity, without digression and concealment of true strength, constitutes the observance in regard to power (viryacara). Acarya Pujyapada has expounded in Istopadesa9: icchatyekAntasaMvAsaM nirjanaM jnitaadrH| nijakAryavazAtkiJciduktvA vismarati drutam / / 40 / / The Yogi longs for solitude and distances himself from interaction with men. If due to some reason he has to communicate with them, he soon puts it out of his mind. (xviii)

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Acarya Pujyapada goes on to explain: paraH parastato duHkhamAtmaivAtmA tataH sukham / ata eva mahAtmAnastannimittaM kRtodyamAH / / 45 / / Preface An alien object is always alien and is the cause of suffering; the soul is always own and is the cause of happiness. All great sages, therefore, have exerted themselves only for the sake of the soul. Acarya Vidyananda has established himself firmly in own nature. Engaged incessantly in Self-realization, he has no time or inclination to interact with the external environment. External objects generally remain unnoticed by him as he pays no attention to these. His interaction with the people is minimal and without passions. For the few people he has to interact with occasionally, he engenders no lasting emotions of attachment or aversion. A Yogi of few words, he chooses words that are sweet, positive and helpful. As soon as his interaction with the outside world is over, he presents himself again to the service of the pure Self. I repeatedly salute Acarya Vidyananda, the light to guide me on the path that leads to true happiness, here and hereafter, by prostrating in front of him with great devotion. I meditate on his virtues in order to wash away impurities - attachment, aversion and delusion - of my wavering mind, and to reach that stage of spiritual excellence where the faults and obstructions associated with my soul are destroyed. November 2015 Dehradun, India Vijay K. Jain References: 1. DaoN. pannAlAla jaina (2004), AcArya jinasena viracita AdipurANa (prathama bhAga ), dasavA~ saMskaraNa, bhAratIya jJAnapITha, naI dillI- 110003, parva 1, gAthA 43 44, pRSTha 10. (xix)

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Aptamimamsa 2. DaoN. e. ena. upAdhye, DaoN. hIrAlAla jaina (1972), narendrasenAcAryaviracitaH siddhAntasArasaMgrahaH, zrI lAlacaMda hirAcanda dozI, solApura, dvitIyA AvRttiH, pRSTha 3. 3. paM. pannAlAla vAkalIvAla (1913), zrIzubhacandraviracitaH jJAnArNavaH, zrIparamazruta prabhAvaka maNDala, bambaI-2, dvitIyAvRttiH, pRSTha 8. 4. DaoN. pannAlAla jaina (2003), AcArya jinasena viracita harivaMzapurANa, AThavA~ saMskaraNa, bhAratIya jJAnapITha, naI dillI-110003, prathamaH sargaH, gAthA 29, pRSTha 3-4. 5. pro. udayacandra jaina (1993), AcArya samantabhadra viracita svayambhUstotra kI tattvapradIpikA vyAkhyA, zrI gaNeza varNI di. jaina (zodha) saMsthAna, vArANasI-221005, prastAvanA, pRSTha 18. 6. See paM. jugalakizora mukhtAra (vi. saM. 1982), zrIsamantabhadrasvAmiviracito ratnakaraNDaka-zrAvakAcAraH, maNikacandra di. jainagranthamAlAsamitiH, bambaI, prAkkathana, pRSTha 62-72. 7. ibid., p. 196. 8. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2013), "Acarya Nemichandra's Dravyasamgraha - with Authentic Explanatory Notes", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun, p. 189 190. 9. Jain, Vijay K. (2014), "Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - The Golden Discourse", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun, p. 104, 114. (xx)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT ll that is contained in this book has been excerpted, translated or adapted from a number of authentic Jaina texts. Due care has been taken to conserve the essence of Aptamimamsa (Devagamastotra) - the Holy Scripture composed by Acarya Samantabhadra. Contribution of the following publications in the preparation of the present volume is gratefully acknowledged: 1. jagadIzacandra jaina (DaoN.) (1992), zrImalliSeNasUripraNItA syAdvAdamaJjarI, zrI paramazruta prabhAvaka maNDala, zrImad rAjacandra Azrama, agAsa-388130, paMcamAvRtti. 2. paM. kailAzacandra zAstrI (2010), jaina nyAya, bhAratIya jJAnapITha, 18 __insTITyUzanala eriyA, lodI roDa, naI dillI-110003. 3. paM. jugalakizora mukhtAra (1978), zrImatsvAmi-samantabhadrAcAryavarya-viracita devAgama aparanAma AptamImAMsA, vIra sevA mandira TrasTa prakAzana, vArANasI-221005. 4. paM. manoharalAla (vi. saM. 1969), zrImatkundakundAcAryaviracitaH pravacanasAraH, zrI paramazruta prabhAvaka maNDala, bambaI-2. 5. paM. mohanalAla zAstrI (2005), zrImANikyanandisvAmi viracita parIkSAmukha, bhAratavarSIya anekAnta vidvatpariSad. 6. pro. udayacandra jaina (2012), AcArya samantabhadra dvArA viracita AptamImAMsA kI tattvadIpikA nAmaka vyAkhyA, zrI gaNeza varNI di. jaina saMsthAna, vArANasI-221005. 7. zrI manohara jI varNI 'sahajAnanda jI' mahArAja (1970), AptamImAMsA pravacana, sahajAnanda zAstramAlA, raNajItapurI, sadara, meraTha. 8. siddhAntAcArya paM. phUlacandra zAstrI (2010), AcArya pUjyapAda viracita sarvArthasiddhi, bhAratIya jJAnapITha, 18 insTITyUzanala eriyA, lodI roDa, naI dillI-110003, solahavA~ saMskaraNa. (xxi)

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Aptamimamsa 9. Chakravarti Nayanar, A. (Prof.) (2009), "Acarya Kundakunda's Pancastikaya-Sara", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi, Third Edition. 10. Chakravarti, A. (Prof.) (2008), "Acarya Kundakunda's Samayasara", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi, Fifth Edition. 11. Ghoshal, Saratchandra (2010), "Apta-mimamsa of Acharya Samantabhadra", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi. 12. Jain, Champat Rai (1916), "Nyaya - The Science of Thought", The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah (India). 13. Jain, Champat Rai (1975), "The Key of Knowledge", Today & Tomorrow's Printers & Publishers, New Delhi, Fourth Edition. 14. Jain, S.A. (1960), "Reality : English Translation of Shri Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi", Vira Sasana Sangha, Calcutta-37. 15. Jain, S.C. (Dr.) (2003), "Vimaladasa's Saptabhangi Tarangini", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi. 16. Jain, S.C. (Dr.) (2003), "Yogasara Prabhrta", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi. 17. Jain, Vijay K. (2014), "Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - The Golden Discourse", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 18. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra - Adoration of The Twenty-four Tirthankara", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 19. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2011), "Acharya Umasvami's Tattvarthsutra - with Hindi and English Translation", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 20. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2012), "Shri Amritchandra Suri's Purusartha siddhyupaya - with Hindi and English Translation", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 21. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2012), "Acharya Kundkund's Samayasara - with Hindi and English Translation", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. (xxii)

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Acknowledgment 22. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2013), "Acarya Nemichandra's Dravyasamgraha - with Authentic Explanatory Notes", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 23. Jaini, Jagmanderlal (1916), "Outlines of Jainism", Jain Literature Society, Cambridge University Press, London. 24. Shah, Nagin J. (1999), "Samantabhadra's Aptamamamsa - Critique of an Authority", Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth, Nehru Nagar Char Rasta, Ambawadi, Ahmedabad-380015. 25. Shastri, Devendra Muni (1983), "A Source-book in Jaina Philosophy", Sri Tarak Guru Jain Granthalaya, Shastri Circle, Udaipur (Rajasthan). 26. Thomas, F.W. (1968), "The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine - Sri Mallisena Suri's Syadvada-Manjari", Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna. 27. Upadhye, A.N. (1935), "Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara - A Pro-canonical Text of the Jainas", Shetha Manilal Revashankar Jhaveri - for the Parama-Sruta-Prabhavaka-Mandala, Bombay. 28. Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra (1909), "Nyayavatara: The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic by Siddha Sena Divakara", The Indian Research Society, Calcutta. Prof. (Dr.) Veer Sagar Jain, Head, Department of Jaina Philosophy (Jaina Darsana), Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha (Deemed University), New Delhi, has very willingly, swiftly and, as he himself conveyed to me, very joyfully, undertook the task of proofreading this work. His deep knowledge of the Sanskrit language as well as the subject matter has led to the removal of many flaws attributable to my inadequacy and inadvertence. I acknowledge with utmost gratitude his magnanimous contribution. In the final stage, the non-English portion of the work was voluntarily proofread, with great intent, by a group of learned celibates who happened to visit Dehradun on a short visit. My thanks to each member of the group for removing certain infelicities that still remained in the work. V.K.J. (xxiii)

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VIJAY K. JAIN - BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE aving had his schooling from Mhow and Bhopal in Madhya L Pradesh, Vijay K. Jain (b. 1951) did his graduation in Electronics Engineering from Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University, and Post-Graduation in Management from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. Mr. Jain had been associated, as a visiting faculty teaching marketing management and entrepreneurship, with several institutions including National Institute for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development (NIESBUD), Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU), and University of Roorkee (now IIT Roorkee). He is an Ex-President of Dehradun Management Association. He has written/edited several books: Marketing Management for Small Units (1988), Management Publishing Co., Dehradun. s tf : Hic ufau (1994), Management Publishing Co., Dehradun. From IIM-Ahmedabad to Happiness (2006), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Acharya Umasvami's Tattvarthsutra - with Hindi and English Translation (2011), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Acharya Kundkund's Samayasara - with Hindi and English Translation (2012), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Shri Amritchandra Suri's Purusarthasiddhyupaya - with Hindi and English Translation (2012), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Acarya Nemichandra's Dravyasamgraha - with Authentic Explanatory Notes (2013), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - The Golden Discourse (2014), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra - Adoration of the Twenty-four Tirthankara (2015), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Mr. Jain is the proprietor of Vikalp Printers, a high-end printing and publishing firm, based in Dehradun, India. (xxiv)

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OM namaH siddhebhyaH Acarya Samantabhadra's Aptamimarsa (Devagamastotra) Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord AcArya samantabhadra viracita AptamImAMsA (devAgamastotra)

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mohakSayAjjJAnadarzanAvaraNAntarAyakSayAcca kevalam // 10-1 // [ mohakSayAt ] moha kA kSaya hone se (antarmuhUrta paryanta kSINakaSAya nAmaka guNasthAna prApta karane ke bAda) [ jJAnadarzanAvaraNAntarAyakSayAt ca ] aura jJAnAvaraNa, darzanAvaraNa tathA antarAya ina tIna karmoM kA eka sAtha kSaya hone se [ kevalam ] kevalajJAna utpanna hotA hai| Omniscience (perfect knowledge) is attained on the destruction of deluding karmas, and on the destruction of knowledge- and perception-covering karmas, and obstructive karmas. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2011), "Acharya Umasvami's Tattvarthsutra - with Hindi and English Translation", p. 146.

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Section 1 prathama pariccheda Insignia like the attendance of heavenly beings do not make you great: devAgamanabhoyAnacAmarAdivibhUtayaH / mAyAviSvapi dRzyante nAtastvamasi no mahAn // 1 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! devoM kA Agamana, AkAza meM gamana aura cAmara Adi vibhUtiyA~ jo Apa meM pAyI jAtI haiM, ina kAraNoM se Apa hamAre stuti karane yogya - guru, stutya, Apta nahIM haiN| ye vibhUtiyA~ to mAyAvI puruSoM meM bhI dekhI jAtI haiN| - Attendance of the heavenly beings, movement in the sky, waving of the flywhisks (camara) and other symbols of majesty are found even in jugglers; it is not owing to these that thou art great [supreme preacher (guru), worthy of adoration (stutya) and Omniscient (sarvajna or apta)]. The aforesaid symbols of majesty do not establish greatness; these are found in jugglers too who do not possess real greatness and, therefore, not worthy of our adoration. If it be said that the symbols of majesty are artificial in case of jugglers but real in your case then on what basis can we distinguish between the real and the counterfeit? On the basis of the scripture? The others too have their own scripture which, according to them, is a valid source of knowledge. 3

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Aptamimamsa Bodily and other distinctions do not make you great: adhyAtma bahirapyeSa vigrahAdimahodayaH / divyaH satyo divaukassvapyasti rAgAdimatsu saH // 2 // sAmAnyArtha - Apa meM zarIra Adi kA jo antaraMga aura bahiraMga atizaya pAyA jAtA hai vaha yadyapi divya aura satya hai, kintu rAgAdiyukta svarga ke devoM meM bhI ukta prakAra kA atizaya pAyA jAtA hai| ataH ukta atizaya ke kAraNa bhI Apa mere stutya nahIM ho sakate haiN| The superior excellence of your body etc. - both internal and external - which though is real and divine can be found even in celestial beings who are swayed by impurities like attachment. Therefore, this too does not make thou great. The Arhat, the World Teacher or 'Jina', is free from eighteen imperfections, and possessed of forty-six distinctive attributes. The divine attributes and splendours of the Arhat are described thus in the Scripture: The Arhat is free from these eighteen imperfections: 1. janma - (re)birth; 2. zara - old-age; 3. trsa-thirst; 4. ksudha-hunger; 5. vismaya-astonishment; 6. arati - displeasure; 7. kheda - regret; 8. roga - sickness; 9. soka - grief; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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10. mada-pride*; 11. moha-delusion; 12. bhaya-fear**; 13. nidra-sleep; 14. cinta-anxiety; 15. sveda-perspiration; 16. raga-attachment; 17. dvesa-aversion; and 18. marana-death. Forty-six divine attributes of the Arhat comprise four infinitudes (ananta catustaya), thirty-four miraculous happenings (atisaya), and eight splendours (pratiharya). The four infinitudes (ananta catustaya) comprise: 1. anantajnana - infinite knowledge; 2. ananta darsana - infinite perception; Verse 2 3. ananta sukha - infinite bliss; and 4. ananta virya-infinite energy. Of the thirty-four miraculous happenings (atisaya), ten appear naturally at the time of birth, ten on attainment of infinite knowledge (kevalajnana), and the remaining fourteen are fashioned by the celestial devas. Pride is of eight kinds: pride of knowledge (jnana mada), veneration (puja mada), lineage (kula mada), caste (jati mada), strength (bala mada), accomplishments (rddhi mada), austerities (tapa mada), and beauty (sarira mada). ** Fear is of seven kinds: fear relating to this life (ihaloka bhaya), of the life beyond (paraloka bhaya), of death (marana bhaya), of pain and suffering (vedana bhaya), of being without protection (atrana bhaya), of divulgence of one's deeds (agupti bhaya), and of the unexpected (akasmika bhaya). 5

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Aptamimamsa The eight splendours (pratiharya) are 1. asoka vrksa - the Ashoka tree; 2. simhasana - bejeweled throne; 3. chatra - three-tier canopy; 4. bhamandala - halo of unmatched luminance; 5. divya dhvani - divine voice of the Lord without lip movement; 6. puspa-varsa - shower of fragrant flowers; 7. camara - waving of sixty-four majestic flywhisks; and 8. dundubhi - dulcet sound of kettle-drums and other musical instruments. Jain, Vijay K. (2014), "Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - The Golden Discourse", p. 2-4. The aforesaid symbols of superior excellence fail to establish real greatness; these symbols can be found in celestial beings too who are swayed by passions like anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed. It may be claimed that your symbols of superior excellence appear on the destruction of the four inimical (ghatiya) karmas - deluding (mohaniya), knowledge-obscuring (jnanavarniya), perception-obscuring (darsanavarniya), and obstructive (antaraya) - but it is not so in the case of the celestial beings. What is the basis of this assertion? Scripture? Let us wait till we are able to establish which scripture among many is a valid source of knowledge.

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Verse 3 The fact that you are a sect-founder does not make you great: tIrthakRtsamayAnAM ca parasparavirodhataH / sarveSAmAptatA nAsti kazcideva bhavedguruH // 3 // sAmAnyArtha - (sugatAdika) tIrthaMkaroM ke AgamoM meM paraspara virodha pAye jAne ke kAraNa saba tIrthaMkaroM meM Aptatva kA honA saMbhava nahIM hai| una tIrthaMkara kahe jAne vAloM meM se koI eka hI hamArA stutya (Apta) ho sakatA hai| There are mutual contradictions in the teachings of the founders of different sects; this should not have happened if all of them were trustworthy. It is clear, therefore, that only one of them, at most, could be worthy of our trust. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Aptamimamsa It is possible for someone to attain complete destruction of imperfections: doSAvaraNayorhAnirniHzeSA'styatizAyanAt / kvacidyathA svahetubhyo bahirantarmalakSayaH // 4 // sAmAnyArtha - kisI puruSa-vizeSa meM doSoM (rAga-dveSAdika) aura AvaraNoM (doSoM ke kAraNoM) kI sAtizaya hAni dekhane meM AtI hai| doSoM aura AvaraNoM kI pUrNa hAni usI prakAra saMbhava hai jisa prakAra khAna se nikale hue suvarNa meM mala-virodhI kAraNoM ke dvArA kITa Adi bahiraMga mala aura kAlimA Adi antaraMga mala donoM prakAra ke maloM kA atyanta nAza kiyA jA sakatA hai| In some individuals extensive destruction of imperfections and their causes is seen; there must be a case where a particular individual, owing to his supremacy, attains complete destruction of imperfections and their causes. It is akin to the complete removal of external and internal impurities (of a substance like gold ore) on the availability of appropriate means. Imperfections (called dosa), like attachment, aversion and passions, are dispositions of the soul (bhavakarma) and these are due to the prior envelopment of the soul (called avarana) by material karmas (dravyakarma), like knowledge-obscuring karmas. There is cause and effect relationship between the material karmas (avarana) and the imperfections (dosa). Due to appropriate exertion, extensive destruction of imperfections and their causes is possible in some individuals. Acarya Nemicandra's Dravyasamgraha: jahakAleNa taveNa ya bhuttarasaM kammapuggalaM jenn| bhAveNa saDadi NeyA tassaDaNaM cedi NijjarA duvihA // 36 //

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Verse 4 Dispositions of the soul to get rid of the karmic matter already bound with it, either when it falls off by itself on fruition, or when it is annihilated through asceticism (tapas), constitute the subjective shedding of karmas (bhava nirjara). The actual dissociation of the karmic matter from the soul is the objective shedding of karmas (dravya nirjara). Thus nirjara should be known of two kinds. Jain, Vijay K. (2012), "Acarya Nemichandra's Dravyasamgraha", p. 129. Acarya Kundakunda's Pancastikaya-Sara: saMvarajogehiM judo tavehiM jo ciTThade bahuvihehiM / kammANaM NijjaraNaM bahugANaM kuNadi so NiyadaM // 144 // That mighty personality which after closing the springs of karmas, good and evil, and equipped with the faculty of pure thought, controls its life according to manifold forms of tapas, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of karmas manifold. Chakravarti Nayanar, A. (2009), "Acarya Kundakunda's Pancastikaya-Sara", p. 118. On the destruction of inimical karmas, called the ghatiya karmas, it is possible for a person to attain unhindered, infinite and pure knowledge, i.e., omniscience. A single substance is endowed with infinite modifications and there are infinite classes of substances. To know one substance fully is to know the whole range of the object of knowledge and that is possible only in omniscience. 9

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Aptamimamsa The attainment of omniscience is established: sUkSmAntaritadUrArthAH pratyakSAH kasyacidyathA / anumeyatvato'gnyAdiriti sarvajJasaMsthitiH // 5 // sAmAnyArtha sUkSma-padArtha (svabhAva - viprakRSTa paramANu Adika), antarita-padArtha (kAla-viprakRSTa rAma Adika) tathA dUravartI (deza-viprakRSTa meru Adika) kisI ko pratyakSa avazya hote haiM kyoMki unako hama anumAna se jAnate haiN| jo bhI padArtha anumAna se jAne jAte haiM koI na koI unako pratyakSa se jAnatA hai| parvata meM agni ko dUravartI puruSa anumAna se jAnatA hai kintu parvata para rahane vAlA puruSa usI ko pratyakSa se jAnatA hai| isa prakAra sUkSma, antarita tathA dUravartI samasta padArthoM ko jAnane vAle sarvajJa kI siddhi hotI hai| 10 - Objects that are minute (like atoms), past (like Lord Rama), and distant (like Mount Meru), being the objects of inference (anumeya - and, therefore, also objects of knowledge-prameya), must be perceivable directly by someone; like the fire on the hill is an object of inference for a distant person but is perceived directly by the one who is in its proximity. The one who perceives directly the objects of knowledge that are minute, past, and distant is the Omniscient (sarvajna); this way the existence of the Omniscient is truly and firmly established. acarya Kundakunda's Pravacanasara: jadi pacckkhamajAdaM pajjAyaM palaidaM ca NANassa / havadi vA taM NANaM divvaM ti hi ke parUveMti // 1-39 // If that omniscience would not directly visualize the future and past modifications (of an object of knowledge), who then would call that knowledge divine and supernatural?

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Verse 5 atthaM akkhaNivadidaM IhApuvvehiM je vijANaMti / tesiM parokkhabhUdaM NAdumasakkaM ti paNNattaM // 1-40 // It is declared that for those who (are accustomed to) know the objects of knowledge by means of discrimination and other stages (of perception?) it is impossible to know the objects, past and future, that are not within the range of the senses. Upadhye, A.N. (1935), "Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara", p. 52-53. Sensory knowledge ascertains, in stages, the nature of an object through the use of the senses. The past and the future modes of the object remain beyond the scope of such knowledge as these do not reach the senses. Besides, minute objects like the atoms, distant objects like the heaven and Mount Meru, and non-material objects like the soul, virtue and vice, also remain beyond the scope of sensory knowledge. Only the gross objects like the pot and the board are known by the senses and, therefore, sensory knowledge is indirect, inadequate, and fit to be discarded. Those possessing sensory knowledge, to whatever degree, cannot be called the Omniscient (sarvajna). Things which are minute and remote in space or time are directly perceived by the Arhat, since these are cognizable, just as the objects of our perception that are well ascertained. The reason assigned here is not fallacious because these are made the subject of the minor premise. In Astasahasri, Acarya Vidyananda employs anumeya and 1. Sensory knowledge, being not immediate, has four sequential stages: outlinear grasp or apprehension - avagraha; discrimination or speculation - iha; judgement - avaya; and retention of the judgement - dharana. Such stages are not present when omniscience is functioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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Aptamimamsa prameya as synonymous terms; all objects of inference (anumeya) are objects of knowledge (prameya). It follows that the minute, past, and distant objects are perceived directly (pratyaksa) by the Arhat, because these are anumeya. Only omniscience (kevalajnana) - the self-born, perfect, pure, and non-sequential super-sensuous knowledge - embraces the knowledge of all objects and their infinite modes, making its possessor the Omniscient (sarvajna). 12

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Verse 6 You (Lord Jina) are such an Omniscient: sa tvamevAsi nirdoSo yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk / avirodho yadiSTaM te prasiddhena na bAdhyate // 6 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! pUrva meM jise nirdoSa - vItarAga tathA sarvajJa - siddha kiyA gayA hai vaha Apa hI haiN| Apake nirdoSa hone kA pramANa yaha hai ki Apake vacana yukti aura Agama se avirodhI haiN| ApakA jo iSTa (mokSAdi tattva-rUpa abhimata) hai vaha prasiddha se (pramANa athavA para-prasiddha ekAnta se) bAdhita nahIM hai| (isa kAraNa se Apake vacana yukti aura Agama se avirodhI haiN|) You only are such an Omniscient, free from all defects, because your words are not in contradiction with either the reason or the scripture. The proof of non-contradiction of your words lies in the fact that your tenets (about liberation etc.) are unopposed to what has been established through the known sources of knowledge*. In the first three verses Acarya Samantabhadra spells out certain qualities belonging to the Arhat, which are also found in jugglers, celestial beings, and the founders of sects. These * dharmi, the entity or abode of the sadhya (that which is to be proved), is known through: 1) pramana prasiddha, i.e., that which is known by pramana - 'This hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke'; 2) vikalpa prasiddha, i.e., that which is taken for granted being utterly distinct - 'The horns of a hare are non-existent'; and 3) pramana-vikalpa prasiddha, i.e., that which partakes of the nature of pramana and vikalpa both - 'Man is the master of his destiny because he has the power to control his actions'. 13

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Aptamimamsa qualities cannot establish the omniscience of the Arhat. In the next two verses the Acarya establishes that it is possible for someone to attain complete destruction of imperfections which cause obstruction to infinite knowledge. And as the soul attains omniscience, it is able to perceive things which are minute, past and distant. Omniscience is attained through the destruction of imperfections, i.e., the deluding (mohaniya), knowledgecovering (jnanavarniya), perception-obscuring (darsanavarniya) and obstructive (antaraya) classes of karmas. Omniscience images, as it were in a mirror, all substances and their infinite modes, extending through the past, the present, and the future. Being a possessor of omniscience - perfect knowledge and perception of unimaginable splendour and magnificence - the Arhat comprehends all objects of knowledge in their entirety, from all possible angles. His exposition of Reality is for the benefit of all living beings and non-controvertible by any known sources of knowledge. His words are the Holy Scripture. Acarya Samantabhadra's Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara: AptopajJamanullaMghyamadRSTeSTavirodhakam / tattvopadezakRtsArvaM zAstraM kApathaghaTTanam // 9 // That alone is true scripture which is the word of the Omniscient, inviolable, not opposed to the two kinds of valid knowledge - direct (pratyaksa) and indirect (paroksa) - reveals the true nature of reality, universally helpful to living beings, and potent enough to destroy all forms of falsehood. 14

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Verse 7 The absolutist view is in contradiction with the sources of valid knowledge: tvanmatAmRtabAhyAnAM sarvathaikAntavAdinAm / AptAbhimAnadagdhAnAM sveSTaM dRSTena bAdhyate // 7 // sAmAnyArtha - jinhoMne Apake mata-rUpI amRta - anekAnta zAsana dvArA pratipAdita vastu-tattva - kA svAda nahIM liyA hai, jo sarvathA ekAntavAdI haiM, aura jo 'hama Apta haiM' isa prakAra ke abhimAna se dagdha haiM, unakA jo iSTa tattva hai usameM pratyakSa pramANa se bAdhA AtI hai| Those who are unfamiliar with your nectar-like doctrine and adopt absolutist (ekanta) views are the victims of conceit as they erroneously claim themselves to be Omniscient and trustworthy. What they seek to establish is contradicted by the direct (pratyaksa) sources of knowledge. Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: ekAntadRSTipratiSedhi tattvaM pramANasiddhaM tadatatsvabhAvam / tvayA praNItaM suvidhe svadhAmnA naitatsamAlIDhapadaM tvadanyaiH // (9-1-41) O Lord Suvidhinatha ! With the light of your omniscience you had promulgated the nature of reality in a manner which contradicts the absolutistic point of view, wellfounded, and incorporates the principle of predication involving both the affirmation and the negation, depending on the point of view. Others have not been able to view the nature of reality in such light. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 58. 15

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Aptamimamsa In the absolutist view, division of activities into virtuous and wicked is unsustainable: kuzalAkuzalaM karma paralokazca na kvacit / ekAntagraharakteSu nAtha svaparavairiSu // 8 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! jo vastu ke ananta dharmoM meM se kisI eka hI dharma ko svIkArate haiM aise ekAnta-rUpa graha ke raMga meM raMge ( vazIbhUta) loga apane bhI zatru haiM aura dUsare ke bhI zatru haiN| unake yahA~ zubha-karma evaM azubha karma tathA paraloka Adi kucha bhI nahIM banatA hai| O Lord! Those saturated with prejudice to their own absolutist views (such as describing a substance absolutely permanent or absolutely transient) harm themselves as well as others. Such absolutist, standalone and non-equivocal views fail to establish the existence of virtuous (subha) and wicked (asubha) activities (karma) and consequently of things like rebirth (acquisition of another abode after death-paraloka). 16 Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: ya eva nityakSaNikAdayo nayA mitho'napekSAH svaparapraNAzinaH / ta eva tattvaM vimalasya te muneH parasparekSAH svaparopakAriNaH // (13-1-61) O Unblemished Lord Vimalanatha ! Those who hold the one-sided, standalone points of view such as describing a substance absolutely permanent (nitya) or transient (ksanika), harm themselves and others, but, as you had proclaimed, when the assertions are understood to have been made only from certain standpoints, these reveal the

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Verse 8 true nature of substances, and, therefore, benefit self as well as others. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 86. Sri Mallisena Suri's Syadvada-Manjari highlights the faults associated with the absolutist (ekanta) doctrine: naikAntavAde sukhaduHkhabhogau na puNyapApe na ca bandhamokSau / durnItivAdavyasanAsinaivaM paviluptaM jagadapyazeSam // 27 // With the non-equivocal doctrine there are not experiences of pleasure and pain; not merit and sin, also not bondage and liberation. By the sword of the vice of contentions of bad reasoning the promulgators of such a doctrine abolish the world without residue. With the non-equivocal (ekanta) doctrine, expressions of pleasure and pain, merit and sin, and bondage and liberation do not fit. A soul which is non-equivocally eternal the two experiences of pleasure and pain are not appropriate, for the mark of the eternal is 'having a single permanent form without loss and without origination'. If the eternal soul, having experienced pleasure, feels pain through the force of the apparatus of its karma, then, due to the difference in its own nature, non-eternalness follows; there is the consequence of loss of its having a single permanent form. The same is to be said of it when, having experienced pain, it enjoys pleasure. Furthermore, experience of pleasure and pain are to be brought about by merit (to be obtained by good karma) and sin (to be obtained by evil karma), and the bringing about of them is the practical efficacy. That on the part of eternal isolated is not appropriate, either successively or not successively. Bondage is the mutual interlacing of the self in its several infinitesimal parts (pradesa) with atoms of karma, like a mass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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Aptamimamsa of metal and fire. Liberation is waning of all karma. In the nonequivocally eternal these two also would not be. For bondage is a particular conjunction, and is defined as "the meeting of things which had not met"; non-meeting, belonging to a prior time is one state, and meeting, belonging to a later time, is another. Thus in the case of these two also the fault of difference of state is hard to get over. And how the self, having one-formness, has impromptu conjunction with bondage? And before conjunction with bondage, why was it not liberated? Moreover, by that bondage, does it experience alteration, or not? If it experiences, it is non-eternal. If it does not experience alteration, because of the fruitlessness of the bondage, it would be simply eternally liberated. In case of non-appropriateness of bondage there is also non-appropriateness of liberation; because the word 'liberation' is a synonym for the cleaving apart of bonds. Likewise also, in the doctrine of non-equivocal non-eternal there is no appropriateness of pleasure and pain etc. What is non-eternal has the attribute of absolute annihilation; and if the soul is such, since the performer of the action of acquiring merit has perished without continuance, to whom does the experience of the pleasure which is the fruit thereof belong? Likewise, upon the total destruction also of the performer of action for acquiring sin, to whom does the consciousness of pain belong? Excerpted, with modifications, from: Thomas, FW. (1968), "The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine - Sri Mallisena Suri's Syadvada-Manjari", p. 149-151 18

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Fault in considering objects of knowledge as having 'absolute existence' (bhavaikanta) character: bhAvaikAnte padArthAnAmabhAvAnAmapahnavAt / sarvAtmakamanAdyantamasvarUpamatAvakam // 9 // Verse 9 sAmAnyArtha padArthoM ke bhAva ( astitva) kA ekAnta padArtha sarvathA sat-rUpa hI hai - aisA bhAvaikAnta mAnane para abhAva padArthoM (prAk - abhAva Adi) kA lopa ThaharatA hai aura ina cAra prakAra ke vastu dharmoM kA lopa karane se vastu-tattva saba-rUpa (sarvAtmaka), anAdi, ananta aura asvarUpa ho jAtA hai jo ApakA mata nahIM hai| -- If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have 'absolute existence' (bhavaikanta) character, their 'non-existence' (abhava) character is denied. And then (by denying the four aspects of their non-existence) each object will pervade in every other object, will become without a beginning, without an end, and devoid of the form of its own. Affirmation is the aspect of existence (bhava); negation of nonexistence (abhava). The abhava or non-existence of a substance-object of knowledge (artha ) - is of four kinds: 1. Prior (antecedent) non-existence (pragabhava): The non-existence of the effect (the jar) in the cause (the lumpof-clay) previous to its production is the prior (antecedent) non-existence. It is expressed in the knowledge 'a thing will be'. Due to prior (antecedent) non-existence (pragabhava) the effect comes into existence. The lump-of-clay signifies the prior non-existence (pragabhava) of the pitcher which is 19

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Aptamimamsa formed on the lump-of-clay's cessation to exist. Non-existence of 'pitcher' before it is made is the pragabhava of the pitcher. The clay that was transformed into pitcher did not possess the attribute 'pitcher' before the pitcher was made. All substances will become 'without beginning (defect - anadi)'if prior (antecedent) non-existence (pragabhava) is not accepted. The absence of which, as a rule, accompanies the completion of an activity (e.g., making of a jar) is the prior non-existence (pragabhava). 2. Posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvamsabhava): The non-existence of the jar, consequent to its destruction by a pestle is the posterior (emergent) non-existence. Due to posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvamsabhava) the effect comes to an end. The collection of pitcher-pieces signifies the posterior non-existence (pradhvamsabhava) of the pitcher which is necessarily destroyed on the rise of the pitcher pieces. Non-existence of 'pitcher' after it is broken is pradhvamsabhava of the pitcher. The collection of pitcher-pieces no more possess the attribute 'pitcher' after the pitcher has been broken. All substances will become 'without end (defect - ananta)' if posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvamsabhava) is not accepted. The absence of which, as a rule, accompanies the destruction of an activity (e.g., destruction of a jar) is the posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvamsabhava). 3. Reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava): Reciprocal non-existence is expressed in the 20

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Verse 9 consciousness 'this is not that'. Reciprocal non-existence implies the non-pervasion of the nature of a thing in the nature of another thing; for instance the non-pervasion of the nature of a pitcher in the nature of a pillar. There is reciprocal non-existence of a pitcher in a pillar, as these exist. Reciprocal non-existence focuses on the present, i.e., on the present form of substances. The jar and the board are mutually non-existent in each other but the possibility of conversion of one into the other cannot be ruled out. It is possible that after a jar gets destroyed and takes the form of clay, the clay then gets transformed into a board at some point of time. All substances will become 'pervading in everything or allpervading (defect - sarvatmaka)' if reciprocal nonexistence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava) is not accepted. There is no rule which suggests that either the presence or absence of reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava) will bring about the accomplishment or destruction of an activity. There is reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava) in water and fire but there is no rule that in the absence of water there is fire and in the presence of water there is destruction of fire. 4. Absolute non-existence (atyantabhava): Absolute nonexistence is the non-existence of something in a substrate through the three times (past, present and future). Thus there is absolute non-existence of colour in air. Absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) denies the existence, in all the three times, of an attribute of a substance in another substance - for instance the animate nature of the soul (jiva) cannot be found in the non-soul 21

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Aptamimamsa (ajiva); never ever can the soul become a non-soul and the non-soul a soul. There is absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) between the soul (jiva) and the matter (pudgala); these two can never become one in the three times. Soul is existent with respect to its own characteristic of consciousness but exhibits absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) with respect to the inanimate nature of matter. All six substances (dravya) exhibit absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) with respect to each other; for example, there is absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) between matter (pudgala) and medium of motion (dharma), and between space (akasa) and the substance of time (kala). These substances may mingle like milk and water, give room to others, but still retain their individual identity. While the time-frame of reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava) is the present, that of absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) is the past, present and future. All substances will become 'devoid of the form of their own (defect - asvarupa)' if absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) is not accepted. 22

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Verse 10 Fault in non-acceptance of prior (antecedent) non-existence (pragabhava) and posterior (emergent ) non-existence (pradhvamsabhava): kAryadravyamanAdi syAt prAgabhAvasya nihnave / pradhvaMsasya ca dharmasya pracyave'nantatAM vrajet // 10 // sAmAnyArtha - prAgabhAva kA yadi lopa kiyA jAe to ghaTa Adi kArya - rUpa dravya anAdi - utpatti-vihIna - ho jAtA hai aura yadi pradhvaMsAbhAva kA lopa kiyA jAe to vaha kArya - rUpa dravya ananta - vinAza-vihIna - ho jAtA hai| If prior (antecedent ) non-existence (pragabhava) is not accepted, a produced entity (for example, a jar or a word) will become 'without beginning' (anadi ). If posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvamsabhava) is not accepted, a produced entity will become 'without end' (ananta). ... 23

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Aptamimamsa Fault in non-acceptance of reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava) and absolute non-existence (atyantabhava): sarvAtmakaM tadekaM syAdanyApohavyatikrame / anyatra samavAye na vyapadizyeta sarvathA // 11 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi anyApoha - anyonyAbhAva athavA itaretarAbhAva - kA vyatikrama kiyA jAe arthAt anyonyAbhAva ke na mAnane para kisI kA jo eka iSTa tattva hai vaha abhedarUpa sarvAtmaka ho jaaegaa| tathA atyantAbhAva ke na mAnane para eka dravya kA dUsare dravya meM samavAya-sambandha (tAdAtmya) svIkRta hotA hai| aisA hone para kisI bhI iSTa tattva kA sarvathA bhedarUpa se koI vyapadeza (kathana) - jaise yaha cetana hai, aura yaha acetana hai - nahIM ho skegaa| If reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava or itaretarabhava) is not accepted, the substance under consideration will become 'pervading in everything or all-pervading' (sarvatmaka). If absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) is not accepted, the substance will become 'devoid of the form of its own' (asvarupa) and distinction between different substances (e.g., the animate soul and the inanimate matter) will not be maintained. 24

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Verse 12 Fault in considering objects of knowledge as having 'absolute non-existence' (abhavaikanta) character - sunyavada: abhAvaikAntapakSe'pi bhAvApahnavavAdinAm / bodhavAkyaM pramANaM na kena sAdhanadUSaNam // 12 // sAmAnyArtha - bhAva ko nahIM mAnane vAle - sabhI padArthoM ko sarvathA asat-rUpa kahane vAle - abhAvaikAntavAdiyoM ke mata meM bhI iSTa tattva kI siddhi nahIM ho sakatI hai kyoMki vahA~ na bodha (jJAna) kA astitva hai aura na vAkya ( Agama) kA aura isalie pramANa bhI nahIM banatA hai| pramANa ke abhAva meM svamata kI siddhi tathA paramata kA khaNDana kisa prakAra saMbhava hai? If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have 'absolute non-existence' (abhavaikanata) character and their 'existence' (bhava) character is denied, cognition (bodha) and sentence (vakya) can no longer remain the sources of valid knowledge (pramana). And in the absence of the sources of valid knowledge (pramana), how can the proposed thesis ( ' absolute_nonexistence' character of an object of knowledge) be established, and that of the rivals repudiated? 25

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting both, 'absolute existence' (bhavaikanta) and 'absolute non-existence' (abhavaikanta), without mutual dependence: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 13 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ bhAva aura abhAva donoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha-doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. 'absolute existence' (bhavaikanata) and "absolute nonexistence' (abhavaikanata) - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be selfcontradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words "the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 26

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Verse 14 Flawless depiction of reality through the 'seven-nuance system' (saptabhangi): kathaJcit te sadeveSTaM kathaJcidasadeva tat / tathobhayamavAcyaM ca nayayogAnna sarvathA // 14 // sAmAnyArtha - he vIra jina ! Apake zAsana meM vastu-tattva kathaJcit sat-rUpa hI hai, kathaJcit asat-rUpa hI hai| isI prakAra apekSAbheda se vaha vastu-tattva kathaJcit ubhaya-rUpa aura kathaJcit avaktavya-rUpa hI hai| (kathaJcit sat aura avaktavya-rUpa, kathaJcit asat aura avaktavya-rUpa tathA kathaJcit sat, asat aura avaktavya-rUpa hI hai|) naya kI apekSA se vastu-tattva sat Adi rUpa hai, sarvathA nhiiN| O Lord ! In your reckoning, the object of knowledge is in a way existing (sat); in a way non-existing (asat); in a way both existing and non-existing (sat as well as asat - ubhaya); and in a way indescribable (avaktavya) [further, as a corollary, in a way existing (sat) and indescribable (avaktavya); in a way nonexisting (asat) and indescribable (avaktavya); and in a way existing (sat), non-existing (asat), and indescribable (avaktavya)]. These assertions are made in accordance with the speaker's choice of the particular state or mode of the object - naya. A thing or object of knowledge has infinite characters (i.e., it is anekantatmaka); each character can be analyzed and grasped individually. Each individual character is called a naya. Anaya thus reveals only a part of the totality, and should not be mistaken for the whole. A synthesis of different viewpoints is 27

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Aptamimamsa achieved by the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) wherein every viewpoint is able to retain its relative importance. Syadvada consists in seven vocal statements adorned by the qualifying clause 'in a way'-syat. When in regard to a single entity - soul etc. - an enquiry is made relating to its attribute - existence etc. - with all-round examination, there is a possibility of seven statements, adorned with the term 'quodammodo'l or 'in a way' (syat) This is called the 'seven-nuance system' (saptabhangi). It embraces the seven limbs (saptabhanga) of assertion, the onesided but relative method of comprehension (naya), and also the acceptance and rejection of the assertion. Syaduada, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Its chief merit is the anekanta, or manysided view of logic. This, it would be seen at once, is most necessary in order to acquire full knowledge about anything. Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. Two seemingly contrary statements may be found to be both true if we take the trouble of finding out the two points of view from which the statements are made. For example, a man may be a father with reference to his son, and he may be a son with reference to his father. Now it is a fact that he can be a son and a father at one and the same time. A thing may be said to be existent in a way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. Syadvada examines things from seven points of view, hence the doctrine is also called saptabhangi naya (sevenfold method of relative comprehension). It is stated as follows: 1. The Latin word quodammodo has many meanings, mainly: 'in a certain way', and 'in a certain measure'. 28

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Verse 14 1. PIE 3711 Ta (syad-asti-eva) In a way it simply is; this is the first 'nuance', with the notion of affirmation. 2. PIG FIAT Ta (syad-nasti-eva) In a way it simply is not; this is the second 'nuance', with the notion of negation. PIG 37colo Ta (syad-avaktavya-eva) In a way it is simply indescribable; this is the third 'nuance', with the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation. PITG 31747 FIFA ya (syad-asti-nasti-eva) In a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not; this is the fourth 'nuance', with the notion of successive affirmation and negation. 5. PIG 371 370619 Ta (syad-asti-avaktavya-eva) In a way it simply is, in a way it is simply indescribable; this is the fifth 'nuance', with the notion of affirmation and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation. 6. PING FIRST 370041af Ta (syad-nasti-avaktavya-eva) In a way it simply is not, in a way it is simply indescribable; this is the sixth 'nuance', with the notion of negation and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation. 7. PIG 34 FIR 3401710 Ta (syad-asti-nasti-avaktavya-eva) In a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not, in a way it is simply indescribable; this is the seventh 'nuance', with the successive notions of affirmation and negation, and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation. 29

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Aptamimamsa The primary modes of predication are three - syad-asti, syad-nasti and syad-avaktavya; the other four are obtained by combining these three. The phrase 'in a way' (syat) declares the standpoint of expression - affirmation with regard to own substance (drauya), place (ksetra), time (kala), and being (bhava), and negation with regard to other substance (dravya), place (ksetra), time (kala), and being (bhava). Thus, for a "jar', in regard to substance (dravya) - earthen, it simply is; wooden, it simply is not. In regard to place (ksetra) - room, it simply is; terrace, it simply is not. In regard to time (kala) - summer, it simply is; winter, it simply is not. In regard to being (bhava) - brown, it simply is; white, it simply is not. And the word 'simply' has been inserted for the purpose of excluding a sense not approved by the 'nuance'; for avoidance of a meaning not intended. The phrase 'in a way' is used to declare that the 'jar' exists in regard to its own substance etc. and not also in regard to other substance etc. Even where the phrase is not employed, the meaning is conceived by knowers of it in all cases from the sense; just as the word eva, having the purpose of cutting off the non-application. The seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of pairs of opposite attributes like eternal and non-eternal, one and many, and universal and particular. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of every attribute of reality. In the case of contradictory propositions, we have two opposite aspects of reality, both valid, serving as the basis of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion; each assertion is definite and clear. To the existence of an entity non-existence is indispensable; and to its non-existence the former. And the primariness and secondariness of the two depends on the standpoint or intent. 30

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Verse 14 When a single entity is designated by the two attributes, existence and non-existence, applied simultaneously as primary, from the impossibility of such a word, the entity is indescribable. The pair of qualities, existence and nonexistence, cannot be stated together, as one thing, by the term 'existent' because that is incompetent for the expression of non-existence. Similarly, the term 'non-existent' cannot be used because that is incompetent for the expression of existence. Nor can a single conventional term express that since it can cause presentation of things only in succession. From lack of all forms of expression the entity is indescribable, but it stands out-overpowered by simultaneous existence and non-existence, both applied as primary. It is not in every way indescribable because of the consequence that it would then be undenotable even by the word 'indescribable'. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which could include both, the thesis and the antithesis, at the same time. The remaining three are easily understood. That the complex nature of a real object or dravya is amenable to description by the seven and only seven propositions is made clear by Acarya Kundakunda in Pancastikaya-Sara: siya atthi Natthi uhayaM avvattavvaM puNo ya tattidayaM / davvaM khu sattabhaMgaM AdesavaseNa saMbhavadi // 14 // According as dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following propositions: 1) in a way it is; 2) in a way it is not; 3) in a way it is both (is and is not); 4) in a way it is indescribable; 5) in a way it is and is indescribable; 6) in a way it is not and is indescribable; and 7) in a way it is and is not and is indescribable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

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Aptamimamsa The first two standpoints of saptabhangi - affirmation and negation: sadeva sarvaM ko necchet svarUpAdicatuSTayAt / asadeva viparyAsAnna cenna vyavatiSThate // 15 // sAmAnyArtha - svarUpAdi catuSTaya - svadravya, svakSetra, svakAla tathA svabhAva kI apekSA se saba padArthoM ko sat-rUpa tathA pararUpAdi catuSTaya paradravya, parakSetra, parakAla tathA parabhAva kI apekSA se asat-rUpa kauna nahIM aMgIkAra karegA? vastu-tattva ke viSaya meM yahI vyavasthA hai; aisA na mAnane para kisI bhI tattva kI vyavasthA nahIM bana sakatI hai| O Lord! Who will not agree that the objects of knowledge exhibit the quality of existence (sat) with regard to their ownquaternion (svacatustaya) [own - substance (svadravya), ownplace (svaksetra), own-time (svakala ), and own-being (svabhava)], and the quality of non-existence (asat) with regard to other-quaternion (paracatustaya) [other-substance (paradravya), other-place (paraksetra), other-time (parakala), and other-being (parabhava ) ] ? Without such a method of analysis of reality, no object of interest can be systematically established. 32 The positive predicate refers to the object's own-quaternion (svacatustaya) and the negative predicate refers to otherquaternion (paracatustaya ). Consider this : 'as per the scripture, consciousness (upayoga) is the own-being (svabhava) of the soul (jiva).' The positive predicate will be: 'the soul is existent (sat) with regard to consciousness (upayoga) which is its own-being (svabhava).' The negative

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Verse 15 predicate will be: 'the soul is non-existent (asat) with regard to non-consciousness (anupayoga) which is its other-being (parabhava).' As another illustration, the world is eternal with regard to its substance (dravya); it is non-eternal with regard to the forms (paryaya) of substances that are seen one day and gone the next. If the object be considered existent (sat) with regard to its other-quaternion too, the difference between an animate object (jiva soul) and an inanimate object (ajiva non-soul, matter) will vanish. If the object be considered non-existent (asat) with regard to its own-quaternion too, everything will become null and void (sunya). 33

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Aptamimamsa Successive affirmation and negation (ubhaya), simultaneous affirmation and negation (avaktavya), and the remaining three limbs of saptabhangi: kramArpitadvayAd dvaitaM sahAvAcyamazaktitaH / avaktavyottarAH zeSAstrayo bhaGgAH svehatutaH // 16 // sAmAnyArtha - vastu-tattva sva-para-catuSTaya kI apekSA se krama se vivakSA hone se ubhayAtmaka (dvaita) hai tathA sva-para-catuSTaya kI apekSA se yugapat vivakSA hone se kathana kI asAmarthya ke kAraNa avaktavya hai| isI prakAra sat, asat tathA ubhaya ke sAtha avaktavya ko lie hue jo zeSa tIna bhaMga haiM ve bhI apane-apane kAraNoM ke anusAra sughaTita haiN| An object can exhibit, in a way, the dual character of existence as well as non-existence (sat and asat - ubhaya) when asserted successively in regard to the elements of the quaternion; the same character (existence as well as non-existence), when asserted simultaneously, leads to a proposition that is indescribable (avaktavya) due to the limitation of our expression. The remaining three forms of assertion [existing (sat) and indescribable (avaktavya); non-existing (asat) and indescribable (avaktavya); and existing (sat), non-existing (asat), and indescribable (avaktavya)] arise from their own causes depending on the particular state or mode of the object - naya. When the object is seen successively from the two points of view - substance (dravya) and form (paryaya) - there is simple summing up only of the results. We can assert, without fear of contradiction, that soul is both eternal and non-eternal. It is 34

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Verse 16 eternal from the substance (dravya) point of view and noneternal from the form (paryaya) point of view. When we think of the object from both the substance (dravya) and the form (paryaya) points of view simultaneously, it presents existence as well as non-existence at once, and as there is no word in our language except indescribability that can represent the idea that arises in the mind at that time, we express this by the word 'indescribable' (avaktavya). 35

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Aptamimamsa Existence has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with nonexistence: astitvaM pratiSedhyenAvinAbhAvyekadharmiNi / vizeSaNatvAt sAdharmyaM yathA bhedavivakSayA // 17 // sAmAnyArtha - eka hI vastu (dharmI) ke vizeSaNa hone ke kAraNa astitva dharma (vidheya) kA nAstitva dharma (pratiSedhya) ke sAtha avinAbhAva sambandha hai, jaise ki hetu prayoga meM sAdharmya (anvaya-hetu) bheda vivakSA se vaidharmya (vyatireka- hetu) ke sAtha avinAbhAva sambandha lie rahatA hai| Existence (astitva), being a qualifying attribute (visesana) of an entity (dharmi), has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with its opposite, non-existence (nastitva). It is like presence-inhomologue (sadharmya), a qualifying attribute (visesana) of the middle term (hetu), will have invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with its opposite, absence-in-heterologue (vaidharmya), used to highlight distinction (vyatireka). 36 The middle term (hetu) has both - the association (anvaya) and the distinction (vyatireka) - with the major term (sadhya). Association (anvaya) establishes the homogeneousness (sadharmya), and distinction (vyatireka) the heterogenousness (vaidharmya) with the major term (sadhya). Association (anvaya) establishes the logical connection (vyapti) by positivity: "The hill is full of fire (major term) because it is full of smoke (middle term), as a kitchen," - the presence of the major term (sadhya) is attended by the presence of the middle term (hetu or sadhana) - presence-inhomologue (sadharmya).

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Verse 17 Distinction (uyatireka) establishes the logical connection by contrariety: "The hill has no smoke (major term) because it has no fire (middle term), as a lake," - the absence of the major term (sadhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (hetu or sadhana) - absence-in-heterologue (vaidharmya). Homogeneousness (sadharmya) and heterogeneousness (vaidharmya) are relative to each other and always go together. The middle term (hetu) is qualified by both - homogeneousness (sadharmya) and heterogeneousness (vaidharmya). Smoke has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with fire: smoke means existence of fire, and there is no smoke without fire. Fire, on the other hand, has no invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with smoke as there can be fire without smoke. It cannot be said that fire must have smoke, and that without smoke there is no fire. But existence and non-existence have mutual (ubhaya) invariable togetherness (avinabhava); non-existence is always accompanied by existence and existence is always accompanied by non-existence. This is because existence and non-existence, both, are qualifying attributes (visesana) of the same substratum, i.e., the entity (dharmi). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

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Aptamimamsa Non-existence has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with existence: nAstitvaM pratiSedhyenAvinAbhAvyekadharmiNi / vizeSaNatvAdvaidharmyaM yathA'bhedavivakSayA // 18 // sAmAnyArtha - eka hI vastu (dharmI) meM vizeSaNa hone se nAstitva dharma apane pratiSedhya astitva dharma ke sAtha avinAbhAva sambandha lie rahatA hai, jaise ki hetu prayoga meM vaidharmya (vyatireka-hetu) abheda vivakSA se sAdharmya (anvaya-hetu) ke sAtha avinAbhAva sambandha lie rahatA hai| Non-existence (nastitva), being a qualifying attribute (visesana) of the entity (dharmi), has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with its opposite, existence (astitva). It is like absence-inheterologue (vaidharmya), a qualifying attribute (visesana) of the middle term (hetu), will have invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with its opposite, presence-in-homologue (sadharmya), used to highlight association (anvaya). 38

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Verse 19 An entity, expressible by word, possesses both the characters - existence and non-existence: vidheyapratiSedhyAtmA vizeSyaH zabdagocaraH / sAdhyadharmo yathA heturahetuzcApyapekSayA // 19 // sAmAnyArtha - vizeSya (dharmI yA pakSa) vidheya-rUpa aura pratiSedhya - rUpa hotA hai kyoMki vaha zabda kA viSaya hotA hai| jaise ki sAdhya kA dharma apekSA bheda se hetu-rUpa (sAdhana) bhI hotA hai aura ahetu-rUpa (asAdhana) bhI hotA hai| The entity qualified (visesya), being expressible by word, must possess the characters existence (astitiva or vidheya affirmative) as well as non-existence (nastitva or pratisedhya - negative). This is akin to the fact that depending on what is to be proved of the major term (sadhya), a reason can be a legitimate middle term (hetu) and also not a legitimate middle term (ahetu). When the hill is full of fire, smoke is a hetu, able to establish the particular attribute of the sadhya. But when the hill is full of snow, smoke is an ahetu, unable to establish the particular attribute of the sadhya. Thus, smoke has both the attributes - hetu and ahetu - depending on the attribute of the major term (sadhya) under consideration. In the same way, an entity, expressible by word, possesses both the characters - existence and non-existence - depending on the point of view. Existence is from one point of view (substance-dravya), and non-existence from another point of view (mode - paryaya). Existence and non-existence are the qualifying attributes (visesana) of the entity qualified (visesya). 39

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Aptamimamsa The remaining nuances (limbs) of saptabhangi also fit appropriately in the naya scheme: zeSabhaGgAzca netavyA yathoktanayayogataH / na ca kazcidvirodho'sti munIndra tava zAsane // 20 // sAmAnyArtha yathokta naya ke anusAra zeSa bhaMgoM - kathaJcit avaktavya, kathaJcit sat aura avaktavya, kathaJcit asat aura avaktavya, tathA kathaJcit sat, asat aura avaktavya - ko bhI lagA lenA caahie| he munIndra ! (vastu-tattva anekAntAtmaka hone ke kAraNa ) Apake zAsana meM kisI prakAra kA virodha nahIM hai| 40 1 The remaining nuances of saptabhangi simultaneous affirmation and negation (indescribability); affirmation and indescribability; negation and indescribability; and affirmation, negation and indescribability - should also be understood in respect of appropriate state or mode of the object (naya). O Lord of the Sages! There are no contradictions in your doctrine [of non-absolutism (anekantavada)]. It has been established that existence is not contradictory to non-existence and existence as well as non-existence are possible in a single entity. In the same manner, indescribability also, consisting of simultaneous affirmation and negation, has no mutual contradiction. The whole seven-nuance view, a combination of the triad of nuances defined as existence, nonexistence, and indescribability, has no contradictions whatsoever when viewed in light of the doctrine of nonabsolutism (anekantavada). How is the association of these seemingly contradictory

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Verse 20 attributes - existence and non-existence, one and many, eternal and non-eternal, universality and particularity, etc. - possible in a single entity? This is possible when the statement is conditioned by differences of conditions - delimitants or part-aspects. Non-existence in existent things is not contradictory when conditioned by differences of conditions. In the same way, existence and indescribability are not contradictory. Existence does not occur with avoidance of nonexistence, nor does non-existence occur with avoidance of existence. Contradiction would be if existence and nonexistence were to be with one (same) condition. Existence has one condition, and non-existence another. Existence is with respect to own form and non-existence with respect to the form of another. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Aptamimamsa Relative existence of both, affirmation and negation, make it possible for an object to perform activity: evaM vidhiniSedhAbhyAmanavasthitamarthakRt / neti cenna yathA kAryaM bahirantarupAdhibhiH // 21 // sAmAnyArtha - isa prakAra vidhi aura niSedha ke dvArA jo vastu (artha) avasthita nahIM hai arthAt ubhaya-rUpa jo vastu hai ( sarvathA astitva-rUpa yA sarvathA nAstitva-rUpa se nirdhArita nahIM hai ) - vahI artha-kriyA ko karane vAlI hotI hai, anyathA nhiiN| aisA na mAnane para bahiraMga aura antaraMga kAraNoM se jo kArya kA niSpanna honA mAnA gayA hai vaha nahIM bntaa| An object (artha) which is either absolutely existent (affirmation --sat, vidhi) or absolutely non-existent (negation-asat, nisedha) is incapable of performing activity (artha-kriya); only with the relative presence of both, existence and non-existence, it becomes capable of performing activity. It is not possible for an absolutely existent or absolutely non-existent object to perform activity even on the availability of appropriate extrinsic and intrinsic causes. 42 The activity of an object is called the artha-kriya. The loss of its previous form and emergence of the new form, together, is called the parinama. The artha-kriya is possible only in objects which exhibit both, the general (samanya - dravya) as well as particular (visesa - paryaya), attributes. It cannot exist only in dravya or only in paryaya. An object must have both, the general as well as the particular attributes; without dravya there is no paryaya and without paryaya there is no dravya. Without any of these two, the object becomes a non-object (avastu) and hence not a subject of valid knowledge (pramana).

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Verse 22 Each attribute of the entity is different from the other; the point of view determines the primary or secondary nature of the attribute: dharme dharme'nya evArtho dharmiNo'nantadharmaNaH / aGgitve'nyatamAntasya zeSAntAnAM tadaGgatA // 22 // sAmAnyArtha - ananta-dharma vAle dharmI kA pratyeka dharma eka bhinna hI prayojana ko lie hue hotA hai| aura una dharmoM meM se eka dharma ke pradhAna hone para zeSa dharmoM kI pratIti usa samaya gauNa-rUpa se hotI hai| Each individual attribute (dharma) of an entity (dharmi), having innumerable attributes, carries with it a particular meaning. When one attribute is treated as the primary attribute, the other attributes stay in the background as the secondary attributes. Objects possess innumerable attributes and may be conceived from as many points of view; i.e., objects truly are subject to allsided knowledge (possible only in omniscience). What is not composed of innumerable attributes, in the sphere of the three times, is also not existent, like a sky-flower. To comprehend the object from one particular standpoint is the scope of naya (the one-sided method of comprehension). Naya comprehends one specific attribute of the object but pramana comprehends the object in its fullness. Pramana does not make a distinction between substance and its attributes but it grasps the object in its entirety. But naya looks at the object from a particular point of view and gives emphasis to a particular aspect of the object. Both pramana and naya are forms of knowledge; pramana 43

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Aptamimamsa is sakaladesa comprehensive and absolute, and naya is vikaladesa - partial and relative. A naya looks at the object from a particular point of view and presents the picture of it in relation to that view; the awareness of other aspects is in the background and not ignored. 44 Anaya is neither pramana nor apramana (not pramana). It is a part of pramana. A drop of water of the ocean cannot be considered the ocean nor the non-ocean; it is a part of the ocean. Similarly, a soldier is neither an army, nor a non-army; but a part of the army. The same argument goes with naya. A naya is a partial presentation of the nature of the object, while pramana is comprehensive in its presentation. A naya does neither give false knowledge nor does it deny the existence of other aspects of knowledge. There are as many naya as there are points of view.

