Sambodhi 1993 Vol 18

Author(s): J B Shah, N M Kansara
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 17

10
SAMBODHI
lasts for one world-period and the absolute permanence not limited by world periods. It is of interest to note that the universals are here not described as entities in any way dependent upon language or human thought (as in other passages in the VP, and in the Jāti-samuddeša e.g. in kārikās 11-12,19), but they are independent realities, even though they are ultimately just divisions of one all-embracing existence. Both existence and its divisions precede its being expressed in language (cf. also 46).
One may ask: what is the status of the sambandhins, 'things related to existence)' in kārikā 33 ? In 40 four different views are enumerated28. 40. The substratum, or the own elements, or entities which are different (from it), or the own
capacities are the causes of secing division in existence.29 At least two view, the first and the third, accept some kind of division between existence and the things related.30 The view which indentifies the things related' as capacities of existence could be taken to imply that the thing related' have no independent status, in contradistinction to the view according to which they are explicitly said to be “entities which are different' (bhāvā vyatirekinah).
In the kārikās after 46, several potentially problematic cases are explained according to the view that the universal is the word meaning. The problems relate mainly to number as expressed in verbal and nominal ending (49ff), and to compounds (47-48, 87, 90-91). From 54 the context of the discussion is Vedic injunctions.
In a digression (72-80), Bhartrhari returns to the problem of substitutes in Vedic injunctions. He discusses the relation between quality, substance and (prescribed) action, both from the point of view that word meaning is the substance and that it is the universal. In 3.1.3-5 Bhartrhari has provided for the possibility of a substitute if the word meaning is a universal, making use of the notion of sakti 'capacity'. According to 76, there is a problem if the substance and the quality of a prescribed object would be equally eligible for substitution. Preferably, only the quality should be substituted and not the substance. Kārikā 77-79 explain next that there is a solution if the object refers to a universal or to a capacity. The solution is worked out from the point of view of the universal as the word meaning. But this should not be mistaken as an indication that Bhartrhari prefers the ‘universal view' to the 'substance view' as Helārāja seems to suggest in his comments on these kārikās. Since Bharthari will argue that the individual substance can be seen as a capacity (3.6.1, 3.7.1-2), the reference to 'capacity'in kārikā 77 implies that on this view too the desired solution can be reached. In kārikā 80 Bharthari mentions that some would accept a substitution of the substance as equal with a substitution of a quality. This option is apparently not preferred by Bharthari, but included for completeness' sake. The wording of this kārikā and the mentioning of the capacity in 77 do not support Helārāja's explanations according to which this nonpreferred view is exclusively connected with the substance view'. In any case, this passage (72-80) introduces some refinements after the possibility of substitutes was provided for in 3.1.3-5.