Sambodhi 1993 Vol 18

Author(s): J B Shah, N M Kansara
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 28

Vol. XVIII, '92-93
21 the question whether the word as expressive of the universal is well-established or not according to the Jāti-samuddesa. Inasmuch as the words express the ultimate universal, i.e. Existence, their meaning is absolute and they are as such well-established. But inasmuch as individual word meanings are only divisions of this Existence, their specific meaning is not absolute in itself. The same is true for verbs expressing action. Inasmuch as they all ultimately express the one verb-meaning 'Existence', they are wellestablished. But inasmuch as individual verbs express this Existence only in a certain way, their meaning is not so absolute and they are not so well-established. It would thus be only the verbs as and bhu 'to be', which would express this Existence in its full form.
In any case, the Kriya-samuddesa starts with views corresponding to the 'individual instance' view and in that sense the introductory kārikā 3.6.1 applied also to this Samuddesa. 10.4. The Kāla-samuddesa
Next, in the Kāla-samuddesa, it is again the individual instance' view which first receives all attention. Kārikā 1 defines kāla, in accordance with the Vaišeşika-thinkers, as 'one permanent all-pervading substance'. This and numerous other views on time are subsequently explained (cf. the survey given by Peri in the introduction to his translation: Peri, 1972:13-17). Having discussed a great number of these views, Bhartrhari observes6S: 58. Whcther (time) is a capacity present in the understanding, or rather really existing
outside, verbal usage is not possible without having recourse to an entity 'time'. Here, the view that time is something mental is opposed to the view that it is something external. Whatever be the case, in verbal usage one has to make use of the notion of time.
Elsewhere in the Kāla-samuddesa, the notion of sakti 'capacity' plays again an important role; aspects of time are referred to as 'capacities' (3.9.24 with kālasakti as Tatpurusa 3.9.49, 50, 51). There is also a general reference to time as a capacity : saktyātmadevatāpaksair bhinnam kālasya darśanam, "The understanding of time is different with the views (that it is) a capacity, the self, a deity (respectively)." Thus, a very important view in the Kāla-samuddesa, which considers time a capacity, 67 and therefore something not absolutely well-defined in itself, is again in accordance with VP 3.6.1. 11. The Puruşa, Samkhya-, Upagraha- and Linga-samuddesa
It has been pointed out above that while the first four chapters of the group of eight are introduced by Helārāja with reference to the first kārikā of the Dik-samuddesa, the next four chapters, Purusa, Samkhyā-, Upagraha- and Linga-samuddesa, are presented by him as a kind of addenda.? The first three of these chapters refer to notions which become manifest together whthe verb-meanig (bhava, 'Being') expressed by the verb. These are, (apart from kāla 'time', to which one of the previous chapters was devoted) purusa 'person', samkhyā 'number', and upagraha ‘aspect. While some of the notions discussed so far are not only expressed by verbs but also by nouns (Helārāja mentions