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Verse 23 The seven-nuance system (saptabhangi) should also be applied in case of other duals like one and many: ekAnekavikalpAdAvuttaratrApi yojayet / prakriyAM bhaGginImenAM nayairnayavizAradaH // 23 // sAmAnyArtha - jo naya-nipuNa (naya-vizArada) haiM unako isa sAta bhaMga vAlI prakriyA ko Age bhI eka-aneka Adi dharma-yugaloM meM naya ke anusAra yojanA karanA caahie| Those proficient in the scheme of the naya (viewing an object from a particular point of view) should apply the seven-nuancesystem (saptabhangi) to other dual attributes like one (eka) and many (aneka). Objects of knowledge exhibit the quality of one (eka) as well as the quality of many (aneka). Oneness (ekatva), being a qualifying attribute (visesana) of an entity (dharmi), has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with manyness (anekatva). Manyness (anekatva), being a qualifying attribute (visesana) of the entity (dharmi), has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with oneness (ekatva). An object can exhibit, in a way, the dual character of oneness (ekatva) as well as manyness (anekatva) when asserted successively in regard to the elements of the quaternion; the same character (oneness as well as manyness), when asserted simultaneously, leads to a proposition that is indescribable (avaktavya) due to the limitation of our expression. The remaining three forms of assertion [oneness (ekatva) and indescribable; manyness (anekatva) and indescribable; and oneness (ekatva), manyness (anekatua), and indescribable)] arise from their own causes 45

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Aptamimamsa depending on the particular state or mode of the object-naya. The naya scheme, applied to a pitcher: the pitcher is, in a way, one (as a substance), and also, in a way, many (as modes). The substance of clay runs through all its modes but the modes keep on changing due to origination and destruction. 46

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Section 2 dvitIya pariccheda Fault in the doctrine of absolute non-dualism (advaita-ekanta): advaitaikAntapakSe'pi dRSTo bhedo virudhyate / kArakANAM kriyAyAzca naikaM svasmAt prajAyate // 24 // sAmAnyArtha - advaitaikAnta pakSa meM kArakoM aura kriyAoM kA bheda jo pratyakSa siddha (spaSTa dikhAI dene vAlA satya) hai vaha virodha ko prApta hotA hai| kyoMki jo bhI koI eka sarvathA akelA (asahAya ) hai vaha svayaM apane se utpanna nahIM ho sakatA hai| The doctrine of absolute non-dualism (advaita-ekanta) suffers from contradiction as it denies the duality of factors-of-action (karaka) and action (kriya), as ascertained directly by cognition; it is not possible for an object to get produced out of itself. In this verse we come to the Advaita-Vedanta doctrine which holds that Brahma, often described as 'Existence-ThoughtBliss' (sat-cid-ananda) is the sole reality, the world being a product of illusion (maya) or ignorance (avidya). All different things are manifestations of Brahma; only the one eternally undivided Brahma exists. The doctrine justifies an ultimate non-reality of the world of things (vastu-prapanca ) found in the triple universe as being appearance (pratibhasa) through the power of illusion (maya) or ignorance (avidya). Factors-of-action (karaka) comprise the doer (karta), the 47

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Aptamimamsa activity (karma) and the instrument (karana) etc. Action (kriya) consists in changes that are termed as coming and going, motion and stillness, origination and destruction, eating and drinking, contraction and expansion etc. Duality between the factors-of-action (karaka) and the action (kriya) is seen in everyday experience. This universally observable cognition goes against the doctrine of absolute nondualism (advaita-ekanta). Without the instrumentality of the factors-of-action (karaka) and the action (kriya), it is also not possible to account for the production of an absolutely non-dualistic object; it can certainly not get produced by itself. If illusion (maya) is something 'existent, distinct from Self-Brahma, then reality is established as dual, setting an axe at the root of the Advaita doctrine. If illusion (maya) is something 'non-existent but capable of producing effects, there is contradiction within own statement, as in the phrase 'a barren mother'. A woman who gives birth to a child is a mother and barren is the opposite thereof; if mother, how barren? Acarya Amstcandra's commentary on Acarya Kundakunda's Pravacanasaral, explains the sixfold factors-of-action (karaka) from the empirical as well as the transcendental points of view: Factors-of-action (karaka) are of six kinds: 1) the doer (karta), 2) the activity (karma), 3) the instrument (karana), 4) the bestowal (sampradana), 5) the dislodgement (apadana), and the substratum (adhikarana). Each of these is of two kinds: empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahara satkaraka) and transcendental sixfold factors-of-action 1. See U. HELGA (fa. #. 1969), sfthrobochglareffae fala: Yder:, 372| 1, " 16, 78 21-22. . . .... . . .. . . 48

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Verse 24 (niscaya satkaraka). When the accomplishment of work is through external instrumental causes (nimitta karana) it is the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahara satkaraka) and when the accomplishment of work is for the self, in the self, through the self as the material cause (upadana karana), it is the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niscaya salkaraka). The empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahara salkaraka) is based on what is called as upacara asadbhuta naya and, therefore, untrue; the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niscaya satkaraka) is based on the self and, therefore, true. Since every substance (dravya) is independent and is not a cause of either the creation or the destruction of other substances, the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahara satkaraka) is untrue. And since the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niscaya satkaraka) accomplishes the work of the self, in the self, through the self, it is true. An illustration of the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahara satkaraka) can be as under: the independent performer of the activity, the potter, is the doer (karta); the work that is being performed, the making of the pot, is the activity (karma); the tool used for the performance of the action - the wheel - is the instrument (karana); the end-use of the work performed - the storage vessel - is the bestowal (sampradana); the change of mode from one state to the other, from clay to pot, is the dislodgement (apadana); and the bedrock of activity, the clay, is the substratum (adhikarana). In this case, the doer (karta), the activity (karma), the instrument (karana), the bestowal (sampradana), the dislodgement (apadana), and the substratum (adhikarana) are different entities and, therefore, the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahara satkaraka) is established only from empirical point of view and not true. The transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niscaya 49

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Aptamimamsa salkaraka) takes place in the self and, therefore, true. The soul established in its Pure Self (through suddhopayoga) attains omniscience (kevalajnana) without the help of or reliance on any outside agency (such a soul is appropriately termed selfdependent or svayambhu). Intrinsically possessed of infinite knowledge and energy, the soul, depending on self, performs the activity of attaining its infinite knowledge-character and, therefore, the soul is the doer (karta). The soul's concentration on its own knowledge-character is the activity; the soul, therefore, is the activity (karma). Through its own knowledgecharacter the soul attains omniscience and, therefore, the soul is the instrument (karana). The soul engrossed in pure consciousness imparts pure consciousness to self; the soul, therefore, is the bestowal (sampradana). As the soul gets established in its pure nature at the same time destruction of impure subsidential knowledge etc. takes place and, therefore, the soul is the dislodgement (apadana). The attributes of infinite knowledge and energy are manifested in the soul itself; the soul, therefore, is the substratum (adhikarana). This way, from the transcendental point of view, the soul itself, without the help of others, is the sixfold factors-of-action (niscaya salkaraka) in the attainment of omniscience through pure concentration (suddhopayoga). 50

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Verse 25 Absolute non-dualism cannot explain dualities like virtuous and wicked activities, and their fruits like merit and demerit: karmadvaitaM phaladvaitaM lokadvaitaM ca no bhavet / vidyA'vidyAdvayaM na syAd bandhamokSadvayaM tathA // 25 // sAmAnyArtha - advaita ekAnta meM karma-dvaita - zubha aura azubha karma, phala-dvaita - puNya-rUpa aura pApa-rUpa phala, loka-dvaita - ihaloka aura paraloka nahIM banate haiN| isI taraha vidyA aura avidyA kA dvaita tathA bandha aura mokSa kA dvaita bhI siddha nahIM hote haiN| (If this doctrine of absolute non-dualism (advaita-ekanta) be accepted -) There will be no duality of activities (karma) - virtuous (subha) and wicked (asubha), of fruits of activities (phala) - merit (punya) and demerit (papa), of abodes of existence (loka) - this world (ihaloka) and the other world (paraloka), of knowledge (vidya) and ignorance (avidya), and of bondage (bandha) and liberation (moksa). The duals which are mentioned in the above verse negate the doctrine of absolute non-dualism. The doctrine of non-dualism (advaita) itself expounds dualism as in the two statements, 'All this is the primeval Person', and 'All this surely in truth is Brahman'. So, even the scripture does not establish non-dualism. Non acceptance of one component of any of these duals entails the negation of the other component too since one cannot exist without the other. An entity defined as a non-dual Person in the doctrine is not within the range of demonstration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

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Aptamimamsa There is obvious contradiction if non-dualism is established with the help of a middle term (hetu): hetoradvaitasiddhizced dvaitaM syAddhetusAdhyayoH / hetunA cedvinA siddhidvaitaM vAGmAtrato na kim // 26 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi kahA jAe ki advaita kI siddhi hetu ke dvArA kI jAtI hai to hetu (sAdhana) aura sAdhya ke sadbhAva se dvaita kI siddhi kA prasaMga AtA hai| aura yadi hetu ke binA advaita kI siddhi kI jAtI hai to kyA vacanamAtra se dvaita kI bhI siddhi nahIM ho sakegI? If we undertake to establish this doctrine of absolute nondualism (advaita-ekanta) with the help of the middle term (hetu) [also called reason (sadhana) or mark (linga)], there is bound to be duality because the middle term (hetu) will have a predicate - the major term (sadhya or lingi). If it be established without the help of the middle term (hetu) by mere speech, in that case, can the contrary view (absolute dualism) too not be established by mere speech? The minor term, locus or abode (paksa) is that with which the reason or middle term (hetu) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (sadhya) is to be proved. The minor term (paksa) is related to the major term (sadhya) through their common relation to the middle term (hetu). In a proposition (pratijna) the subject is the minor term (paksa), and the predicate the major term (sadhya or lingi). In an inference for the sake of others, the minor term (paksa), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The following is an inference for the sake of others: 1. This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term). - 52

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Verse 26 pratijna: proposition; statement of that which is to be proved. 2. Because it is full of smoke (middle term). - hetu: statement of reason. 3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen. - drstanta or udaharana : statement of a general rule supported by an example. 4. So is this hill full of smoke. upanaya: application of the rule to this case. 5. Therefore the hill is full of fire. nigamana: conclusion. The hetu or the reason consists in the statement of the mark or the sign (linga) which being present in the subject or the minor term (paksa) suggests that the latter possesses a certain property predicated of it. It is the assertion of the middle term (hetu) by which the relation or not of the minor term (paksa) to the major term (sadhya) is known. While the pratijna is a proposition of two terms, the hetu is a one-term proposition. There is inseparable connection (vyapti) between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu). In other words, there is inseparable presence of one thing in another, e.g., no smoke without fire. Absolute non-dualism loses its essential characteristic the instant a middle term is employed to establish it as there is inseparable connection between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu). If from the middle term (hetu) there should be establishment of nonduality, there would be duality of the middle and major terms. If non-duality is established without the middle term why not establish it by mere speech? And, if established by mere speech, without the middle term, there is no problem in establishing its opposite too, i.e., dualism, likewise. 53

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Aptamimamsa Non-dualism is inseparably connected (avinabhavi) with dualism: advaitaM na vinA dvaitAdaheturiva hetunA / saMjJinaH pratiSedho na pratiSedhyAdRte kvacit // 27 // sAmAnyArtha - jisa prakAra se hetu ke binA ahetu nahIM hotA hai usI prakAra se dvaita ke binA advaita nahIM ho sakatA hai| kahIM bhI saMjJI (nAmavAle) kA pratiSedha (niSedha) pratiSedhya ke binA nahIM banatA hai| As there can be no non-reason (ahetu) without the presence of a middle term or reason (hetu), similarly there can be no nondualism (advaita) without the presence of dualism (dvaita). The denial of a word-denoted-entity (samjni) is nowhere seen without the real existence of the thing that is used for denial. The existence of a reason (hetu) is necessarily accompanied by the existence of a non-reason (ahetu). Smoke is a reason (hetu) for establishing the existence of fire but a non-reason (ahetu) for establishing the existence of water. Also, for establishing the existence of fire, smoke is a reason (hetu) and water is a non-reason (ahetu). The word dualism (dvaita), which is countered or denied by non-dualism (advaita), must have real connotation to be able to fit the task. Even when we express non-existence with the phrase "sky-flower' it clearly connotes the existence of the entity 'flower'. 54

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Verse 28 The doctrine of 'absolute separateness' is faulted: pRthaktvaikAntapakSe'pi pRthaktvAdapRthak tu tau / pRthaktve na pRthaktvaM syAdanekastho hyasau guNaH // 28 // sAmAnyArtha - pRthaktvaikAnta pakSa meM (vastu-tattva ko eka dUsare se sarvathA bhinna mAnanA) prazna uThatA hai ki kyA 'dravya' aura 'guNa' pRthaka haiM athavA apRthk| yadi apRthak haiM to pRthaktva kA ekAnta hI nahIM rhaa| aura yadi pRthak haiM to bhI pRthaktva nAma kA guNa nahIM banatA hai kyoMki 'guNa' eka hote hue bhI aneka padArthoM meM sthita mAnA gayA hai aura taba pRthakbhUta padArtha eka dUsare se apRthak ho jaayeNge| If one maintains that objects are possessed of the character 'absolute separateness' (prthaktva-ekanta) - declaring every object as absolutely different from all other - the question arises as to whether, in light of the character of absolute separateness, the substance and its qualities are considered non-separate or separate. If these be held as non-separate then the character of absolute separateness gets repudiated. If these be held as separate then too the character of absolute separateness cannot be maintained since such so-called 'separate' qualities are seen to reside in many objects making them 'non-separate'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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Aptamimamsa If oneness (ekatva) is denied absolutely, phenomena like series of successive events (santana) become untenable: saMtAnaH samudAyazca sAdharmyaM ca niraMkuzaH / pretyabhAvazca tatsarvaM na syAdekatvanihnave // 29 // sAmAnyArtha - ekatva ke abhAva meM (yadi ekatva kA sarvathA lopa kiyA jAe) jo santAna, samudAya, sAdharmya aura pretyabhAva niraMkuza haiM (nirbAdha rUpa se mAne jAte haiM) una saba kA bhI abhAva ho jaayegaa| If the reality of oneness (ekatva) - different units of a substance forming a composite - is absolutely denied (and thus subscribing to the doctrine of absolute separateness) then authentic phenomena like series of successive events (santana), aggregate of qualities in a single object (samudaya), similarity between two objects (sadharmya), and birth following death or transmigration (pretyabhava), would become untenable. The Buddhists do not accept oneness (ekatva) - they subscribe to the doctrine of momentariness (ksanikatva) - but believe in the four phenomena mentioned in the verse. The term 'series of successive events' (santana) is used by the Buddhist maintainers of momentariness to account for the continuity constituting the substance. However, just as the tree has no existence without the root, the above mentioned four phenomena cannot exist without accepting the reality of oneness (ekatva). 56

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Verse 30 Fault in considering the knowledge (jnana) as absolutely different from the object of knowledge (jneya): sadAtmanA ca bhinnaM cejjJAnaM jJeyAd dvidhA'pyasat / jJAnAbhAve kathaM jJeyaM bahirantazca te dviSAm // 30 // sAmAnyArtha - (sarvathA pRthaktvaikAnta ko mAnakara -) yadi jJAna ko sat-svarUpa kI apekSA se bhI jJeya se pRthak mAnA jAe to jJAna aura jJeya donoM asat ho jAyeMge arthAt donoM kA hI abhAva ThaharatA hai| he bhagavan ! Apase dveSa karane vAloM ke yahA~ jJAna ke asat hone para (jJAna ke abhAva meM) bahiraMga aura antaraMga kisI bhI jJeya kA astitva kaise bana sakatA hai? If the knowledge or cognition (jnana) be considered absolutely different, even in terms of its nature of 'being' (sat), from the object of knowledge (jneya) then both, the knowledge (jnana) and the object of knowledge (jneya) turn out to be 'non-beings' (asat); the knowledge (jnana) becomes a 'non-being' being different from the object of knowledge (jneya) which is accepted to be a 'being' (sat), and without the instrument of knowledge (jnana) the object of knowledge (jneya) too becomes a 'non-being' (asat). O Lord ! In the absence of knowledge (jnana) how can the existence of any external or internal objects of knowledge (jneya) be proved by those opposed to your views? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

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Aptamimamsa Fault in considering words as capable of describing only the general (samanya) attributes of a substance: sAmAnyArthA giro'nyeSAM vizeSo nAbhilapyate / sAmAnyAbhAvatasteSAM mRSaiva sakalA giraH // 31 // sAmAnyArtha - kucha logoM ke mata meM zabda sAmAnya kA kathana karate haiM kyoMki (unakI mAnyatAnusAra) zabdoM ke dvArA vizeSa kA kathana nahIM banatA hai| vizeSa ke abhAva meM sAmAnya kA bhI astitva nahIM banatA hai aura sAmAnya ke mithyA hone se sAmAnya-pratipAdaka samasta vacana asatya hI Thaharate haiN| In the doctrine of others, words can describe only the general (samanya) attributes of a substance and not the specific (visesa) attributes. [In the absence of the specific (visesa) attributes, the general (samanya) attributes too become nonentity; therefore, words, which can describe only the nonentity, too become nonentity.] Upon accepting the general (samanya) attributes as nonentity, all words become false. Just as the two mutually supportive causes, the substantial cause (upadana karta) and the instrumental cause (nimitta karta), result in the accomplishment of the desired objective, in the same way, two kinds of attributes in a substance - general (samanya) and specific (visesa) - ascertain its particular characteristic (naya) depending on what is kept as the primary consideration for the moment while keeping the other attributes in the background, not negating their existence in any way. All objects have two kinds of qualities - the general (samanya), and the specific (visesa). The general qualities 50

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Verse 31 express the genus (jati) or the general attributes, and the specific qualities describe the constantly changing conditions or modes. In a hundred pitchers, the general quality is their jar-ness, and the specific quality is their individual size, shape or mark. Dravya refers to a general rule or conformity. That which has the dravya as the object is the general standpoint (dravyarthika naya). Paryaya means particular, an exception or exclusion. That which has the paryaya as the object is the standpoint of modifications (paryayarthika naya). Whatever condition or form a substance takes, that condition or form is called a mode. Modes partake of the nature of substance, and are not found without the substance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting both, absolute 'non-dualism' (advaita-ekanta) and absolute 'separateness' (prthaktva-ekanta), without mutual dependence: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 32 // sAmAnyArtha - (advaita-ekAnta aura pRthaktva-ekAnta donoM meM alaga-alaga doSa dekhakara) jo syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ advaita aura pRthaktva donoM kA ubhayaikAtmya (ekAnta) nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha-doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| (Upon realization of the flaws of the two views individually -) The enemies of your doctrine of syadvada can also not maintain that the two views-viz.'absolutenon-dualism' (advaita-ekanta) and absolute separateness' (prthaktva-ekanta) - describe one and the same phenomenon; it is impossible since the two views are self-contradictory (like the child of a barren woman'). If (upon realization of the flaw of this position) they proclaim that the phenomenon is absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then, having described reality as 'indescribable', it becomes describable and their stand gets refuted (only a non-reality can be said to be indescribable). (Syaduada characterizes a phenomenon as 'indescribable' only in the sense of inexpressibility of the state of simultaneous affirmation and denial of the proposition; the phenomenon is a reality but due to the limitation of the language it cannot be expressed.) 60

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Verse 33 With mutual dependence, separateness (prthaktva) and nondualism or oneness (ekatva), become reality: anapekSe pRthaktvaikye hyavastu dvayahetutaH / tadevaikyaM pRthaktvaM ca svabhedaiH sAdhanaM yathA // 33 // sAmAnyArtha - paraspara nirapekSa pRthaktva aura ekatva donoM hetudvaya se avastu haiM (pRthaktva avastu hai ekatva - nirapekSa hone para; ekatva avastu hai pRthaktva-nirapekSa hone para) / ekatva aura pRthaktva sApekSa-rUpa meM virodha ke na hone se usI prakAra vastu tattva ko prApta haiM jaise ki sAdhana ( hetu) eka hone para bhI apane bhedoM ke dvArA aneka bhI hai| Considered independent of each other, the two views of separateness (prthaktva) and non-dualism or oneness (ekatva) become fictitious or non-reality. [Separateness (prthaktva) becomes a non-reality without it being considered in relation to non-dualism (ekatva), and non-dualism becomes a non-reality without it being considered in relation to separateness (prthaktva) ]. In fact, an object is characterized by oneness as well as separateness just as a single reason (sadhana, hetu) is characterized by one as well as many attributes. The reason or middle term (sadhana, hetu) is defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with that which is to be proved, the major term (sadhya). Thus, it has invariable togetherness (avinabhava) with the major term (sadhya). But it has other attributes too. Consider this: "This hill (minor term, locus or abode - paksa) is full of fire (major term sadhya) because it is full of smoke (middle term or reason sadhana or hetu), as in the kitchen (homogeneous example - 61

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Aptamimamsa sapaksa)". Here smoke (hetu) exists in relation to the hill - paksa-dharmatva - and it also exists in relation to the kitchen - sapaksa-sattva. Consider another example where the absence of the major term (sadhya) is established by the absence of the middle term (hetu): "This hill (minor term, locus or abode - paksa) has no fire (major term - sadhya) because it has no smoke (middle term or reason-sadhana or hetu), as in the lake (heterogeneous example - vipaksa)". Here smoke (hetu) does not exist in relation to the lake (vipaksa-vyavrtti). 62 According to Buddhist logicians, the true hetu should possess the following three characteristics: i) it should be present in the paksa, ii) it should also exist in the sapaksa, and iii) it should not be found in the vipaksa. The paksa has already been explained to mean the sadhya and its abode, the dharmi; but sapaksa is the place where the sadhana and sadhya are known to abide in some already familiar instance, while vipaksa embraces all other places where the very possibility of the existence of the sadhya is counter-indicated. Illustration: This hill (paksa) is full of fire, because it is full of smoke; Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen (sapaksa); Whatever is not full of fire is also not full of smoke, as a pond (vipaksa). Excerpted from: Jain, Champat Rai (1916), "Nyaya - The Science of Thought", p. 50.

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Verse 34 Flawless establishment of separateness (prthaktva) as well as non-dualism or oneness (ekatva) in an entity: satsAmAnyAttu sarvaikyaM pRthagdravyAdibhedataH / bhedAbhedavivakSAyAmasAdhAraNahetuvat // 34 // sAmAnyArtha - sat-astitva meM samAnatA hone kI apekSA se saba jIvAdi padArtha eka haiM aura dravya Adi ke bheda se aneka (pRthak) haiN| jaise asAdhAraNa hetu bheda kI vivakSA se aneka-rUpa aura abheda kI vivakSA se eka-rUpa hotA hai, usI prakAra saba padArthoM meM bheda kI vivakSA se pRthaktva aura abheda kI vivakSA se ekatva sughaTita hai| With reference to the attribute of universal character of being or existence' (sat, astitva) all substances exhibit oneness or unity while with reference to their specific root-substance etc. [substance (dravya), place (ksetra), time (kala) and manifestation (bhava)] these exhibit separateness or distinction; this is just as a specific reason (sadhana, hetu) is one when it is employed in entirety and many when its divisions are emphasized by the speaker. Reason (sadhana, hetu) is one but when employed in an inference (anumana) it can be used in two ways: as an agent (karaka - that from which a thing is made, like clay from which a pitcher is made), or as a source of knowledge (jnapaka - that which makes a thing known, like smoke leading to the knowledge of fire). Reason (hetu) can also be classified as exhibiting paksa-dharmatva, sapaksa-sattva or vipaksavyavitti depending on the intention of the speaker (see explanatory note- Verse 33). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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Aptamimamsa Only the 'existent' (sat) forms the subject of expression or no-expression: vivakSA cAvivakSA ca vizeSye'nantadharmiNi / sato vizeSaNasyAtra nAsatastaistadarthibhiH ||35|| sAmAnyArtha - vivakSA aura avivakSA karane vAle vyakti ananta dharma vAlI vastu meM vidyamAna (sat) vizeSaNa kI hI vivakSA aura avivakSA karate haiM, avidyamAna (asat) kI nhiiN| usa vizeSaNa kA arthI vivakSA karatA hai aura anarthI avivkssaa| sarvathA asat to gadhe ke sIMga ( kharaviSANa) yA gaganakusuma ke samAna artha-kriyA se zUnya, avastu hotA hai| The object of knowledge possesses infinite attributes and the speaker expresses a distinguishing attribute while choosing not to express other attributes; he does not speak of an attribute that is non-existent (like bharavisana - the 'horns of a hare', or gaganakusuma - the 'sky-flower'). 64

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Verse 36 Both unity (abheda, ekatva) and diversity (bheda, prthaktva) can coexist in a single substance: pramANagocarau santau bhedAbhedau na saMvRtI / tAvekatrA'viruddhau te guNamukhyavivakSayA // 36 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! Apake mata meM bheda (pRthaktva) aura abheda (ekatva, advaita) donoM pramANa ke viSaya hone se vAstavika (paramArthabhUta) haiM, saMvRti ke viSaya (kAlpanika athavA upacAramAtra) nhiiN| ye donoM gauNa aura pradhAna kI vivakSA ko lie eka hI vastu meM avirodha rUpa se rahate haiN| Being objects of valid knowledge (pramana) both, unity (abheda, ekatva, advaita) and diversity (bheda, prthaktva), in a single substance are real, and not imaginary. Depending on the speaker's intention, these become primary or secondary, without there being any conflict in their coexistence in the same substance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

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Section 3 tRtIya pariccheda Fault in accepting the objects of knowledge as absolutely permanent (nityatva-ekanta): nityatvaikAntapakSe'pi vikriyA nopapadyate / prAgeva kArakAbhAvaH kva pramANaM kva tatphalam // 37 // sAmAnyArtha ( yadi yaha mAnA jAe ki padArtha sarvathA nitya hai to - ) nityatvaikAnta pakSa meM vikriyA kI utpatti nahIM ho sakatI hai| jaba pahale hI kAraka kA abhAva hai (avasthA na badale to kArakoM kA sadbhAva banatA hI nahIM hai) taba pramANa aura pramANa kA phala (pramiti ) ye donoM kahA~ bana sakate haiM? If the objects of knowledge are supposed to be absolutely permanent (nityatva-ekanta) then there cannot be any modifications in them; when already there is the absence of the agent (karaka) for a modification how can one have the possibility of a valid source of knowledge (pramana) and its fruit (pramana-phala i.e., correct notion-pramiti)? Only an object which has general (samanya-dravya) as well as particular (visesa - paryaya) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. The general (dravya) without its modification (paryaya) and modification (paryaya) without its general (dravya) cannot be the subject of valid knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of valid knowledge. The conception of prama or valid knowledge implies three 67

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Aptamimamsa necessary factors, namely the subject of knowledge (pramata), the object of knowledge (prameya) and the method of knowledge (pramana). The subject (pramata) and the object (prameya) are strictly correlative factors involved in all knowledge. They are distinguishable, no doubt, as the knower and the known, but not separable in any act of knowledge. All true knowledge must be connected with some method of knowledge. In Western philosophy it is customary to analyze the knowledge-relation into the three factors of subject, object and process of knowledge. These correspond respectively to pramata,prameya and prama in Indian philosophy. What is the fruit of pramana - pramana-phala or pramiti? The aim of pramana is to make the object of knowledge clear. It is to illuminate the object. Most importantly, pramana removes ignorance and enables one to make distinction between what is true and what is false and between what needs to be accepted and what needs to be discarded. The Omniscient, however, who enjoys infinite knowledge and bliss, has complete detachment for the worldly objects of knowledge. 68

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Verse 38 No modification is possible if the source of knowledge (pramana) and the agent (karaka) are considered absolutely permanent: pramANakArakairvyaktaM vyaktaM cedindriyArthavat / te ca nitye vikAryaM kiM sAdhoste zAsanAbahiH // 38 // sAmAnyArtha - (sAMkhyamata vAdiyoM ke mata meM -) jaise ki indriyoM ke dvArA artha abhivyakta hotA hai usI prakAra yadi pramANa aura kArakoM ke dvArA avyakta ko vyakta huA batalAyA jAtA hai, aura jaba pramANa aura kAraka donoM nitya mAne gae haiM taba unake dvArA vikriyA kaise bana sakatI hai? Apake anekAnta zAsana se bAhara (nityatva ke ekAnta zAsana meM) koI bhI vikriyA nahIM ho sakatI hai| [It is held (by the Samkhya system) that although unmanifest (avyakta) causes (karana) - source of knowledge (pramana) and agent (karaka) - are absolutely permanent but the manifest (vyakta) effects (karya) - like the Great or Intellect (Mahat or Buddhi) and its consequence the I-ness or Ego (Ahamkara) - are non-permanent and, therefore, transformation is possible-] It is held that just as sense-organs reveal an object, manifest (vyakta) objects are revealed by the source of knowledge (pramana) and the agent (karaka). But when both, the source of knowledge (pramana) and the agent (karaka), considered absolutely permanent, are employed to make a non-manifest (avyakta) into a manifest (vyakta), what kind of modification could be predicated? O Lord ! There is no possibility of any modification taking place outside your doctrine of manifold points of view. Note: In absolute permanence, manifestation of any kind is not possible; there must be some change of mode to warrant manifestation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

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Aptamimamsa The main tenets of the Samkhya system are: 1. Dualism of (a) entirely inactive Spirit (Purusa) or Intelligence (Cit) and (b) a material, non-intelligent nature (Prakrti) of triple constitution, from which emerges, and into which is dissolved, the entire universe of things experienced. 2. An evolution of Prakyti in the presence of Spirit by stages of which the first is an instrument of determinate awareness (Buddhi, Reason), and the second a simultaneous origination of Egoity (Ahamkara, principle of individuality) and of Sense-faculties. Thence come the essences of the Five Elements and through their composition the gross material elements and the general physical universe. 3. An unreal connection of Spirit and Prakrti and its evolutes in consequence of a failure on the part of Spirit to realize his actual detachment and of a false semblance of intelligence in the mechanism of Praksti through reflection from the light of Spirit. 4. Liberation of Spirit from the unreal connection and bondage when, having seen the work of Prakrti through and through, he realizes his own absolute aloofness.1 The Reals (tattvas) are 25 as follows: the unmanifested (avyakta, Prakyti in its unevolved quiescence); and the manifested (vyakta) - 24-fold by reason of the distinction of the 'great principle' (Mahat, Buddhi), ego (Ahamkara), the 5 pure principles (sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa, gandha), the 11 senseorgans including mind, the 5 gross elements (akasa, vayu, teja, jala, prthvi), and the Spirit of the form of intelligence. 1. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), "The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine - Sri Mallisena Suri's Syadvada-Manjari", p. 93-94. 70

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Verse 38 In the Samkhya system, it is the function of the intellect (buddhivrtti) that is regarded as pramana or the specific cause of true knowledge. The self knows an object through a mental modification that corresponds to the impression produced in the sense-organ by the object in question. The object having impressed its form on the sense organ, the mind presents it to the self through a corresponding modification of itself. Hence the mental function is pramana or the source of our knowledge of the object. I or Ego (Ahamkara), which is the ground of our personal identity, merely means further modification of the subtle Buddhi which itself is a modification of acetana Prakrti. Prakrti is otherwise called avyakta or the unmanifest or Pradhana or the primary basis of existence. The intelligent Purusa is inactive by nature and hence is incapable of being the architect of his own destiny. Acetana - the unenlightened - Prakrti has all activity and force in itself and is quite blind by nature. The Purusa is intelligent but inert and Prakrti is all activity but blind. The union of the two - the blind and the cripple - leads to living.1 Human volition and consequent human conduct are said to be the effects of acetana Prakrti; virtue and vice are alien to the Purusa. These are associated with the non-spiritual Prakrti and hence these do not affect the soul and yet with a strange inconsistency it is the fate of Purusa to enjoy the fruits pleasurable and painful of the karmas directly and immediately due to the activity of Prakrti. Why it is the fate of Purusa that he should vicariously suffer the consequences of an alien being in life is entirely unexplained. As per the Samkhya ontology, Purusa being ever free can 1. See Prof. A. Chakravarti (2008), "Acarya Kundakunda's Samayasara", Introduction, p. 106. 71

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Aptamimamsa never be bound; it is the Prakrti that is bound and liberated. The question can be raised, if there is no bondage why talk of liberation; and if there is no real connection between Purusa and Prakrti, how the false conception of such connection can rise? It is these points such as Prakrti does everything and Purusa is neutral without doing anything, that are attacked. The Jaina position is that the soul or spirit is the agent of various bhava or psychic states whereby there is the influx of karmas leading to further bondage; when the karmas are destroyed, with their causes rooted out and the existing stock evaporated, the soul attains its natural purity constituted of eternal bliss and omniscience.1 1. See Upadhye A.N. (1935), "Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara A Pro-canonical Text of the Jainas", Introduction, p. XLVIII. 72

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Verse 39 When the effect (karya) has eternal existence (sat), the idea of a produced entity is untenable: yadi satsarvathA kAryaM puMvannotpattumarhati / pariNAmapraklRptizca nityatvaikAntabAdhinI // 39 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi kArya ko sarvathA sat mAnA jAe to caitanya puruSa ke samAna usakI utpatti nahIM ho sakatI hai| aura utpatti na mAnakara kArya meM pariNAma kI kalpanA karanA nityatvaikAnta kI bAdhaka hai| If the effect (karya) be considered as having eternal existence (sat), like the intelligent Purusa of the Samkhya philosophy, it cannot be a produced entity. And to imagine the process of transformation in an entity which cannot be produced goes against the doctrine of 'eternal existence'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

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Aptamimamsa Phenomena involving merit (punya) and demerit (papa) etc. cannot be explained in the doctrine of absolute permanence (nityatva-ekanta): puNyapApakriyA na syAt pretyabhAvaH phalaM kutaH / bandhamokSau ca teSAM na yeSAM tvaM nAsi nAyakaH // 40 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! jinake Apa nAyaka nahIM hai, una nityatvaikAnta-vAdiyoM ke mata meM puNya-pApa kI kriyA nahIM banatI hai, aura (kriyA ke abhAva meM) pretyabhAva (paraloka-gamana), sukha-duHkha-rUpa kriyA kA phala, bandha tathA mokSa bhI nahIM banate haiN| O Lord ! Those who do not accept the superiority of your leadership and believe in absolute permanence of objects are incapable of explaining the phenomena of acts involving merit (punya) and demerit (papa), of birth following death (pretyabhava), of fruits of activities (phala), of bondage (bandha), and liberation (moksa). 74

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Verse 41 Fault in the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (ksanikaekanta): kSaNikaikAntapakSe'pi pretyabhAvAdyasaMbhavaH / pratyabhijJAdyabhAvAnna kAryArambhaH kutaH phalam // 41 // sAmAnyArtha - (nityatvaikAnta meM doSa ko jAnakara ) yadi kSaNikaikAnta (bauddhoM dvArA pratipAdita anityatva - rUpa ekAnta) kA pakSa liyA jAe to usameM bhI pretyabhAvAdika saMbhava nahIM haiN| pratyabhijJAnAdi jaise jJAnoM kA abhAva hone se kArya kA Arambha saMbhava nahIM hai aura jaba kArya kA Arambha hI nahIM taba usakA phala kaise saMbhava ho sakatA hai? (On the other hand -) When viewed from the point of view of 'absolute momentariness' (hsanika- ekanta) then also it is impossible to explain phenomena like birth following death (pretyabhava). [Since the soul, according to this view, is characterized by momentariness, therefore, memory (smrti) and recognition (pratyabhijnana) etc. are not possible.] In the absence of the sources of knowledge, like recognition (pratyabhijnana), the production of an effect (karya) is not possible and consequently how can the fruit (phala) of that effect be imagined? The Buddhists hold the self to be merely a succession of moments of awareness; and not like a single thread running through a collection of pearl drops, one permeating them all. On their view the moment of cognition whereby the carrying out of good or carrying out of evil has been effected, has not, because it perishes without residue, the enjoyment of the fruit thereof; and that which has the enjoyment of the fruit was not 75

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Aptamimamsa the doer of that deed. Thus on the part of the former moment of cognition there is 'loss of deed', because it does not experience the fruit of the deed done by itself, and on the part of the latter moment of cognition there is 'enjoyment of a deed not done', because of enjoyment of fruit of deed not done by itself, but by another. 1 In regard to an object experienced by a prior awareness, a memory on the part of later awareness is not possible because they are other than it; like awareness on the part of another series. For a thing seen by one is not remembered by another; otherwise a thing seen by one person would be remembered by all. And, if there is no recollection, whence in the world comes the begetting of recognition? Recognition (pratyabhijnana) arises from both recollection and (original) experience; it is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of pratyaksa and smarana (memory). For the maintainers of momentary destruction, memory does not fit in. 1. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), "The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine - Sri Mallisena Suri's Syadvada-Manjari", p. 119. 76

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Verse 42 When the effect (karya) is considered absolutely non-existent (asat), the idea of a produced entity is untenable: yadyasatsarvathA kAryaM tanmAjani khapuSpavat / mopAdAnaniyAmo'bhUnmA''zvAsaH kAryajanmani // 42 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi kArya ko sarvathA asat mAnA jAe to AkAzapuSpa kI taraha usakI utpatti nahIM ho sktii| yadi asat kA bhI utpAda mAnA jAe to kArya kI utpatti meM upAdAna kAraNa kA koI niyama nahIM rahatA aura na hI koI vizvAsa banA raha sakatA hai| If the effect (karya) be considered absolutely non-existent (asat) then it can never be produced just as it is an impossibility to produce the 'sky-flower' (akasapuspa or gaganakusuma). If production of the non-existent (asat) be accepted, the rule of the availability of a substantial cause (upadana karta) for the accomplishment of an effect (karya) cannot be applied with confidence. Kundakunda, following the tradition of Jaina metaphysics, speaks of two different causes, upadana karana and nimitta karana - material cause and instrumental cause. For example, clay is the material out of which the jar is made. In this case the material out of which the thing is made is the upadana karana. For transforming the clay into the jar you require the operating agent, the potter, the potter's wheel on which the clay is moulded, and the stick with which he turns the wheel and so on. All these come under the nimitta karana or the instrumental cause. This distinction is considered very important in Jaina metaphysics. The upadana karana or the 77

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Aptamimamsa material cause must be identical with its effect. There can be no difference in nature and attributes between the material cause and its effect. From clay we can only obtain a mud-pot. Out of gold you can only obtain a gold ornament.1 The relation between the material cause and its effect is that wherever the cause is present the effect would be present, and wherever the effect would be present the cause must have been present. Again, negatively, if the cause is absent the effect must also be absent and conversely if the effect is absent the cause must also be absent. Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: bAhyetaropAdhisamagrateyaM kAryeSu te dravyagataH svabhAvaH / naivAnyathA mokSavidhizca puMsAM tenAbhivandyastvamRSirbudhAnAm // (12-5-60) The accomplishment of a task (karya - the making of a pitcher, for example) depends on the simultaneous availability of the internal (upadana - substantial) and the external (nimitta - auxiliary) causes; such is the nature of the substance (dravya)*. In no other way can liberation be achieved and, therefore, the learned men worship you, O Adept Sage! Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 83-84. *To give a familiar example, when a potter proceeds with the task (karya) of making a pitcher out of clay, the potter is the external or instrumental cause (nimitta karta) and the clay is the internal or substantial cause (upadana 1. See Prof. A. Chakravarti (2008), "Acarya Kundakunda's Samayasara", Introduction, p. 171. 78

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Verse 42 karta). The task necessarily means the destruction of clay in its original form but the inherent qualities of clay still remain in the pitcher. There is the origination (utpada) of the new form of clay, the disappearance (vyaya) of its old form, and still the existence (being or sat) of the substance itself continues (dhrauvya). In other words, existence is accompanied by origination (utpada), disappearance (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya). As there is no destruction of the inherent nature of clay, it is lasting. Permanence is the existence of the past nature in the present. From a particular point of view, the indestructibility of the essential nature of the substance is determined as its permanence. Qualities reside permanently in the substance but the modes change. Modes like the pitcher are not permanently associated with clay but the qualities reside permanently. So, utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya cannot be said to be non-existent like 'a flower in the sky'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

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Aptamimamsa Relationship of cause (karana) and effect (karya) is not possible in the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (ksanika-ekanta): na hetuphalabhAvAdiranyabhAvAdananvayAt / santAnAntaravannaikaH saMtAnastadvataH pRthak // 43 // sAmAnyArtha - kSaNikaikAnta meM sarvathA anvaya ke abhAva meM pUrvottara-kSaNoM ke hetubhAva va phalabhAva Adi nahIM bana sakate haiM kyoMki una pUrvottara-kSaNoM meM santAnAntara ke samAna sarvathA pRthak (anyabhAva) hotA hai| santAniyoM se pRthak koI eka santAna bhI nahIM hotA hai| In the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (ksanika-ekanta) a logical connection (agreement in association - anvaya) between two entities cannot be established and, therefore, relationship of cause (karana) and effect (karya) - hetu-phala-bhava etc. - is not possible. The cause remains utterly distinct from the effect as there is no commonality between entities belonging to different series of successive events (santana). Moreover, (if each event is really momentary and perishes utterly, as the Buddhists assert) there is no existence of a "series' apart from the individual elements that are believed to constitute the series. The Buddhists assert that a never-ceasing series of momentary ideas (santana), impressed each by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul. If each idea is really momentary, and perishes utterly, how can it affect the subsequent idea, contemporaneity of ideas being negated by the Buddhist theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

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Verse 44 Using fiction without associated real meaning leads to deception: anyeSvananyazabdo'yaM saMvRtirna mRSA katham / mukhyArthaH saMvRtirna syAd vinA mukhyAnna saMvRtiH // 44 // sAmAnyArtha - (bauddhoM dvArA yadi kahA jAe -) pRthak-pRthak kSaNoM meM ananya zabda (santAna) kA jo vyavahAra hai vaha saMvRti (kAlpanika, aupacArika) hai to sarvathA saMvRti hone se vaha zabda mithyA kyoM nahIM hai? yadi zabda (santAna) ko mukhya artha ke rUpa meM mAnA jAe to mukhya artha sarvathA saMvRti-rUpa nahIM hotA hai aura mukhya artha ke binA saMvRti nahIM hotI hai| (If each successive event is really momentary, and perishes utterly, as the Buddhists assert -) To use the word santana or 'series' - implying unity - for successive momentary events which have no unity among themselves can only be fictional (samurti) and, therefore, is the word not misleading? The real meaning of a word can never be called fictional and there cannot be an occasion for fiction unless the word has a real meaning. According to the Buddhists concept of santana (lit. offspring or child, meaning 'series' of successive events) no permanent parts exist in an entity which are carried forward as unchanged from one momentary mode to the next. Santana, at any particular moment, is the material cause of the entity's mode the next moment and not of any other object of same or different class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

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Aptamimamsa The Buddhists argument that it is not possible to give verbal expression to the relation between a 'series' and its members: catuSkoTervikalpasya sarvAnteSUktyayogataH / tattvAnyatvamavAcyaM cettayoH santAnatadvatoH // 45 // sAmAnyArtha - (bauddhoM kI ora se yadi kahA jAe - ) sattva Adi saba dharmoM meM cAra prakAra kA vikalpa (catuSkoTivikalpa) nahIM ho sakatA hai, ataH una santAna aura santAnI kA bhI tattva-dharma (ekatva-abheda aura anyatva-bheda) avAcya ThaharatA hai| (agalI kArikA dekheN|) (The Buddhists argue -) Since it is not possible to give verbal expression to the fourfold causal relations! (catuskotivikalpa) that can exist between the characteristic and the entity, similarly we can also not describe whether a series of successive events (santana) is one with its members or different from them (or both, or neither); it is indescribable. (See next verse.) The Buddhists say that there is one thing only, the cognition, but as the result of impressions left by previous cognition there appears the distinction of cognizer, cognized, and cognition, in place of the unity. Each idea is momentary, but it can and does impress its successor; there is no substantial reality like the soul but a never-ceasing series of momentary ideas, each impressed by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul. 1. (a) this characteristic belongs to this entity; (b) this characteristic does not belong to this entity; (c) this characteristic both belongs and does not belong to this entity; (d) this characteristic neither belongs nor does not belong to this entity. 82

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Fault in the Buddhist argument: avaktavyacatuSkoTivikalpo'pi na kathyatAm / asarvAntamavastu syAdavizeSyavizeSaNam // 46 // Verse 46 sAmAnyArtha - taba to (bauddhoM ko) catuSkoTivikalpa (vastu meM sat Adi cAra prakAra ke vikalpa) ko avaktavya bhI nahIM kahanA cAhie (sarvathA avaktavya kA pakSa lene para 'catuSkoTivikalpa avaktavya hai' yaha kahanA bhI nahIM banatA hai)| jo asarvAnta (sarva - dharma rahita ) hai vaha avastu (AkAza-puSpa ke samAna) hai kyoMki usameM vizeSya- vizeSaNa - bhAva nahIM banatA hai| (The reply is -) It cannot be said that the fourfold causal relation (catuskotivikalpa) is indescribable. (Firstly, just by uttering these words it somehow becomes describable, and secondly, cognition by others of the fourfold causal relation has been made possible through description only.) Moreover, an entity devoid of all characteristics will be a nonentity like the 'sky-flower' since it will neither have qualifying attributes (visesana) nor the substance to be qualified (visesya). 83

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Aptamimamsa Negation (nisedha), in regard to some attribute, can only be of an existing entity (sat) and not of a nonentity (asat): dravyAdyantarabhAvena niSedhaH saMjJinaH sataH / asabhedo na bhAvastu sthAnaM vidhiniSedhayoH // 47 // sAmAnyArtha - jo saMjJI sat (vidyamAna) hotA hai usI kA para-dravya Adi (para-dravya, para-kSetra, para-kAla, para-bhAva) kI apekSA se niSedha kiyA jAtA hai| jo sarvathA asat (avidyamAna) hai vaha vidhi aura niSedha kA viSaya hI nahIM hotA hai| Only a named (samjni), existing entity (sat) can be subjected to negation (nisedha) with regard to attributes1 like the rootsubstance. A nonentity (asat - a non existing substance) cannot be subjected to either affirmation (vidhi) or negation (nisedha). Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: sataH kathaJcittadasattvazaktiH khe nAsti puSpaM taruSu prasiddham / sarvasvabhAvacyutamapramANaM svavAgviruddhaM tava dRSTito'nyat // (5-3-23) The nature of reality (sat) involves two logical predications - one affirmative (asti) and the other negative (nasti); likea flower exists in the tree and does not exist in the sky. If reality be accepted without any of these two predications (asti and nasti), nothing can exist logically and will lose validity. O Lord Sumatinatha, the assertions of all others 1. The attributes are (a) root-substance (dravya); (b) space of its existence (ksetra); (c) time of its existence (kala); and (d) its nature (bhava). ........................ 84

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Verse 47 not following your doctrine are self-contradictory. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 31-33. Jaina logicians describe every fact of reality according to four different aspects: its substance (dravya), space of its existence (ksetra), time of its existence (kala), and its nature (bhava). Every object admits of a fourfold affirmative predication (svacatustaya) with reference to its own substance (svadravya), own space (svaksetra), own time (svakala), and own nature (svabhava). Simultaneously a fourfold negative predication is implied with reference to other substance (paradravya), other space (paraksetra), other time (parakala), and other nature (parabhava). The substance of an object not only implies its svadravya but differentiates it from paradravya. It becomes logically necessary to locate a negation for every affirmation and vice-versa. We must not only perceive a thing but also perceive it as distinct from other things. Without this distinction there cannot be true and clear perception of an object. When the soul, on the availability of suitable means, admits of the fourfold affirmation with respect to svadravya, svaksetra, svakala, and svabhava, it also admits of the fourfold negation with respect to paradravya, paraksetra, parakala, and parabhava. Excerpted from: Jain, Vijay K. (2014), "Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - The Golden Discourse", p. 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

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Aptamimamsa Yes, a nonentity (asat) is indescribable, but only an entity (sat) becomes a nonentity (asat), in some respect, depending on the process of reasoning: avastvanabhilApyaM syAt sarvAntaiH parivarjitam / vastvevAvastutAM yAti prakriyAyA viparyayAt // 48 // sAmAnyArtha - jo sarva-dharmoM se rahita hai vaha avastu hai ( kisI bhI pramANa kA viSaya nahIM hone ke kAraNa ), aura jo avastu hai vaha hI (sarvathA) anabhilApya (avAcya) hotI hai| vastu prakriyA ke viparyaya se (viparIta ho jAne para para-dravya Adi kI apekSA se ) avastutA ko prApta ho jAtI hai| (As posited by the Buddhists -) Something that is devoid of all characteristics is a nonentity (being not discernible through any method of knowledge - pramana) and being a nonentity that something is indescribable. (But we posit -) Only a real entity is called a nonentity (somehow, in some respect) when the process of reasoning (of attributing characteristics to it) is reversed. 86 The empiricist Buddhist refuses to call a 'series' a real entity in the sense in which he calls the members of this series real entities but that he at the same time refuses to dismiss a 'series' as an illusory appearance. Shah, Nagin J. (1999), "Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa - Critique of an Authority", p. 51.

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Verse 49 If all characteristics of an entity are indescribable then do not make these a subject of articulation: sarvAntAzcedavaktavyAsteSAM kiM vacanaM punaH / saMvRtizcenmRSaivaiSA paramArthaviparyayAt // 49 // sAmAnyArtha - (kSaNikaikAnta-vAdI bauddhoM ke anusAra) yadi yaha kahA jAe ki sarva dharma avaktavya haiM to unakA kathana (dharma-dezanA Adi ke lie) kyoM kiyA jAtA hai? yadi unakA kathana saMvRti-rUpa (kevala vyavahAra ke lie) hai to paramArtha se viparIta hone ke kAraNa vaha mithyA hI hai| If all characteristics of an entity are indescribable (as proclaimed by the Buddhists) then why make these a subject of articulation (in discourses, to corroborate and contradict viewpoints)? If it be accepted that this kind of articulation is fictional (samurti) - mere usage - then it is opposed to reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

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Aptamimamsa The use of the term 'indescribable' by our rivals amounts to 'nonexistence' of reality: azakyatvAdavAcyaM kimabhAvAtkimabodhataH / AdyantoktidvayaM na syAt kiM vyAjenocyatAM sphuTam // 50 // sAmAnyArtha - (yadi kSaNikaikAnta-vAdI bauddhoM se pUchA jAe -) tattva avAcya kyoM hai? kyA azakya (kathana karane kI asamarthatA) hone se avAcya hai, yA abhAva (astitva-vihIna) hone se avAcya hai, yA Apa meM jJAna na hone se avAcya hai? pahalA aura anta ke vikalpa to banate nahIM haiM (Apa ko svIkAra nahIM ho sakate haiN)| yadi abhAva hone se vastu-tattva avAcya hai to bahAne banAne se kyA lAbha? spaSTa kahie ki vastu-tattva kA sarvathA abhAva hai| To the question as to why reality is pronounced as 'indescribable' the possible answers are (a) due to lack of strength, (b) due to its non-existence, and (c) due to lack of knowledge. The first and the third options cannot be accepted by the proponents of 'indescribability' (as this would mean inadequacy on their part). Then why pretend (and not concede that as per your assertion reality is 'indescribable' because it does not exist; it amounts to nihilism - sunyavada)? Speak clearly. 88

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Verse 51 Incongruence in the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (ksanika-ekanta): hinastyanabhisaMdhAtR na hinastyabhisaMdhimat / badhyate tadvayApetaM cittaM baddhaM na mucyate // 51 // sAmAnyArtha - (yadi kSaNikaikAnta-vAdI bauddhoM ke kSaNa-kSaNa meM pratyeka padArtha ke niranvaya vinAza kA siddhAnta mAnA jAe -) hiMsA karane kA jisa citta kA abhiprAya nahIM hai vaha hiMsA karatA hai, jisa citta kA hiMsA karane kA abhiprAya hai vaha hiMsA nahIM karatA hai| jisa citta ne hiMsA karane kA koI abhiprAya nahIM kiyA aura na hiMsA hI kI vaha citta bandhana ko prApta hotA hai| aura jisa citta kA bandhana huA usakI mukti nahIM hotI hai, phira mukti kisakI hotI hai? (The Buddhists' assertion that the never-ceasing series of momentary ideas, each impressed by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul, amounts to -) The mind that had not intended to injure, injures; the mind that had intended to injure, does not injure; and the mind that had neither intended to injure nor injured, suffers bondage. Moreover (since the existence of the last mentioned mind is also momentary), the mind that had suffered bondage does not get rid of bondage. (To whom, then, belongs liberation? The term liberation is a synonym for 'severance of bonds' and liberation can take place only of the person who was bound, while on the contention of momentary extinction, one moment a person is bound, and the liberation belongs to another moment; there, therefore, results a negation of liberation.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

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Aptamimamsa Fault in asserting that destruction takes place on its own, without any cause: ahetukatvAnnAzasya hiMsAheturna hiMsakaH / cittasantatinAzazca mokSo nASTAGgahetukaH // 52 // sAmAnyArtha - (kSaNikaikAnta-vAdI bauddhoM ke anusAra vinAza binA kAraNa ke svayaM hotA hai -) vinAza ke ahetuka hone se hiMsA karane vAlA hiMsaka nahIM ThaharatA hai| isI prakAra citta-santati ke vinAza-rUpa jo mokSa mAnA gayA hai vaha bhI aSTAGgahetuka nahIM ho sakatA hai| (bauddha-mata meM mokSa ko citta-santati kA nAza-rUpa mAnA gayA hai| mokSa ke ATha aMga bhI varNita haiM - samyagdRSTi, samyak saMkalpa, samyak vAc, samyak karman, samyak AjIvana, samyak vyAyAma, samyak smRti tathA samyak smaadhi|) (In view of your assertion that destruction takes place on its own, without any cause-) When there is no cause for destruction then the person alleged to have injured someone cannot be the cause of injury. In the same light, the eightfold path (astangahetuka)1 to liberation (moksa), in the form of destruction of the series of mental states, cannot be the cause of liberation (moksa). 1. Buddha's Noble Eightfold Path consists of a set of eight interconnected factors or conditions, that when developed together, lead to the cessation of suffering (dukkha): Right View (samyag drsti), Right Intention (samyag samkalpa), Right Speech (samyag vac), Right Action (samyag karman), Right Livelihood (samyag ajivana), Right Effort (samyag vyayama), Right Mindfulness (samyag smrti), and Right Concentration (samyag samadhi). 90

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Verse 52 The Buddhists say that all, except consciousness, is unreal. Consciousness alone is the established truth. All the three worlds are the result of discrimination or thought-relations. No external object exists in reality. All that is, is consciousness. Liberation (moksa) is origination of a cognition purified from the inundation of the forms of objects which have passed away upon the annihilation of all suffusions (vasana)l. And that does not fit since simply from the absence of the cause, the attainment of liberation (moksa) is unaccountable.2 1. 'vasana', which in common language signifies imparting of a scent, is much discussed in Buddhist writings; it denotes a factor in a thought due to prior experience or activity, a bias. 2. See Thomas, FW. (1968), "The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine - Sri Mallisena Suri's Syaduada-Manjari", p. 120. 91

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Aptamimamsa For entities that are internally connected, the cause of destruction and origination is one and the same: virUpakAryArambhAya yadi hetusamAgamaH / AzrayibhyAmananyo'sAvavizeSAdayuktavat // 53 // sAmAnyArtha - (bauddha-mata ke anusAra jisako vinAza kA kAraNa kahA jAtA hai vaha vinAza kA kAraNa nahIM hai apitu usase kevala visadRza-kArya kI utpatti hotI hai -) yadi visadRza padArtha kI utpatti ke lie hetu kA samAgama iSTa kiyA jAtA hai to vaha nAza aura utpAda donoM kA kAraNa hone se unakA AzrayabhUta hai aura isalie apane AzrayI nAza aura utpAda donoM kAryoM se abhinna hogaa| If a cause is required to bring into existence a dissimilar effect (that is, an effect that is different from the preceding moment) then that cause should be responsible for both - bringing into existence of a new effect and destruction of the effect that existed at the preceding moment. Therefore, for entities that are internally connected, the cause of both effects, destruction and origination, is one and the same. The stroke of a hammer which is the cause of destruction of a jar is also the cause of origination of potsherd; the cause of two effects is the same. Wherever there is concomitance between effects, the cause must be the same; like mango-ness and treeness are concomitant and coexist. 92

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Verse 54 For an entity devoid of self-existence, there cannot be origination, destruction and continuance: skandhasaMtatayazcaiva saMvRtitvAdasaMskRtAH / sthityutpattivyayAsteSAM na syuH kharaviSANavat // 54 // sAmAnyArtha - (yadi kSaNikaikAnta-vAdI bauddhoM ke mata meM visadRza-kArya kI utpatti ko skandha-santatiyoM kI utpatti mAnA jAe -) skandhoM kI saMtatiyA~ bhI Apake mata meM saMvRti-rUpa hone se aparamArthabhUta (akArya-rUpa) haiM, taba unake lie hetu kA samAgama kaisA? ataH jo pA~ca skandha (rUpa-skandha, vedanA-skandha, saMjJA-skandha, saMskAra-skandha, vijJAna-skandha) batAe gae haiM ve paramArtha-sat nahIM haiM, unameM gadhe ke sIMga (kharaviSANa) ke samAna sthiti, utpatti aura vyaya nahIM bana sakate haiN| The series (santana) and lumps or aggregates (skandha) are considered fictional (samurti) - mere usage - and devoid of selfexistence. There can certainly be no origination, destruction and continuance of a fictional entity like the 'horns of a hare' (kharavisana). In Buddhist phenomenology the aggregates (skandha) are the five functions or aspects that constitute the sentient being: a) form or matter (rupa), b) sensation or feeling (vedana), c) perception or cognition (samjna), d) mental formations or volitions (samskara), and e) consciousness or discernment (vijnana). The five aggregates are considered to be the substrata for 93

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Aptamimamsa clinging and thus 'contribute to the causal origination of future suffering'. Clinging to the five aggregates must be removed in order to achieve release from samsara. Nothing among them is really "I" or "mine". 94 In the technical language of Buddhism, the human knowledge is confined to the samvrti-satya, i.e., to the phenomenal reality. It is unable to grasp the paramarthikasatya, i.e., the noumenal reality. The empirical world is the phenomenal reality while the ultimate truth is the noumenal reality. The phenomenal reality is svabhava-sunya, i.e., devoid of self-existence.

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Verse 55 Fault in accepting both, absolute 'being' (nityatva) and absolute 'non-being' (anityatva), without mutual dependence: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 55 // sAmAnyArtha - syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAloM ke yahA~ virodha Ane ke kAraNa ubhayaikAtmya (nityatva aura anityatva donoM ekAnta pakSoM ko eka-rUpa mAnanA) nahIM bana sakatA hai| yadi (donoM ekAnta pakSoM kI mAnyatA meM virodha Ane ke bhaya se) avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) kA ekAnta mAnA jAe to vaha bhI nahIM banatA hai, avAcya zabda kA prayoga karane se svavacana virodha upasthita hotA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. absolute 'being' (nityatva) and absolute 'non-being' (anityatva) - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 95

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Aptamimamsa From different points of view both permanence (nityatva) and momentariness (anityatva) are universally experienced: nityaM tatpratyabhijJAnAnnAkasmAttadavicchidA / kSaNikaM kAlabhedAtte buddhyasaMcaradoSataH // 56 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! Apake anekAnta mata meM pratyabhijJAna kA viSaya hone ke kAraNa tattva kathaJcit nitya hai| pratyabhijJAna kA sadbhAva binA kisI kAraNa ke nahIM hotA hai kyoMki avicchedarUpa se vaha anubhava meM AtA hai| kAla ke bheda se pariNAma-bheda hone se tattva kathaJcit kSaNika bhI hai| sarvathA nitya aura sarvathA kSaNika tattva meM buddhi kA saMcAra nahIM ho sakatA hai| Being subject to recognition (pratyabhijnana)1, the real has permanence from a particular point of view. Recognition of the real is not accidental since it is universally experienced without any hindrance. O Lord! In your view the real also has momentariness since it exhibits change of state at different times. If the real be considered either absolutely permanent or 1. Recognition (pratyabhijnana), in general, means knowing the thing as that which was known before. It consists in knowing not only that a thing is such and such but that it is the same thing that was seen before. Recognition (pratyabhijnana) is the conscious reference of the past and a present cognition of the same object. I see a jar, recognize it as something that was perceived before, and say 'this is the same jar that I saw'. Recognition (pratyabhijnana) is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of the present cognition and remembrance (smrti). Recognition (pratyabhijnana) is not regarded as depending solely on a previous mental impression and, therefore, is exempt from the fatal defect of remembrance (smrti). 96

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Verse 56 absolutely momentary, its cognition, remaining static always, will be meaningless. Acarya Umasvami asserts in Tattvarthasutral: tadbhAvAvyayaM nityaM // 5-31 // Permanence is indestructibility of the essential nature (quality) of the substance The assertion based on remembrance (smrti), "This is only that," is recognition (pratyabhijnana). (This is the same thing I saw yesterday.) That does not occur accidentally. That which is the cause of such a statement is its intrinsic nature (tadbhava). Tadbhava is its existence, condition or mode. A thing is seen having the same nature with which it was seen formerly. So it is recognized in the form, "This is the same as that". If it be considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and that an entirely new thing has come into existence then there can be no remembrance. And worldly relations based on it would be disturbed. Therefore, the indestructibility of the essential nature of a substance is determined as permanence. But it should be taken from one point of view. If it be permanent from all points of view, then there can be no change at all. And, in that case, transmigration as well as the way to salvation would become meaningless. 1. See Jain, S.A. (1960), "Reality : English Translation of Shri Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi", p. 156-157. 97

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Aptamimamsa Existence is characterized by origination (utpada), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya): na sAmAnyAtmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayAt / vyetyudeti vizeSAtte sahaikatrodayAdi sat // 57 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! Apake zAsana meM vastu sAmAnya kI apekSA se na utpanna hotI hai aura na naSTa hotI hai| yaha bAta spaSTa hai kyoMki saba paryAyoM meM usakA anvaya pAyA jAtA hai (vastu kA sAmAnya-svarUpa usakI saba avasthAoM meM sthira rahatA hai)| tathA vizeSa kI apekSA se vastu naSTa aura utpanna hotI hai| yugapat (eka sAtha) eka vastu meM tInoM (utpAda, vyaya, dhrauvya) kA honA hI sat hai| O Lord ! In your doctrine, so far as the general characteristic (samanya svabhava) of a substance is concerned it neither originates nor gets destroyed since existence (being or sat) is its differentia. However, so far as the particular characteristics (visesa svabhava) are concerned, the substance originates and gets destroyed. Thus, the existence (of a substance) is characterized by origination (utpada), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya). A substance is permanent from the point of view of general properties. From the point of view of its specific modes it is not permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as identical. Thus these form the cause of worldly intercourse. 98

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Verse 58 If origination, destruction and permanence are not viewed as mutually depended, the 'being' (sat) will get reduced to a nonentity like the 'sky-flower': kAryotpAdaH kSayo hetorniyamAllakSaNAt pRthak / na tau jAtyAdyavasthAnAdanapekSAH khapuSpavat // 58 // sAmAnyArtha - eka hetu kA niyama hone se (upAdAna kAraNa kA) jo kSaya hai vahI (uttarAkAra-rUpa) kArya kA utpAda hai| utpAda aura vinAza lakSaNa kI apekSA se kathaJcit pRthak-pRthak haiN| jAti Adi ke avasthAna ke kAraNa utpAda aura vinAza meM kathaJcit bheda nahIM bhI hai| paraspara nirapekSa utpAda, vyaya aura dhrauvya AkAza-puSpa ke samAna avastu haiN| The destruction of the cause (a jar, for example) is the cause of the origination of the effect (the potsherd); both, destruction of the cause and origination of the effect, invariably go together. In some respect (the mode), the two- origination and destruction - are mutually different. However, due to the presence of the universal characters of being' (class - jati, enumeration - samkhya, etc.) the two-origination and destruction - can also be said to be not different from each other. If origination, destruction and permanence are not viewed as mutually depended, the 'being' (sat) will get reduced to a nonentity like the sky-flower'. Here we come to the main metaphysical tenet of Jainism to the effect that every real is a complex of origination (utpada), destruction (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya) besides of substance (dravya), mode (paryaya) and quality (guna). 99

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Aptamimamsa From the point of view of modes, the three characteristics (origination, destruction and permanence) are mutually different from one another and are also different from the substance. From the point of view of substance, these three (origination, destruction and permanence) are not perceived separately from the substance. Hence these are not different. Origination, destruction and permanence, mutually irrespective, become non-existent like the 'sky-flower'. Mere origination does not exist because that is without stability and departure; mere destruction does not exist because that is without stability and origination; mere permanence does not exist because that is without destruction and origination - all three, mutually irrespective, are like the 'hair of a tortoise'1. = 1. See Thomas, FW. (1968), "The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine - Sri Mallisena Suri's Syadvada-Manjari", p. 130. 100

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Verse 59 Three characters of existence - origination, destruction and permanence - explained through an example: ghaTamaulisuvarNArthI nAzotpAdasthitiSvayam / zokapramodamAdhyasthyaM jano yAti sahetukam // 59 // sAmAnyArtha - (suvarNa-ghaTa ko suvarNa-mukuTa meM parivartita karane kI sthiti meM-) suvarNa ke ghaTa kA, suvarNa ke mukuTa kA aura kevala suvarNa kA icchuka manuSya kramazaH suvarNa-ghaTa kA nAza hone para zoka ko, suvarNa-mukuTa ke utpanna hone para harSa ko, aura donoM hI avasthAoM meM suvarNa kI sthiti hone se zoka aura harSa se rahita mAdhyasthya-bhAva ko prApta hotA hai| aura yaha saba sahetuka hotA hai| (binA hetu ke una ghaTArthI, mukuTArthI tathA suvarNArthI ke zokAdi kI sthiti nahIM banatI hai|) (When a diadem is produced out of a gold jar -) The one desirous of the gold jar gets to grief on its destruction; the one desirous of the gold diadem gets to happiness on its origination; and the one desirous of gold remains indifferent, as gold remains integral to both - the jar as well as the diadem. This also establishes the fact that different characters of existence (origination, destruction and permanence) are the causes of different responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

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Aptamimamsa Another example of the threefold character of existence: payovrato na dadhyatti na payotti dadhivrataH / agorasavato nobhe tasmAttattvaM trayAtmakam // 60 // sAmAnyArtha - jisakA dUdha hI lene kA vrata hai vaha dahI nahIM khAtA hai, jisakA dahI hI lene kA vrata hai vaha dUdha nahIM pItA hai, aura jisakA gorasa nahIM lene kA vrata hai vaha donoM (dUdha tathA dahI) nahIM letA hai| isa prakAra se vastu-tattva trayAtmaka (utpAda, vyaya tathA dhrauvya rUpa) hai| The one who has vowed to take only milk, does not take curd; the one who has vowed to take only curd, does not take milk, and the one who has vowed not to take any cow-producel (gorasa) does not take either. Thus existence (being' or sat) has threefold character - origination (of the mode that is curd), destruction (of the mode that is milk), and permanence (of the substance that is cow-produce, present in curd as well as milk). 1. The genus cow-produce (gorasa) is consumed in many forms like milk, curd, cheese, and buttermilk. 102

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Section 4 caturtha pariccheda The view that the effect (karya) and the cause (karana) etc. are absolutely different: kAryakAraNanAnAtvaM guNaguNyanyatApi ca / sAmAnyatadvadanyatvaM caikAntena yadISyate // 61 // sAmAnyArtha - (naiyAyika - vaizeSika mata meM - ) yadi kArya-kAraNa meM, guNa-guNI meM aura sAmAnya-sAmAnyavAn meM sarvathA ( ekAnta rUpa se) bheda mAnA jAe to aisA mAnanA ThIka nahIM hai - (As per the Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology -) If one maintains that the effect (karya) and the cause (harana), the quality (guna) and the possessor of that quality (guni), and the generality (samanya) and its possessor (samanyavan), are absolutely different, then difficulties arise In the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, seven categories of reality are substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), generality (samanya), uniqueness ( visesa ), inherence (samavaya) and non-existence (abhava ). Substance (dravya) is that in which a quality or an action can exist but which in itself is different from both quality and action. Quality (guna) differs from substance and action (karma) in the sense that it is an unmoving property. The action ( karma), like quality, has no separate existence, it belongs to the substance. But while quality is a permanent feature of a substance, action is a .... 103

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Aptamimamsa transient one. Generality (samanya) relates to abstract characteristic that is singular and eternal and yet pervades many. Like leadership is a single characteristic, but it resides in many individuals. Leadership is also eternal because it was already in existence before the first leader emerged and will continue to exist even if there were no more leaders. Uniqueness (vicesa) is that characteristic by virtue of which a thing is distinguished from all other things. Like space, time and soul, it is eternal. Everything in the world, existent or nonexistent, is accompanied by uniqueness. Generality and uniqueness are opposite concepts. Inherence (samavaya) is a permanent relation between two entities, one of whom inheres in the other. One of the entities depends for its existence on the other. Objects in an inherent relationship cannot be reversed as those that are related by nearness. Non-existence (abhava) is that which is not found in any of the six positive categories, and yet according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika view non-existence exists, just as space and direction. To illustrate, to the question 'how does one know that there is no chair in the room?', the answer is 'by looking at the room'. Thus non-existence also exists. The universalities and particularities are held to be eternal and have a distinct own-nature, but these are not credited with existence (satta), which is confined to substances, qualities and actions. The gist of the Jaina argument is that universality and particularity are involved in the nature of everything and not imposed from outside by virtue of a relation of'inherence'. 104

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Verse 62 Fault in accepting that there is inherence (samavaya) of a single effect in many causes: ekasyAnekavRttirna bhAgAbhAvAdabahUni vA / / bhAgitvAdvA'sya naikatvaM doSo vRtteranArhate // 62 // sAmAnyArtha - (yadi vaizeSika mata ke anusAra kArya-kAraNa, guNa-guNI aura sAmAnya-sAmAnyavAn meM sarvathA bheda mAnA jAe to-) eka kI anekoM meM vRtti nahIM ho sakatI hai, kyoMki usake bhAga (aMza) nahIM hote haiN| aura yadi eka ke aneka bhAga haiM, to vaha ekatva sthira nahIM rahatA hai| isa prakAra eka kI aneka meM sarvAtmaka athavA sarvadeza vRtti mAnane se anArhata mata meM aneka doSa Ate haiN| A single effect (in the aggregate - avayavi) cannot inhere in many causes (the constituent parts-avayava) since, as has been assumed, it is possessed of no parts. Or if it be assumed that the effect is possessed of parts then it no longer remains a single entity. Thus, there are difficulties in accepting the non-Jaina position regarding the way the effect inheres in its cause. The Vaisesika hold1 that attributes', like the intelligence (caitanya) and the colour (rupa), and bearers of attributes', like the self (atma) and the pot (ghata), are completely different, yet being connected by `inherence' (samavaya) these attain the designations 'attributes' and 'bearers of attributes'. Inherence weaves together; it is also styled 'occurrence' (vrtti). Through that occurrence, the inherence connection, the 1. See jagadIzacandra jaina (DaoN.) (1992), zrImalliSeNasUripraNItA syAdvAdamaJjarI, pRSTha 43. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

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Aptamimamsa designation 'attributes' and 'bearer of attributes' is approved. However, there can be no relation of 'attributes' and 'bearer of attributes' if the two are utterly different. If it be said that the relation between the two is through 'inherence' then we must be able to cognize the thing called 'inherence'and that is not possible. The connection between the 'attributes' and the bearer of the attributes' is to be adopted only as defined by 'non-separate existence and not something other, such as inherence etc. 106

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Verse 63 Fault in accepting absolute separateness between the aggregate (avayavi) and the constitutent parts (avayava): dezakAlavizeSe'pi syAvRttiryutasiddhavat / samAnadezatA na syAt mUrtakAraNakAryayoH // 63 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi avayava - avayavI, kArya-kAraNa Adi eka dUsare se sarvathA pRthak haiM, to yutasiddha padArthoM kI taraha (ghaTa - vRkSa kI taraha) bhinna deza aura bhinna kAla meM unakI vRtti (sthiti) mAnanI pdd'egii| isa kAraNa se mUrtika kAraNa aura kArya meM jo samAnadezatA ( eka - kAla - dezatA) dekhI jAtI hai vaha nahIM bana skegii| If cause and effect are considered absolutely separate from one another, there should be separateness between these with respect to space and time, just as is seen between two external material substances (e.g., the pot and the tree residing in separate substrata-yutasiddha). Then it will not be possible to explain the occurrence (vrtti) of cause and effect in a material entity in same space (and time). 107

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting inherence as independent of the constituent parts (avayava) and the aggregate (avayavi): AzrayA''zrayibhAvAnna svAtantryaM samavAyinAm / ityayuktaH sa sambandho na yuktaH samavAyibhiH // 64 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi yaha kahA jAe ki samavAyiyoM meM Azraya-AzrayI - bhAva (avayava Azraya hai aura avayavI AzrayI hai) hone ke kAraNa svataMtratA nahIM hai jisase deza-kAla kI apekSA se bheda hone para bhI vRtti banatI hai, to aisA kahanA ThIka nahIM hai| kyoMki jo svayaM asambaddha hai ( samavAya anAzrita hone se asambaddha hI rahatA hai) vaha eka avayavI kA dUsare avayavI ke sAtha sambandha kaise karA sakatA hai? It might be said that there exists a relationship of substratum and superstratum between two entities (viz. the constituent parts and the aggregate avayava and avayavi) through inherence (samavaya), and due to inherence the two cannot remain independent of each other even at different space and time. We respond that if inherence (samavaya) itself is independent of the two entities, how can it possibly create a relationship between them? 108

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Verse 65 Relationship between generality (samanya) and inherence (samavaya): sAmAnyaM samavAyazcA'pyekaikatra samAptitaH / antareNA''zrayaM na syAnnAzotpAdiSu ko vidhiH // 65 // sAmAnyArtha - sAmAnya aura samavAya apane-apane AzrayoM meM pUrNa rUpa se rahate haiN| aura Azraya ke binA unakA sadbhAva nahIM ho sakatA hai| taba naSTa aura utpanna hone vAle anitya kAryoM meM unake sadbhAva kI vidhi-vyavasthA kaise bana sakatI hai? (As per the Vaisesikas -) Generality or universality (samanya) and inherence (samavaya) both exist in their entirety (and inseparably) in their substratum (that is, the entity). Also, these two cannot exist independent of their substratum. If so, how can these persist in entities which are subject to destruction and origination? 109

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Aptamimamsa If no relation whatsoever is accepted between generality (samanya) and inherence (samavaya): sarvathA'nabhisambandhaH sAmAnyasamavAyayoH / tAbhyAmartho na sambaddhastAni trINi khapuSpavat // 66 // sAmAnyArtha - (vaizeSika mata ke anusAra -) jaba sAmAnya aura samavAya kA paraspara meM kisI prakAra kA (saMyogAdi-rUpa kA) sambandha nahIM hai taba una donoM ke sAtha dravya, guNa tathA karma-rUpa jo artha hai usakA bhI sambandha nahIM banatA hai| ataH sAmAnya, samavAya aura artha ye tInoM hI 'AkAzapuSpa' ke samAna avastu Thaharate haiN| (As per the Vaisesikas -) The generality (samanya) and the inherence (samavaya) are considered absolutely independent of each other. Also, these two have no relation whatsoever with their substratum, the entity (artha) - the object of knowledge. If so, all three - the generality (samanya), the inherence (samavaya), and the entity (artha) - become nonentities like the 'sky-flower'. The universalities and particularities are held by the Vaisesikas to be eternal and having their own distinct nature, but they are not credited with existence (satta), which is confined to the entity (artha) - substance (dravya), quality (guna) and action (karma). 110

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Verse 67 Fault in accepting atoms as absolutely non-distinct: ananyataikAnte'NUnAM saMghAte'pi vibhAgavat / asaMhatatvaM syAdbhUtacatuSkaM bhrAMtireva sA // 67 // sAmAnyArtha - (bauddha-mata ke anusAra -) yadi ananyataikAnta meM paramANuoM kI ananyatA kA ekAnta mAnA jAe to skandha-rUpa meM unake milane para bhI vibhAga ke samAna paraspara asambaddhatA hI rhegii| aura aisA hone para bauddhoM ke dvArA mAnya jo bhUtacatuSka (paramANuoM kA pRthivI, jala, agni aura vAyu aise cAra skandhoM ke rUpa meM kArya) hai vaha vAstavika na hokara bhrAnta hI hogaa| If it be maintained that the atoms (anu) are absolutely nondistinct (oneness-ananyatva) then these should remain as such (non-distinct) even after their union to form molecules (skandha), creating thereby a substance. Under such a regime the four basic substances (bhutacatuska of the Buddhists) - earth (prthvi), water (jala), fire (agni), and air (vayu) - which are but the effects of the union of atoms, will turn out to be illusory. 111

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Aptamimamsa If the effect is illusory, the cause must also be illusory; the atoms (anu) then become illusory: kAryabhrAnteraNubhrAntiH kAryaliGga hi kAraNam / ubhayAbhAvatastatsthaM guNajAtItaracca na // 68 // sAmAnyArtha - bhUtacatuSka-rUpa kArya ke bhrAnta hone para tatkAraNa aNu bhI bhrAnta hI ThahareMge kyoMki kArya ke dvArA kAraNa kA jJAna kiyA jAtA hai (arthAt kAraNa kAryaliGgaka hotA hai)| kArya aura kAraNa donoM ke abhAva se unameM rahane vAle guNa, jAti, kriyA - Adi kA bhI abhAva ho jaaegaa| As the cause (karana) is established by the effect (karya), therefore, when the effect (bhutacatuska of the Buddhists) is illusory, the cause [the atoms (anu) responsible for the formation of molecules (skandha)] must also be illusory. And with nonexistent character of both, the cause and the effect, the attributes of the effect like quality (guna) and genus (jati) will also become illusory (non-existent). Note: The relation between the material cause and its effect is that wherever the cause is present the effect would be present, and wherever the effect would be present the cause must have been present. Again, negatively, if the cause is absent the effect must also be absent and conversely if the effect is absent the cause must also be absent. 112

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Verse 69 Fault in considering the effect (karya) and the cause (karana) as absolutely one: ekatve'nyatarAbhAvaH zeSAbhAvo'vinAbhuvaH / dvitvasaMkhyAvirodhazca saMvRtizcenmRSaiva sA // 69 // sAmAnyArtha - (sAMkhyamatAnusAra -) yadi kArya aura kAraNa ko sarvathA eka mAnA jAe to unameM se kisI eka kA abhAva ho jaaegaa| aura eka ke abhAva meM dUsare kA bhI abhAva ThaharegA kyoMki unakA paraspara meM avinAbhAva sambandha hai| yadi dvitva-saMkhyA ko saMvRti-rUpa - kalpita athavA aupacArika - mAnA jAe to saMvRti ke mithyA hone se dvitvasaMkhyA bhI mithyA hI ThaharatI hai|| (As per the Samkhya view -) If the effect (karya) and the cause (karana) are considered absolutely one, then, as the two are declared to be inseparably connected (avinabhavi), one of these is bound to be non-existent. (And, as a corollary, the other too becomes non-existent.) If it be said that the effect and the cause are actually one but are referred to as two by mere usage then also, being a product of imagination, both these remain misconceptions. 113

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting both, absolute separateness (anyatva) and absolute oneness (ananyatva) of cause (karana) and effect (karya), without mutual dependence: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 70 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ kArya aura kAraNa kI anyatA aura ananyatA donoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha-doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syaduada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. absolute separateness (anyatva) and absolute oneness (ananyatva) of cause (karana) and effect (karya) - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 114

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Verses 71 & 72 The doctrine of non-absolutism (anekantavada) declares that the substance and its modes show oneness as well as separateness in some respects only: dravyaparyAyayoraikyaM tayoravyatirekataH / pariNAmavizeSAcca zaktimacchaktibhAvataH // 71 // saMjJAsaMkhyAvizeSAcca svalakSaNavizeSataH / prayojanAdibhedAcca tannAnAtvaM na sarvathA // 72 // sAmAnyArtha - dravya aura paryAya meM kathaJcit aikya (abheda) hai, kyoMki una donoM meM avyatireka pAyA jAtA hai| dravya aura paryAya kathaJcit eka dUsare se nAnA-rUpa bhI haiM, kyoMki dravya aura paryAya meM pariNAma-pariNAmI kA bheda hai, zaktimAn aura zaktibhAva kA bheda hai, saMjJA (nAma) kA bheda hai, saMkhyA kA bheda hai, svalakSaNa kA bheda hai, aura prayojana Adi kA bheda hai| (Adi zabda se kAla evaM pratibhAsa kA bheda grahaNa kiyA gayA hai|) The substance (dravya) and its mode (paryaya), somehow, exhibit oneness (with each other) as both these have logical continuance (avyatireka). The two also, somehow, exhibit separateness (from each other) as there is difference of effect (parinama and parinami), of capacity (saktimana and Saktibhava), of designation (samjna), of number (samkhya), of self-attribute (svalaksana), of utility (prayojana), and so onl. The substance and its modes, thus, are neither absolutely one nor absolutely different; as established by the doctrine of nonabsolutism (anekantavada), these two, the substance and its modes, show oneness as well as separateness in some respects only. 1. Time (kala) and appearance (pratibhasa) are also included. 115

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Aptamimamsa Acarya Umasvami's Tattvarthasutra: guNaparyayavad dravyam // 5-38 // That which has qualities and modes is a substance. Hogia: ufu114: 14-82|| The condition (change) of a substance is a mode. That in which qualities and modes exist is a substance. What are qualities and what are modes? Those characteristics which exhibit association (anvaya) with the substance are qualities. Those characteristics which exhibit distinction or exclusion (uyatireka) - logical discontinuity, "when the pot is not, the clay is," - are modes. A substance possesses both. That which makes distinction between one substance and another is called a quality, and the modification of a substance is called a mode. The substance (dravya) is inseparable (residing in same substratum - ayutasiddha) from its qualities, and permanent (nitya). That which distinguishes one substance from all others is its distinctive quality. Only the presence of this quality makes it a substance. If such distinctive characteristics were not present, it would lead to intermixture or confusion of substances. For instance, souls are distinguished from matter by the presence of qualities such as knowledge. Matter is distinguished from souls by the presence of form (colour) etc. Without such distinguishing characteristics, there can be no distinction between souls and matter. Therefore, from the general point of view, knowledge etc. are qualities always associated with the soul, and form etc. are always associated with the matter. Their modifications, which are separable from particular points of view, are modes. For instance, in living beings, these are knowledge of pitcher, knowledge of cloth, anger, pride, etc., and in matter these are intense or mild odour, 116

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Verses 71 & 72 colour, etc. The collection or aggregate of qualities and modes, which somehow is considered different from these, is called a substance. If the aggregate were completely (from all points of view) the same, it would negative both substance and qualities. From the point of view of designation (samjna) etc., qualities are different from the substance. Yet, from another point of view, qualities are not different from the substance as they partake of the nature of substance and are not found without substance. Whatever condition or form a substance, such as the medium of motion, takes that condition or form is called its modification (parinama). It is of two kinds, without a beginning and with a beginning. 117

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Section 5 paJcama pariccheda The entity (dharmi) and its attribute (dharma) are neither absolutely dependent (apeksika) nor absolutely independent (anapeksika): yadyApekSikasiddhiH syAnna dvayaM vyavatiSThate / anApekSikasiddhau ca na sAmAnyavizeSatA // 73 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi padArthoM (dharma va dharmI Adi ) kI siddhi ApekSika ( sarvathA eka-dUsare kI apekSA rakhane vAlI) hotI hai, to ApekSya aura ApekSika donoM meM se kisI kI siddhi nahIM ho sakatI hai| aura siddhi ko sarvathA anApekSika (eka-dUsare kI apekSA na rakhane vAlI) mAnane para unameM sAmAnya - vizeSa bhAva nahIM bana sakatA hai| The existence of the entity (dharmi) and its attribute (dharma) cannot be established if these are considered absolutely dependent (apeksika) on each other as neither can then hold its identity. (In case two objects are absolutely dependent on each other, both are bound to lose their individual identity.) If these, the entity and its attribute, be considered absolutely independent (anapeksika) of each other, then the general (samanya) and the particular (visesa) attributes cannot be established. [Only an entity which has general (samanya dravya) and particular (visesa - paryaya) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. Dravya without its modification and modification without its dravya cannot be the subject of valid - 119

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Aptamimamsa knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge.] Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: yathaikazaH kArakamarthasiddhaye samIkSya zeSaM svasahAyakArakam / tathaiva sAmAnyavizeSamAtRkA nayAstaveSTA guNamukhyakalpataH // (13-2-62) Just as the two mutually supportive causes, the substantial cause (upadana karta) and the instrumental cause (nimitta karta), result in the accomplishment of the desired objective, in the same way, your doctrine that postulates two kinds of attributes in a substance, general (samanya) and specific (visesa), and ascertains its particular characteristic (naya) depending on what is kept as the primary consideration for the moment while keeping the other attributes in the background, not negating their existence in any way, accomplishes the desired objective. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 87. Acarya Manikyanandi's Pariknamukha: sAmAnyavizeSAtmA tadartho viSayaH // 4-1 // Only an object which has both, the general (samanya - dravya) and the specific (visesa - paryaya) attributes can be the subject of valid knowledge. 120

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Verse 74 Fault in accepting both absolute dependence (apek sika) and absolute independence (anapeksika) of the entity and its attribute, without any mutual relation: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 74 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ ApekSika siddhi aura anApekSika siddhi donoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha-doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) can also not maintain that the two - viz. absolute dependence (apeksika) and absolute independence (anapeksika) of the entity and its attribute - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be selfcontradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 121

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Aptamimamsa There is invariable togetherness (avinabhava) between an entity (dharmi) and its attribute (dharma) but still each has its ownnature: dharmadharmyavinAbhAvaH siddhyatyanyo'nyavIkSayA / na svarUpaM svato hyetat kArakajJApakAGgavat // 5 // sAmAnyArtha - dharma aura dharmI kA avinAbhAva sambandha hI paraspara kI apekSA se siddha hotA hai, unakA svarUpa nhiiN| svarUpa to kAraka aura jJApaka ke aMgo kI taraha svataH siddha hai| (kAraka ke do aMga kartA aura karma tathA jJApaka ke do aMga pramANa aura prameya ye apane-apane svarUpa ke viSaya meM dUsare aMga kI apekSA nahIM rakhate haiN| vyavahAra ke lie pArasparika apekSA Avazyaka hai, svarUpa ke lie nhiiN|) The fact that there is invariable togetherness (avinabhava) between an entity (dharmi) and its attribute (dharma) is established on the basis of their relative existence. This fact, however, has no implication on their respective own-nature Their respective own-nature is self-proven like the constituent parts of the agent of production (karaka) [the doer (karta), the activity (karma) etc.), and the agent of knowledge (jnapaka) [the method of knowledge (pramana), and the object of knowledge (prameya)]. Note: The doer (karta) does not rely on the activity (karma) for its own nature and the activity (karma) does not rely on the doer (karta) for its own nature. Similarly, the method of knowledge (pramana) does not rely on the object of knowledge (prameya) for its own nature and the object of knowledge (prameya) does not rely on the method of knowledge (pramana) for its own nature. But empirically these are considered related to each other. 122

