Sambodhi 1993 Vol 18

Author(s): J B Shah, N M Kansara
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 69

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SAMBODHI In other words, according to this doctrine, existence is not different from the causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). The implication is, that there is no separate thing which undergoes change or, of which, change is characterised or predicated.
Before bringing forth the truth of this thesis, the falsity of the view, that change is attributed to, or affirmed of the thing — or it is the permanent substance that undergoes change - has been demonstrated.
Before we proceed further, it is necessary to clarify that according to the Sautrāntika school, if an entity is not momentary, it is bound to be eternal, because it is in the nature of a thing either to be subject to destruction or not. If it is not in its nature to be destroyed, it can never be destroyed by any number of attempts of the accessories. But if it is in the very nature of the thing to be destroyed, no amount of the attempts of the accessories, can stop it from destruction. The implication is, that the germs of destruction are inherent in all the existing entities. A causally efficient seed, therefore, does not need any accessories for its being replaced by the sprout-series. Similarly, it does not require any external agent other than itself for the destruction.
By implication, therefore, the germs of destruction being inherent in each and every entity, an entity cannot last for more than — or beyond — an instant. If an entity does not annihilate itself, nothing else can ever destroy it, and if it does not end itself in the instant following its appearance, there is no reason why it should disappear at all at any time. This implies, that if an entity is not momentary it has to be enternal. Sautrāntika, therefore, by demonstrating the impossibility of a permanent or eternal entity being causally efficient, makes the way for the acceptance of the remaining alternative as valid.
Now the thesis under examination is, that no continuant or sthāyibhāva is capable of producing the effects. Take for instance a continuant (sthāyibhāva).
If it is to produce the effect, it must produce it either simultaneously (yugapat) or successively (kramena), there being no third alternative besides these two.
If it produces its effects successively, it must either possess the capacity (sāmarthya) to produce the effects, or it must be devoid of that capacity.
If it possesses the capacity, why should it not produce the effects all at once as the capacity (samarthya) being present, there is not bar to its producing its effects all at once.
If it does not possess the capacity (samarthya), then it will not produce any effect at any time whatever, which would amount to saying, that the continuant does ot exist.
It can not be said, that it produces its effects with the help of the axiliary conditions (sahakāri). A thing that possesses the capacity of casual efficiency, does not require the help of the auxiliary conditions.
If the thing does not possess the capacity, the auxiliary conditions cannot help in producing any effect. The auxiliary help is, therefore, useless.
Now regarding the proximity of the auxiliary conditons, the causal efficiency of the