Sambodhi 1993 Vol 18

Author(s): J B Shah, N M Kansara
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 18

11
Vol. XVIII, '92-'93
From 92 onwards, Bhartṛhari returns to the question: what is a universal? According to some a universal is similarity, according to other it is a capacity (3.1.92). Some thinkers (identified as Vaiseṣikas by Helārāja) emphasize that a universal is to be postulated as a separate entity (3.1.93-94). According to some, if one cognition arises with regard to several individuals, one cognizes the essence of the individuals, as it were (3.1.96). The main problem according to Helārāja is whether or not the universal is separate entity (VP IIIa:93.22; 94.1; 96.2; 99.1). The Buddhist view explained in 101 has been mentioned above.
The Jati-samuddeśas concludes with a passage in which the domain of the universal is restricted. First, in 104, a view is mentioned according to which there are universals in cognitions as in external objects, and the kārikā attributes this view to the Samsargaview; Helārāja does not give more details about this Samsarga-view, but elsewhere, the Samsargavādins have been indentified as Vaiseṣikas (Helārāja on 3.7.9, VP IIIa:239.34; cf. discussion below). In the Vaiseṣika-system, a cognition31 is considered a quality (guna) of the self (atman) and universals reside in substance, qualities and actions. The view in 104 is, therefore, in accordance with the Vaiseṣika system. The next kārikā (105) mentiones a view which does not accept universals in cognitions; and the following kārikās (106-110) explain how it is impossible that a cognition could ever be the thing know in another cognition. A cognition cognizes itself but is not cognized in another cognition, just as a light illuminates itself but is not illuminated by another light. In the context, this is an elaboration of what was said in 105, that universals reside in 'things to be known' (jñeya) but not in a cognition or knowing (jñāna) itself.
The combination of the comparison of a cognition with light and the refusal to accept a cognition being cognized in another cognition would be in accord with Vijñānavāda tenets32 with which Bharthari must have had some acquaintance.33 Whatever Bharthari's evaluation of this view (he seems quite positive about it, 'in spite' of its closeness to Buddhist ideas), they leave much room for word meanings which are not well-defined individual basic units.
What we have seen so far may be summarized as follws: On the basis of the tendency to prefer the sentence as the primary unit one would expect some attention for views which relativize the status of the individual word meaning. In the Jati-samuddeśas, much positive attention is still paid to views according to which word meanings in the form of universals are well-established and individually permanent. But in most of these views, the individual status of universals is, on closer study, not so absolute, for instance because they are dependent on the function of language (3.1.11); or because they are simply unreal because in fact there are only differences (3.1.19, 101); or because they are only divisions of one all-embracing Existence (3.1.33-39), while the seeing of divisions may be caused in different ways. (3.1.40). In the 'Existence-approach', it can be maintained that words have a permanent meaning, inasmuch as all words express Existence; and yet the status of individual words and their specific meanings need not be