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Verse 75 The existence of the entity (dharmi) and its attribute (dharma), thus, can be described in seven ways: 1) somehow dependent (apeksika), 2) somehow independent (anapeksika), 3) somehow both (ubhaya) - dependent and independent, 4) somehow indescribable (avaktavya), 5) somehow dependent and indescribable (apeksika-avaktavya), 6) somehow independent and indescribable (anapeksika-avaktavya), and 7) somehow both dependent and independent and indescribable (ubhaya-avaktavya). 123

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Section 6 SaSTha pariccheda Eardt in the tye views Fault in the two views that Reality can only be established through the use of the middle term (hetu), or through the authority of the scripture (agama): siddhaM ceddhetutaH sarvaM na pratyakSAdito gatiH / siddhaM cedAgamAt sarvaM viruddhArthamatAnyapi // 76 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi hetu se hI (ekAntataH) saba tattvoM kI siddhi hotI hai, to pratyakSa Adi se padArthoM kA jJAna nahIM bana skegaa| (aisA mAnane para hetumUlaka anumAna-jJAna bhI nahIM bana sakegA kyoMki anumAna ke lie dharmI, sAdhana aura udAharaNa kA pratyakSa jJAna honA Avazyaka hai|) aura yadi Agama se saba tattvoM kI siddhi hotI hai, to paraspara-viruddha artha ke pratipAdaka matoM kI bhI siddhi ho jaaegii| If it be maintained that Reality can only be established through the use of the middle term (hetu) then it will not be possible to establish anything with the help of the proven sources of knowledge - direct (pratyaksa) sources of knowledge etc. [For, under such a regime, the use of the middle term (hetu), which necessarily requires, among other things, prior knowledge of the entity (dharmi), the reason (sadhana or linga) and the general rule or illustration (udaharana), will not be possible.] If it be maintained that Reality can only be established through the authority of the scripture (agama) then even contradictory doctrines (promulgated by different scriptures) will stand 125

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Aptamimamsa established. (The knowledge thus obtained, without any scrutiny, will be unreliable and not necessarily true.) In inference, the proposition (pratijna) is the statement about the aspect to be proved of the major term (sadhya). The middle term (hetu) is the statement of reason (sadhana). The statement of a general rule supported by an example is called the udaharana. 126

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Verse 77 Fault in accepting both, the use of the middle term (hetu) and the scriptural authority (agama), to establish Reality, without mutual relation: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 77 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda - nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ hetu - siddhi aura Agama-siddhi donoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha- doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. the use of the middle term (hetu) and the scriptural authority (agama), to establish Reality - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be selfcontradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 127

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Aptamimamsa Reality can be established by both - the authentic middle term (hetu) and the true authority (apta): vaktaryanApte yaddhetoH sAdhyaM taddhetusAdhitam / Apte vaktari tadvAkyAt sAdhyamAgamasAdhitam // 78 // sAmAnyArtha - vaktA ke anApta hone para jo hetu se siddha kiyA jAtA hai vaha hetu-sAdhita (yuktisiddha) kahA jAtA hai aura vaktA ke Apta hone para usake vacanoM se jo siddha kiyA jAtA hai vaha Agama-sAdhita (zAstrasiddha) kahA jAtA hai| (Apta yathArtha vastu-tattva kA pratipAdaka evaM avisaMvAdaka hai|) When the promulgator of Reality is 'not a true authority' (anapta), whatever is established through the use of the authentic middle term (hetu) is called hetu-established; when the promulgator of Reality is 'a true authority' (apta), whatever is established through his incontrovertible statement is called apta-established. 128

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Section 7 saptama pariccheda Fault in the vijnanadvaita's assertion that cognition arrived at through the subjective act of mind is the only source of valid knowledge: antaraGgArthataikAnte buddhivAkyaM mRSA'khilam / pramANAbhAsamevAtastat pramANAdRte katham // 79 // sAmAnyArtha - (vijJAnAdvaita matAvalambiyoM ke anusAra ) kevala antaraMga artha kA hI sadbhAva hai, aisA ekAnta mAnane para saba buddhi-rUpa anumAna aura vAkya-rUpa Agama mithyA ho jAyeMge aura mithyA hone se ve pramANAbhAsa Thaharate haiN| kintu pramANa kA astitva svIkAra kiye binA pramANAbhAsa kA vyavahAra bhI kaise ho sakatA hai? If it be maintained (as the proponents of vijnanadvaita do) that there is existence only of internal 'objects of knowledge' (artha), i.e., of cognition arrived at through the subjective act of mind, then all inferences (anumana) drawn by the intellect (buddhi), and verbal testimony of the scripture (agama) would become sources of invalid knowledge (pramanabhasa). But how can there be invalid knowledge (pramanabhasa) without there being existence of valid knowledge (pramana)? 129

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Aptamimamsa In the vijnanadvaita scheme, inference, through the use of the sadhya and the sadhana, cannot establish that cognition alone is real: sAdhyasAdhanavijJapteryadi vijJaptimAtratA / na sAdhyaM na ca hetuzca pratijJAhetudoSataH // 80 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi sAdhya aura sAdhana (hetu) kI vijJapti (jJAna) ko vijJAna-mAtra hI mAnA jAe to aisA kahane se pratijJAdoSa (svavacana-virodha) aura hetudoSa (asiddhAdi doSa) upasthita hote haiM - aura isa kAraNa na koI sAdhya bana sakatA hai aura na hetu| (In the scheme of vijnanadvaita -) If through the use of the sadhya (statement of that which is to be proved, the major term) and the sadhana (statement of the reason, the middle term, hetu) one tries to prove that cognition alone is real, the process will not be a legitimate one; the statement of the sadhya, without considering any distinction whatsoever between the sadhya and sadhana, will suffer from what is known as the fallacy of the thesis (pratijnadosa) and the statement of the hetu, without accepting an inseparable connection with the major term, sadhya, from the fallacy of the reason (hetudosa). 130

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Verse 81 Fault in the bahirangarthaikanta that maintains the absolutist view that all cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone: bahiraGgArthataikAnte pramANAbhAsanihnavAt / sarveSAM kAryasiddhiH syAviruddhArthA'bhidhAyinAm // 81 // sAmAnyArtha - kevala bahiraMga artha kA hI sadbhAva hai (antaraMga-jJAna ko na mAnakara kevala bahiraMgArthatA ko hI mAnanA), aisA ekAnta mAnane para pramANAbhAsa (saMzayAdi-rUpa mithyAjJAna) kA nihnava (lopa) ho jAne se viruddha artha kA pratipAdana karane vAle saba logoM ke kArya kI siddhi tthhregii| If the absolutist view (of the bahirangarthaikanta) that all cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone (totally objective, with no subjective input) be maintained then each cognition becomes prima facie valid, with a total absence of a cause for fallacy in the source of valid knowledge (i.e. nonexistence of pramanabhasa). And, as a result, all propositions, even those holding contradictory positions, will remain validated. 131

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting both, the all-subjective cognition of the internal reality and the all-objective cognition of the external reality, without mutual dependence: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 82 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ antaraMga artha ekAnta aura bahiraMga artha ekAnta donoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha-doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syaduada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. the all-subjective cognition of the internal reality and the allobjective cognition of the external reality - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 132

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Both, internal- and external-cognition, can be sources of valid knowledge: bhAvaprameyA'pekSAyAM pramANAbhAsanihnavaH / bahiH prameyApekSAyAM pramANaM tannibhaM ca te // 83 // Verse 83 sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! Apake mata meM bhAva - prameya (jJAna ke svasaMvedana) kI apekSA se koI bhI jJAna sarvathA pramANAbhAsa nahIM hai| aura bAhya - prameya (indriya- jJAna ke dvArA artha ko mAnanA) kI apekSA se jJAna pramANa aura pramANAbhAsa donoM hotA hai| O Lord! You have asserted that when reality is ascertained through internal cognition that illumines the subjective knowledge-object1 (prameya) there is no scope for invalid knowledge (pramanabhasa), and when it is ascertained through external cognition that illumines the objective knowledge-object (prameya) there is the possibility of valid knowledge (pramana) as well as invalid knowledge (pramanabhasa). 1. The conception of prama or valid apprehension implies three necessary factors, namely the subject (pramata), the object (prameya) and the method of knowledge (pramana). 133

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Aptamimamsa The word 'soul' must have a corresponding external object (bahyartha): jIvazabdaH sabAhyArthaH saMjJAtvAddhetuzabdavat / mAyAdibhrAntisaMjJAzca mAyAdyaiH svaiH pramoktivat // 84 // sAmAnyArtha - 'jIva' zabda saMjJA hone se bAhya artha sahita hai; jo zabda saMjJA yA nAmarUpa hotA hai vaha bAhya artha ke binA nahIM hotA hai jaise 'hetu' shbd| (dhUma zabda jaba 'hetu' kI taraha prayukta hotA hai taba vaha 'dhuA~' bAhya padArtha ke astitva ke binA nahIM hotA hai|) jisa prakAra 'pramA' zabda kA bAhya artha pAyA jAtA hai, usI prakAra 'mAyA' Adi bhrAnti kI saMjJAe~ bhI apane bhrAnti rUpa artha se sahita hotI haiN| The word 'jiva'(soul), being a designation (samjna), must have a corresponding external object (bahyartha) that it signifies; a word, being a designation, is always associated with a corresponding external object, just as the word 'hetu' - the middle term. (The word 'hetu' may have 'smoke' as the corresponding external object.) As the word 'prama' (valid apprehension) has a corresponding object that signifies valid apprehension, similarly words like 'maya'(deceit), signifying an illusory cognition, have corresponding objects that signify illusory cognition. 134

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Verse 85 These three, a piece of cognition (buddhi), a word (sabda), and an object (artha), signify three corresponding comprehensions: buddhizabdArthasaMjJAstAstisro buddhayAdivAcikAH / tulyA buddhayAdibodhAzca trayastatpratibimbakAH // 85 // sAmAnyArtha - buddhi-saMjJA, zabda-saMjJA aura artha-saMjJA ye tIna saMjJAe~ kramazaH buddhi, zabda aura artha kI samAna rUpa se vAcaka haiN| aura una saMjJAoM ke pratibimba-svarUpa buddhi Adi kA bodha bhI samAna rUpa se hotA hai| The three kinds of designations (samjna) - a piece of cognition (buddhi), a word (sabda), and an object (artha) - concurrently signify three corresponding comprehensions - a piece of cognition (buddhi), a word (sabda), and an object (artha), respectively. And the three kinds of comprehensions reflect equally the corresponding designations. (For example, the word jiva' - when the designation is jiva-buddhi, it reflects the cognition of 'jiva'; when the designation is jiva-sabda, it reflects the word 'jiva'; and when the designation is jiva-artha, it reflects the object that is 'jiva".) 135

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Aptamimamsa The speaker (vakta) having the piece of cognition (bodha), the hearer (srota) hearing the sentence (vakya), and the subject (pramata) having the knowledge (prama ), are distinct: vaktRzrotRpramAtRNAM bodhavAkyapramAH pRthak / bhrAntAveva pramAbhrAntau bAhyA'rthI tAdRzetarau // 86 // sAmAnyArtha - vaktA kA jo (abhidheya-viSayaka) bodha ( vAkya kI pravRtti meM kAraNa) hotA hai, zrotA ( abhidheya - parijJAna ke lie) jisa vAkya ko sunatA hai, aura pramAtA ko jo pramA (abhidheya - viSaya meM yogya-ayogya athavA satya-asatya kA nirNaya) hotA hai - ye tInoM pRthak-pRthak vyavasthita haiN| (isa prakAra vijJAnAdvaitatA bAdhita ThaharatI hai / ) pramANa ke bhrAnta hone para antarjJeya aura bahirjJeya rUpa bAhyArthoM kA vivecana bhI bhrAnta hI ThaharegA / The speaker (vakta) with a particular piece of cognition (bodha), the hearer (srota) receiving the auditory perception in the form of the sentence (vakya), and the subject (pramata) in whom valid knowledge (prama) inheres as an attribute, are distinctly established. In case the method of knowledge (pramana) is fallacious, the corresponding external objects (bahyartha) - in the form of internal and external cognition too will be fallacious. 136

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Verse 87 The validity of the knowledge depends on whether there is agreement or disagreement with the corresponding external object (bahyartha): buddhizabdapramANatvaM bAhyArthe sati nAsati / satyAnRtavyavasthaivaM yujyate'rthAptyanAptiSu // 87 // sAmAnyArtha - buddhi aura zabda meM pramANatA bAhya artha ke hone para hotI hai, bAhya artha ke abhAva meM nhiiN| bAhya artha kI prApti hone para satya kI vyavasthA aura bAhya artha kI prApti na hone para asatya kI vyavasthA kI jAtI hai| The piece of cognition (buddhi) and the word (sabda) can be sources of valid knowledge (pramana) only when the external objects (bahyartha) corresponding to these exist; not when there is absence of the corresponding external objects. Truth is established on the existence of the corresponding external objects (of the piece of cognition and the word), and untruth when the external objects are absent. Two kinds of sources of valid knowledge (pramana) can be thought of: one, used for self through the piece of cognition (buddhi), and two, used for others through the word (sabda). These two can be considered authentic only when there is existence of the corresponding external objects (bahyartha). The existence of the corresponding external objects (bahyartha) establishes the authenticity of the speaker (vakta), the hearer (srota), and the subject (pramata) and also of the piece of cognition (bodha), the uttered sentence (vakya), and the valid knowledge (prama). The corresponding external object (bahyartha) of the word 'jiva' (soul) is thus established 137

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Aptamimamsa The validity of the knowledge depends on whether there is agreement or disagreement with the corresponding external object (bahyartha); when there is agreement, the knowledge is valid; in case of disagreement, the knowledge is invalid. 138

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Section 8 aSTama pariccheda Fault in accepting that the accomplishment of objects is due only to fate: daivAdevArthasiddhizcedaivaM pauruSataH katham / daivatazcedanirmokSaH pauruSaM niSphalaM bhavet // 88 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi daiva se hI saba artha (prayojana-rUpa kArya) kI siddhi hotI hai to pauruSa se daiva kI siddhi kaise kahI jA sakegI? aura daiva se hI daiva kI siddhi mAnane para kabhI bhI mokSa nahIM hogaa| mokSa ke abhAva meM mokSa prApti ke lie puruSArtha karanA niSphala hI hogaa| If the accomplishment of objects (artha) is due only to fate (daiva), then how could human-effort (paurusa) be responsible for the creation of fate? If it be assumed that fate is responsible for the creation of fate, then there is no possibility of attainment of liberation (moksa), and all human-effort to attain liberation (moksa) will be futile. 139

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting that the accomplishment of objects is due only to human-effort: pauruSAdeva siddhizcet pauruSaM daivataH katham / pauruSAccedamoghaM syAt sarvaprANiSu pauruSam // 89 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi pauruSa se hI saba artha (prayojana-rUpa kArya) kI siddhi kA ekAnta mAnA jAe to pauruSa-rUpa kArya kI siddhi kaise hotI hai? yadi usakI daiva se siddhi hotI hai to aisA mAnane para ukta ekAnta kA virodha hotA hai| aura yadi pauruSa se hI pauruSa kI siddhi mAnI jAe to saba prANiyoM kA pauruSa amogha (niSphala na honA) ThaharegA (jo pratyakSa ke viruddha hai)| If the accomplishment of objects (artha) is due only to humaneffort (paurusa) then how could fate (daiva) be responsible for the creation of human-effort? If it be assumed that only humaneffort is responsible for the creation of human-effort, then all human-effort for the accomplishment of objects should always be successful. 140

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Verse 90 Fault in accepting both, the accomplishment of objects is due only to fate and that it is due only to human-effort, without mutual relation: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 90 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda - nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ daiva aura pauruSa donoM ekAntoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha- doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. the accomplishment of objects is due only to fate (daiva) and the accomplishment of objects is due only to human-effort (paurusa) describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 141

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Aptamimamsa Both fate and human-effort are jointly responsible for desirable and undesirable effects: abuddhipUrvApekSAyAmiSTAniSTaM svadaivataH / buddhipUrvavyapekSAyAmiSTAniSTaM svapauruSAt // 11 // sAmAnyArtha - jo iSTa (anukUla) aura aniSTa (pratikUla) artha kI prApti kisI ko abuddhipUrvaka (buddhi-vyApAra kI apekSA ke binA) hotI hai use sva-daiva-kRta samajhanA caahiye| jo iSTa aura aniSTa artha kI prApti buddhipUrvaka (buddhi-vyApAra kI apekSA rakhakara) hotI hai use sva-pauruSa-kRta samajhanA caahiye| The desirable and undesirable effects (karya) that one begets without premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's fate (daiva). (In incidences of such effects human-effort (paurusa) occupies the secondary role and fate (daiva) the primary role.) The desirable and undesirable effects (karya) that one begets in consequence of premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's human-effort (paurusa). (In incidences of such effects fate (daiva) occupies the secondary roleand human-effort (paurusa) the primary role.) Fate (daiva) - It is invisible (adrsta). The word implies one's inherent capability (yogyata) and the fruition of karmas from previous life (purva-karma). ___Human-effort (paurusa) - It is visible (drsta). The word implies one's efforts in this life. ___Both, fate (daiva) and human-effort (paurusa), are responsible for the accomplishment of the object (artha). 142

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Section 9 navama pariccheda Fault in accepting that causing pain and pleasure to others must necessarily result into demerit and merit: pApaM dhruvaM pare duHkhAt puNyaM ca sukhato yadi / acetanAkaSAyau ca badhyeyAtAM nimittataH // 92 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi para ko duHkha dene se nizcita rUpa se pApa kA bandha honA aura para ko sukha dene se nizcita rUpa se puNya kA bandha honA mAnA jAe to para ke du:kha aura sukha meM nimitta hone ke kAraNa acetana padArtha (kaNTakAdika aura dugdhAdika) aura kaSAya rahita jIva (vItarAga) ko bhI pApa aura puNya kA bandha hote rahanA caahiye| If it be maintained that causing pain to others must necessarily result into bondage of demerit (papa) and that causing pleasure to others must necessarily result into bondage of merit (punya) then, being the instrumental cause of pain and pleasure to others, inanimate objects (like thorn and poison, milk and sweet-food) and persons free from passionsl (like passionless saints of high order) must also suffer bondage (of karmas involving merit and demerit). 1. Major passions (kasaya) are four -anger (krodha), pride (mana), deceitfulness (maya), and greed (lobha). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

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Aptamimamsa Fault in accepting that causing pain and pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into merit and demerit: puNyaM dhruvaM svato duHkhAt pApaM ca sukhato yadi / vItarAgo munirvidvAMstAbhyAM yuGgyAnnimittataH // 13 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi apane ko duHkha dene se puNya kA bandha nizcita rUpa se hotA hai aura apane ko sukha dene se pApa kA bandha nizcita rUpa se hotA hai to vItarAga (kaSAya-rahita) aura vidvAn munijanoM ko bhI (puNya aura pApa-rUpa) karma-bandha honA cAhiye kyoMki ve bhI apane sukha aura duHkha kI utpatti ke nimitta-kAraNa hote haiN| If it be maintained that causing pain to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of merit (punya) and that causing pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of demerit (papa) then, being the instrumental cause of pain and pleasure to oneself, those free from all attachment (vitaraga), and learned ascetics must also suffer bondage (of karmas involving merit and demerit). Acarya Umasvami's Tattvarthasutra: zubhaH puNyasyAzubhaH pApasya // 6-3 // Virtuous activity is the cause of merit (punya) and wicked activity is the cause of demerit (papa). Acarya Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi What is good and what is evil? Killing, stealing, copulation, etc. are wicked activities of the body. Falsehood, harsh and uncivil language are wicked speech-activities. Thoughts of violence, envy, calumny, etc. are wicked thought-activities. The 144

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Verse 93 opposites of these are good. How can activity be good or wicked? That activity which is performed with good intentions is good. And that which is performed with evil intentions is wicked. But the distinction is not based on the activities being the causes of auspicious and inauspicious karmasl. In that case, there would be no good activities at all, as good activities also are admitted to be the cause of bondage of knowledgeobscuring karmas etc. (by the Jainas)2. That, which purifies the soul or by which the soul is purified, is merit (punya), namely that which produces happy feeling etc. That which protects or keeps the soul away from good is demerit (papa), namely that which produces unhappy feeling etc. Jain, S.A. (1960), "Reality: English Translation of Shri Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi", p. 168-169. Acarya Kundakunda's Pancastikaya-Sara rAgo jassa pasattho aNukaMpAsaMsido ya pariNAmo / citte Nasthi kalussaM puNNaM jIvassa Asavadi // (135) Whenever Jiva has desires high and noble, thoughts based on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no evil impulses towards the same, the Karmic matter that causes merit flows in as conditioned by the above mentioned springs of righteousness. 1. From the Jaina standpoint, intentions are all-important and not activities in themselves. And the consequences are largely determined by the intentions underlying any activity. 2. From the real point of view, it is no doubt true that all activities are undesirable as every kind of activity is the cause of influx and bondage. But from the empirical point of view there is difference. Merit leads to pleasure and demerit to pain. 145

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Aptamimamsa tisidaM bubhukkhidaM vA duhidaM daTThUNa jo du duhidamaNo / paDivajjadi taM kivayA tassesA hodi aNukaMpA // (137) 146 If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry and the miserable, offers relief to them, out of pity, then such behavior of that person is love or charity. kodho va jadA mANo mAyA lobho va cittamAsejja / jIvassa kudi khohaM kaluso ttiya taM budhA veMti // (138 ) Whenever anger, pride, deceit and covetousness, appear in the mind of a Jiva, they create disturbing emotion, interfering with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation of thought is called impure thought by the wise. cariyA pamAdabahulA kAlussaM loladA ya visayesu / paraparitAvapavAdo pAvassa ya AsavaM kuNadi // (139) Inordinate taste for worldly things, impure emotions, hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or covertly; these constitute the spring of evil. saNNAo ya tilessA iMdiyavasadA ya attaruddANi * / NANaM ca duppauttaM moho pAvappadA hoMti // ( 140 ) The different animal instincts, the different soul-soiling emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of perception and will; these constitute the spring of evil. Chakravarti Nayanar, A., "acarya Kundakunda's Pancastikaya - Sara", p. 112-115. * pAThAntara : aTTaruddANi

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Verse 94 Fault in accepting both, causing pain and pleasure to others and to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of karmas, without mutual dependence: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 14 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda-nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ para-duHkha-sukha aura sva-duHkha-sukha janita pApa aura puNya sambandhI donoM ekAntoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha-doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syaduada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. causing pain and pleasure to others and causing pain and pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of karmas - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints - ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words "the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 147

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Aptamimamsa Auspicious or inauspicious kinds of dispositions cause the influx of meritorious or demeritorious karmas: vizuddhisaMklezAGgaM cet svaparasthaM sukhAsukham / puNyapApAstravau yuktau na cedvyarthastavArhataH // 15 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi sva-para meM hone vAlA sukha-du:kha vizuddhi kA aMga hai to puNya kA Asrava hotA hai aura yadi saMkleza kA aMga hai to pApa kA Asrava hotA hai| he bhagavan ! Apake mata meM yadi sva-parastha sukha aura duHkha vizuddhi aura saMkleza ke kAraNa nahIM haiM to puNya aura pApa kA Asrava vyartha hai, arthAt unakA koI phala nahIM hotA hai| When pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are due to the limbs (anga) of the auspicious kind of disposition (visuddhi)1, these are causes of the influx of meritorious karmas (punya). When pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are due to the limbs of the inauspicious kind of disposition (samklesa)2, these are causes of the influx of demeritorious karmas (papa). O Lord ! In your view, if pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are not due to the auspicious or inauspicious kinds of dispositions then there cannot be influx of meritorious or demeritorious karmas; these do not yield any fruit. 1. auspicious kind of disposition (visuddhi) - due to virtuous (dharmya) and pure (sukla) kinds of concentration. There are three limbs (anga) of the auspicious kind of disposition - its cause (karana), its effect (karya), and its own-nature (svabhava). 2. inauspicious kind of disposition (samklesa) - due to sorrowful (arta) and cruel (raudra) kinds of concentration. This also has three limbs - its cause (karana), its effect (karya), and its own-nature (svabhava). 148

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Section 10 dazama pariccheda Fault in views that ignorance is the cause of bondage and that liberation is possible with slight-knowledge: ajJAnAcce vo bandho jJeyA'nantyAnna kevalI / jJAnastokAdvimokSazcedajJAnAdbahuto'nyathA // 16 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi ajJAna se bandha niyama se hotA hai to jJeyoM ke ananta hone se koI bhI kevalI nahIM ho sakatA hai| aura yadi alpajJAna se mokSa kI prApti mAnI jAe to ajJAna ke bahuta hone ke kAraNa bandha kA prasaMga sadA banA rahegA aura isalie mokSa kA honA nahIM bana skegaa| If ignorance (ajnana) be considered an assured cause of bondage (bandha) then since there are infinite knowables (jneya), no one can become an Omniscient (kevalin) [i.e., the one who has attained omniscience (kevalajnana)]. If it be maintained that liberation (moksa) results from even slight-knowledge (alpajnana) then, because of the persistent presence of acute ignorance, the cause of bondage will persist (and, as such, attainment of liberation cannot be imagined). The Samkhya view that only through the realization of his independence from the environment including his own psychophysical mechanism, Purusa attains perfect knowledge, is the point of contention in this verse. According to the Samkhya view, with his discriminative knowledge Purusa is able to 149

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Aptamimamsa perceive that the activities are all due to Prakrti while he himself remains in unruffled peace. Prakrti, which continues to spin round on account of its own impulse, can no more influence the liberated Purusa because he has attained freedom on account of his discriminative knowledge. 150

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Verse 97 Fault in accepting that ignorance is an assured cause of bondage and even slight-knowledge is the cause of liberation, without mutual relation: virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 97 // sAmAnyArtha - jo syAdvAda - nyAya se dveSa rakhane vAle haiM unake yahA~ ajJAna se bandha aura alpajJAna se mokSa donoM ekAntoM kA nirapekSa astitva nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki donoM ke sarvathA ekAtmya mAnane meM virodha- doSa AtA hai| avAcyatA (avaktavyatA) ekAnta bhI nahIM bana sakatA hai kyoMki avAcyataikAnta meM 'yaha avAcya hai' aise vAkya kA prayoga karane se vaha vAcya ho jAtA hai| Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications (syadvada) can also not maintain that the two attributes - viz. ignorance (ajnana) is an assured cause of bondage (bandha) and even slight-knowledge (alpajnana) is the cause of liberation (moksa) - describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints ubhayaikanta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avacyataikanta) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational. 151

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Aptamimamsa The real causes of bondage and liberation: ajJAnAnmohino bandho nAjJAnAdvItamohataH / jJAnastokAcca mokSaH syAdamohAnmohino'nyathA // 98 // sAmAnyArtha - moha-sahita ajJAna se bandha hotA hai aura moha-rahita ajJAna se bandha nahIM hotA hai| isI prakAra moha-rahita alpa-jJAna se mokSa hotA hai, kintu moha-sahita alpa-jJAna se mokSa nahIM hotA hai| Bondage (bandha) is caused due to ignorance (ajnana) accompanied by delusion (moha), and bondage is not caused due to ignorance (ajnana) not accompanied by delusion (moha). In the same way, liberation (moksa) is caused due to slightknowledge (alpajnana) not accompanied by delusion (moha), and liberation (moksa) is not caused due to slight-knowledge (alpajnana) accompanied by delusion(moha). 152

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Verse 99 Dispositions, like attachment or desire, originate according to the type of karmic bondage: kAmAdiprabhavazcitraH karmabandhAnurUpataH / tacca karma svahetubhyo jIvAste zuddhayazuddhitaH // 99 // sAmAnyArtha - icchA Adi bhAvasaMsAra-rUpa kAryoM kI utpatti vicitra hai aura vaha karmabandha ke anusAra hotI hai tathA karmabandha apane kAraNoM ke anurUpa hotA hai| jinheM karmabandha hotA hai ve jIva zuddhi aura azuddhi ke bheda se do prakAra ke ( bhavya aura abhavya ) hote haiN| The origination of dispositions, like attachment or desire, is variegated (vicitra) according to the type of karmic bondage (karmabandha), and this karmic bondage originates from its own appropriate causes. The souls subject to karmic bondage are of two types - those possessing spiritual purity (suddhi) [and destined to attain liberation (moksa) - bhavya jiva], and those possessing spiritual impurity (asuddhi) [and destined not to attain liberation (moksa) - abhavyajiva]. 153

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Aptamimamsa The manifestation of purity in a soul has a beginning while the manifestation of impurity is beginningless: zuddhayazuddhI punaH zaktI te pAkyApAkyazaktivat / sAdyanAdI tayorvyaktI svabhAvo'tarkagocaraH // 100 // sAmAnyArtha - pAkya-zakti ( pakane kI yogyatA) aura apAkya-zakti (pakane kI ayogyatA - kisI-kisI mU~ga yA ur3ada ko kitanA bhI pakAyA jAe vaha pakatA nahIM hai) kI taraha zuddhi aura azuddhi ye do zaktiyA~ haiN| zuddhi kI vyakti sAdi aura azuddhi kI vyakti anAdi hai| yaha vastu - svabhAva hai jo tarka kA viSaya nahIM hotA hai| These, purity (suddhi) and impurity (asuddhi), are two kinds of power akin to the cookability (pakya) or the non-cookability (apakya) of a cereal (viz. beans like urada and munga). The manifestation of purity (in a soul) has a beginning while the manifestation of impurity is beginningless. And, being (the soul's) own-nature (svabhava), it is not open to logical argument (tarka). The capacities (purity and impurity) of two kinds of souls are compared with those of beans; some of these become soft and edible on being stewed and others remain hard even after being stewed for a long time. It is not possible to know beforehand whether a particular bean is edible or non-edible. On being boiled some beans, as per their nature, will become soft; the others, as per their nature, will remain hard as before. In the same manner, it is not possible to know beforehand whether a person has the capacity to attain liberation (moksa) or not. 154

