New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

Author(s): Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers

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New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
This conception of substance formulated by Spinoza comes very near the Jaina conception of substance as a possessor of infinite modes which, however, do not reveal the substance in its entirety, as the modes and the attributes of Spinoza do not express his highest substance called God. It should be noted in this connection that Spinoza's God is not the creator of the world, not even the fundamental cause of all things, but the logical presupposition of all that exists, that in virtue of which alone everything else can become an object of thought, and which itself does not require for its conception the antecedent conception of anything else. This is the only meaning of Spinoza's causa sui.
The Indian philosophers of monistic persuasion have also propounded the highest truth as causa sui, i.e. svayambhū and inexpressible through words or concepts, and as such unthinkable.
The Jaina logicians have not accepted a substance as inexpressible. · Their argument is that if a substance is inexpressible in language and unthinkable in mind, then its inexpressibility will not be amenable to proof through any verbal symbol or concept which are the only means through which the inexpressibility could be established. The substance, therefore, is neither absolutely inexpressible nor absolutely otherwise. The infinite number of modes cannot be expressed simultaneously by any linguistic or conceptual device. It is from this standpoint that a substance is inexpressible. But there are modes in a substance which are expressible in language, and as such the substance is expressible through those modes. This exposition of inexpressibility or otherwise of a substance has been made by Jaina logicians on the basis of syadvāda (doctrine of conditional predication).
In the proposition the jar is red', the jar is explained through a colour. But jar is not only a coloured object. It has also taste, smell, touch and many such qualities. When we characterise an object by a particular attribute, we are not able to distinguish other attributes from that thing, and at the same time we have no such linguistic or conceptual device to express all the attributes simultaneously. The particle 'syāt' was invented by the Jaina logicians to get out of this predicament. Accordingly, it should be more appropriate to say 'in some respect the jar is red' (syäd asti rakto ghatah), than to assert simply, 'the jar is red' (asti rakto ghatah). In other words, the jar is red relatively in a particular framework of reference. The use of the particle 'syāt' is indicative of the fact that you are here describing the jar with reference to a particular colour