________________
92
to any class of objects constituting the Reality. This Dravya is defined thus: Guna-paryayavat Daravyaḥ-that which has characteristic qualities and that which is undergoing constant modifications is what is called Dravya. The general illustration of a dravya given in textbooks is the substance, gold. This dravya-gold-has got its characteristic quality of yellowness, brilliance, malleability, etc., and it may be made into several ornaments One ornament of gold may be changed into another ornament if the owner so desires. The changing form into which this substance, gold, shall be constituted is its mode. The substance, gold, out of which these ornaments are made is the Dravya and the characteristic attributes of yellowness, etc., constitute its Guņa. Here also the conception of Dravya is peculiar to the Jaina Darśana, and to a very large extent differs from the conception of Dravya found in the other Non-Jaina Daršanas. The substance and qualities cannot be separated. Dravya and Gupa are inseparable and yet the substance is not the same as its attributes nor the attributes same as the substance, though it is a fact it is the substance that manifests this nature through its attributes. Substance without attributes and attributes dissociated from the underlying substance would all be meaningless abstractions. Guna cannot exist apart from the Dravya nor the Dravya apart from the gupas. A real Dravya is that which manifests through its Gunas and real gunas- are those that have their roots in the underlying Dravya. Gupas which are not based upon the underlying Dravya, whose manifestations they are, would be merely sensory illusions having no claim to the status of reality. Hence in the world of reality there can be no separate éxistence either of Dravya or Gupa from each other. It may be clearly seen that according to Jaina Darśana, the systems which speak of a real existence without Guņas, Nirguna or of Gunas existing separately from the substance till they are brought together by a third entity called Samavāya, are erroneous philosophical views not corroborated by facts of reality. As we shall see later on, according to this conception even Cetana or Soul or Atma cannot separate its quality of Cetana or consciousness but some other philosophical systems do maintain that the Cetana quality and Atamadravya are two different entities occasionally brought together by extraneous circumstances. These two doctrines as to the nature pertaining to reality-Sat, and Dravya lead us to the consideration of fundamental and logical doctrine which is also peculiar to Jainism.
SAMAYASARA
Asti-Nasti Vada-According to this logical doctrine every fact of reality is capable of being described in two logical propositions-one affirmative and the other negative. This paradoxical logical doctrine of Asti-Nasti Vada has perplexed many non-Jaina thinkers including even the great philosopher Sankara. Apparently this conception will be meaningless. How could the same fact be described by two contradictory logical propositions? How can we say that it is and at the same time it is not? Because Asti-Nasti literally means the thing is and is not. If we remember the two previous
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