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Verse 100 Austerities (tapas) and observance of vows (vrata) are like heating our souls up. On performance of such laudable efforts, some will acquire true knowledge and attain liberation, but others will not be able to get rid of worldly sufferings and are destined to stay forever in the cycle of rebirths (samsara). The attainment of purity in a soul has a beginning but impurity is beginningless. In this verse Acarya Samantabhadra makes an important point: purity or impurity of souls is their inherent nature (svabhava) and, therefore, not open to logical argument (tarka). We cannot know through indirect knowledge of the senses if a person has the capacity to attain liberation (moksa); only the Omniscient can know this. 155

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Aptamimamsa That by which substances (souls and non-souls) are rightly known, or knowledge alone, is pramana: tattvajJAnaM pramANaM te yugapatsarvabhAsanam / kramabhAvi ca yajjJAnaM syAdvAdanayasaMskRtam // 101 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! Apake mata meM tattvajJAna ko pramANa kahA gayA hai| tattvajJAna do prakAra kA hai - akramabhAvI aura kramabhAvI / jo jJAna eka sAtha (yugapat) sampUrNa padArthoM ko jAnatA hai, aisA pratyakSa kevalajJAna akramabhAvI hai| jo jJAna (matijJAna Adi) krama se padArthoM ko jAnatA hai vaha kramabhAvI hai| kramabhAvI jJAna syAdvAda aura naya donoM se saMskRta hotA hai| O Lord! As per your teaching, that by which substances (souls and non-souls) are rightly known, or knowledge alone, is pramana (lit. the method of knowledge). Pramana is of two kinds: first, direct (pratyaksa) - omniscience (kevalajnana) which knows the whole range of objects of knowledge simultaneously, without gradation ( akramabhavi), and second, indirect (paroksa), which knows the objects of knowledge partially and in succession (kramabhavi). Knowledge in succession features the doctrine of conditional predications - syadvada, and ascertainment, without contradiction, of one particular state or mode of the object, called naya. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; his apprehension of reality is partial and it is valid only from a particular viewpoint. This leads to the nayavada of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is syadvada, the doctrine of conditional 156

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Verse 101 predications. Thus the doctrine is the direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and the limitations of human apprehension and expression. Pramana is the comprehensive view; naya is the partial view. Acarya Kundakunda's Pravacanasara: jAdaM sayaM samattaM NANamaNaMtatthavitthaDaM vimalaM / rahiyaM tu oggahAdihiM suhaM ti egaMtiyaM bhaNiyaM // 1-59 // That self-born, perfect and pure knowledge which spreads over infinite things and which is free from the stages of perception such as apprehension and speculation is called the real happinessl. Upadhye, A.N. (1935), "Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara", p. 76. While the self-born, direct knowledge (or omniscience) is utterly pure and free from stages, the sensory knowledge (matijnana) has four stages as mentioned in the following sutra. Acarya Umasvami's Tattvarthasutra: 3TATE ETSGITERUIT: 118-8411 (The four divisions of sensory knowledge are) apprehension (sensation), speculation, perceptual judgement, and retention. Jain, S.A. (1960), "Reality : English Translation of Shri Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi", p. 23. 1. Ignorance, the result of knowledge-obscuring karmas, is misery in this world. Real happiness consists in destroying the karmas and attaining omniscience, the very nature of the self. 157

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Aptamimamsa Fruits of the two kinds of pramana: upekSAphalamAdyasya zeSasyA''dAnahAnadhIH / pUrvA vA'jJAnanAzo vA sarvasyAsya svagocare // 102 // sAmAnyArtha - prathama jo yugapatsarvabhAsanarUpa pramANa (kevalajJAna) hai, usakA phala upekSA hai| zeSa jo kramabhAvI-bhAsanarUpa pramANa (matyAdi jJAna-samUha) hai usakA paraMparA phala AdAna (grahaNa) aura hAna (tyAga) kI buddhi hai| athavA pUrva meM kahI gaI upekSA bhI usakA phala hai| vAstava meM apane viSaya meM ajJAna kA nAza honA hI saba pramANa-rUpa jJAnoM kA phala hai| The fruit of the first kind of pramana - direct (pratyaksa) or omniscience (kevalajnana) - is equanimity (upeksa). The fruit of the other kinds of pramana - indirect (paroksa)-is discernment, i.e., acceptance (grahana) or rejection (tyaga); besides, of course, equanimity, as stated above. Destruction of ignorance (ajnana) about the self, however, is the actual fruit of all methods of knowledge (pramana). Acarya Umasvami's Tattvarthasutra asserts that the five kinds of knowledge constitute the two types of pramana: tatpramANe // 1-10 // These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of pramana (valid knowledge). As regard the fruit of pramana, there is satisfaction in the attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose knowledge-nature is clouded by the foreign matter of karmas, finds satisfaction in determining the nature of substances with the help of the 158

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Verse 102 senses. That is spoken of as the fruit of knowledge (or of pramana). Or the attainment of equanimity (upeksa) and the destruction of ignorance (ajnana) may be considered the fruit. Equanimity is freedom from attachment and aversion. Also, on the destruction of darkness, that is ignorance, the self attains the power of discrimination between what needs to be accepted and rejected. 159

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Aptamimamsa The word 'syat' is used to assert a particular attribute of the object of knowledge and explicatory of the manifold points of view (anekanta): vAkyeSvanekAntadyotI gamyaM prati vizeSaNam / syAnnipAto'rthayogitvAttava kevalinAmapi // 103 // sAmAnyArtha - he bhagavan ! 'syAt' zabda artha (jJeya padArtha) ke sAtha sambaddha (jaise 'syAdasti ghaTaH' meM) hone ke kAraNa anekAnta kA dyotaka hotA hai| kevaliyoM aura zrutakevaliyoM ke bhI vAkyoM meM prayukta 'syAt' zabda nipAta (avyaya) hai aura gamya-bodhya (vivakSita artha) kA vizeSaNa (bodhakasUcaka) hotA hai| O Lord ! The word 'syat', used in conjunction with the object of knowledge (artha), imparts to your sentences a definitive meaning explicatory of the manifold points of view (anekanta) and corroborates a particular attribute of the object. The word 'syat' is a nipatal - a particle, an indeclinable - acknowledged by the Omniscients (kevalins) as well as the all-knowing Masters of Scripture (srutakevalins); it qualifies the meaning of the sentence concerned. 1. An avyaya is a preposition, an indeclinable word or particle; a kind of compound. Nipata words are parts of avyaya used to communicate the meaning. The word 'syat' is used in relation to a particular meaning, not in terms of doubt, possibility or vacillation (maybe, perhaps). 160

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Verse 104 Syadvada is the doctrine of conditional predications, renouncing the absolutist view: syAdvAdaH sarvathaikAntatyAgAt kiMvRttacidvidhiH / saptabhaMganayApekSo heyAdeyavizeSakaH // 104 // sAmAnyArtha - sarvathA ekAnta kA tyAga karake kathaJcit vidhAna karane kA nAma syAdvAda hai| (isalie kathaJcit Adi zabda syAdvAda ke paryAyavAcI haiN|) syAdvAda saptabhaMgoM aura nayoM kI apekSA ko lie rahatA hai tathA heya aura upAdeya kA vizeSaka (bhedaka) hotA hai| Discarding the absolutist (ekanta) point of view and observing the practice of using the word 'kathancit' - 'from a certain viewpoint', or in a respect', or under a certain condition' - is what is known as syadvada - the doctrine of conditional predications. It embraces the seven limbs (saptabhanga) of assertion, the one-sided but relative method of comprehension (naya), and also the acceptance and rejection of the assertion. The particle 'syat' in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence. It refers to a 'point of view' or 'in a particular context' or 'in a particular sense'. The 'vada'presents a theory of logic and metaphysics. Syadvada means a theory of predication of reality from different points of view, in different contexts or from different universes of discourse. Syaduada is the expression of the pictures of reality obtained from different points of view in definite and determinate logical predications Syaduada promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach to the problem of knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it 161

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Aptamimamsa presents a synoptic picture of reality from different points of view. Syaduada expresses a protest against one-sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problems of reality. It affirms that there are different facets of reality and these have to be understood from various points of view by the predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability. Anekanta is the basic understanding of the complexity of reality and the necessity of looking at it from different points of view. Syadvada is the expression of the anekantavada in logical and predicational form. In this sense, anekantavada is the foundational principle and syaduada is the logical expression of the foundational principle.1 In the presentation of the nature of an object in its infinite aspects we have to adopt the sevenfold predicational form (saptabhangi) which includes the positive and the negative predications without contradicting each other. The nature of the object can be considered from seven points of view and their predications would be sevenfold. Everything can be presented through sevenfold predications. These predications have been worked out on the basis of permutations of the fundamental threefold predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability. A limb (bhanga) refers to the partial presentation or a particular form of expression. Saptabhangi is the sum total of the seven limbs of logical expression. It is the expression of the psychological basis in nayavada. 1. See Shastri, Devendra Muni (1983), "A Source-book in Jaina Philosophy", p. 240. 162

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Verse 105 The doctrine of conditional predications (syaduada) and omniscience (kevalajnana) are both illuminators of reality: syAdvAdakevalajJAne sarvatattvaprakAzane / bhedaH sAkSAdasAkSAcca vastvanyatamaM bhavet // 105 // sAmAnyArtha - syAdvAda aura kevalajJAna donoM sampUrNa tattvoM (jIvAdi) ke prakAzaka haiN| donoM ke prakAzana meM sAkSAt (pratyakSa) aura asAkSAt (parokSa) kA bheda hai| jo vastu ina donoM jJAnoM meM kisI bhI jJAna kA viSaya nahIM hotI hai vaha avastu hai| Syadvada, the doctrine of conditional predications, and kevalajnana, omniscience, are both illuminators of the substances of reality. The difference between the two is that while kevalajnana illumines directly, syadvada illumines indirectly. Anything which is not illuminated or expressed by the two is not a substance of reality and hence a non-substance (avastu). Syadvada and kevalajnana are the foundational facts of knowledge. The difference between the two is that kevalajnana is the complete and all-emracing knowledge of reality while syaduada is the conditional predication of the individual propositions of the knowledge obtained in kevalajnana. Kevalajnana is the direct experience and syadvada is its indirect expression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __ 163

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Aptamimamsa A naya gives expression to a particular aspect of an object, comprehended fully by syadvada: sadharmaNaiva sAdhyasya sAdhAdavirodhataH / / syAdvAdapravibhaktArthavizeSavyaJjako nayaH // 106 // sAmAnyArtha - sAdhya kA sAdharmya dRSTAnta ke sAtha sAdharmya dvArA aura vaidharmya dRSTAnta ke sAtha vaidharmya dvArA binA kisI virodha ke jo syAdvAda-rUpa paramAgama ke viSayabhUta artha-vizeSa ('nityatva' Adi) kA vyaJjaka hotA hai, vaha naya kahalAtA hai| Anaya gives expression to a particular aspect (like 'nityatva') of an object, comprehended fully by syadvada, through the use of homogeneous (sadharmya) or heterogenous (vaidharmya) example (drstanta) to establish, without contradiction, inseparable connection (vyapti) between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu). (Thus, naya is designated here as a virtual synonym of hetu, beside its usual designation as a relative, one-sided comprehension.) 164

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A substance (dravya) is an inseparable consolidation of attributes: nayopanayaikAntAnAM trikAlAnAM samuccayaH / avibhrADbhAvasambandho dravyamekamanekadhA // 107 // Verse 107 sAmAnya tInoM kAloM ko viSaya karane vAle nayoM aura upanayoM ke viSayabhUta (ekAnta viSayoM kA) aneka dharmoM ke tAdAtmya sambandha ko prApta samudAya kA nAma dravya hai / vaha dravya eka bhI hai aura aneka bhI hai| A substance (dravya) is an inseparable consolidation of attributes expressed through all one-sided, but relative, comprehensions ( naya) and their subdivisions ( upanaya), pertaining to the three times (the past, the present, and the future). It is one (with respect to the dravyarthika naya) and many (with respect to the paryayarthikanaya). 165

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Aptamimamsa The conglomeration of inter-dependent and relative assertions reveals the true nature of an object: mithyAsamUho mithyA cenna mithyaikAntatAsti naH / nirapekSA nayA mithyA sApekSA vastu te'rthakRt // 108 // sAmAnyArtha - koI kaha sakatA hai ki nityatva Adi ekAnta dharmoM ko mithyA mAnane para unakA samudAya-rUpa dravya bhI mithyA hI mAnanA caahiye| yaha ThIka nahIM hai kyoMki syAdvAdiyoM ke yahA~ mithyaikAntatA nahIM hai, kevala nirapekSa naya hI mithyA hote haiN| he bhagavan ! Apake mata meM naya paraspara sApekSa haiM aura isalie unake viSaya arthakriyAkArI hote haiM (aura isalie unake samUha ke vastupanA sughaTita hai)| If it be said that the conglomeration of unseemly propositions [purported to be made by independent, one-sided points of view (naya) in isolation (of reality)] is bound to be false, our reply is that this is not correct. In your scheme, O Lord, only those onesided points of view (naya) which make absolute and nonrelative assertions are false; assertions which are interdependent and relative, in fact, each reveal an aspect of truth, and their conglomeration, therefore, reveals the true nature of an object. 166

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Verse 109 A sentence asserts, either positively or negatively, a particular characteristic of the multifarious nature of an entity: niyamyate'rtho vAkyena vidhinA vAraNena vA / tathA'nyathA ca so'vazyamavizeSyatvamanyathA // 109 // sAmAnyArtha - (vastu-tattva ke anekAntAtmaka hote hue bhI use vAkya dvArA kaise niyamita kiyA jAtA hai usakA samAdhAna -) anekAntAtmaka vastu-tattva kA vidhi-vAkya athavA niSedha-vAkya ke dvArA niyamana hotA hai| anekAntAtmaka hone se vastu-tattva vidhi-rUpa bhI hai aura niSedha-rUpa bhI hai| yadi aisA na mAnA jAe to kevala vidhi-vAkya athavA kevala niSedha-vAkya se jo ekAnta-rUpa vizeSya (vastu-tattva) hai vaha avastu hI hai| In the doctrine of non-absolutism (anekantavada), a sentence asserts, either positively (vidhi) or negatively (nisedha), a particular characteristic of the multifarious nature of an entity. Irrespective of whether the sentence asserts the characteristic positively or negatively, both such (seemingly contradictory) characteristics are present in it. Without the acceptance of this feature (i.e., if only the positive or the negative characteristic is assumed to be present in the entity), the entity is bound to become a nonentity (avastu). The basic thesis in Jainism is the non-one-sided (anekanta) nature of reality. A thing is supposed to have infinite-fold characteristics or properties. It becomes imperative, therefore, to apply all kinds of predicates, including seemingly contradictory ones, to describe its singular aspect depending on one's point of view. To illustrate, an entity has an aspect that 167

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Aptamimamsa is unchanging - this is its 'sataspect or 'svabhava'aspect or its 'substance' aspect. The reality seems to be unchanging when we consider its "substantial aspect but it seems to be everchanging when we consider its qualities and modes. Anekantavada synthesizes the two aspects and builds them into a coherent whole. All standpoints (naya) are right in their own respective spheres but if they are taken to be refutations, each of the other, they are wrong. A man who knows the 'non-one-sided' nature of reality never says that a particular view is absolutely wrong. A naya deals only with the particular point of view of the speaker and does not deny the remaining points of view, not under consideration at the moment. Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: vivakSito mukhya itISyate'nyo guNo'vivakSo na nirAtmakaste / tathArimitrAnubhayAdizaktirdvayAvadheH kAryakaraM hi vastu // (11-3-53) O Lord Sreyansanatha ! You had pronounced that the naya deals with a particular attribute that is under consideration - called the primary attribute - of a substance and it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes - called the secondary attributes. A substance, thus, exhibits attributes like a friend, a foe, and neither a friend nor a foe; it incorporates duality of attributes (and their combinations)1 which truly explain its existence. The sevenfold mode of predications (saptabhangi) with its partly meant and partly non-meant affirmation (vidhi) and 1. See Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 72-75. 168

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Verse 109 negation (nisedha), qualified with the word 'syat (literally, in some respect; indicative of conditionality of predication) dispels any contradictions that can occur in thought. The student of metaphysics in Jainism is advised to mentally insert the word 'syat before every statement of fact that he comes across, to warn him that it has been made from one particular point of view, which he must ascertain. Acarya Amotcandra's Purusarthasiddhyupaya: paramAgamasya bIjaM niSiddhajAtyandhasindhuravidhAnam / sakalanayavilasitAnAM virodhamathanaM namAmyanekAntam // 2 // I bow to Anekanta (the doctrine of manifold points of view - relative pluralism), the root of unmatched Jaina Scripture, that reconciles the partial viewpoints of men, born blind, about the elephant, and which removes all contradictions about the nature of substances by apprehending reality through multiplicity of viewpoints. Acarya Amrtcandra has termed the doctrine of nonabsolutism (anekantavada) as the root of the Jaina Scripture. Without a clear understanding of this gem of Jainism, men of this world are like the blind men of the parablel; they insist on their partial knowledge being accepted for the whole truth. 1. See Jain, Vijay K. (2012), "Shri Amritchandra Suri's Purusartha siddhyupaya - with Hindi and English Translation", p. 3-4. 169

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Aptamimamsa The nature of reality can be predicated only through a sentence that incorporates both the affirmation and negation, depending on the point of view: tadatadvastu vAgeSA tadevetyanuzAsI / na satyA syAnmRSAvAkyaiH kathaM tattvArthadezanA // 110 // sAmAnyArtha - vastu tat aura atat (sat aura asat Adi) rUpa hai| jo vAkya vastu ko sarvathA tat-rUpa ( sat - nityAdi - rUpa) athavA sarvathA atat-rUpa (asat-anityAdi-rUpa) hI pratipAdita karatA hai vaha satya nahIM hai| aise mithyA vacanoM ke dvArA tattvArtha (tattva-svarUpa) kA pratipAdana kaise ho sakatA hai ? The nature of reality is such that it can be predicated only through a sentence that incorporates both the affirmation ('that is' - tat) and negation ( ' that is not' - atat), depending on the point of view. (In case a sentence predicates affirmation, affirmation is the primary theme and negation is present but as a secondary theme; in case a sentence predicates negation, negation is the primary theme and affirmation is present but as a secondary theme.) A predication that takes the absolutist view of either affirmation or negation is not true. And how can one describe the nature of reality through such a false sentence? Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra: tadeva ca syAnna tadeva ca syAt tathApratItestava tatkathaJcit / nAtyantamanyatvamananyatA ca vidherniSedhasya ca zUnyadoSAt // 170 (9-2-42) O Lord Suvidhinatha ! Your description of reality postulates that, as established by experience, there is the

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Verse 110 conditional affirmation of a substance, from a particular point of view, and also the conditional negation, from another point of view. The two views, existence and nonexistence, are not without any limitation; these views are neither totally inclusive nor totally exclusive to each other. Leaving out the limitation will lead to nihilistic delusion. nityaM tadevedamiti pratItena nitymnytprtipttisiddheH| na tadviruddhaM bahirantaraGganimittanaimittikayogataste // (9-3-43) When we reckon the existence of a substance we maintain that it is eternal and when we reckon the non-existence of that substance we maintain that it is perishable. O Lord Suvidhinatha ! You had declared that the two views that proclaim the same substance to be eternal as well as perishable are reconciled by the doctrine of material or internal cause (upadana karta) and the auxiliary or external cause (nimitta karta) in the performance of any action. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), "Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra", p. 59-60. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

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Aptamimamsa A sentence while calling attention to its own general meaning simultaneously negates the other meanings: vAksvabhAvo'nyavAgarthapratiSedhaniraGkuzaH / Aha ca svArthasAmAnyaM tAdRgvAkyaM khapuSpavat // 111 // sAmAnyArtha - vAkya kA yaha svabhAva hai ki vaha apane artha sAmAnya kA pratipAdana karatA huA anya vAkyoM ke artha kA pratiSedha karane meM niraMkuza (svataMtra) hotA hai| isa vAkya-svabhAva se bhinna jo sarvathA anyApohAtmaka (niSedha-rUpa) vAkya hai vaha 'AkAzapuSpa' ke sAmAna avastu hai| It is the nature of a sentence that while calling attention to its own general meaning expressly conveyed by it, it also negates the meanings that may be conveyed by other (unspoken) sentences. (For example, the sentence, "Bring the jar," not only conveys to the listener to bring the jar but also that a piece of cloth, a table, or a lamp, are not to be brought. Thus, while a sentence affirms its own meaning, it also simultaneously negates the other meanings.) If a sentence is thought of as capable only of expressing its own general meaning without negating what is not meant, the speech becomes a nonentity like the 'sky-flower' (akasapuspa). 172

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Verse 112 The use of the word 'syat acts like a stamp of truth that enables the listener to grasp the intended particular meaning of a sentence: sAmAnyavAgvizeSe cenna zabdArtho mRSA hi saa| abhipretavizeSApteH syAtkAraH satyalAJchanaH // 112 // sAmAnyArtha - yadi kahA jAe ki ('asti' Adi) sAmAnya vAkya anyApoha-rUpa (para ke abhAva-rUpa) vizeSa kA pratipAdana karate haiM, to aisA mAnanA ThIka nahIM hai kyoMki anyApoha zabda kA artha siddha nahIM hotA hai| ataH anyApoha kA pratipAdana karane vAle vacana mithyA haiN| aura abhipreta artha vizeSa kI prApti hone se syAtkAra (syAdvAda) satya kA cihna hai| If it be said1 that a sentence expressing the universality (samanya) aspect, in fact, denotes only the particularity (visesa) aspect, this is not correct since the speech then becomes a nonentity. The use of the word 'syat acts like a stamp of truth that enables the listener to grasp the intended particular meaning. (An entity has both the universality (samanya) as well as the particularity (visesa) aspects. When the expression makes the universality aspect as its subject, the particularity aspect becomes secondary and when the expression makes the particularity aspect as its subject, the universality aspect becomes secondary; this is doubtlessly achieved by using the word 'syat' in theexpression.) 1. In the Buddhist concept of 'anyapoha-vada', the word is capable only of negating what is not meant, without affirming anything. 173

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Aptamimamsa Affirmation, when not in conflict with negation, yields the desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge: vidheyamIpsitArthAGka pratiSedhyAvirodhi yat / tathaivA''deyaheyatvamiti syAdvAdasaMsthitiH // 113 // sAmAnyArtha - pratiSedhya kA avirodhI jo vidheya hai vaha Ipsita (abhISTa) artha kI siddhi kA kAraNa hai| vidheya ko pratiSedhya kA avirodhI hone ke kAraNa hI vastu Adeya aura heya hai| isa prakAra se syAdvAda kI (yuktizAstrAvirodha ke kAraNa) samyak sthiti (siddhi) hotI hai| Affirmation, when not in conflict with negation, yields the desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge. Only when affirmation and negation are juxtaposed in mutually nonconflicting situation, one is able to decide whether to accept or reject the assertion. This is how the doctrine of conditional predications (syaduada) establishes the truth. 174

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Verse 114 The 'Aptamimamsa' has been composed for the seekers of own well-being: itIyamAptamImAMsA vihitA hitamicchatAm / samyagmithyopadezArthavizeSapratipattaye // 114 // sAmAnyArtha - isa prakAra yaha AptamImAMsA apane hita kI cAha rakhane vAloM ko samyaka-upadeza aura mithyA-upadeza ke artha-vizeSa kI pratipatti (bheda-vijJAna) ke lie banAI gayI hai| This treatise 'Aptamimamsa' - Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord - has been composed for those who seek their well-being (i.e., realization of the Self) by enabling them to discern between the true and the false preaching. This concludes the 'Aptamimamsa' (also known as the 'Devagamastotra') composed by the supremely holy and stainless Acarya Samantabhadra, a glittering jewel among the authors of the sacred scripture, who reigned supreme as a poet, a disputant, a preacher and an orator, and whose expositions, based on the incontrovertible doctrine of syadvada, have torn apart mountains of misconceptions. With great devotion, I make obeisance humble at the worshipful feet of Acarya Samantabhadra. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

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GENERAL INDEX abhava - non-existence 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 103, 104 abhavaikanta - absolute non existence 25, 26 abhavya jiva - destined not to attain liberation 153 abheda - see advaita absolute separateness 55, 60 absolutist view 15, 16, 131, 161, 170 Acarya Amstcandra, Acarya Amritchandra 48, 169 Acarya Kundakunda, Acarya Kundkund 9, 10, 31, 48, 71, 78, 145, 146, 157 Acarya Manikyanandi 120 Acarya Nemicandra, Acarya Nemichandra 8 Acarya Pujyapada 6, 85 Acarya Samantabhadra 13-17, 78, 84, 85, 120, 155, 168, 170, 171, 175 Acarya Umasvami 97, 116, 144, 157, 158 Acarya Vidyananda 11 acetana - inanimate 71 adhikarana - substratum 48-50 adrsta - invisible 142 advaita - ekatua, abheda, non dualism 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 60, Advaita Vedanta 47 Astasahasri 11 affirmation 15, 19, 29, 30, 32, 34, 40, 42, 60, 84, 85, 162, 168, 170, 171, 174 agama - scriptural authority 125, 127, 129 agni - fire 111 Ahankara - I-ness or Ego 69-71 ahetu - not a legitimate middle term, non-reason 39, 54 ajiva - non-soul 22, 33 ajnana - ignorance 149, 151, 152 akasa - space 22, 70 akramabhavi - without gradation 156 alpajnana - slight-knowledge 149, 151, 152 anadi - without beginning 20, 23 ananta - without end 20, 23 ananta catustaya - four infinitudes 5 ananta darsana - infinite perception 5 ananta jnana - infinite knowledge ananta sukha - infinite bliss 5 ananta virya - infinite energy 5 ananyatva - oneness 111, 114 anapeksika - independent 119, 121, 123 65 advaita-ekanta - absolute non dualism 47, 48, 51, 52, 60 177

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Aptamimamsa anapeksika-avaktavya - somehow independent and indescribable 123 anapta - not a true authority 128 aneka, anekatva - many, manyness 45 anekanta, anekantavada - non absolutism, many-sided view 28, 40, 115, 160, 162, 167-169 anga - limbs 148 antaraya - obstructive 6, 14 anu - atom 111, 112 anumana - inference 63, 129 anumeya - object of inference 10 12 anupayoga - non-consciousness 33 anvaya (agreement in) association 36, 38, 80, 116 anyapoha-vada - the Buddhist concept that the word is capable only of negating what is not meant, without affirming anything 173 anyatva - separateness 114 anyonyabhava - reciprocal nonexistence 20-22, 24 apadana - dislodgement 48-50 apakya - non-cookability 154 apeksika-dependent 119, 121, 123 apeksika-avaktavya - somehow dependent and indescribable 123 apprehension 11, 133, 134, 156, 157 apramana - not pramana 44 178 apta - Omniscient, a true authority 3, 128 apta-established 128 arati - displeasure 4 Arhat the World Teacher or 'Jina' 4, 5, 11-14 arta sorrowful (concentration) 148 artha - object (of knowledge) 19, 42, 110, 129, 135, 139, 140, 142, 160 artha-kriya - performance of activity 42 asat - non-existing 27, 32-34, 42, 57, 77, 84, 86 astangahetuka - Buddha's Noble Eightfold Path to liberation 90 astitva - existence 36, 38, 63 asubha - wicked 16, 51 asuddhi - spiritual impurity 153, = 154 asvarupa - devoid of the form of its own 22, 24 atat 'that is not' 170 atisaya - miraculous happenings 5 attachment 4, 5, 8, 144, 153, 159 atyantabhava - absolute non existence 21, 22, 24 avacyataikanta - absolutely indescribable 26, 60, 95, 114, 121, 127, 132, 141, 147, 151 avagraha-apprehension 11 avaktavya - indescribable 27, 30, 34, 35, 45, 123 avarana- envelopment of the soul

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by material karmas 8 avastu - non-object 42, 163, 167 avaya - judgement 11 avayava - constituent parts 105, 107, 108 avayavi - aggregate 105, 107, 108 avidya - ignorance 47, 51 avinabhava - invariable togetherness 36-38, 45, 61, 122 avyakta - non-manifest 69-71 avyatireka - logical continuance 115 ayutasiddha - residing in same substratum 116 bahirangarthaikanta - all cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone (totally objective, with no subjective input) 131 bahyartha - external object 134, 136-138 bandha - bondage 51, 74, 149, 151153 beginningless 154, 155 bhanga - limb 162 bhava - existence, manifestation, nature 19, 25, 26, 30, 63, 84, 85 bhava nirjara - subjective shedding of karmas 9 bhavaikanta - absolute existence 19, 26 bhavakarma - dispositions of the soul 8 bhavya jiva - destined to attain General Index liberation 153 bhaya - fear; ihaloka bhaya - fear relating to this life; paraloka bhaya - fear relating to the life beyond; marana bhaya - fear of death; vedana bhaya - fear of pain and suffering; atrana bhaya - fear of being without protection; agupti bhaya - fear of divulgence of one's deeds; akasmika bhaya - fear of the unexpected 5 bheda - see prthaktva bhutacatuska - the four basic substances as per the Buddhists - earth, water, fire, air 111, 112 bodha - cognition 25, 136, 137 bondage 17, 18, 51, 70, 72, 74, 89, 143-145, 147, 149, 151-153 Brahma 47, 48 Buddhi - reason, intellect, a piece of cognition 69-71, 129, 135, 137 Buddhist 56, 62, 75, 80-83, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 111, 112, 173 buddhivrtti-function of the intellect 71 camara - flywhisk 3, 6 catuskotivikalpa - - fourfold causal relations 1 82, 83 celestial beings 4, 6, 13 Chakravarti Nayanar, A. 9, 146 Chakravarti, A. (Prof.) 71, 78 cinta - anxiety 5 Cit - intelligence 70 179

