Sambodhi 1993 Vol 18

Author(s): J B Shah, N M Kansara
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 13

SAMBODHI
various senses. It may refer to the individual substance in which the universal inheres (3.1.29); it may also refer to a particular instance, without necessarily being a substance (3.1.13; 3.4.3); or it may be the ultimate substance which is not particularized but underlies everything (Dravya-samuddesa 2-18). Some steps in the discussions can only be understood if we are aware of the broad semantic field covered by this and some other words (e.g. artha, 'meaning', 'referent', 'thing-meant', 'purpose'). They do not have corresponding, equally broad terms in modern (academic) English, but Sanskrit authors used them in their broad sense even in more scholarly discussions like those reflected in the Vākyapadīya.
To make the problem of the universal and individual substance more lively to a modern reader it may be explained in simple words as follows. On the view that the universal is the meaning of a word it may be argued as follows. If the word 'cow' referred only to one specific individual cow, one would need another word to refer to another specific cow. Indeed, for each individual thing one would need a separate word, in each case one would need a new relation between word and thing-meant, and communication between people would be impossible. But if the word refers to the universal or the universal property common to all individual cows, it is possible to refer in different situations to different things as 'cow'; it iş possible to recognize new things as cows and to refer to them as cows and communication becomes possible. Therefore, it should be accepted that a word refers first of all to a universal.
On the view that the substance is the meaning of a word, however, one may argue as follows. If someone tells you, 'bring me the cow' he certainly does not want you to bring the universal inhering in all cows. If at all the universal plays any role in communication it is precisely to differentiate the specific substance. Therefore, one should accept that words refer first of all to the individual substance rather than to the universal."
So far, the problem has been described as a linguistic-empirical problem. In the MBhdiscussion of the universal-substance problem, there is an important complication, and since Bhartrhari is so intimately familiar with the MBh and refers to it continuously, we have to take this complication into account. In the MBh, it is concluded that sabda, artha and the relation between the two, should be permanent. Applied to the views that the universal and the substance respectively are the meaning of a word, this means the two views have to show how respectively the universal and the substance are permanent." In the concluding paragraph of the MBh-discussion, the author takes some distance from the problem and says that whatever is accepted as permanent should be taken to be the word meaning
The whole discussion in the MBh takes place in the context of individual words and their meanings.13 In the second Kānda of his VP, however, Bhartrhari arrived at a preference of the sentence as the basic unit. The immediate implication of this preference for the sentence is, as we have seen, the relativization of the status of words and word