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Vol. XVIII, '92-'93
13 In the dravya-samuddesa, however, it is recognized that the fact that all words express the ultimate Substance, would imply that all words have all meanings (sārvārthyam). In fact, however, it is not the case that all words have all meanings, on account of a delimitation through particular forms'34 3.2.5 On account of a delimitation through (particular) forms the connection with all
meanings is restricted; just as the capacity of eyes etc. is restricted by tubes etc. In other words, just as the visual field is restricted if one looks through a tube, like that the unbounded semantic field of a word (ultimately denoting the ultimate substance) is restricted through particular 'forms'. Whatever is meant by these 'forms', it is they that determine that a word meaning has a specific character, different from others. On the other hand, it is the fact that the meaning of a word is ultimately the ultimate Substance, which makes the meaning of the word permanent. In the Dravya-samuddesa much attention is paid to the latter aspect. It is not explained what these 'forms' are and how exactly they restrict the meaning. They are said to be untrue in 3.2.2, and the forms of an object are compared with limiting features of the true (reality)36: 3.2.2 The truc thing-in-itself is ascertained through its untrue forms. Through the untrue
limiting features, only the true (reality) is expressed by words. In 3.2.6 it is emphasized that, ultimately, these forms too are identical with reality (or Substance). A subtle difference with the 'Existence'-passage in the Jāti-samuddesa is that in the Jāti-samuddeša the division of Existence clearly precedes its being expressed in language. But here, in the Dravya-samuddesa, while the limiting features are in fact not different from the Substance (3.2.6), they enter the scene only when the Substance is being expressed. Since the Dravya-samuddesa otherwise does not say anything about these limiting features or forms, Bhartrhari, while demonstrating how all words ultimately express a permanent meaning on the view that the word meaning is the substance, has not committed himself to an absolutely fixed character of individual word meanings.37 8. The Sambandha-samuddesa as a continuation of the Dravya-samuddesa
We now come to the Sambandha-samuddesa, the chapter on 'relation'. Helārāja introduces the first kārikā of the Sambandha-samuddesa as follows: "With the (preceding) two expositions, (Bhartrhari) has established the Universal and the Substance as the meaning of a word, distinguishing different points of view; now, a relation must be the cause of (the fact) that a meaning is expressed by a word, otherwise anything would be conveyed by anything; therefore, he says in order to explain the relation (the following)” (VP IIIa:122.1-2). From this, one could infer that the notion of relation as it is discussed in the Sambandha-samuddeša is equally relevant to the Jāti- and Dravyasamuddesa. However, in the exposition of the Sambandha-samuddesa indications are found which point in a different direction.
One of the first problems discussed in the Sambandha-samuddesa is: how can ‘relation' be expressed in words ? In the theories advanced to account for the problem