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Aptamimamsa consciousness 18, 21, 22, 32, 33, 50, 91, 93 drstanta - statement of a general rule supported by an example 53 daiva fate 139-142 darsanavarniya - perceptionobscuring 6, 14 demerit 51, 74, 143-145, 148 destruction 6, 8, 9, 13, 18, 20, 21, 46, 48-50, 76, 79, 90, 92, 93, 98102, 109, 158, 159 Devagamastotra 175 dharana - retention 11 dharma (1) - medium of motion 22 dharma (2) - attribute 43, 119, 122, 123 dharmi - the entity 13, 36, 37, 38, 43, 45, 62, 119, 122, 123, 125 dharmya - virtuous (concentration) 148 dhrauvya - permanence 79, 98, 99 dosa - imperfections 8 dravya - substance 22, 30-35, 39, 42, 49, 59, 63, 67, 78, 84, 85, 99, 103, 110, 115, 116, 119, 120, 165 dravya nirjara - objective shedding of karmas 9 dravyakarma - material karmas 8 dravyarthika naya- general standpoint with dravya as the object 59, 165 Dravyasamgraha 8, 9, 179 drsta - visible 142 180 dvaita - dualism 54 dvesa - aversion 5 Egoity - Ahamkara 70 eka, ekatva - one, oneness 45, 56, 61, 63, 65 ekanta - absolutist, non-equivocal 15, 17, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 60, 67, 74, 75, 80, 89, 161 empirical (point of view) 48, 49, 94, 122, 145, 178, 179 equanimity 158, 159 factors-of-action 47-50 falsehood 14, 144 fate 139-142 fruit (of pramana) 67, 68, 158, 159 gaganakusuma or akasapuspa - the 'sky-flower' 64, 77, 172 gandha - smell 70 ghatiya karmas - deluding (mohaniya), knowledgeobscuring Gjnanavarniya), perception-obscuring (darsanavarniya), and obstructive (antaraya) 6, 9 gorasa-cow-produce 102 grahana - acceptance 159 guna- quality 99, 103, 110, 112 guni - possessor of quality 103 guru - preacher 3 hetu - the middle term 36-39, 5254, 61-63, 80, 90, 125-128, 130,

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General Index 134, 164 hetudosa - fallacy of the reason 130 hetu-established 128 hetu-phala-bhava - relationship of cause and effect 80 human-effort 139-142 jiva-buddhi - the cognition of jiva' 135 jiva-sabda - the word 'jiva' 135 jnana - knowledge or cognition 5, 57 judgement (perceptual) 11, 157 Istopadesa 6, 85 iha - speculation 11 ihaloka - this world 5, 51 impurity 153-155 indescribable 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 35, 45, 60, 82, 83, 86-88, 95, 114, 121, 123, 127, 132, 141, 147, 151 inference 10, 12, 52, 63, 126, 129 inherence 103-106, 108-110 itaretarabhava - see anyonyabhava Jain, Champat Rai 62 Jain, S.A. 97, 145, 157 Jain, Vijay K. 6, 9, 15, 17, 78, 85, 120, 168, 169, 171 jala - water 70, 111 janma - (re)birth 4 jati - class, genus 59, 99, 112 jnanavarniya - knowledge covering 6, 14 jnapaka - agent of knowledge 63, kala - time 22, 30, 32, 63, 84, 85, 115 karaka - factors-of-action 47-50, 63, 67, 69, 122 karana - instrument 48-50 karana - cause 49, 69, 77, 80, 103, 112-114, 148 karma - activity 16, 48-51, 103, 110, 122 karmabandha - karmic bondage 153 karmic matter 9, 145 karta - doer 47-50, 58, 77-79, 120, 122, 171 karya - effect 69, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 103, 112-114, 142, 148 kasaya - passions 143 kathancit - from a certain viewpoint 161 ksanika - transient 16, 56, 75, 80 ksanika-ekanta - absolute momentariness 75, 80 ksetra - place 30, 32, 63, 84, 85 ksudha - hunger 4 kevalajnana - infinite knowledge 5, 12, 50, 149, 156, 158, 163, kevalin - Omniscient 149 kharavisana - the 'horns of a hare' 64, 93 122 jneya - knowable, object of knowledge 57, 149 jiva - soul 21, 22, 32, 33, 134, 135, 137, 145, 153 jiva-artha - the object that is 'jiva' 135 181

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Aptamimamsa kheda - regret 4 143 knowledge-obscuring 6, 8, 145, 157 | merit 17, 18, 28, 51, 74, 143-145, kramabhavi - in succession 156 148, 176 kriya - action 47, 48 misery 157 krodha - anger 143 mode 11, 12, 14, 27, 30, 34, 39, 40, 46, 49, 59, 69, 79, 81, 97-100, liberation 13, 17, 18, 51, 70, 72, 74, 102, 115-117, 156, 168 78, 89, 90, 91, 139, 149, 151-155 modification 9, 10, 18, 59, 67, 69, linga - mark - see hetu 71, 116, 117, 119 lingi - see sadhya moha - delusion 5, 152 lobha - greed 143 mohaniya - deluding 6, 14 Lord Rama 10 moksa - liberation 51, 74, 90, 91, 139, 149, 151-155 Lord Sreyansanatha 168 Mount Meru 10 Lord Sumatinatha 84 Lord Suvidhinatha 15, 170, 171 nastitva - non-existence 36, 38, 39 Lord Vimalanatha 16 naya - a particular state or mode of object; relative, one-sided mada - pride; jnana mada - pride comprehension 27, 28, 34, 40, of knowledge; puja mada - 43-46, 49, 58, 59, 120, 156, 157, pride of veneration; kula mada 161, 162, 164-166, 168 - pride of lineage; jati mada - negation 15, 19, 29, 30, 32, 34, 40, pride of caste; bala mada - 42, 51, 84, 85, 89, 162, 169-171, pride of strength; ?ddhi mada - 174 pride of accomplishments; tapa mada - pride of austerities; niscaya satkaraka - transcendental sixfold factors-of-action 49-50 sarira mada - pride of beauty 5 Mahat or Buddhi - the Great or nidra - sleep 5 Intellect 69, 70 nisedha - negative 42, 84, 167, 169 Mallisena Suri 17, 18, 70, 76, 91, nigamana - conclusion 53 100 nimitta karta (karana) - auxiliary mana - pride 143 or external cause 49, 58, 77, 78, marana - death 5 80, 120, 171 nipata - a particle, an indeclinable, matijnana - sensory knowledge 157 part of avyaya 160 maya - illusion, deceit 47, 48, 134, nirjara - shedding of karmas 9 182

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General Index nitya, nityatva - permanent, permanence 16, 67, 74, 95, 96, 116, 164 nityatva-ekanta - absolutely permanent 67, 74 nonentity 58, 83, 84, 86, 99, 167, 172, 173 non-eternal 17, 18, 30, 33, 34, 41 non-existence 37-42, 54, 88, 103, 104, 171, Nyaya-Vaisesika 103, 104 omniscience 9-15, 43, 50, 72, 149, 156-158, 163 origination 17, 46, 48, 70, 79, 91 94, 98-102, 109, 153 prthaktva-ekanta - absolute separateness 55, 60 pain 5, 17, 18, 71, 143-145, 147, 148 paksa - minor term, locus or abode 52, 53, 61-63 paksa-dharmatva - existence in relation to the minor term 62, paraksetra - other-place 32, 85 paraloka - abode after death, the other world 5, 16, 51 paramarthikasatya - the noumenal reality 94 Pariksamukha 120 parinama - modification (paryaya) 42, 115, 117 parinami - the substance (dravya) in which modification takes place 115 paroksa - indirect 14, 156, 158 particular 30, 42, 43, 67, 98, 116, 119, 120, 156, 160, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 171, 173, particularity 41, 104, 173 paryaya - form, mode 33, 35, 39, 42, 59, 67, 99, 119, 120, 165 paryayarthika naya - standpoint of modification 59, 165 passions 6, 8, 143, 176 prthaktua - separateness, diversity 61, 63, 65 prthvi - earth 70, 111 paurusa - human-effort 139-142 perception 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 85, 93, 136, 146, 157 pleasure 17, 18, 143-148 pradesa -space-point 17 pradhvamsabhava - posterior (emergent) non-existence 20, 23 pragabhava - prior (antecedent) non-existence 19, 20, 23 Praksti - nature 70-72, 150 prama - valid knowledge or 63 pakya - cookability 154 Pancastikaya-Sara 9, 31 papa - demerit 51, 74, 143-145, 148 parabhava -other-being 32, 33, 85 paracatustaya -other-quaternion 32 paradravya -other-substance 32, 85 parakala - other-time 32, 85 183

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Aptamimamsa apprehension 67, 68, 134, 136, 137 pramana - source or method of valid knowledge 13, 25, 42-44, 65, 67-69, 71, 86, 122, 129, 133, 136, 137, 156-159 pramanabhasa - invalid knowledge 129, 131, 133 pramana-phala - fruit of valid source of knowledge 67, 68 pramata - subject of knowledge 68, 133, 136, 137 prameya - object of knowledge 10, 12, 68, 122, 133 pramiti - correct notion 67, 68 pratibhasa - appearance 47, 115 pratisedhya - negative 39 pratiharya - splendours 5, 6 pratijna - proposition, thesis 52, 53, 126 pratijnadosa - fallacy of the thesis 130 pratyabhijnana - recognition 75, 76, 96, 97 pratyaksa - direct (perception or knowledge) 12, 14, 15, 76, 125, 156, 158 Pravacanasara 10, 11, 48, 72, 157 prayojana - utility 115 pretyabhava - birth following death, transmigration 56, 74, 75 pudgala - matter 22 punya - merit 51, 74, 143-145, 148, 176 purity 72, 153-155 184 Purusa - Spirit 70-73 Purusarthasiddhyupaya 169 quality 32, 45, 59, 97, 99, 103, 110, 112, 116 quodammodo (L.) - 'in a way', syat 18, 28, 70, 76, 91, 100 rasa taste 70 raga - attachment 5 Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara 14 raudra - cruel (concentration) 148 Reals (tattvas) 70 rebirth 16, 155 remembrance 96, 97 retention 11, 157 roga - sickness 4 rupa - form, colour 70, 93, 105 sabda - word 70, 135, 137 sadhana - see hetu sadharmya - presence-in homologue, homogeneousness 36-38, 56, 164 sadhya - the major term 13, 36, 37, 39, 52, 53, 61, 62, 126, 130, 164 sakaladesa - comprehensive and absolute 44 saktibhava - the capacity (paryaya) 115 saktimana - the abode of capacity (dravya) 115 samanya - general, generality 42, 58, 67, 98, 103, 104, 109, 110, 119, 120, 173 samavaya - inherence 103-105,

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General Index 108-110 Samayasara 71, 78 samsara - cycle of rebirths 94, 155 samudaya - aggregate of qualities in a single object 56 santana - series of successive events 56, 80-82, 93 sapaksa - homogeneous example 62, 63 sapaksa-sattva - existence of connection in a homogeneous example 62, 63 saptabhangi - the seven-nuance system 27, 28, 32, 34, 40, 45, 162, 168 saptabhanga - the seven limbs 28, 161 sarvajna - Omniscient 3, 10, 12 Sarvarthasiddhi 97, 144, 145, 157 sarvatmaka - pervading in everything, all-pervading 21, 24 sat - existing, being 27, 32-34, 42, 57, 73, 79, 84, 86, 98, 99, 102, 168 sat-cid-ananda - Existence Thought-Bliss' 47 satta - existence 104 samjna - perception or cognition, designation 93, 115, 117, 134, 135 samjni - named, word-denoted entity 54, 84 Samkhya 69-71, 73, 113, 149 samkhya - enumeration 99, 115 samklesa -inauspicious kind of disposition 148 sampradana - bestowal 48-50 sarskara - mental formations, volitions 93 samurti - fictional, mere usage 81, 87,93 samurti-satya - the phenomenal reality 94 scripture 3, 4, 6, 13, 14, 32, 51, 125, 129, 160, 169, 175 sense-organs 69 Shah, Nagin J. 86 Shastri, Devendra Muni 162 skandha - lump or aggregate, molecule 93, 111, 112 sky-flower 43, 54, 64, 77, 83, 99, 100, 110, 172 smarana - memory 75 smrti - memory 75, 90, 96, 97 soka - grief 4 sparsa - touch 70 speculation 11, 157 srota - the hearer 137 srutakevalins - Masters of Scripture 160 stutya - worthy of adoration 3 subha - virtuous 16, 51 suddhi - spiritual purity 153, 154 suddhopayoga - established in pure self 50 sukla - pure (concentration) 148 sunya - null and void 33, 94 sunyavada - nihilism 88 svabhava - own-being, own-nature 32, 85, 94, 98, 148, 154, 155 185

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Aptamimamsa teja - fire 70 Thomas, F.W. 18, 70, 76, 91, 100 transcendental (point of view) 48 50, 178, 179 transmigration 97 tyaga - rejection 159 svabhava-sunya - devoid of self existence 94 svacatustaya - own-quaternion 32, 85 svadravya - own-substance 32, 85 svakala - own-time 32, 85 svaksetra - own-place 32, 85 svalaksana - self-attribute 115 svayambhu - self-dependent 50 Svayambhustotra 15-17, 78, 84, 85, | 120, 168, 170, 171, 181 sveda - perspiration 5 syad-asti - in a way it simply is 30 syad-avaktavya - in a way it is simply indescribable 30 syad-nasti - in a way it simply is not 30 syaduada - doctrine of conditional predications 17, 18, 26, 28, 60, 70, 76, 91, 95, 100, 114, 121, 127, 132, 141, 147, 151, 156, 161-164, 174, 175 Syadvada-Manjari 17, 18, 70, 76, 91, 100 syat - 'in a way' 28, 160, 161, 169, 173 ubhaya - of both (attributes) 27, 34, 37, 123 ubhaya-avaktavya - somehow both dependent and independent and indescribable 123 ubhayaikanta - endorsing both one-sided and independent standpoints 26, 95, 114, 121, 127, 132, 141, 147, 151 udaharana - illustration 53, 125, 126 universal 30, 63, 99, universality 41, 104, 109, 173 upacara asadbhuta naya 49 upadana karta (karana) - material or internal cause 49, 58, 77, 78, 80, 120, 171 Upadhye, A.N. 11, 72, 157 upanaya - application of the rule; subdivision of naya 53, 165 upayoga - consciousness 32, 33 upeksa - equanimity 158, 159 utpada - origination 79, 98, 99 tadbhava - intrinsic nature 97 tusa - thirst 4 tapas - asceticism, austerities 9, 155 tarka - logical argument 154-155 tat - 'that is' 170 Tattvarthasutra 97, 116, 144, 157, 158 vada - a theory of logic and metaphysics 161 vaidharmya - absence-in heterologue, heterogeneousness 186

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General Index 36-38, 164 Vaisesikas 109, 110 vakta - the speaker 137 vakya - the sentence 25, 136, 137 valid knowledge 14, 15, 25, 42, 65, 67, 120, 129, 131, 133, 136, 137, 158 vasana - suffusions 91 vastu-prapanca - non-reality of the world of things 47 vrtti - occurrence 105, 107 vayu - air 70, 111 Uedana - sensation, feeling 93 vicitra - variegated 153 vidheya - affirmative 39 vidhi - affirmation 42, 84, 167, 168 vidya - knowledge 51 vijnana - consciousness or discernment 93 vijnanadvaita - cognition arrived at through the subjective act of mind is the only source of valid knowledge 129-130 vikaladesa - partial and relative 44 vipaksa - heterogeneous example 62, 63 vipaksa-vyavstti - non-existence by contrariety in a heterogeneous example 62, 63 visesa - particular, specific 42, 58, 98. 103, 104, 119, 120, 173 visesana - qualifying attribute 36 39, 45, 83 visesya - entity qualified 39, 83 vismaya - astonishment 4 visuddhi - auspicious kind of disposition 148 vitaraga - free from all attachment 144 vyakta - manifest 69, 70 vyapti - logical or inseparable connection 36, 53, 164 vyatireka - distinction, exclusion 36, 37, 116 vyavahara satkaraka - empirical sixfold factors-of-action 48-49 vyaya - disappearance 79, 98, 99 yutasiddha - residing in separate substrata 107 zara - old-age 4 ........................ 187

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kArikA kA prathama caraNa ajJAnAcceddhruvo bandho ajJAnAnmohino bandho advaitaM na vinA dvaitAd advaitaikAntapakSe'pi adhyAtmaM bahirapyeSa ananyataikAnte'NUnAM apekSe pRthaktvaik antaraGgArthataikAnte anyeSvananyazabdo'yaM abuddhipUrvApekSAyA abhAvaikAntapakSe'pi avaktavyacatuSkoTi avastvanabhilApyaM syAt azakyatvAdavAcyaM kim astitvaM pratiSedhyenA ahetukatvAnnAzasya AzrayA''zrayibhAvAnna itIyamAptamImAMsA upekSAphalamAdyasya ekatve'nyatarAbhAvaH ekasyAnekavRttirna ekAnekavikalpAdA evaM vidhiniSedhAbhyAm INDEX OF VERSES kArikA anukramaNikA --- --- Verse No. 96 98 222223 27 24 2 67 33 79 44 91 12 46 48 50 17 52 64 114 102 69 62 23 21 Page 149 152 54 47 4 111 61 129 81 142 25 83 86 8888888 36 90 108 175 158 113 105 45 42 189

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Aptamimamsa kArikA kA prathama caraNa --- Verse No. Page --- 14 27 51 153 103 112 101 82 134 kathaJcit te sadeveSTaM karmadvaitaM phaladvaitaM kAmAdiprabhavazcitraH kAryakAraNanAnAtvaM kAryabhrAnteraNubhrAntiH kAryadravyamanAdi syAt kAryotpAdaH kSayo hetokuzalAkuzalaM karma kramArpitadvayAd dvaitaM kSaNikaikAntapakSe'pi ghaTamaulisuvarNArthI catuSkoTervikalpasya jIvazabdaH sabAhyArthaH tattvajJAnaM pramANaM te tadatadvastu vAgeSA tIrthakRtsamayAnAM ca tvanmatAmRtabAhyAnAM devAgamanabhoyAnadezakAlavizeSe'pi daivAdevArthasiddhizced doSAvaraNayorhAniH dravyaparyAyayoraikyaM dravyAdyantarabhAvena dharmadharmyavinAbhAvaH dharme dharme'nya evArthoM nayopanayaikAntAnAM 156 170 107 139 8 115 84 122 43 165 190

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Index of Verses kArikA kA prathama caraNa --- Verse No. Page 57 98 43 37 56 96 109 167 60 102 143 144 74 55 89 140 69 na sAmAnyAtmanodeti na hetuphalabhAvAdinAstitvaM pratiSedhyenAnityatvaikAntapakSe'pi nityaM tatpratyabhijJAnAt niyamyate'rtho vAkyena payovrato na dadhyatti pApaM dhruvaM pare duHkhAt puNyaM dhruvaM svato duHkhAt puNyapApakriyA na syAt pRthaktvaikAntapakSe'pi pauruSAdeva siddhizcet pramANakArakairvyaktaM pramANagocarau santau bahiraGgArthataikAnte buddhizabdapramANatvaM buddhizabdArthasaMjJAstAbhAvaprameyA'pekSAyAM bhAvaikAnte padArthAnAm mithyAsamUho mithyA cet yadi satsarvathA kArya yadyasatsarvathA kArya yadyApekSikasiddhiH syAt vaktaryanApte yaddhetoH vaktRzrotRpramAtRNAM vAkyeSvanekAntadyotI 36 65 131 87 137 85 135 83 133 19 108 166 39 73 77 119 128 136 160 103 191

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Aptamimamsa kArikA kA prathama caraNa --- Verse No. Page --- 111 172 - 19 39 vAksvabhAvo'nyavAgarthavidheyapratiSedhyAtmA vidheyamIpsitArthAGga virUpakAryArambhAya virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM 113 174 92 95 114 121 127 132 141 94 147 151 64 148 95 100 154 20 40 115 vivakSA cAvivakSA ca vizuddhisaMklezAGgaM cet zuddhyazuddhI punaH zaktI zeSabhaGgAzca netavyA saMjJAsaMkhyAvizeSAcca sa tvamevAsi nirdoSo satsAmAnyAttu sarvaikyaM sadAtmanA ca bhinnaM cet sadeva sarvaM ko necchet sadharmaNaiva sAdhyasya saMtAnaH samudAyazca sarvathA'nabhisambandhaH 15 32 106 164 29 56 66 110 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

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Index of Verses kArikA kA prathama caraNa --- Verse No. Page 24 49 87 80 130 112 173 65 109 58 sarvAtmakaM tadekaM syAt sarvAntAzcedavaktavyAsAdhyasAdhanavijJapteH sAmAnyavAgvizeSe cet sAmAnyaM samavAyazca sAmAnyArthA giro'nyeSAM siddhaM ceddhetutaH sarvaM sUkSmAntaritadUrArthAH skandhasaMtatayazcaiva syAdvAdakevalajJAne syAdvAdaH sarvathaikAntahinastyanabhisaMdhAtR hetoradvaitasiddhizced 125 10 93 54 --- 105 163 104 161 51 40 193

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Other sacred Jaina texts from Vikalp Printers: Acharya Umasvami's Tattvarthsutra WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION Acharya Umasvami's Tattvarthsutra WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION AcAryazrI umAsvAmI viracita tattvArthasUtra AcAryazrI umAsvAmI viracita tattvArthasatra Foreword by: Acharya 108 Vidyanand Muni Edited by: Vijay K. Jain parasparopagraho jIvAnAm Foreword by: Acharya 108 Vidyanandji Muniraj Edited by: Vijay K. Jain Published: 2011 Hard Bound Printed on Art Paper Pages: xii + 163 Size: 16 X 22.5 cm ISBN 81-903639-2-1 * Rs. 250/ Tattvarthsutra is invaluable for understanding life, and pursuit of happiness. The hardships and afflictions that we have to endure are of our own making. Our deeds, driven by passions, lead to sufferings and reproach in this world and the next. Virtuous activity alone, which is the cause of merit (punya), leads to joyous feeling, auspicious life, charming and lustrous physique, and high status. Our ultimate goal is the attainment of the divine attributes, in fullness and perfection, of our souls. We can reach the goal only through the threefold path of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (ratnatraya). 194

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Acharya Kundkund's Samayasara WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION zrImadAcArya kundakunda viracita samayasAra Acharya Kundkund's Samavasara WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION The most profound and neved exposition in the Jain religious tradition. zrImadAcArya kundakunda viracita samayasAra Foreword by: Acharya 108 Vidyanand Muni English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain Foreword by: Acharya 108 Vidyanand Muni English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain Published: 2012 Hard Bound Printed on Art Paper Pages: xui + 208 Size: 16 x 22.5 cm * ISBN 81-903639-3-X Rs. 350/ As Acharya Vidyanand writes in the Foreword of Samayasara, it is the ultimate conscious reality. The enlightened soul has infinite glory. It has the innate ability to demolish karmas, both auspicious as well as inauspicious, which constitute the cycle of births and deaths, and are obstacles in the path to liberation. Samayasara is an essential reading for anyone who wishes to lead a purposeful and contented life. It provides irrefutable and lasting solutions to all our problems, concerning worldly ways as well as spiritual curiosities and misgivings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

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Shri Amritchandra Suri's Purusarthasiddhyupaya Realization of the Pure Self WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION zrI amRtacandrasUrI viracita puruSArthasiddhayupAya Shri Amritchandra Suri's Purusarthasiddhyupaya (Purushartha Siddhyupaya) Realization of the Pure Self WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION zrI amRtacandrasUri-viracita Foreword by: Acharya 108 Vidyanand Muni puruSArthasiddhayupAya English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain Foreword by: Acharya 108 Vidyanand Muni English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain * Published: 2012 * Hard Bound * Printed on NS Maplitho Paper Pages: xvi + 191 * Size: 16 x 22.5 cm ISBN 81-903639-4-8 Rs. 350/ Shri Amritchandra Suri's Purusarthasiddhyupaya is a matchless Jaina text that deals with the conduct required of the householder (sravaka). In no other text that deals with the conduct required of the householder we see the same treatment of complex issues such as the transcendental and the empirical points of view, cause and effect relationships, and injury and non-in maintaining throughout the spiritual slant. The basic tenet of Jainism - noninjury or Ahimsa - has been explained in detail in the book. 196

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Acarya Nemichandra's Dravyasamgraha With Authentic Explanatory Notes AcArya nemicandra viracita dravyasaMgraha Acarya Nemichandra's Dravyasamgraha With Authentic Explanatory Notes AcArya nemicandra viracita dravyasaMgraha Foreword by: Acarya 108 Vidyanand Muni English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain Foreword by: Acarya 108 Vidyanand Muni English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain * Published: 2013 * Hard Bound * Printed on NS Maplitho Paper * Pages: xvi + 216 * Size: 16 x 22.5 cm ISBN 81-903639-5-6 Rs. 450/ Dravyasamgraha is one of the finest classical Jaina texts, composed by His Holiness Acarya Nemichandra (c. 10th century CE). It deals primarily with the Realities (tattvas) that contribute to world process. The conduct required for attaining the ultimate goal of liberation follows from the knowledge of these Realities. Both, the transcendental and the empirical points of view, have been considered while explaining the nature of substances, souls and non-souls. It will be of much use to scholars worldwide interested in pursuing the study of Jaina epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

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Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - The Golden Discourse AcArya pUjyapAda viracita iSTopadeza Acarya Pujyapada's Istopadesa - THE GOLDEN DISCOURSE AcArya pUjyapAda viracita iSTopadeza Foreword by: Acarya 108 Vidyanand Muni By: Vijay K. Jain Foreword by: Acarya 108 Vidyanand Muni Published: 2014 Hard Bound Printed on NS Maplitho Paper Pages: xvi + 152 Size: 16 x 22.5 cm VIJAY K. JAIN * ISBN 81-903639-6-4 Rs. 450/ His Holiness Acarya Pujyapada, who graced this earth around 5th century CE, had crafted some valuable gems of Jaina doctrine, including Sarvathasiddhi and Istopadesa. Concise but deep in import, Istopadesa unambiguously establishes the glory of the Self. It is an essential reading for the ascetic. The householder too who ventures to study it stands to benefit much as the work establishes the futility of worldly objects and pursuits, and strengthens right faith, the basis for all that is good and virtuous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

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Divine Blessings: Acarya 108 Vidyanand Muni * * Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra - Adoration of The Twenty-four Tirthankara Published: 2015 Hard Bound Printed on NS Maplitho Paper Pages: xxiv + 220 * Size: 16 x 22.5 cm * AcArya samantabhadra viracita svayambhUstotra * By: Vijay K. Jain Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra - Adoration of The Twenty-four Tirthankara AcArya samantabhadra viracita svayambhU stotra Divine Blessings: Acarya 108 Vidyanand Muni VIJAY K. JAIN ISBN 81-903639-7-2 Rs. 500/ Acarya Samantabhadra's Svayambhustotra (2nd century CE) is a fine composition in Sanskrit dedicated to the adoration of the Twenty-four Tirthankara, the Most Worshipful Supreme Beings. Through its 143 verses Svayambhustotra not only enriches reader's devotion, knowledge, and conduct but also frees his mind from blind faith and superstitions. Rid of ignorance and established firmly in right faith, he experiences ineffable tranquility and equanimity. The book has two useful Appendices. Appendix-1 attempts to familiarize the reader with the divisions of empirical time that are used extensively in Jaina cosmology. Appendix-2 provides a glimpse of life stories, adapted from authentic Jaina texts, of the Twenty-four Tirthankara. 199

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Aptamimamsa GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION Deoanagari IAST | Devanagari IAST. Deuanagari IAST - yeo gha pa yeo na pha ese $ yo ca ba i cha bha nyeo ma eo jha ya oe na Ta yeo 4 tha ua a da sa dha sa | na sa 4 ha yiyi wi yong wa 3 hae wa yo & tha ksa A da tra wa dha jna | i na na sra IAST: International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration 200

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AcArya samantabhadra praNIta AptamImAMsA kA aMgrejI bhASA meM anuvAda evaM vivecana karake dharmAnurAgI zrI vijaya kumAra jI ne bahuta hI mahattvapUrNa kArya kiyA hai| isase sampUrNa vizva ko AcArya samantabhadra ke anupama vacanoM ko samajhane kA saubhAgya prApta hogaa| navambara 2015, naI dillI AcArya 108 zrI vidyAnanda muni __ zrI vijaya kumAra jaina AdhyAtmika tathA anya zAstroM meM nihita pUrvAcAryoM dvArA hameM pradatta zrutajJAna ko apanA tana-mana-dhana samarpita karate hue sevA-bhAva se prasArita karane meM niraMtara saMlagna haiN| yaha unake bhavya jIva hone kA tathA pUrva janma ke puNya-pratApa kA hI phala hai| __ unako merA AzIrvAda hai ki ve aise hI niraMtara jinavANI mAtA kI sevA meM apanA yogadAna karate rheN| maiM Antarika bhAvanA se unako va unake samasta parivAra ko zubhAzIrvAda detA huuN| aise bhavya jIvoM ke dvArA hI jinazAsana isa kalikAla meM bhI surakSita aura jayavanta hai| disambara 2015, hastinApura AcArya 108 zrI niHzaMkabhUSaNa muni ISBN 81-903639-8-0 Rs.: 500/ vikalpa Vikalp Printers