________________
Vol. XVIII, '92-'93
29 29 Sattāyāḥ objective genitive connected with bheda in the cpd. Cf. Speyer, 1886:85, {115 and
177f,{231. 30 Helārāja, adopting what he considers the ultimate view, explains all views as if the division
were not real. 31 According to PDHS 211: buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna and pratyaya are synonyms. NS 1.1.15
mention buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna as synonyms. 32 Cf. VV p. 117 n 1 "Sankara criticizes there the Buddhist idealist (Vijñānavādin), who hols
that cognition is self-luminous, a lamp..." and Vimsatikā ViS 10 + (6:21-22): itarathā hi vijñapter api vijñaptyantaram artham syād iti vijñaptimātratvam na sidhyetārthavatitvād vijñaptinām. A cognition of a cognition' is impossible also according to other thinkers. For instance, in the Vrttikāra-portion in 'Sabara's Bhāsya, a cognition of direct perception is said to have a thing as it object, but not another cognition (arthavisayā hi pratyaksabuddhir na buddhyantaravisayā, ed. Frauwallner, 1968:28.19). The 'functional approach to cognitions may be recognized in kārikās 23-24 of the Sambandhāsamuddesa. Cf. discussion uner these
kārikās, in Houben, 1992. 33 According to Helārāja, the view in 105 belongs also to the Samsarga-view. We do not know
whether or not the Samsarga-view is for Helārāja entirely synonymous with Vaišesika-view, but it may be pointed out that the view explained in the kārikās starting with 105 can hardly have been accepted by the Vaiseșikas as we know them. In their system, all categories and categorizable objects are by definition knowable (this was clearly pronounced for the first time (as far as we know) by Prasastapāda in the well-known dictum sannām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvājñeyatvāni, there is no reason to think that it would not suit pre-Prasastapāda Vaišeşika) and a cognition is known as a quality of the self. Also in the closely related Nyāya-system (as in the Buddhist school of Sarvāstivāda), a cognition can be cognized in another cognition, it can be both cognizer and cognized. Bronkhorst has pointed out that Nyāya shared with Sarvāstivāda the views that mental states can be observed (1985a:108; 127n 3a), that the three times (past, present, future) exist, and that more than one mental state cannot occur at the time in one person (1985a:127). As cognitions cannot be simultaneous (NS 1.1.16), the cognizing cognition and the cognized cognition should belong
to different times. 34 The Dravyāsamuddesa contains some of the main passages adduced as support for the thesis
that Bhart hari's persuasion would be exclusively Advaita Vedāntic (Sharma, 1975). Yet, it should be admitted that some passages in the Dravyāsamuddesa are easily reinterpreted in a
(Buddhist) vijñānavāda sense. 35 3.2.5 äkārais ca vyavacchedät särvärthyam avarudhyate
yathaiva cakşurādinām sāmarthyam nālikādibhih // 36 3.2.2 satyam vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate/
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyam evābhidhīyate // 37 In the MBHD it is explained that 'universals etc. are the qualifiers of the substance and the
limiting features of the word: MBHD, 1:15.25-26: jätyādayas tu bhedakā dravyasya sattvam vaktum upādhibhūtās te śabdasyeti. Since we have seen that in the previous chapter the status of specific universals was not absolute on several views, they also leave the status of the
