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Vol. XVIII, '92-'93 meanings.
If Bhartrhari wants to remain faithful to the MBh, he has to explain how word meaning, either as a universal or as an individual substance is permanent. Accordingly,he spoke of “two permanent word-meanings of all words, the universal or the substance" in the introductory kārikās of the third Kānda. But if he wants to remain faithful to his preference for the sentence evinced in the second Kānda, he cannot accept a permanent, independent status of separate word meanings. Or at least, taking into account his encyclopedic approach, we would expect him to pay sufficient attention to views in which a permanent, independent status of separate word meanings is not accepted, even if he discusses at times views (such as the Mīmāmsā-view) which do accept such status for them. 6. The Jäti-samuddesa
What do we find in the Jāti-samuddesas ? A few crucial passages may be highlighted here. After the introductory kārikās, the topic discussed first is the problem of substitutes in a prescribed (ritual) act.14 On the view that the sentence is indivisible, there were some difficulties, which were explained in the second Kānda (2.64-71). The difficulties were solved in a general way by pointing out that if the sentence is accepted as indivisible, one may still resort to the postulation of words as its part (2.88ff). On the view that individual words have their own meaning and that it is the universal, the problem is still there: taking an object different from the one prescribed would mean a deviation from the prescript. The solution presented in the Jāti-samuddesa (3.1.3-5) is that the universal implies, either on its own accord or on account of the context, not just an object in which it inheres, but an object which also has a certain capacity and which may be replaced by another object having a different universal but the same capacity.15 In this solution the universal which is the word meaning remains the same universal, but some flexibility has been introduced in its relation with the individual instance.
Next, kārikā six gives a model of the relation between word and thing-meant on the view that the word meaning is the universal.16 3.1.6 First the own universal is expressed by all words; next that own universal) is superimposed'?
on the meaning universals.18 The following kārikās (7-10) show that this way it can be maintained that the universal is the word meaning even in a case like the word 'universal' itself. This would be a problematic case for someone strictly adhering to the Vaišesika system, according to which a universal of a universal is impossible. If the universal of the word, i.e. the signifier, is merely superimposed, this principle need not be abandoned.
In 11 a different viewpoint is adopted, and the Vaisesika principle is no longer adhered to. Whereas according to 6 the word expresses only its own universal directly (abhidhīyate) and the connection with the meaning universal is through superimposition, the word itself expresses (abhidhāna) this meaning universal directly according to 1119:
