Sambodhi 1993 Vol 18

Author(s): J B Shah, N M Kansara
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 21

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SAMBODHI (3.3.1-19), there is no indication that a word expressing relation' would first of all express the universal residing in relation. A peculiar theory is explained in some detail (3.3.13-16), according to which (almost) all words have in one way or the other a relation with the thing-meant, a relation analysable in terms of the two types of relation accepted in the Vaišesika system: samyoga 'connection and samavāya `inherence'. There is no place in this theory for a universal which would necessarily intervene between the expressive word and the thing-meant. Does this mean that the Sambandha-samuddesa is, in a sense, a contnuation of the Dravya-samuddesa ?
In the Dravya-samuddesa, 'other views' than the Advaita-like view which forms the main subject were conspicuous by their absence. The view in the Sambandha-samuddesa using Vaišesika-notions would make up, to some extent, for this 'incompleteness of the Dravya-samuddesa. And there are other passages which seem to be closer to the Dravyasamuddesa than to the Jātisamuddeša.
In Sambandha-samuddesa 39-52 a theory is explained which accounts for the relation between the exterior object and the word by assuming that in language the exterior object has only 'Secondary' or 'Metaphorical existence (anyā sattaupacāriki, 39). The problem of the relation between an exterior object and the expressive word is urgent only on the view that the word meaning is the individual substance. If word meaning is a universal, the problem poses itself quite differently: on that view, one has to account for the relation between word and universal and for the relation between universal and individual object. And this was done in various ways (from different points of view) in the Jāti-samuddeša. It is true that the theory of 'Secondary Existence' may be translated in terms of the view that the word meaning is the universal. For instance, it could be said that the secondary existence of an object is in fact its universal, viewed either as a mental concept or as an independent entity. But the fact remains that from the point of view of the Jāti-samuddesa the whole theory of 'Secondary Existence' is superfluous, because the problem was solved in the Jāti-samuddesa in its own terms.
Again, in the Sambandha-samuddesa passage starting with 3.3.52 the problem is the relation between the particular exterior object and the word, whereas the problem in terms of the Jāti-samuddesa would be: what is the relation between the particular exterior object and the universal ? and next, what is the relation between word and universal, and does the universal have independent external existence or is it rather something figuring in the mind ? In 3.3.73, even the universal (sāmānya) is expressed by words as a particular. The kārikā is a mirror-image of kārikā 12 in the Jāti-samuddeša, according to which all words refer to a universal, even in the case of a particular. This kārikā shows most clearly the intimate connection between the Sambandha-samuddeša and the dravyaview, and its contrast with the Jāti-samuddesa.
Towards the end of the Sambandha-samuddeša, we cannot discover strong reasons to assume that the ideas are more closely related to either the Dravya-samuddesa or the Jāti-samuddesa. The last two kārikās, for instance, seem to be equally applicable to both.